Section 3 of the act of May 5, 1892, putting the burden of proving the right to remain in this country on Chinese arrested under the act, and section 6 of the same act requiring Chinese laborers, who are entitled to remain in the United States, to obtain certificates of residence, are brought forward by the act of April 29, 1902 (32 Stats. at L. 176), continuing all laws then in force "so far as the same are not inconsistent with treaty obligations." Ah How v. United States (1904), 193 U. S. 65.

The purpose and effect of the act of April 29, 1902 (32 Stats. at L. 176), as amended by the act of April 27, 1904 (33 Stats. at L. 428), which provides that all laws in force on April 29, 1902, regulating, suspending, or prohibiting the coming of Chinese persons into the United States, or their residence therein, "are hereby re-enacted, extended and continued without modification, limitation, or condition," was to continue all such laws in force after the expiration of the treaty with China on December 8, 1904. Hong Wing v. United States (1906), 142 Fed. 128.

Art. II. The provision, that the general prohibition of the entry

of Chinese laborers into this country contained in Article 1 "shall not apply to the return to the United States of any registered Chinese laborer who has a lawful wife, child or parent in the United States, or property therein of the value of one thousand dollars, or debts of like amount due him and pending settlement," has reference to the condition of the laborer at the time of his return. In re Ong Lung (1903), 125 Fed. 814.

Art. III. By the treaty of 1894, the privilege of transit across the territory of the United States could only be enjoyed subject to such regulations of the government of the United States as might be necessary to prevent the privilege from being abused. The treaty, in recognizing the privilege and providing that it should continue, proceeded on the ground of its existence and continuance under governmental regulations, and no act of Congress was required to carry it into effect. Under existing regulations the action of the collectors of customs in refusing transit cannot be interfered with by the courts. Fok Yung Yo v. United States (1902), 185 U. S. 296.

A Chinaman, admitted to residence in this country upon a certificate duly issued and viséd as provided for in Article

III of the treaty, cannot be deported for having wrongfully entered the United States upon a fraudulent certificate, unless there is some competent evidence to overcome the legal effect of the certificate. Liu Hop Fong v. United States (1908), 209 U. S. 453.

COLOMBIA.

Treaty of Peace, Amity, and Commerce Concluded December 12, 1846.

Art. XXX. A vice consul of Colombia, being entitled under the most-favored-nation clause to all the rights, prerogatives, and immunities given in this respect to vice consuls of France under Article II of the treaty of 1853, cannot be compelled to attend as a witness. This provision is not annulled by the clause in Article V of the consular convention of May 4, 1850, providing that, when the presence of consuls may be required in courts of justice, they shall be summoned in writing. Baiz v. Malo (1899), 58 N. Y. S. 806, citing United States v. Trumbull, 48 Fed. 96.

CUBA.

Commercial Convention Concluded December 11, 1902. Art. VIII. Within the meaning of the convention, the Philippine Islands are not a foreign or another country; and the tariff reductions on articles imported from Cuba are not to be based on tariff rates on the same articles brought from the Philippine Islands. The provisions of Article VIII of the convention are not to be construed so as to give to Cuba advantages over shipments coming into the United States from a part of its own territory. Faber v. United States (1911), 221 U. S. 649.

Art. IX. Under the convention, and the act of Congress of De

cember 17, 1903, to give it effect, imports from Cuba were not entitled to the reduction of duties until December 27, 1903, the date proclaimed by the President of the United States and the President of Cuba for the commencement of the operation of the convention. After the amendment of the convention by the Senate and the acceptance thereof by Cuba, the date on which it should go into effect was to be determined by the act of Congress rather than by the original

provision of the convention fixing as the date the tenth day after the exchange of ratifications. United States v. American Sugar Refining Company (1906), 202 U. S. 563; Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. United States (1906), 202 U. S. 580; United States v. M. J. Dalton Co. (1907), 151 Fed.

144.

DENMARK.

Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Concluded April 26, 1826.

Art. I. The act of August 3, 1882 (22 Stats. at L. 214), requiring owners of vessels to pay a tax for every passenger, not a citizen of the United States, brought from a foreign port to the United States, applies to those brought by Danish ships, notwithstanding the treaty with Denmark. Head Money Cases (1884), 112 U. S. 580. The act of June 26, 1884 (23 Stats. at L. 58, §22) excepts from the passenger tax vessels plying between the ports of the United States and those of Canada and Mexico. Danish vessels, arriving from a port in Denmark, are not exempt under the most-favorednation clause in the treaty from the payment of the tax. In case of a conflict with a prior treaty the statute must prevail in the courts of this country. Thingvalla Line et al. v. United States (1889), 24 C. Cls. 255.

