S. 746, 762; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589, 590; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 14. If this could be refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws would be a barren form of words. It is no answer to say, as it is argued, that the act proceeds upon the assumption that 'the employment of aliens unless restrained was a peril to the public welfare.' The discrimination against aliens in the wide range of employments to which the act relates is made an end in itself and thus the authority to deny to aliens, upon the mere fact of their alienage, the right to obtain support in the ordinary fields of labor is necessarily involved. It must also be said that reasonable classification implies action consistent with the legitimate interests of the State, and it will not be disputed that these cannot be so broadly conceived as to bring them into hostility to exclusive Federal power. The authority to control immigration—to admit or exclude aliens is vested solely in the Federal government. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 713. The assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the State would be tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work. And, if such a policy were permissible, the practical result would be that those lawfully admitted to the country under the authority of the acts of Congress, instead of enjoying in a substantial sense and in their full scope the privileges conferred by the admission, would be segregated in such of the States as chose to offer hospitality. ✶✶✶ No special public interest with respect to any particular business is shown that could possibly be deemed to support the enactment, for as we have said it relates to every sort. The discrimination is against aliens as such in competition with citizens in the described range of enterprises and in our opinion it clearly falls under the condemnation of the fundamental law. The question of rights under treaties was not expressly presented by the bill, and, although mentioned in the argument, does not require attention in view of the invalidity of the act under the Fourteenth Amendment." A provision in the law of New York, which prohibited the employment on public works of all others than citizens of the United States, was held by the Supreme Court in Heim v. McCall, and Crane v. People, decided November 29, 1915, not to be in contravention of the guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment or of treaties with foreign nations.

CHAPTER XXV.

TERMINATION OF TREATIES.

§178. Effect of Change in Form of Government.-A treaty is a compact between states, not organs of government. Consequently its obligation is not, in general, dependent upon the continuance of the particular form of government under which it happened to be concluded. Treaties, the purposes of which are peculiar to the existing form,2 as also agreements of a personal nature between crowned heads, which are not properly termed international treaties, are to be expected. Thus the Family Compact of August 15, 1761, between the Kings of France and Spain, the aim of which was to render permanent the duties which were a "natural consequent of relationship and friendship," came to an end when the Bourbons ceased to reign in France. Of this character was also the alliance entered into September 26, 1815, by the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and the King of Prussia." So also it is possible that, by the new order of things and the changed condition of one of the parties, the considerations entering into the treaty might be so materially changed as to give to the other contracting party the option of declaring the treaty to be

1 "Hence it follows, that as after the change of a democracy into a monarchy, the treaty is still in force, in regard to the new sovereign; so if the government, from a monarchy, becomes a republic, the treaty made with the king does not expire, unless it was manifestly personal." Burlamaqui, Principles of Natural and Politic Law (Translation by Nugent, 2 ed.), II, 321. See also Vattel, Bk. II, c. XII, §§185, 186.

2 Grotius, Bk. II, c. XVI, §16; Vattel, Bk. II, c. XII, §185. 3 Hall, Int. Law (6 ed.), 317.

4 De Clercq, I, 81. In August, 1790, Spain requested France to make common cause against Great Britain in the Nookta Sound controversy; but the National Assembly of France declared the compact not to be binding on the nation. In Article II, possessions in any part of the world had been mutually guaranteed. Twiss, Law of Nations (Peace 2 ed.) §233; Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens, II, 36, 121.

5 See for view of the Italian government that the convention of September 15, 1864, for the protection of Pontifical territory and for the withdrawal of French troops, ceased to be obligatory with the fall of Napoleon III, King, History of Italian Unity, II, 374. For text of the convention, see De Clercq, IX, 129. See for other instances, Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens, II, 120, et seq.

at an end. This would however result not from the mere fact of a change in the form of the government, but from a change in the essential conditions upon which the treaty was based.

An interesting discussion took place in April, 1793, between President Washington's advisors, on the proposition of receiving the new minister from the republic of France with an express reservation of the question whether the treaties of commerce and alliance of 1778 ought not to be deemed temporarily and provisionally suspended. Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury, in support of such a reservation, urged that, if a nation thought fit to make changes in its form of government which rendered treaties theretofore concluded between it and another nation useless, or dangerous, or hurtful to that other nation, the latter had a right to renounce those treaties; that a contracting state had a right to take care of its own happiness and could not be obliged to suffer this to be impaired by the means which its ally had adopted for its own advantage contrary to the ancient state of things; that the treaties continued absolutely binding on the party making the change and would bind the other unless in due time it declared its election to renounce them, which in good faith it ought to do only if the change had rendered them "useless or materially less advantageous, or more dangerous than before"; that an alliance might be formed because each had confided in the strength and efficacy of the government of the other, while the newly-formed government might be feeble, fluctuating, and liable to provoke wars; that, as to the French treaties, since France was in an unsettled condition, it was his opinion that the United States had an option to consider the operation of these treaties as suspended, and would eventually have a right to renounce them, if such changes should take place as could "bona fide be pronounced to render a continuance of the connections which result from them disadvantageous or dangerous." Jefferson, the Secretary of State, with whom Randolph, the Attorney General, concurred, in taking a different view declared that all acts by the proper agents under the authority of the nation were the acts of the nation, were obligatory on it, and enured to its use, and could in no wise be annulled or affected by any change in the form of the government or of the persons administering it; that consequently "the treaties between the United States and France were not treaties between the United States and Louis Capét, but between the two

