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divided, and he lay between the widely separated forces with nearly his entire army. On losing Turner's Gap, on the night of the fourteenth, Lee had withdrawn the shattered troops of Hill and Longstreet, across Pleasant Valley, over the next dividing ridge, and halted in the valley of the Antietam. McClellan moved into Pleasant Valley on the morning of the fifteenth, seven miles north of the position occupied by Franklin, and with an aggregate of not less than eighty-five thousand men, exultant over their recent victories, in the mountain passes. The army would have cordially seconded any bold and dashing tactics of its leader, but he was hampered by his cautious policy and his apprehensions of Lee's "overwhelming numbers." He had telegraphed to Franklin on the thirteenth, "My general idea is to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail." But when the enemy himself had presented the first condition to him voluntarily, he would not avail himself of the opportunity.

So General Franklin was ordered to remain where he was, "to watch the large force in front of him, and protect our left and rear until the night of the sixteenth, (thirty-six hours,) when he was ordered to join the main body of the army at Keedysville. It came to pass, of course, that while Franklin waited, the rebel troops (McLaws' division) he was set to "watch" skillfully withdrew, being really greatly inferior to Franklin in numbers, and, anxious to avoid a battle, repassed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and by a wide detour struck the river again at Shepardstown, crossed to the Maryland side once more, and rejoined Lee at Sharpsburg, in time to participate in the battle of Antietam. So, also, with regard to the entire force which Lee sent on this perilous expedition-every regiment was back and in line of battle on the seventeenth of September.

CHAPTER XXIII.

IN PURSUIT-WHAT MCCLELLAN KNEW-PLEASONTON STRIKES THE REAR GUARD-RICHARDSON AND SYKES FORM LINE OF BATTLE-MCCLELLAN HOPED TO FIGHT ON THE FIFTEENTH-THE ADVANTAGE HE WOULD HAVE HAD-ADVANCE OF PATRICK'S BRIGADE-ANTIETAM AND ITS BRIDGES-SHARPSBURG AND ITS SURROUNDINGS-POSITION OF REBEL ARMY-LEE'S PROBABLE DESIGNS-STRAGGLING-APPEARANCE OF SUCCESS-OBLIGED TO FIGHT TO WITHDRAW-CIRCUMSCRIBED POSITION -FIRST CORPS ACROSS THE ANTIETAM-SHOT AND SHELL-POSITION OF UNION TROOPS-MCCLELLAN'S PLAN-FAULTY-HOOKER'S ATTACK ON SEVENTEENTH-A STRANGE OVERSIGHT-THE TWENTIETH IN SUPPORT OF CAMPBELL'S BATTERY-MAJOR HARDENBURGH IN COMMAND OF LEFT WING-CAPTURES REBEL COLORS AND RECOVERS A UNION FLAGENEMY TRY TO TAKE BATTERY-REPULSED WITH GREAT SLAUGHTERLOSS OF THE "TWENTIETH"-REBEL LOSSES-THE BATTLE AT OTHER POINTS-MANSFIELD KILLED-HOOKER WOUNDED-SUMNER ASSUMES COMMAND-WHAT HE SAID-SEDGWICK'S GAIN AND LOSS-THE "SUNKEN ROAD"-BURNSIDE'S ASSAULT AND SUCCESS-REBELS RE-ENFORCEDBURNSIDE DRIVEN BACK-THE BATTLE ENDED-SOME COMMENTS.

THE fifteenth of September was a clear, cool and breezy day. Patrick's brigade moved down from the mountain top to the turnpike, and halting by the roadside, prepared and ate its frugal breakfast. The enemy had disappeared from our front, and McClellan had begun the pursuit at an early hour. He telegraphed to Halleck at eight A.M., "I have just learned from General Hooker in the advance-who states that the information is perfectly reliable-that the enemy is making for the river in a perfect panic; and General Lee stated last night publicly that he must admit they had been shockingly whipped. I am hurrying everything for ward to endeavor to press their retreat to the utmost."

General McClellan knew that only D. H. Hill and Longstreet had been in front of his right wing, and that they were now retiring towards the Potomac, in the

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direction of Sharpsburg. He knew equally well that the strong divisions of McLaws, Anderson, Walker, A. P. Hill and Stonewall Jackson were at Harper's Ferry or its vicinity; a full day's march away. Now seemed the auspicious opportunity to crush the divisions of D. H. Hill and Longstreet, before the absent divisions could come up. And to secure this result expedition was necessary, and such positioning of the Federal army as would compel Lee to fight at once, or force him to separate himself farther and farther from his detached divisions.

