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INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE AND METHODS OF ETHICS 1

1. The Function of Science. The world presents us with an endless array of phenomena. These phenomena the human mind observes and endeavors to understand. It notices that things and occurrences are, to a certain extent, uniform and constant, that nature is regular and orderly. The intellect of man strives to detect similarities or uniformities in things and actions, and to arrange these in groups or classes. It brings order into apparent confusion,

1 Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, pp. 1-24; The History of Ethics, chap. i; Stephen, The Science of Ethics, pp. 1-40; Schurman, The Ethical Import of Darwinism, pp. 1-37; Höffding, Ethik, pp. 1-54; Münsterberg, Der Ursprung der Sittlichkeit, pp. 1–10; Wundt, Ethics, English translation, pp. 1-20; Paulsen, A System of Ethics, edited and translated by Frank Thilly, pp. 1-29; Muirhead, Elements of Ethics, pp. 1-39; Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, pp. 1-31, 324-328; Hyslop, The Elements of Ethics, pp. 1–17; J. Seth, A Study of Ethical Principles, pp. 1-35; Marion, Leçons de morale, chap. i; Runze, Ethik, Vol. I, pp. 1-16; Dorner, Das menschliche Handeln, Introduction; Sigwart, Logic, translated by Helen Dendy, Vol. II, pp. 529 ff. The beginner will find the works of Paulsen, Muirhead, Mackenzie, and Hyslop especially serviceable in connection with this chapter.

it makes a cosmos out of the chaos, it analyzes and classifies.

But it does not stop here. It would know why things are as they are, why they act as they act. The thinker is not content with knowing what is; the great question is, Why is it so, what is the reason for its being as it is? What is its relation to other things and occurrences, what are the antecedents and concomitants upon which it is said to depend, and without which it cannot be what it is? What are its consequents or effects; in short, what place does it occupy in the world of facts, how does it fit into the system of things? The tendency to find out the why and wherefore of things is universal; it manifests itself in the child who wonders "what makes the wheels go round" in his plaything, no less than in the natural philosopher who longs to know why the rain falls and the wind blows

and the grass grows. And there is something of a Newton in the most superstitious savage. Science begins with a question mark; it begins when reasons are sought after, and its perfection is measured by the manner in which its problems are solved. Events which were once explained by supernatural causes are now referred to their natural antecedents or concomitants, but the scientific instinct is essentially the same as in those dark ages when our benighted forefathers ascribed the thunder to the thunder god, and regarded Apollo as the hurler of the shafts of disease and death. The scientist is

born when man begins to wonder at facts, and aims to correlate them with other facts or insert them into a system, be it ever so crude.1

2. The Subject-matter of the Sciences. Science, therefore, analyzes, classifies, and explains phenomena. Now we may, for the sake of order and convenience, arrange these phenomena into different groups or classes, and form different sciences. Each particular science marks out for itself a particular subjectmatter, and studies this. Thus physics investigates the general properties of matter, biology treats of matter in the living state, psychology examines mental processes or states of consciousness. Each of these sciences may in turn be subdivided until we have an endless number of special sciences, corresponding to limited fields of investigation. In every case, however, the attempt is made not only

1 See Muirhead, The Elements of Ethics, § 8; Hibben, Inductive Logic, chap. i; Creighton, Logic, §§ 49, 59 ff., 78, 88; Sigwart, Logic, Vol. II, pp. 417 ff. I quote from Creighton's Logic, p. 285 : "We have said that Judgment constructs a system of knowledge. This implies, then, that it is not merely a process of adding one fact to another, as we might add one stone to another to form a heap. No! Judgment combines the new facts with which it deals with what is already known, in such a way as to give to each its own proper place. Different facts are not only brought together, but they are arranged, related, systematized. No fact is allowed to stand by itself, but has to take its place as a member of a larger system of facts, and receive its value from this connection. Of course, a single judgment is not sufficient to bring a large number of facts into relation in this way. But each judgment contributes something to this end, and brings some new fact into relation to what is already known."

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