Neither by the law of nations nor by the French-American treaty then in force had a French consul in Charleston in 1793 jurisdiction to condemn as legal prize a British vessel captured and brought into that port by a French frigate; and such act is not only a nullity, but justifies an appeal to the French minister to "interpose efficaciously to prevent a repetition of the error." Mr. Jefferson, Sec. of State, to Mr. Ternant, French min., May 15, 1793. This view was taken by the Supreme Court in Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall. 6. By article 28 of the treaty between the United States and Hayti of November 3, 1863, it is provided "that in matters of prize in all eases the established courts for prize causes, in the country to which the prizes may be conducted, shall alone take cognizance of them.' “The tribunal before which the Haytian Republic and her officers were brought was hastily improvised for the occasion and consisted of two commissioners specially appointed on the 21st of October, 1888, to examine the case of the Haytian Republic. It was in no sense 'an established court for prize causes,' as stipulated in the treaty, but had for its special and only authority the order of the provisional president, Légitime. Its proceedings had scarcely a feature of formality and regularity. The witnesses before it, whose statements were generally founded on hearsay and often palpably inconsistent with established facts, were not even sworn, and no opportunity was given for defense, although the reasonable delay of four days, two of which were holidays, was requested for that purpose and refused. "Such proceedings appear only the more indefensible when it is considered that the provisional president, Légitime, and his minister for foreign affairs now set up a violation of the municipal law of Hayti as the ground of the condemnation of the vessel and the imprisonment of her officers. The professed character of the commission was that of a prize court,' and it is so styled in your notes, to which I have the honor now to reply. The trial of an alleged violation of Haytian municipal law was thus wholly outside its competence. As the tribunal for the examination of such a charge its proceedings were thus not only confessedly without jurisdiction, but destitute of regularity, and also palpably violative of the provisions of the sixth article of the treaty of 1864, which guaranties to citizens of the United States access to the ordinary courts of justice, and full opportunity to defend their rights and interests before them. "A prize court is not a court of criminal jurisdiction. The condemnation of the vessel and cargo' (Bates, Attorney-General, 10 Opin. Atty. Gen'l, 453) in a prize court is not a criminal sentence. No person is charged with an offense; and so no person is in condition to be relieved and reinstated by a pardon.' "To such proceedings as those of the special Haytian commission above described, it is the opinion of the Department that the doctrines set forth in your note of the 19th instant, in relation to appeals from the decisions of prize tribunals, have no application. Such rules can be held to apply only to the procedure of regularly established courts acting within the limits of their competency, and from whose decisions appeals are provided for. It can not be admitted that the decrees of an extraordinary commission, which assumes to act in disregard of treaties and the law of nations, must stand unquestioned as a subject for judicial review, or that the persons who have been deprived of their property or of their personal freedom by such decrees are bound to seek judicial relief. Those doctrines apply only to the regular and formal proceedings of the established judicial courts of a country, acting according to recognized principles of justice. In other cases relief and redress may be obtained by direct appeal to the government of the individuals whose rights of person and property have been invaded." Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Preston, Haytian min. Nov. 28, 1888, The Haytian Government was required to release the ship and pay an The United States not having acknowledged the existence of a Mexican Republic or State at war with Spain, the Supreme Court does not recognize the existence of any lawful court of prize at Gal veston. The Nueva Anna and Liebre, 6 Wheat. 193. The proceedings of a prize court of the Confederate States are of no validity in the United States, and a condemnation and sale by such a court do not convey any title to the purchaser, or confer upon him any right to give a title to others. The Lilla, 2 Sprague, 177. II. JURISDICTION. 1. COURTS OF CAPTOR'S COUNTRY. § 1223. Process was issued by the United States district court at Philadelphia for the seizure of the French privateer Cassius and the arrest of her commander, Samuel Davis, in a suit for damages by the owner of an American vessel and cargo which the Cassius had captured on the high seas and carried into Port de Paix, where they were condemned. Though it was alleged that the Cassius was fitted out in the United States in violation of their laws, and that Davis, her commander, was a citizen of the United States, the Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition to the district court, on the ground that the trial of prizes made by French cruisers on the high seas and brought within the French jurisdiction belonged of right and exclusively to the French tribunals, and that French cruisers and their officers ought not to be held to answer in the United States for such transactions. The writ observed that the libel did not allege that the Cassius was fitted out either by the French Republic or by Davis, or that she was at the time the property of that Republic, or that Davis was concerned in the fitting out, or that he was retained in the French service in the United States. United States v. Richard Peters (1795), 3 Dall. 121. The reporter, in a note to this case (p. 132), says that the libel for damages was accordingly superseded; "but an information, Ketland qui tam, etc.. was immediately afterwards filed in the circuit court against the corvette, for the illegal outfit in violation of the act of Congress, and the vessel being thereupon attached, an application was made to Judge Peters, to discharge her on giving security, but the judge was of opinion, that he had no power as the district judge. to make such an order in a cause depending in the circuit court. The French minister, then deeming (as I have been informed) this prosecution to be a violation of the rights and property of the Republic, delivered a remonstrance to our Government; and, converting the judicial inquiry into a matter of state, abandoned the corvette, and discharged the officers and crew. See 2 vol., p. 365. Ketland qui tam versus The Cassius." The exclusive cognizance of prize questions belongs in general to the capturing power, and the courts of other countries will not undertake to redress alleged marine torts committed by public armed vessels in assertion of belligerent rights. This applies to privateers, duly commissioned. L'Invincible, 1 Wheat. 