arrest and trial. After his return to Iowa from which State he had fled, he was indicted for embezzlement, as a principal, a statute of that State having abrogated the distinction between principals and accessories, and making all concerned in the commission of a crime principals. Held, that he was not detained for trial for an offense different from that for which he was extradited. In re Rowe (1896), 77 Fed. 161. Art. IV. Where, upon the extradition of a person charged to be a fugitive from justice, a warrant for his arrest is issued by the "county judge and extradition agent," the function so performed is judicial, and not administrative, and is for the purpose of preliminary examination; and the warrant is not invalid because it fails to show his authority as an extradition agent under the provision in the convention to the effect that, within the frontier States and Territories of each country, the surrender may be made by the chief civil authority thereof, or by such chief civil or judicial authority of the districts or counties bordering on the frontier as may for this purpose be authorized by said chief civil authority of the frontier State or Territory. Ex part McCabe (1891), 46 Fed. 363.

Art. VI. In view of the express provision that "neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens under the stipulations of this treaty," and of the recognized principle of international law that, in the absence of a treaty stipulation, a nation is under no obligation to surrender fugitives from justice, the United States will not surrender one of its citizens charged with a murder committed in Mexico. Ex parte McCabe (1891), 46 Fed. 363.

Claims Convention Concluded July 4, 1868.

Although the awards made by the commissioners under the authority of this convention, in which it is specifically provided that the parties will "consider the result of the proceedings of this commission as a full, perfect and final settlement," are on their face final and conclusive as between the United States and Mexico, they are only so until set aside by agreement between the two governments or otherwise; and the United States may treat with Mexico for a retrial of any case decided by the commission, and the President may withhold from any claimant his distributive

share of any sums paid by Mexico under the convention, while negotiating for a retrial of his case. Frelinghuysen v. Key (1884), 110 U. S. 63; La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. Frelinghuysen, Id. See also Alling v. United States (1885), 114 U. S. 562; Bayard v. United States (1888), 127 U. S. 246; Boynton v. Blaine (1891), 139 U. S. 306; La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States (1899), 175 U. S. 423.

So long as the government retains money received from a foreign power in payment of an award, it should in the discharge of its moral and international obligations enquire and ascertain its duty with respect to the fund, not only toward the citizen for whom it was received, but the government from which it was received. United States v. LaAbra Silver Mining Co. (1894), 29 C. Cls. 432. See also 32 C. Cls. 521.

Extradition Convention Concluded February 22, 1899. (See extradition convention concluded December 11, 1861.) Art. X. Where a complaint in extradition proceedings was based on the information and belief of the vice-consul general of the demanding country, and it appeared that the sources of his information and the grounds of his belief, that petitioner had committed the crime of murder and that a warrant had been issued in Mexico for his arrest and that a requsition accompanied by the warrant and duly authenticated depositions in support thereof were about to be or had been made, were official correspondence between deponent and the Department of Foreign Affairs of Mexico and official communications between the deponent and the Mexican government, the complaint was not defective on the ground of not sufficiently alleging the sources of deponent's information and the grounds of belief. Ex parte Dinehart (1911), 188 Fed. 858.

NETHERLANDS.

Treaty of Peace and Commerce Concluded October 8, 1782. Art. VI. The provision, that subjects of either party may dispose of their "effects" by testament, donation or otherwise, and their heirs although unnaturalized shall receive such succession ab intestato, includes real as well as personal estate. In virtue of this article, an alien heir can inherit real estate located in the State. It is for the department of the govern

ment appointed to represent and act for us with foreign powers, not the judicial, to determine whether a treaty has ceased to be binding because of changes in the organization of the other contracting party since the concluson of the treaty. University v. Miller (1831), 14 N. C. 188.

NORWAY.

(See Sweden and Norway.)

OTTOMAN EMPIRE.

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Concluded May 7, 1830. Art. II. See Oscanyan v. Arms Co. (1880), 103 U. S. 261, 272. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Concluded February 25, 1862.

Art. I. The treaty of 1862 (if not that of 1830) has the effect of conceding to the United States the same privileges, in respect of consular courts and the civil and criminal jurisdiction thereof, as are enjoyed by other Christian nations. Dainese v. Hale (1875), 91 U. S. 13. See also Dainese v. United States (1879), 15 C. Cls. 64.

