On demand of a Russian vice-consul, process was issued by a United States commissioner, upon which a deserter from a Russian naval vessel was arrested and detained in prison for surrender to the vice-consul or master of the vessel, in accordance with the requirement of Article IX of the treaty of 1832, that such assistance shall be rendered by either country to the other in such cases on proper demand and at the cost of the party making the demand. The person so held was discharged on a writ of habeas corpus by the district court, on the ground that he was not a deserter within the meaning of the treaty; but, on an appeal being taken, such court required him to enter into a recognizance with a surety to appear and abide the judgment of the higher court. The judgment of the district court was finally reversed by the Supreme Court, and, the defendant failing to appear, suit was brought by the United States on the recognizance and the amount of the penalty was paid into court by the surety. Held, that the recognizance was not taken for the benefit of the vice-consul or the Russian government, and that the court had no power under the treaty or any rule of comity to award the amount recovered thereon to him in reimbursement for costs expended in the proceedings. Tucker v. United States (1907), 157 Fed. 386.

Treaty for the Acquisition of Alaska Concluded March 30, 1867.

Art. I. The district court for the district of Alaska has jurisdiction in admiralty to forfeit vessels for violating the provisions of Rev. Stats., §1956, on any of the navigable waters of the United States which were acquired by the treaty with Russia. It is a well settled principle that an application to a court to review the action of the political department of the government, upon a question then pending between it and a foreign power, and to determine whether the government is right or wrong, should be denied. In re Cooper (1892), 143 U. S. 472.

Arts. II, III, IV and VI. The commissioners appointed by the governments of the United States and Russia for the transfer of Alaska had no power to vary the language of the treaty or to determine questions of title or ownership. The build

ing constructed by the Russian-American Company in 1845 on land belonging to Russia became thereby, so far as disclosed by the facts in the case, the property of the Russian government, and, being transferred to the United States by the treaty, no property or ownership in it remained in the Russian-American Company, which it could transfer to a private person adversely to the United States. Kinkead v. United States (1893), 150 U. S. 483.

Lands granted in fee simple by Russia prior to the treaty did not pass to the United States. The courts will protect the possession of the owners of such fee, such protection being among the obligations assumed by the United States under the treaty. Callsen v. Hope (1896), 75 Fed. 758. Art. III. Under the treaty and subsequent legislation by Congress, Alaska is to be considered as incorporated into the United States; and in legislating therefor Congress is under the prohibitions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution, giving to one accused of a misdemeanor the right of a trial by a common law jury. Rassmussen v. United States (1905), 197 U. S. 516. See also Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 486; In re Minook (1904), 2 Alaska 200; McFarland v. Alaska Perseverance Mining Co. (1907), 3 Alaska 308.

Such Russian subjects as remained in Alaska after three years became citizens of the United States by virtue of the treaty and subsequent laws of Congress incorporating Alaska into the United States. In re Minook (1904), 2 Alaska 200.

The Athapascan stock, including the native bands of the Tanana, belong to the uncivilized tribes in Alaska, which, according to the terms of Article III of the treaty, by which Alaska was ceded to the United States, are subject to such laws and regulations as the United States may from time to time adopt in regard to the aboriginal tribes of that country. All the vacant and unappropriated lands in Alaska at the date of cession became a part of the public domain and public lands of the United States. United States v. Berrigan (1905), 2 Alaska 442.

Extradition Convention Concluded March 28, 1887. Art. VI. An order made by an officer in Russia, who purports to act as an examining magistrate, in which the fact of de

fendant's flight is recited, and in which he is ordered to be brought before an examining magistrate, and which is evidently designed to secure the apprehension of the accused and his production before an examining magistrate, although not in the form of a warrant of arrest as used in this country, is a sufficient compliance with the provision of the convention requiring an authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest or of some other equivalent judicial document issued by a judge or magistrate of the demanding government. Furthermore, Congress not having required, by section 5270, Rev. Stats., the production of a warrant of arrest by the foreign magistrate has waived that requirement of the convention. Grin v. Shine (1902), 187 U. S. 181.