238. The court of admiralty of the State of Delaware had, in accordance with common-law doctrine, jurisdiction of a prize made at Whitehall landing, in Little Duck Creek, in the body of Kent County. W. B. r. Latimer, Delaware Court of Errors, 1788, 4 Dall. App. I. The power of the courts in the United States to adjudge prize cases is dependent upon legislation by Congress. The Mary and Susan, 1 Wheat. 46. The legislation of the United States in reference to prizes is to be found in the following statutes: (1) Act in respect to right of salvage in case of reprisals, Mar. 3, 1800, 2 Stat. 16. (2) Supplementary act of Jan. 27, 1813, id. 792. (3) Act simplifying process of seizure, Mar. 25, 1862, 12 Stat. 374. (4) Sections 2, 6, and 12 of the act of July 17, 1862, in reference to the U. S. Navy, id. 600. (5) Act regulating prize procedure, Mar. 3, 1863, id. 759. (6) Act regulating prize procedure and distribution, June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 306, 314; act for the reorganization of the Navy and Marine Corps, Mar. 3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1004. "The prize court of an ally can not condemn. Prize or no prize, is a question belonging exclusively to the courts of the country of the captor." 1 Kent, Comm. 103; Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall. 6. The United States have the right to order an uncondemned ship, captured by the subjects of a foreign power, out of their territory. Lee, At. Gen., 1797, 1 Op. 78. See 8 Hamilton's Works, by Lodge, 304. The owner, master, supercargo, and crew of a Haytien schooner filed a libel for a marine trespass in the United States district court for the southern district of New York against the owners of an American privateer. The evidence showed that the privateer seized, robbed, and plundered the schooner, and maltreated some of her crew, and then permitted her to proceed on her course. The name of the privateer was the Scourge, commanded by Samuel Eames. Objection was made to the jurisdiction of the court. Held, that the court had, independently of the provisions of the prize act of June 26, 1812, chapter 107, and by virtue of its general maritime jurisdiction, authority to entertain the suit. The court said that this point had been so repeatedly decided that it could not be permitted again to be judicially brought into doubt. The Amiable Nancy (1818), 3 Wheat. 546. Wheaton refers, in a footnote, to the appendix to volume 2 of his reports, See, also, Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How. 498. When the courts have acquired jurisdiction of cases of maritime capture, the political department of the Government should postpone the consideration of questions concerning reclamations and indemnities until the judiciary has finally performed its functions in these cases. Bates, At. Gen. 1864, 11 Op. 117. "Your letter of the 2d instant has been received. You state your purpose to visit Europe this summer, and make enquiries respecting the treatment you would receive should war break out between England and Russia, and the British steamer on which you take passage be captured by a Russian cruiser. PRIZE COURTS AND PROCEDURE. [§ 1224. "Neutral passengers in such a case, like neutral goods not contraband of war, found on board a belligerent vessel, are exempt from the jurisdiction of any prize court before which the vessel when captured might be taken. The captor would be under no obligation to transport either passengers or goods, being neutral, to any other port of debarkation than that where a competent prize court may sit. "The Department usually abstains from answering hypothetical questions on points of international law which are usually treated of in the standard text-books, but the answer herein conveyed seems due to your courteous enquiry." Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Boya, May 5, 1885, 155 MS. Dom. Let. 286. 2. POSSESSION OF THE CAPTURED PROPERTY. § 1224. See supra, § 1212. A captor may, under imperative circumstances, sell the captured property and subject the proceeds to the adjudication. Although it is the duty of the captor promptly to take the captured property before a prize court, yet he may, under imperative circumstances, sell it and subject the proceeds to adjudication. Jecker r. Montgomery, 13 How. 498; Fay v. Montgomery, 1 Curtis, 266. The American schooner Fortitude, having been captured by a French privateer under the Milan decree, was taken into the Dutch island of St. Martins and left there, while the prize master proceeded to the French island of Guadaloupe, with a copy of the schooner's papers, for the purpose of instituting proceedings for condemnation. Sentence of condemnation was pronounced, but in the meantime the Dutch governor of St. Martins, acting under the laws and constitution of the island and without authority from the tribunal at Guadaloupe, had sold the schooner and cargo; and a part of the cargo was brought to the United States, where a libel was filed for its recovery. In support of this claim it was urged that the jurisdiction of the prize court depended on the possession of the thing; that the sentence was a formal decision by which a forcible possession was converted into a civil right; and that, the possession being gone, there was nothing on which the sentence could operate. Held that, however just this reasoning might be where the possession of the captor had been divested by an adversary force, as in cases of recapture, rescue, or escape, it did not apply to the present case, in which the possession was not an adversary possession, but the possession of a person claim |