Art. IV. This article contains a pledge of the contracting parties that there shall be no discriminating legislation against the importation of articles, the growth, produce or manufacture of the respective countries, in favor of articles of like character imported from any other country. It is not designed to prevent special concessions, upon sufficient considerations, touching the importation of specific articles into the country of the other, and does not carry with it automatically such concessions. Bartram v. Robertson (1887), 122 U. S. 116.

Art. VII. A statute of Iowa, which imposes a collateral inheritance tax of 20 per cent. in case the beneficiaries are nonresident aliens, while it is only 5 per cent. otherwise, does not conflict with the provision in the treaty with Denmark of 1826, renewed in 1857,-"that no higher or other duties, charges or taxes of any kind shall be levied in the territories

or dominions of either party, upon any personal property, money or effects of their respective citizens or subjects, on the removal of the same from their territories or dominions reciprocally, either upon the inheritance of such property, money or effects, or otherwise, than are or shall be payable in each state upon the same, when removed by a citizen or subject of such state, respectively,"-since the tax is not a tax upon property, but merely a tax upon the succession or transmission of the property occasioned by the death of the owner. That portion of the property deducted by the executor or administrator and paid to the State Treasurer pursuant to the statute never reaches the beneficiary. In re Anderson's Estate (1914), 147 N. W. (Iowa) 1098. See later case of McKeown v. Brown (1914), 149 N. W. (Iowa) 593, under Article I of the convention with Great Britain of March 2, 1899.

Art. VIII. Under the most-favored-nation clause, a consul of Denmark, invoking the rights and privileges enjoyed by the consuls of Italy under Article XXII of the treaty of 1871, and by the consuls of the Argentine Republic under Article IX of the treaty of 1853, cannot appear for an infant party in a proceeding for the probate of a will, so as to give the Surrogate's Court jurisdiction of such party, without the issuance of a citation. In re Peterson's Will (1906), 101 N. Y. S. 285.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

Treaty of Amity and Commerce Concluded February 8, 1867. Art. IX. This article is a pledge of the contracting parties that there shall be no discriminating legislation against the importation of articles, the growth, produce, or manufacture of their respective countries, in favor of articles of like character imported from any other country. It was never intended to prevent special concessions to other countries, upon sufficient considerations, and does not carry with it automatically such concessions. Whitney v. Robertson (1888), 124 U. S. 190.

FRANCE.

Treaties of Amity and Commerce, and Alliance Concluded February 6, 1778.

The treaties of alliance and commerce with France of 1778, having been concluded on the same day and as the result of the same negotiation, and signed by the same plenipotentiaries, are in diplomatic effect one instrument. Gray, Admr. v. United States (1886), 21 C. Cls. 340.

The abrogation of a treaty may be justified as the result of a breach by the other party or as a result of a change of circumstances. The United States was justified in annulling the treaties of 1778; and the act of July 7, 1798, was effective as between the nations. The compact ended, July 7, 1798. Thereafter, the relations between the two nations were governed by international law and not by the treaties of 1778. Hooper, Admr. v. United States (1887), 22 C. Cls. 408; The Brig William (1888), 23 C. Cls. 201.

The United States abrogated the treaties of 1778 by the act of July 7, 1798, and thereby relieved France from all obligations under them. The Ship James and William (1902), 37 C. Cls. 303; The Schooner Endeavor (1909), 44 C. Cls. 242.

The treaty of 1794 between the United States and Great Britain did not release France from any obligation of the treaties of 1778. The Ship James and William (1902), 37 C. Cls. 303. Treaty of Amity and Commerce Concluded February 6, 1778. Art. II. The most-favored-nation clause in the treaty related to duties and rights and benefits in the ports of the parties. Provisions which declare what shall be regarded as contraband or non-contraband of war relate to the procedure of the two nations in time of war and are not affected by a treaty of either with another power. Ship James and William (1902), 37 C. Cls. 303.

Art. XI. "Upon every principle of fair construction, this article gave to the subjects of France a right to purchase and hold lands in the United States." Chirac v. Chirac (1817), 2 Wheat. 259, 271.

The treaty of 1778 allowed citizens of either country to hold lands in the other; and the title, once vested in a French subject, was not divested by the abrogation of that treaty,