have been gained by a further investigation as to the feeling or prejudice of the complaining witness towards the plaintiff in error.

Plaintiff in error further insists that reversible error was committed by the special State's attorney in the crossexamination of the plaintiff in error. He was asked, on cross-examination, whether he had published in the issue of his paper July 8, 1908, an article containing the statement: "Franklin J. Stransky has prostituted the office of State's attorney for his private interests and for political purposes and through it to eke out his spite and that of others." An objection to this question was sustained. He was then asked if he had not published a printed hand-bill or "dodger" containing a similar statement. An objection to this question was sustained by the court. He was then asked if he had not written and caused to be printed in the same month an article which opened with the statement, "Let every man, let every citizen of Carroll county,take this statement home with him," followed by a charge against the State's attorney similar to the one already referred to. An objection was also sustained to this question. It is urged that the continued repetition of these questions tended to prejudice the jury even though the court sustained the objections. The plaintiff in error testified that he did not have any unfriendly feeling towards the prosecuting witness, and it was insisted by the special State's attorney that he had a right to prove the publication of these articles by plaintiff in error in order to show his feeling. Without deciding that question, we deem it sufficient to say that we do not think the prosecuting attorney asked these questions of the witness from an improper motive or that he persisted in asking similar questions merely for the purpose of prejudicing the jury. In the light of all the facts in the record we do not think the jury were improperly prejudiced by these questions.

Plaintiff in error next contends that the court erred in excluding evidence offered by the plaintiff in error as to what he intended by certain portions of the alleged libelous article. The rule is, that in the construction of an article such as this the whole of the language of the article must be read together and the meaning of any part gathered from the reading of the whole article. The test is, what would men of ordinary understanding infer from the words of the libel? (People v. Fuller, supra; Newell on Libel and Slander, p. 301; Townsend on Slander and Libel,-2d ed.-sec. 139.) The sense in which the publisher meant the language cannot be material. When a party has clearly imputed wrongdoing on the part of another, he can not afterwards be permitted to say, "I did not intend what my words legally imply." The guilt of plaintiff in error must be determined by the article itself and the meaning that would naturally be attributed to the words used therein, and not by any unexpressed meaning unknown to the readers of the article. State v. Heacock, 76 N. W. Rep. 654; Miller v. Johnson, 79 Ill. 58.

Plaintiff in error argues at length in regard to the giving and refusal of instructions. Twenty-two were given for the People, eighteen for plaintiff in error, and twentyone asked by him were refused. Plaintiff in error argues that substantially all of those given for defendant in error were erroneous and that all the refused instructions were improperly refused. It is insisted that the first instruction for the People is misleading because, after setting out the definition of criminal libel as given in section 177 of the Criminal Code, it afterwards, in repeating the substance of the definition, left out the word "thereby," as given in the statute. We do not think it possible that the jury were misled on this account.

It is insisted that the sixth instruction given for the People permitted the jury to judge of the libelous article as ordinary and reasonable men would in the light of the

surrounding circumstances, and that the instruction did not confine the jury to the facts and circumstances in evidence. We do not think this instruction is open to this criticism. If it were, the other instructions given clearly tell the jury that they were limited to the facts and circumstances in evidence, and as instruction No. 6 did not direct a verdict it must necessarily be considerd in connection with all the other instructions.

Other instructions given for the People are complained of because, it is alleged, they put the burden of proof as to the truth of the article in question upon plaintiff in error. At common law the truth could not be shown in the defense of a prosecution for libel. The rule is changed in this State, and the truth is now a defense when published with good motives and for justifiable ends. It is, however, an affirmative defense and must be proved by the defendant. (People v. Fuller, supra.) The instructions in question were in harmony with this rule.

It is further insisted that certain instructions for the People failed to tell the jury that when the words of an alleged libel could have two meanings, one harmless and the other libelous, the innocent one should be taken. The instructions in question are not open to this charge. Furthermore, other instructions given for the plaintiff in error fully set out his contention on this question. Neither is there basis for counsel's contention that certain instructions for the People took from the jury the right to determine the law as well as the facts in the case.

The complaint as to the refusal of the court to give the first, second, third, fifth, eighth, ninth and tenth instructions asked by plaintiff in error is without merit. Each of these instructions called particular attention to isolated portions of the article in question. The rule is too well settled to require a citation of authorities that such instructions are improper. Other refused instructions cast upon the People the burden of proving the falsity of the statements

in said libelous article. The truth as to this article was an affirmative defense resting upon the plaintiff in error. (People v. Fuller, supra.) Certain other refused instructions were covered by those that were given.

The fourteenth refused instruction stated that plaintiff in error was a competent witness and that his testimony should not be discredited from caprice or because he was the defendant; that it should be treated the same as that of any other witness and subjected to the same tests, and while the jury might consider his interest in the result of the trial, yet they should also take into consideration the fact, if it was a fact, that he was corroborated by other credible evidence or by facts and circumstances proven on the trial. This instruction stated a correct rule of law and could properly have been given. (McElroy v. People, 202 Ill. 473; Schultz v. People, 210 id. 196.) Plaintiff in error, while called as a witness, did not testify as to any material facts, and therefore there was no testimony in the case that corroborated him. His testimony could not have influenced the verdict. The article was libelous in itself. His testimony, in substance, was as to only a few of the less serious charges in said article, claiming that they were published in good faith. The fact that they were published in good faith could have no bearing on the question at issue unless the charges were true. No attempt was made to show that they were true. The question of good faith could therefore have no bearing except as to the amount of the fine. With this the jury were not concerned. They only found whether he was guilty or innocent and the court fixed the fine. We do not think the refusal of this instruction injured plaintiff in error.

The instructions, taken as a series, fully and fairly instructed the jury as to the law of the case. While there was some inaccuracy in some of the instructions, it is impracticable to require absolute accuracy. It is sufficient if

they substantially present the law of the case fairly to the jury. Ritzman v. People, 110 Ill. 362.

It is admitted that plaintiff in error wrote the article in question. It was clearly libelous, and no attempt was made to show that the charges were true or that the main portions of the article were published with justifiable motives. The plaintiff in error was admittedly guilty. Considering the nature of the article in question, the fine was certainly not excessive. Under such circumstances this court will not reverse a judgment for slight errors committed on the trial when it can see they did not affect the result. Wistrand v. People, 218 Ill. 323, and cases cited. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

CARTWRIGHT, DUNN and COOKE, JJ., dissenting.

FRANCIS C. FARWELL, Appellant, vs. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee.

Opinion filed October 28, 1910-Rehearing denied Dec. 9, 1910.

1. PLATS-fee of Fifth avenue, in School Section addition to Chicago, is in abutting owners. The plat of School Section addition to Chicago was a common law plat, and the fee of Fifth avenue, in such addition, is therefore in the abutting owners and not in the city.

2. SAME-fee of Congress street, in School Section addition to Chicago, is in abutting owners. By reason of the failure of the owner of the land to properly acknowledge the plat by which Congress street, in School Section addition to Chicago, was dedicated, the title to said street remained in such owner, and when he conveyed lots abutting upon Congress street he conveyed title to his grantees to the center of the street.

3. The principles involved in this case are discussed in the opinions rendered in Sears v. City of Chicago, (ante, p. 204.) and in Tacoma Safety Deposit Co. v. City of Chicago, (ante, p. 192.)