minion of the United States in the waters of Behring Sea," must be construed to mean the waters within three miles of the shores of Alaska. La Ninfa (1896), 75 Fed. 513. Convention as to Tenure and Disposition of Real and Personal Property Concluded March 2, 1899.

Art. I. This article contemplates the elimination of the disqualification of alienage, under the statute of the State of Delaware, in the next of kin, and puts non-resident aliens next of kin on the same footing as if they were residents of the State at the time of the death of the intestate. A statute of the State, which provides that any such kindred, being aliens and not residing within the limits of the United States at the time of intestate's death, shall be passed by, and the effect shall be the same as if they were dead, must give way to the convention. Dockstader v. Kershaw (1903), 4 Pennewill 398.

A provision in the code of Iowa, which, while imposing an inheritance tax of 5 per cent. of the value of property passing to collateral relatives, subjects property passing to persons, who are alien non-residents of the United States, to a tax of 20 per cent. of its value, violates the provision in the convention with Great Britain entitling a citizen or subject of that country to sell real property, which would by the laws of the land pass to him were he not disqualified on account of alienage, and to remove the proceeds therefrom without restraint or interference, and "exempt from any succession, probate or administrative duties or charges" other than those which may be imposed in like cases upon the citizens or subjects of this country. Accordingly, a tax of only 5 per cent. may be collected on property passing to a non-resident subject of Great Britain. The treaty is paramount to State legislation in this respect. Where the personal property of the decedent was insufficient to discharge his debts, and the administrator, under order of the court, sold land for the payment of debts, the property inherited by a non-resident alien heir was real property within the meaning of the treaty. McKeown v. Brown (1914), 149 N. W. (Iowa) 593

Art. II. Under the provisions of this article, subjects of Great Britain are liable to no other taxes upon successions to per

sonal property than are payable by citizens of the United States. "It will be noted therefore that this article covers succession, possession, and disposal of personal property all to be subject to such duties only as the citizens of the country where the property lies will be liable to pay in like cases. No reason appears therefore why any different effect should be given to the terms of the treaty as applied to personal property than was given in the McKeown case, supra, as applied to real property." In re Moynihan's Estate (1915), 151 N. W. (Iowa) 504.

Convention Concerning the Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada Concluded January 11, 1909. Art. I. In view of the provision in this treaty-that the navigation of navigable boundary waters shall be free and open for the purpose of commerce to the inhabitants and ships of both countries, equally, subject to any laws and regulations of either country, within its own territory, not inconsistent with such privilege of free navigation, and applying equally without discrimination to the inhabitants and vessels of both countries, the city of Sault Ste. Marie has no power to prescribe and fix rates of fare to be charged by the Canadian owner and operator of ferry-boats across St. Mary's river between Ontario and Michigan as a municipal regulation. International Transit Co. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie (1912), 194 Fed. 522.

"Assuming that, by reason of the local considerations. pertinent to the operation of ferries, there exists in the absence of Federal action a local protective power to prevent extortion in the rates charged for ferriage from the shore of the State, and to prescribe reasonable regulations necessary to secure good order and convenience, we think that the action of the city in the present case in requiring the appellee to take out a license, and to pay a license fee, for the privilege of transacting the business conducted at its wharf, was beyond the power which the State could exercise either directly or by delegation. In this view, it is unnecessary to consider the question raised with respect to the treaty with Breat Britain." City of Sault Ste. Marie v. International Transit Co. (1914), 234 U. S. 333, 342, affirming decree in 194 Fed. 522.

GREECE.

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Concluded December 22,

1837.

Art. XV. The provision, that a vessel arriving directly from Greece and provided with a prescribed bill of health shall be subjected to no other quarantine than such as may be necessary for the visit of the health officer of the port, has reference to the particular form of document which shall be taken by a ship for the purpose of establishing that infectious or contagious diseases did not exist at its point of departure. It was not intended to nullify the quarantine power, since the concluding section of the article expressly subjects the vessel holding such certificate to quarantine detention, if on its arrival a general quarantine has been established against all ships coming from the port whence the ship holding the certificate had sailed. It was not intended to deal with the exercise by the government of its power to legislate for the safety and health of its people, or to render the exertion of such a power nugatory, by exempting the vessels of Greece when coming to the United States from the operation of such laws. Especially is this true where the restriction imposed upon the vessel is based, not upon the conditions existing at the port of departure, but upon the presence of an infectious or contagious malady at the port of arrival, which, in the nature of things, could not be covered by the certificate relating to the state of health at the port whence the ship had sailed. Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of Health (1902), 186 U. S. 380.

Consular Convention Concluded December 2, 1902.

Art. XI. The privileges enjoyed by consuls of Sweden under the convention of June 1, 1910, in the administration of estates of deceased countrymen, were claimed by the consul of Greece, under the most-favored-nation clause of this article, in Fontana v. Hynes (1915), 146 Pac. 651.

ITALY.

Extradition Convention Concluded March 23, 1868.

A person may be surrendered under the convention for the crime of murder committed in Italy before the conclusion of the convention. In re Angelo de Giacomo (1874), 12 Blatchf. 391. Art. I. The stipulation for the extradition from one country to the other of persons charged with crime in the demanding country, "provided, that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his or her apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime had been there committed," does not warrant the return to Italy of a person there charged with murder, where the only proof presented of his connection with the offense is hearsay. Ex parte Fudera (1908), 162 Fed. 591. Arts. I and II. The word "persons" in the extradition convention with Italy of 1868 as amended in 1884, providing for the surrender of persons charged with certain enumerated crimes, is sufficiently broad to embrace citizens and subjects of the contracting parties. A citizen of the United States, who, while in Italy, commits an offense and then flees to the United States, is within the convention, and may be extradited thereunder, though Italy has construed the word so as not to include its citizens and subjects. Whether the United States is released from the obligations of the convention as the result of the violation of its provisions by Italy, is a political, not a judicial, question; and the executive department having elected to waive any right to free itself from the obligation to deliver up its own citizens, it is the duty of the court to recognize the obligation. Ex parte Charlton (1911), 185 Fed. 880; affirmed in Charlton v. Kelly (1913), 229 U. S. 447.

In the extradition of a person to Italy under section 7, Article II of the convention of 1868, which provides for the extradition of persons charged with "the embezzlement of public moneys, committed within the jurisdiction of either party, by public officers or depositors," if the accused is charged with having as treasurer of a hospital embezzled its funds, the proof must show that the hospital was a public institution, that the accused, as its treasurer, was a public

officer or depositor, and that the money taken was public money. Ex parte Ronchi (1908), 164 Fed. 288.

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Concluded February 26, 1871.

Arts. II, III and XXIII. The treaty only requires equality of treatment, and that the same rights and privileges be accorded to a citizen of Italy that are accorded to a citizen of the United States under like circumstances. Storti v. Massachusetts (1901), 183 U. S. 138.

If an Italian subject, sojourning in this country, is himself given all the direct protection and security afforded by the laws to our own people, including all rights of action for himself or his personal representatives to safeguard the protection and security, the provision in the treaty,—that citizens of each country shall receive, in the States and Territories of the other, the most constant protection and security, "and shall enjoy in this respect the same rights and privileges as are or shall be granted to the natives, on their submitting themselves to the conditions imposed upon the natives,"-is not violated by a statute which gives a right of action for damages for death to native resident relatives but not to nonresident alien relatives, although the existence of such a right might indirectly and remotely promote his safety. Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. (1909), 213 U. S. 268, affirming 216 Pa. 402.

The provisions in these articles do not create in Italian subjects, not resident in the United States, any new or substantial rights of person or property to be enforced in the United States; their purpose, so far as they concern rights of person or property of non-resident Italians, is limited to the prevention of invidious discriminations in favor of citizens of the United States and against subjects of Italy, with respect to the enjoyment or enforcement in the United States of privileges and rights of person and property, arising and existing wholly independently of such provisions. Whether a non-resident alien may recover for wrongful death of an alien resident in Pennsylvania depends upon the statutes of that State, aside from the Italian treaty, as to which the Federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania are bound by the deci