CHAPTER XVII.

POSITION OF ARMIES-ARTILLERY FIRE-FEINTS-POPE'S DIFFICULT ROLE -HALLECK'S ORDER-SIGEL-POPE'S PLAN--ITS CHANCES OF SUCCESS— SULPHUR SPRINGS-A REBEL BATTERY--C COMPANY AS SKIRMISHERSON THE RIGHT BY FILE INTO LINE-A FRESHET-NEW PLANS-POSITION OF POPE'S ARMY-WHERE IS THE FOE ?-LEE'S DESIGNS JACKSON IN REAR OF POPE-CONDITION OF POPE'S ARMY-RE-ENFORCEMENTS— JACKSON DESTROYS RAILROADS AND CARS-GOES TO CENTREVILLEPOPE'S TACTICS TO CAPTURE HIM-JACKSON'S DANGER-HOOKER AND EWELL-PATRICK'S BRIGADE-MARCH TO GAINSVILLE-MARCH OF OTHER TROOPS-FITZ-JOHN PORTER AND POPE'S ORDER-JACKSON RETURNS TO MANASSAS JUNCTION-POPE'S ORDERS THEREON-NUMBER AND QUALITY OF JACKSON'S CORPS--MARCHES FROM CENTREVILLE— POPE PURSUES-RICKETTS' DIVISION SENT TO THOROUGHFARE GAP— JACKSON SURROUNDED-KING'S DIVISION ON CENTREVILLE PIKETHREE HORSEMEN—A BATTERY-A SEVERE BATTLE-POPE'S ORDERS -HOW HIS PLANS WERE OVERTHROWN-GENERAL KING.

THE position of Pope's army on the morning of the 20th of August, was along the east bank of the Rappahannock, with its left at Kelly's Ford and its right about three miles above Rappahannock Station, whither Sigel had marched after crossing the Hedgeman, at the Sulphur Springs, until he connected with McDowell's right. The enemy's advance pushed up to Kelly's Ford and Rappahannock Station, almost immediately after the Federal troops had crossed and drove in our pickets. But finding the army in position on the opposite side of the river, they retired out of range, awaiting the arrival of the main body of their army.

The 21st of August opened with artillery fire along the river, for a distance of seven or eight miles, and several attempts were made by the enemy to cross, but they were each time repulsed. The same tactics were continued through the next day. The Twentieth Regiment was engaged during this time in supporting Cap

1862.]

HALLECK'S ORDER-SIGEL.

243

tain Reynolds' Battery L, First New York Artillery, and on picket along the river, and was under artillery fire most of the time.

Having felt our lines at every ford from Kelly's to Sigel's right, probably as feints, rather than with any design to force a crossing, the enemy began on the 22d to move slowly up the river, with the intention of turning Pope's right. This General was constrained by his orders from General Halleck to maintain his communications with Falmouth, to facilitate the junction with him of troops landing at Aquia Creek, and for the other reasons hereinbefore mentioned. His left was thereby tied as it were to the lower fords of the Rappahannock, and to extend farther to his right was to weaken his line to a dangerous degree. He represented this condition of things to Halleck, but the latter could not bring himself to contemplate the abandonment of Aquia Creek and Fredericksburg, except in the very last emergency, and he directed Pope to hold on, and promised reenforcements from the Army of the Potomac in a day or two, which would enable him to maintain his line and have a force sufficient for any required movement. On the 21st he telegraphed Pope: "Dispute every inch of ground, and fight like the devil, till we can re-enforce you. Forty-eight hours more and we can make you strong enough." But the promised re-enforcements did not come. The Army of the Potomac moved slowly toward this new field of operations, and General Halleck and the President exhausted all their powers of persuation and commands to accelerate its movements, without avail.

Sigel, who apprehended his right would be turned, proposed to withdraw from bis position, but this Pope forbade, and directed him to stand firm, but not to attempt to interfere with any effort the enemy might make to cross the Hedgeman above his right at Sulphur Springs. Pope then purposed to allow a considerable

force of the Confederates to pass the river at the point indicated, and to suddenly mass a portion of his forces and fall upon their flank, as they should move toward Warrenton, which was supposed to be their first objective. The cavalry was watching the movements of the enemy at and above Sulphur Springs. General Lee himself was at Culpepper on the night of the 21st, and it was evident that his whole army was confronting Pope.