Pleasonton's cavalry led the advance and overtook the enemy's rear guard at Boonsborough, where a brisk skirmish occurred, resulting in the defeat of the rebels with a loss of a number killed and wounded, and two hundred and fifty prisoners and two guns. Richardson's division of Sumner's corps followed Pleasonton, and after a march of about ten miles, descried the enemy in possession of the hill on the west side of Antietam Creek, and in front of the little village of Sharpsburg. Richardson deployed on the right of the road from Keedysville to Sharpsburg, and on the east side of the creek. Sykes, with his division of regulars, arrived soon after, and deployed on the left of the road. The afternoon was now well spent.

To have moved the right wing of McClellan's army from Turner's Gap to the Antietam in time to have attacked Lee in the afternoon of the fifteenth, does not seem an impossible exploit, and when such great advantages were offered to the Union commander by making battle before the Rebel detachments could join their chief, the utmost celerity was demanded. Franklin had telegraphed McClellan that firing ceased at Harper's Ferry at eight o'clock that morning, and the deductions were either that Miles had surrendered or that Lee had recalled his troops. In either event they would be on their return, and would increase the strength of the

Rebel army a hundred per cent. within twenty-four hours.

In his report of the battle, McClellan says: "It had been hoped to engage the enemy during the fifteenth ;" but, "after a rapid examination of the position, I found it was too late to attack that day, and at once directed the placing of the batteries in position in the centre, and indicated the bivouacs for the different corps, massing them near and on both sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike. The corps were not all in their positions until next morning after sunrise."

Patrick's brigade marched through Boonsborough on the fifteenth, and bivouacked, supperless, about three miles beyond. Marching next morning at six o'clock, we reached the circle of hills on the east side of the Aatietam, a little after seven. The position taken by Patrick's brigade proved to be in range of the enemy's batteries, and the brigade was withdrawn to a ridge which protected it from the guns.

At any time before twelve o'clock on the sixteenth, McClellan could have hurled 60,000 troops against less than half their number. Jackson had rejoined Lee that morning after an exhausting march, but he had left A. P. Hill to receive the surrender of Harper's Ferry, and McLaws, with his own and Anderson's division, was still in front of Franklin, in Pleasant Valley, and did not reach Lee until the morning of the seventeenth. Walker arrived about noon of the sixteenth; so it will be seen that Lee was allowed time to gather together the scattered divisions of his army (excepting only A. P. Hill,) before McClellan delivered battle.

The position of Patrick's brigade was changed a number of times during the day, and about three o'clock in the afternoon, it was moved to the right of the Union line, and, fording the creek, advanced up the slope on the west side, through the fields for the distance of a mile under a heavy fire of shell and solid shot, to a piece

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of woods on the Williamsport road, where it formed line of battle, and where it lay on its arms during the night.

There are four stone bridges that span Antietam Creek in the vicinity of the battle-field-the most northerly one on the Keedysville and Williamsport road; the next on the Keedysville and Sharpsburg Turnpike; the third about a mile below the second, on the Rohrersville and Sharpsburg road, and the fourth near the mouth of the creek on the road leading from Harper's Ferry to Sharpsburg, some three miles below the third bridge. The stream is sluggish, with few and difficult fords.

Sharpsburg occupies a high point of ground about a mile east of the Potomac, and a little less than a mile west of Antietam Creek. The Potomac is very serpentine in the vicinity of Sharpsburg, and immediately opposite that place makes a sharp bend to the east. Two miles north of Sharpsburg, and at an equal distance south of it, the river again diverges from its generally southerly course and runs nearly east, a distance of a mile and a half. It then turns abruptly to the westward, flows back to the line of its general direction, and pursues its course southerly. A cord drawn from the easterly point of the bend above Sharpsburg to the bank of the river at the bend below, would intersect the village, and would be about five miles long. The Antietam flows into the Potomac three miles south of Sharpsburg, and is not fordable below bridge number four. The Baltimore & Ohio Canal is constructed along the east bank of the Potomac, rendering access to the river difficult, except in the few localities where the canal is bridged. The ground rises by a steep ascent from the Potomac, about seventy-five feet, and thence easterly, the surface is broken into ridges running parallel with the river, until the high ground breaks away into the valley of the Antietam.