CHAPTER XXII. ENFORCEMENTS-COLONEL TARDY MOVEMENTS-LOCATION OF ARMY-MCCLELLAN'S VIEWS AS TO EN- STRIKE "BEAT HIM IN DETAIL"-TOO CAUTIOUS-ORDER TO FRANKLIN IT will have been observed that the movement of the army from Washington to the line of the Monocacy, was very gradual-very tardy. Perhaps the responsibility for this was about equally divided between Halleck and McClellan. But it was the latter's business to find out the position and design of the enemy, and to manœuvre his army accordingly. The means taken to this end seem to have been utterly inadequate, and, until Lee's order for the march on Harper's Ferry fell into General McClellan's hands, he knew very little of the location or movements of the Confederates. Ninetenths of the population of the western part of Maryland were loyal-McClellan had the Potomac river on his left, which could be crossed by an army only at certain well-known points, and it seems as though it ought to have been possible to procure speedy and accurate information of the enemy's passage of that stream, and the direction of his march after he threw his army into Maryland. As stated in the preceding chapter, Lee crossed the Potomac between the fourth and seventh of September, and drew up his forces around Frederick. The several corps of the Army of the Potomac were on the latter day lying in divisions and brigades at Leesburg, Rockville, Tenallytown, Offut's Cross Roads, Brook 1862.] MCCLELLAN'S VIEWS AS TO ENEMY. 303 ville, Middleburg, Darnstown and at the Mouth of Seneca—the nearest within less than a day and the most remote not more than two days' march from Frederick. McClellan "supposed it would be necessary to force the line of the Monocacy," (Report of Army of Potomac, cf p. 186,) and his dilatory movements gave the enemy abundant opportunity to compel him to fight his way across that stream, if they had chosen to do so. The river is a broad and deep one, and its passage in face of such an army as Lee commanded would have been difficult, if not impossible. But McClellan's plans were yet unformed, and as late as eight o'clock, on the evening of the eighth of September, twenty-four hours after Lee had crossed, and when his entire army was advancing on Frederick, he telegraphed to General Halleck: "I am by no means satisfied yet that the enemy have crossed the river (Potomac) in any large force." The positions of the Federal Army remained practically unchanged on the tenth, waiting for the enemy to develop himself or for General McClellan to mature a plan of campaign, and on this day he changed his views as to the locality of the enemy and telegraphed to the President as follows: "The statements I get regarding the enemy's forces that have crossed to this side (Maryland), range from 80,000 to 150,000." This put a very different aspect on the situation of affairs, and if General Lee really had anywhere near the larger number of men given, he was numerically much stronger than McClellan; and if he had anywhere near the lesser number his losses must have been extraordinary and unaccountable, for he states that he fought the battle of Antietam "with less than forty thousand men on our side." (Reports of Army of Northern Virginia, page 35.) These exaggerated stories of the strength of the Confederates drove McClellan to his cautious and dilatory policy, and he began to call for re-enforcements. On the eleventh he telegraphed General Halleck that evidence from various sources goes to prove that "almost the entire rebel army in Virginia, amounting to not less than 120,000 men, is in the vicinity of Frederick.” 66* They are probably aware that their forces are numerically superior to ours, by at least twenty-five per cent." (Report on Conduct of the War, Part 1, page 479.) General McClellan then asks that one or two of the three Army Corps opposite Washington be sent to him, and that Colonel Miles, commanding the garrison at Harper's Ferry also be directed to join him. At three o'clock and forty-five minutes, the same afternoon, he telegraphed to have the "Corps of Porter, Heintzleman and Sigel, and all the other old troops" sent to him. As to Colonel Miles, General Halleck replied: "There is no way for Colonel Miles to join you at present. The only chance is to defend his works until you can open a communication with him. When you do so he will be subject to your orders." Lee's army of 150,000 men, more or less, was between McClellan and Miles' 9,000 men, and if the former could not reach Miles, the latter could hardly have been expected to be able to reach McClellan. To the residue of the