On the night of the 22d, Pope's information of the movements and position of the enemy induced him to contemplate an immediate withdrawal behind Cedar Run, or the massing of his entire army, re-crossing the Rappahannock, and attacking the flank and rear of the Confederates. Halleck assented to this latter plan, and Pope arranged to carry it into execution as soon as Lee had thrown a sufficient number of his troops across the upper fords of the Hedgeman to give reasonable hopes of success. It was a soldierly conception, and if carried out with judgment and spirit, would have been successful, and would have changed the entire aspect and results of the campaign. Lee's army was now stretched out from the forks of the Rappahannock to Waterloo Bridge, and necessarily exposed a long flank to its adversary, and much time would be required to concentrate a sufficient body to resist such an assault as Pope contemplated. Pope intended to strike his blow on the

24th.

Therefore, on the twenty-third, McDowell's corps marched to Warrenton, through a tremendous rainstorm, and the "Twentieth" bivouacked in the streets of Warrenton that night, after a march of twelve miles. The next day we marched two miles toward the Springs and encamped. The following morning we broke camp at six o'clock, and marched to the White Sulphur Springs, seven miles west of Warrenton. The Springs is a fashionable summer resort, with a large and fine hotel

1862.]

CAPTAIN TAPPEN-A FRESHET.

245

and a number of cottages, with grounds handsomely arranged and laid out. As we approached the Springs, a battery, posted near a large yellow house on the opposite side of the river (the Hedgeman river flows within a few hundred feet of the Springs), opened upon our column, and at the same moment a brisk musketry fire was delivered upon General Patrick and staff, who had ridden to the Hedgeman to water their horses, unsuspecting the presence of a foe. C Company, Captain Tappen, was at once deployed as skirmishers, and advancing through the grounds surrounding the Springs, they got into the tall grass along the Hedgeman, where the rebel infantrymen were concealed, and soon drove them from cover and forced them to retreat, leaving Captain Tappen in possession of the ground. At a later hour of the day Colonel Pratt was ordered to move across an open field, almost under the guns of the rebel battery, which still maintained its fire, and take up a position on a hill to our left and front. The regiment moved down the road by wings, the right under command of Colonel Pratt, and the left under LieutenantColonel Gates. Reaching the vicinity of the Hedgeman, they filed to the left into a by-road, and moving up that a few hundred yards filed to the right into an open field. As each wing entered the field it formed line of battleon the right by file-to present a narrower mark to the rebel artillerists, who were now directing their guns exclusively at the Twentieth. Our movements were so rapid they could not get range of us, and we reached the position we were directed to occupy without casualty. Infantry skirmishing continued through the day, and we had a few men wounded. We remained in this position during the night.

The next day the streams began to experience the effect of the heavy rains, and before night they had risen six feet. Both the Hedgeman and the Rappahannock were fordable at several different places from

Kelly's to the Blue Ridge, in ordinary August weather, but now both were impassable, except by the bridge at Rappahannock Station. So, the strategy on which so many hopes had been grounded came to naught, and it was necessary to recast a plan of campaign to meet the changed circumstances, and to utilize, if possible, the unlooked-for flood.

It was believed at headquarters that a considerable body of the enemy was on the left side of the river, and Pope resolved to attack them before the subsidence of the water should allow them to retreat or to be re-enforced. The Federals were posted on the night of the 24th as follows: Ricketts' division of McDowell's corps, on the road from Warrenton to Waterloo Bridge, and about four miles west of Waterloo; King's division, between Warrenton and Sulphur Springs; Sigel's corps, near the Rappahannock, with his advance at Waterloo, and his rear in the direction of Sulphur Springs; in his rear and immediately in contact with him, was Banks' corps; while Reno was lying east, and very near the Springs.

But it was found that the enemy had not exposed himself to this peril. He certainly was not on the left side of the river, and where he was, became, for a time, the leading question. No fact could more forcibly convey an idea of the topography of the country in which these military operations were being carried on, than that each army was often in ignorance of the position of the other, although they were manœuvering within a few miles of each other. On the 25th, General Sigel insists that the main force of the enemy is advancing on Waterloo Bridge, where he is stationed, and he wants 20-pound Parrott guns at once. Pope orders Sigel to ford the river in the morning, at daylight, and find out what is in front of him. Pope does not believe there is any enemy in force there, but thinks they have gone to the west and northwest. McDowell telegraphs Pope: