and the expiration of the subsequent convention of 1800. Carneal v. Banks (1825), 10 Wheat. 181.

Art. XIV. Neutral property in an enemy's ship was subject to forfeiture under Article XIV of the treaty. Bolchos v. Darrel (1795), Bee's Admr. Repts. 74.

Art. XVII. No foreign power can of right institute, or erect, any court of judicature of any kind within the jurisdiction of the United States, except such only as may be warranted by, and in pursuance of, treaties. The admiralty jurisdiction, which has been exercised in the United States by the consuls of France, not being so warranted, is not of right. Glass v. The Sloop Betsey (1794), 3 Dall. 6, 16.

"It is true, both by the law of nations, and the treaty with France, if a French privateer brings an enemy's ship into our ports, which she has taken as prize on the high seas, the United States, as a nation, have no right to detain her, or make any enquiry into the circumstances of the capture. But this exemption from enquiry, by our courts of justice, in this respect, only belongs to a French privateer, lawfully commissioned, and, therefore, if a vessel claims that exemption, but does not appear to be duly entitled to it, it is the express duty of the court, upon application, to make enquiry, whether she is the vessel she pretends to be, since her title to such exemption depends on that very fact.” Iredell, J., Talbot v. Janson (1795), 3 Dall. 133, 159.

This article was pleaded in bar to the jurisdiction of the district court of the United States in cases of captures by French privateers on the high seas and brought into our ports, and the plea sustained in British Consul v. Schooner Favourite (1794); Stannick v. Ship Friendship (1794); Salderondo v. Ship Nostra Sigñora del Camino et al. (1794); Reid v. Ship Vere (1795); British Consul v. Ship Mermaid (1795); and Moodie v. Ship Amity (1796). Bee's Admr. Repts. 39, 40, 43, 66, 69, 89.

Article XXV of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain of 1794, in which similar privileges and exemptions as to prizes in ports were granted to Great Britain, was in conflict with the provision in Article XVII of the treaty with France, that "no shelter or refuge shall be given in their ports to such as shall have made prize of the subjects,

people or property of either of the parties." Gray, Admr. (1886), 21 C. Cls. 340.

Art. XIX. By this article French vessels, whether public and of war, or private and of merchants, may, on any urgent necessity, enter our ports and be supplied with all things needful for repairs. "In the present case, the privateer only underwent a repair; and the mere replacement of her force cannot be a material augmentation; even if an augmentation of force could be deemed (which we do not decide) a sufficient cause for restitution." Moodie v. Ship Phoebe Anne (1796), 3 Dall. 319. See also Geyer v. Michel, (1796), 3 Dall. 285.

Arts. XXIII and XXV. Where an American vessel carried the

passport or sea-letter prescribed by Article XXV of the treaty, it was a case where free ships made free goods under Article XXIII; and the cargo could not be condemned for want of evidence of its neutrality. The Ship James and William v. United States (1902), 37 C. Cls. 303.

Art. XXIV. By the treaty of 1778 with France, it was declared that tar and turpentine should not be reputed contraband, and, until the abrogation of the treaty by the act of Congress approved July 7, 1798, French condemnations on the ground that tar and turpentine were contraband were illegal. The Ship James and William v. United States (1902), 37 C. Cls. 303.

Art. XXV. A sea-letter is not the only document by which the neutral character of a vessel belonging to citizens of the United States may be established. Tunno v. Preary (1794), Bee's Admr. Repts. 6.

Arts. XXV and XXVII. A ship with the passport or sea-letter, and certificate or manifest, as provided for in Article XXV of the treaty, was free under Article XXVII from search upon the high seas. The absence of these two papers did not render the merchant vessel liable to condemnation, but simply left her without the benefits of the article and subject to the rules of international law. The Brig Venus (1892), 27 C. Cls. 116.

Consular Convention Concluded November 14, 1788. Art. IX. As to the evidence required for the issuance of a war

rant for the apprehension under this article of a deserter from a French vessel, see United States v. Lawrence (1795), 3 Dall. 42.

Art. XII. A French subject who has taken the oath of allegiance to the United States is not within the twelfth article of the convention. Portier v. Le Roy (1794), I Yeates (Pa.) 371. Treaty of Peace, Commerce, and Navigation Concluded September 30, 1800.

The treaty was not a treaty of peace; nor did it conclude or recognize a state of war or a condition of hostility. Cushing, Admr. v. United States (1886), 22 C. Cls. 1. See also Gray, Admr. v. United States (1886), 21 C. Cls. 340.