Where the complaint refers to the instruments, alleged to have been forged, as bills of exchange, and the evidence discloses them to be promissory notes, the variance will not defeat surrender, where the instruments are identified and there is a plain case of forgery. If an extraditable crime under the law of the State where the accused is found is sufficiently charged, the effect of variance between complaint and proof is a matter to be decided on general principles irrespective of the law of that State. Even though the complaint be sworn to on information and belief, if it is supported by testimony of witnesses stated to have deposed, the court will presume that they were sworn; and the complaint is sufficient. Glucksman v. Henkel (1911), 221 U. S. 508. Art. VII. While this article undoubtedly contemplates a prior

certificate of the Secretary of State, the language is merely permissive, and does not compel the production of such certificate before the warrant can issue. Grin v. Shine (1902), 187 U. S. 181.

Under section 5270, Rev. Stats., which provides generally for the issuance of a warrant in extradition proceedings on a complaint under oath, a certificate of the Secretary of State that the application for the extradition of the person named has been made by the foreign government is not necessary to the issuance of such warrant, even where, as in the case of Russia, the convention provides for such certificate. In re Schlippenbach (1908), 164 Fed. 783.

SALVADOR.

Extradition Convention Concluded May 23, 1870.

Art. I. In the examination of persons found in California, charged with being fugitives from the justice of Salvador, the evidence of criminality must conform to, and be weighed and judged by, the laws of this country, particularly the laws of California; and the evidence of criminality which will justify holding the accused need be such only as ordinarily obtains at a preliminary examination and shows probable cause, or such as would justify a cautious man in believing the accused guilty. In re Ezeta (1894), 62 Fed. 972. Art. II. Sec. I. Homicide as defined in section 361 of the penal code of Salvador constitutes murder as defined in the convention. Id.

Art. II. Sec. 4. Under the definition of robbery as "the action

of feloniously and forcibly taking from the person of another goods or money, by violence, or putting him in fear," is included the taking of money or goods from the presence or view of the party robbed, by violence, or by putting him in fear.

Id.

Art. III. The testimony showed that the alleged hanging of four persons, May 29, 1894, by officers under President Ezeta,— the killing of C. H., June 3, 1894, by President Ezeta and the other defendants, his officers, the robbery of a bank, June 5, 1894, by President Ezeta,-and the killing of C., June 6, 1894, by President Ezeta and one of his officers,-all took place during the existence of a state of siege in Salvador, proclaimed April 29, 1894, and during the progress of actual hostilties between the contending forces, wherein Ezeta and his companions were seeking to maintain the authority of the then existing government against a revolutionary uprising; that such acts were associated with the actual conflict of such armed forces; that the four persons were hung because they did not assist in defending the government; that C. H. was killed because he was considered a spy; that the robbery of the bank was for the purpose of paying Ezeta's soldiers and was what is known in the Central and South American states as a "forced loan," recognized in Article XXIX of the treaty of December 6, 1870, between the United States and Salvador; and that the killing

of C. was the result of a report that he had gone over to the enemy. Held, that such offenses were of a political character and not extraditable under the convention. Id.

SPAIN.

Treaty of Friendship, Boundaries, Commerce and Navigation Concluded October 27, 1795.

Art. II. By the treaty of 1795, the boundary line between the United States and Spain ran through the middle of the St. Mary's River in its whole course to the Atlantic Ocean. The only access from the ocean to the Spanish waters running into the St. Mary's as well as to the adjacent Spanish territories was through this river. By the general principles of the law of nations, the waters of the whole river must be considered as common to both nations for all purposes of navigation, as a common highway necessary for the advantageous use by each of its own territorial rights and possessions. The Apollon (1824), 9 Wheat. 362.

The provisions of this article do not import to be a cession of territory, but the adjustment of a boundary controversy between the two nations. It is understood as an admission that the right was originally in the United States to the territory north of the boundary therein defined. Accordingly, Spanish grants made, after the treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain, within the territory east of the river Mississippi, and north of a line drawn from that river at the 31st degree of north latitude east to the middle of the river Apalachicola, have no intrinsic validity; and the holders must depend for their titles exclusively on the laws of the United States. Henderson v. Poindexter's Lessee (1827), 12 Wheat. 530; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan (1845), 3 How. 212; Lessee of Hickey v. Stewart (1845), 3 How. 750; La Roche v. Jones, 9 How. 155; Robinson v. Minor (1850), 10 How. 627.

Art. VI. The treaty with Spain enjoins restitution of captures only in case they are made by pirates or within our jurisdictional limits. The Neustra Señora de la Caridad (1819), 4 Wheat. 497.

The provisions of this article apply exclusively to the protection and defense of Spanish ships within our territorial