however jumbled: but if one atom be taken away, it is not the fame mafs.

In Vegetables, the identity depends not on the fame mafs, and is not applyed to the fame thing. The reafon of this is the difference between an animate body, and mafs of matter; This being only the cohesion of particles any how united; The o ther, fuch a difpofition and organization of parts, as is fit to receive and diftribute nourishment, fo as to continue and frame the wood, bark, leaves,

c. (of an Oak, for inftance) in which confifts the vegetable life. That therefore which has fuch an organization of parts partaking of one common life, continues to be the fame Plant, tho' that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant. The cafe is not so much different in Brutes, but that any one may hence fee what makes an Animal, and continues it the fame.

The identity of the fame Man likewife confifts in a participation of the fame continued life, in fucceeding particles of matter vitally united to the fame organized body.

To understand Identity aright, we must consider what Idea the word it is applied to stands for. It being one thing to be the fame Substance, another the fame Man, and a third the fame Person.

An Animal, is a living organized body: and the fame animal, is the fame continued life communi

cated to different particles of matter, as they happen fucceffively to be united to that body, and our notion of Man, is but of a particular fort of Animal.

Perfon ftands for an intelligent being, that reafons and reflects, and can confider it self the fame thing in different times and places; which it doth by that Consciousness that is infeparable from thinking. By this every one is to himself what he calls Self, without confidering whether that Self be continu'd in the fame, or divers fubftances. In this confifts Perfonal Identity, or the fameness of a rational being: and fo far as this confcioufnefs extends backward to any paft action, or thought, so far reaches the identity of that perfon. It is the fame Self now, it was then: and it is by the fame Self, with this prefent one, that now reflects on it, that that action was done.

Self is that confcious thinking thing, whatever fubftance it matters not, which is confcious of pleasure or pain, capable of happiness or mifery; and fo is concerned for it self, as far as that confcioufnefs extends. That with which the confcioufnefs of this prefent thinking thing, can join it self, makes the fame person, and is one self with it; and fo attributes to it felf, and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that confciousness reaches.:

This Perfonal Identity is the object of reward

and punishment, being that by which every one is concerned for himself. If the Consciousness went along with the little finger, when that was cut off, it would be the fame felf that was juft before concerned for the whole body.

If the fame Socrates, waking and fleeping, did not partake of the fame consciousness, they would not be the fame Perfon. Socrates waking, could not be in justice accountable for what Socrates sleeping did, no more than one Twin, for what his brother Twin did, because their outfides were fo like, that they could not be diftinguifhed.

But fuppofe I wholly lofe the memory of fome parts of my life, beyond a poffibility of retrieving them, fo that I shall never be conscious of them again; am I not the fame Perfon that did those actions, tho' I have now forgot them? I answer, that we must here take notice what the word is applied to, which in this cafe is the man only: and the fame man being prefumed to be the fame perfon, Iis eafily here fuppos'd to stand alfo for the faine perfon. But if it be poffible for the fame man, to have distinct incommunicable confciousness at different times, it is past doubt the fame man would, at different times, make different perfons. Which we fee is the fense of mankind in the folemnest declaration of their opinions, human laws not punishing the madman for the fober man's actions, nor the fober man for what the madman did; thereby

making them two perfons. Thus we fay in English, fuch a one is not himself, or is besides himself, in which phrases it is infinuated, that Self is changed, and the Self fame Perfon is no longer in that man.

But is not a man drunk or fober the fame Per

fon? why elfe is he punifhed for the fame fact he commits when drunk, tho' he be never afterwards conscious of it? just as much the fame person, as a man that walks, and does other things in his fleep, is the fame perfon, and is as answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Human laws punish both with a juftice fuitable to their way of knowledge: because in these cafes they cannot diftinguish certainly what is real, and what is counterfeit; and fo the ignorance in drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea. For tho' punishment be annexed to perfonality, and perfonality to consciousness; and the drunkard perhaps is not confcious of what he did; yet human judicatures juftly punish him, because the fact is proved against him; but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him. But in the great day wherein the Secrets of all Hearts fhall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of, but fhall receive his doom, his own Confcience accuf ing, or else excusing him.

To conclude, whatever fubftance begins to exift, it must during its existence be the fame : whatever compofitions of fubstances begin to exist, during

the union of thofe fubftances, the concrete must be the fame. Whatsoever mode begins to exift, during its existence it is the fame: and fo if the compofition be of diftinct fubstances, and different modes, the fame rule holds. Whence it appears that the difficulty or obfcurity that has been about this matter, rather arifes from names ill us'd, than from any = obfcurity in the things themselves. For whatever makes the fpecifick Idea, to which the name is applied, if that Idea be fteadily kept to, the diftinction of any thing into the fame, and divers, will eafily be conceived, and there can arise no doubt concerning it.

A

CHA P. XXVIII.

Of other Relations.

LL fimple Ideas, wherein are parts or degrees, afford an occafion of comparing the fubjects wherein they are to one another in respect of thofe fimple Ideas. As Whiter, Sweeter, More, Lefs, &c. thefe depending on the equality and excefs of the fame fimple Idea, in feveral fubjects may be called, Proportional Relations.

Another occafion of comparing things is taken from the circumstances of their origine, as Father, Son, Brother, &c. thefe may be called Natural Relations.