By the bargain with France, the United States obtained the renunciation of the French claims against it and a relinquishment from its obligations under the treaties of 1778, and, in consideration therefor, released France from all claims of American citizens. The use, to which the claims of citizens thus released were put, was a public use, since the bargain solved the strained relations between the two countries and forever put an end to the treaties of 1778. Gray, Admr. v. United States (1886), 21 C. Cls. 340; Cushing, Admr. v. United States (1886), 22 C. Cls. 1; Hooper, Admr. v. United States (1887), 22 C. Cls. 408. See also Blagge v. Balch (1896), 162 U. S. 439.

A claim arising after the conclusion of the treaty, though prior to its final ratification, was not relinquished under Article II. The Schooner Jane (1888), 23 C. Cls. 226.

The supplemental article to the treaty of 1800, not having been appended to the treaty until several months after that instrument was signed, cannot be referred to for the purpose of explaining the preceding articles. The Ship Tom (1904), 39 C. Cls. 290.

Art. IV. A final condemnation in an inferior court of admiralty, where a right of appeal exists and has been claimed, is not a definitive condemnation within the meaning of the treaty. The court is as much bound as the executive to take notice

United

of a treaty, and will reverse the original decree of condemnation (although it was correct when made) and order restitution of the property under the treaty, although the treaty was concluded after the original condemnation. States v. Schooner Peggy (1801), I Cr. 103. Art. VII. The provision, that the citizens of one country holding lands in the other may dispose of the same by testament, or otherwise, and inherit lands in the respective countries, without being obliged to obtain letters of naturalization, applies equally to those who took by descent as to those who acquired by purchase. The stipulation, "that in case the laws of either of the two states should restrain strangers from the exercise of the rights of property with respect to real estate, such real estate may be sold, or otherwise disposed of, to citizens or inhabitants of the country where it may be," does not affect the rights of a French subject, who takes or holds by the treaty, so as to deprive him of the power of selling to citizens of this country. It gives to a French subject, who has acquired lands by descent or devise, the right, during life, to sell or otherwise dispose thereof, if lying in a State where lands purchased by an alien, generally, would be immediately escheatable. The instant the descent was cast on a French subject, his rights became complete and could not be affected by the subsequent expiration of the treaty. Chirac v. Chirac (1817), 2 Wheat. 259.

"This article, by its terms, suspended, during the existence of the treaty, the provisions of the common law of Maryland and of the statutes of that State of 1780 and of 1791, so far as they prevented citizens of France from taking by inheritance from citizens of the United States, property, real or personal, situated therein." Geofroy v. Riggs (1890), 133 U. S. 258, 266.

Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana Concluded April 30, 1803. Art. I. By the treaty of St. Ildefonso of October 1, 1800, Spain ceded Louisiana to France; and, by the treaty of Paris of April 30, 1803, France transferred her rights to the territory to the United States. The political departments of the government asserted title under the treaty to the territory between the Iberville and the Perdido rivers, and the courts have

followed the determination in this respect of the legislative and executive branches. Grants of land in this disputed territory by the crown of Spain after the treaty of St. Ildefonso were void. Foster v. Neilson (1829), 2 Pet. 253; United States v. Arredondo (1832), 6 Pet. 691; Garcia v. Lee (1838), 12 Pet. 511; Keene v. Whitaker (1840), 14 Pet. 170; United States v. Reynes (1850), 9 How. 127; United States v. Lynde (1870), 11 Wall. 632.

Art. II. As to public property as distinguished from private property, see New Orleans v. United States (1836), 10 Pet. 662; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan (1845), 3 How. 212; United States v. King (1849), 7 How. 833, 847; Slidell v. Grandjean (1883), 111 U. S. 412.

By the cession of Louisiana, the government of the United States succeeded to all the property and interests formerly possessed by the governments of France and Spain in that province. A right reserved by the terms of a grant to use the land for any fortification is more than the right of eminent domain. It is a right to use the land for that purpose without compensation; and this reserved right passed to the United States under the treaty of cession. Josephs v. United States (1865), 1 C. Cls. 197. See dissenting opinion, 2 C. Cls. 586.

Art. III. An adjudication made by a Spanish tribunal in Louisiana is not void because it was made after the cession of the country to the United States, for it is historically known that the actual possession of the country was not surrendered until some time after the proceedings and adjudication in the case took place. It was the judgment, therefore, of a competent Spanish tribunal, having jurisdiction of the case, and rendered while the country, though ceded, was, de facto, in the possession of Spain, and subject to Spanish laws. Such judgments, so far as they affect the private rights of the parties thereto, must be deemed valid. Keene v. McDonough (1834), 8 Pet. 308, 310.

A grant by the Spanish governor, dated January 2, 1804, for lands included within the limits of Louisiana was void, Spain having parted with her title to that province by the treaty of St. Ildefonso of October 1, 1800, and France having ceded the same province to the United States by the treaty