nations of America and France," and, the nations remaining in existence, though both of them had since changed their forms of government, the treaties were not annulled by these changes. He however admitted that conditions might arise which would release one of the parties from treaty obligations. "When performance, for instance, becomes impossible, non-performance is not immoral. So if performance becomes self-destructive to the party, the law of self-preservation overrules the laws of obligation to others"; but the danger which absolves "must be great, inevitable and imminent." As to the French treaties, no part of them, he declared, except the clause of guarantee, held up "danger even at a distance." The minister was received without the proposed reservation; and the treaties were recognized by the United States as continuing in force until abrogated by the joint resolution of Congress passed in 1798."

$179. Effect of Change in State Entity.-The obligation of a treaty, as distinguished from rights already conveyed or transferred under it, comes to an end upon the extinguishment of one of the contracting parties with the consequent loss of power to perform. "It is also an implied condition of the continuing obligation of a treaty that the parties to it shall keep their freedom of will with respect to its subject-matter except in so far as the treaty is itself a restraint upon liberty, and the condition is one which holds good even when such freedom of will is voluntarily given up." The principle that a treaty between two parties is

6 Works of Hamilton (Lodge ed.), IV, 74; Writings of Jefferson (Ford ed.), VI, 219.

7 See Hooper v. United States (1887), 22 C. Cls. 408; The Brig William (1888), 23 C. Cls. 201.

8 See West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. v. Rex (1905), L. R., 2 K. B. 391, 400. See as to the use of the term obligation in the law of private contracts as giving rise to rights in personam, as distinguished from rights in rem, Savigny, Obligations, c. 1, §3 (Brown's epitome, 3); Pothier, Obligations (Evans' translation), I, 2; Holland, Jurisprudence (11 ed.), 239, 253-255; Pollock, Contracts (7 ed.), 1; Anson, Contracts (12 ed.), 3, 4, 6. "Obligatio est juris vinculum, quo necessitate adstringimur alicuius solvendae rei secundum nostrae civitatis jura." Justinian, Institutes, Bk. III, Tit. 13. "In the language of the Roman law, and of all the modern systems which are offsets from the Roman law, the term 'obligation' is restricted to the duties which answer to rights in personam." Austin, Jurisprudence (5 ed. by Campbell), I, 370. See, however, Marshall, C. J., Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 136.

9 Hall, Int. Law (6 ed.), 350.

not annulled by an inconsistent subsequent treaty between one of them and a third party does not have full application in such cases. "It cannot be supposed that a state will subordinate its will to that of another state, or to a common will of which its own is only a factor, except under the pressure of necessity or of vital needs." 9910

The treaty of commerce and navigation concluded June 10, 1846, and the convention of extradition concluded January 18, 1855, between the United States and Hanover, and the convention abolishing droit d'aubaine and emigration taxes concluded May 27, 1846, between the United States and Nassau, have been considered as at an end upon the final and complete incorporation of these two kingdoms into Prussia in 1866.11 The Italian government considered the treaties between foreign powers and Tuscany, the Two Sicilies and the several other Italian states to have been extinguished, at least for most purposes, upon the consolidation of these states with Sardinia in 1860. Treaties theretofore concluded by Sardinia, the nucleus of the consolidated kingdom of Italy, were regarded as still binding and applicable to the whole kingdom.12 Shortly after the consolidation, new treaties were however concluded with many of the treaty powers. It has been held by the tribunals of both France and Italy that Article XXII of the treaty between France and Sardinia concluded March 24, 1760, providing for the execution of judgments of the courts of the one in the territory of the other, was applicable to the kingdom of Italy after the consolidation, and binding upon the two countries.13 Upon the permanent occupation of

10 Id., 351. See, also, Vattel, Bk. II, c. XII, §176.

II U. S. For. Rel., 1875, p. 479. See for decree of the King of Prussia, dated September 20, 1866, uniting "forever with the Prussian monarchy," Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau and Frankfort, Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty, III, 1741. As to treaties between Hanover and the Netherlands likewise terminated, see Archives diplomatiques, 1868, p. 745; Kiatibian, Conséquences juridiques des Transformations Territoriales, 30-31.

12 Dip. Cor. 1864, IV, 328, 334. See also Kiatibian, Conséquences juridiques des Transformations Territoriales, 81-82, 89. It may be noted that in the treaty concluded with Great Britain August 6, 1863, it was expressly provided that the treaties "in force," among which those with the Two Sicilies were enumerated, were to be superseded by the new treaty. Art. XX. Brit. and For. State Papers, LIII, 45.

13 Kiatibian, 101, citing decisions of the Court of Paris, December 1, 1879, and the tribunal of St. Quentin, October 30, 1885; Larivière, Trans