PANAMA.

Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal Concluded November 18, 1903.

Art. II. The title of the United States to the Canal Zone in Panama is not imperfect either because the treaty with Panama does not contain technical terms used in ordinary conveyances of real estate or because the boundaries are not sufficiently defined for identification, the territory in question having been practically identified by the concurrent action of the two interested nations. Wilson v. Shaw (1907), 204 U. S. 24.

PARAGUAY.

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Concluded February 4, 1859.

Art. X. This article gives to consuls of Paraguay the right to name an administrator of the estate of a deceased countryman who has died in this country intestate. In re Baglieri's

Estate (1912), 137 N. Y. S. 175. See, however, In re Estate of D'Adamo (1914), 212 N. Y. 214.

PERSIA.

Treaty of Friendship and Commerce Concluded December 13, 1856.

Art. IV. The act of Congress of June 6, 1872, (17 Stats. 232), imposing an additional ad valorem duty of ten per centum on goods, the growth and produce of countries east of the Cape of Good Hope, when imported from places west of the Cape of Good Hope, is not in violation of the treaty with Persia, since the subjects of Persia exporting their products directly to the United States are required to pay no higher duties than are paid by the "merchants and subjects of the most favored nation." Powers v. Comly (1879), 101 U. S. 789.

PERU.

Extradition Convention Concluded September 12, 1870.

Where the prisoner has been kidnapped in the foreign country and brought by force against his will within the jurisidction of the State whose law he has violated, with no reference to an extradition convention, though one existed, and with no attempt to proceed under the convention, the Supreme Court can give no relief, since these facts do not establish any right under the Constitution, or laws, or treaties of the United States. The conventions of extradition do not guarantee a fugitive from the justice of one of the countries an asylum in the other. They only make provision that for certain crimes he shall be deprived of that asylum and surrendered to justice, and prescribe the mode in which this shall be done. Ker v. Illinois (1886), 119 U. S. 436.

PORTUGAL.

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Concluded August 26,

1840.

Art. II. This article is confined exclusively to vessels, and does not include cargoes or make any provision for indirect trade. Oldfield v. Marriott (1850), 10 How. 146.

RUSSIA.

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Concluded December 18, 1832.

Art. VI. The stipulation in the treaty, that the products of Russia shall not be subjected to a higher rate of duty than like products imported into the United States from other countries, addresses itself to the political and not the judicial department of the government, and the courts cannot try the question whether it has or has not been observed. An act of Congress approved by the President repeals a prior treaty with which it conflicts, so far as the treaty is a municipal law, provided the subject matter is within the legislative power of Congress. Taylor v. Morton (1855), 2 Curtis 454. See 2 Black 481; also Curtis's Admx. v. Fiedler, Id. 461.

It being provided by Article VI that no higher duties shall be imposed on the importation into the United States of any article, the produce or manufacture of Russia, than are or shall be payable on the like articles, the produce or manufacture of any other foreign country, and Congress having by section I of the act of August 5, 1861 (12 Stats. 292) imposed a duty on unmanufactured Russia hemp of forty dollars per ton, and on Manila and other hemps of India of twenty-five dollars per ton, such legislation is a declaration by Congress that such provision of the treaty shall no longer operate as the law of the land in respect of the duty on unmanufactured Russia hemp. Ropes v. Clinch (1871), 8 Blatchf. 304. See Art. XVII of the treaty with Sweden and Norway of July 4, 1827. Art. VIII. The most-favored-nation clause carries with it the privileges and powers conferred on consuls of the Argentine Republic under Article IX of the treaty of 1853. McEvoy v. Wyman (1906), 191 Mass. 276.

Art. IX. A member of the Russian naval service, sent to the United States to become one of the crew of a cruiser, then in course of construction in the United States, who deserts before the vessel has received her crew on board, or has been commissioned for active service and is still in process of construction, but after the vessel has been launched, is a deserter from a Russian ship of war within the meaning of the treaty of 1832. Tucker v. Alexandroff (1902), 183 U. S. 424.