dispatch the President responded the same day, and among other things said: "If Porter, Heintzleman and Sigel were sent to you it would strip everything from the other side of the river, because the new troops have been distributed among them; as I understand it, Porter reports himself 21,000 strong. * He is ordered to-night to join you as 本 quickly as possible. I am for sending you all that can by spared, and I hope others can follow Porter very soon." On the 12th Halleck telegraphed McClellan : "Is it not possible to open communication with Harper's Ferry so that Colonel Miles' forces can co-operate with yours?" McClellan forbore to employ the tactics that a bold 1862.] MCCLELLAN'S TRUE POLICY. 305 and confident commander would have resorted to, under the circumstances in which he found himself placed. Such a commander would have pushed forward his left and interposed between Lee and his line of communication with his base, and his line of retreat in case of disaster. This would have been the initial object of the campaign for the reasons given, and it would have been the proper policy, also, in view of the position of Miles and White, whose forces should have been saved. From the time McClellan possessed himself of Lee's Order he knew what his adversary's immediate tactics were, and he should have manoeuvred to support the garrison at Harper's Ferry, not only, but to destroy the forces detached to operate against it—or he should have moved rapidly against Lee, himself, and overwhelmed him before the large force moving against Miles could succor him. Something more than energy was demanded of the Federal commander, by the circumstances of the case. There was needed boldness, dash, impetuousity -a rapid concentration of his forces on his left and a resistless assault of the passes of the mountain at Crampton's and at the Potomac itself. Crampton's Pass is but six miles south of Turner's, and debouches into Pleasant Valley, five miles from Maryland Heights, opposite Harper's Ferry. In the pre-arranged order of march, the left wing of the Federal Army, under Franklin, was to cross South Mountain at Crampton's. On the evening of the thirteenth, McClellan communicated to Franklin the substance of Lee's Order, and urged him to "seize the pass if not occupied by the enemy in force." If so occupied he was directed to make his preparations for attack and commence it a half an hour after he hears severe firing at Turner's. The rebel General McLaws, who commanded one of the divisions detached against Miles, learning of the approach of the Union forces to Crampton's, and at once appreciating the danger of allowing this force to get in his rear, sent back General Cobb, with three brigades, with orders to hold Crampton's Pass until the work at Harper's Ferry should be completed, "even if he lost his last man in doing it." (Reports of Army of Northern Virginia, Vol. II., Page 165.) As late as two o'clock on the afternoon of the fourteenth, Franklin was held in check at Burkettsville, a hamlet at the foot of the mountain. At that hour McClellan telegraphed him: "Mass your troops and carry Burkettsville at any cost." Franklin attacked, and after a fight of three hours' duration, drove the enemy out of Burkettsville, and following closely up the mountain, dislodged them from one point after another, until he gained the crest of the mountain, and the Confederates fled down the other side. On the evening of that day, Franklin's advance was in Pleasant Valley. Franklin's loss was one hundred and fifteen killed and four hundred and sixteen wounded. He captured four hundred prisoners, seven hundred stand of arms, one piece of artillery and three colors. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was about equal to Franklin's. At 8:50 on the morning of the fifteenth, Franklin telegraphed McClellan from Pleasant Valley: "The enemy is drawn up in line of battle about two miles to our front, one brigade in sight." Two hours later, he telegraphs again from the same place, that the enemy in front outnumber him two to one; "it will, of course, not answer to pursue (?) the enemy under these circumstances." But the crisis, so far as Miles was concerned, had passed. He surrendered into the hands of the enemy at eight o'clock that morning, 11,583 men, 73 pieces of artillery, 13,000 small arms and large quantities of ammunition and other stores. Colonel Miles himself was killed by a rebel shot, after the white flag had been run up. It was not too late for McClellan to revenge this unfortunate result of timid generalship. Lee's army was |