Hence we may conclude that he has the perfecteft idea of any particular fubftance, who has collected most of thofe fimple ideas which do exist in it among which we are to reckon its active pow ers, and paffive capacities, tho' not strictly simple i deas.

Secondary qualities for the moft part ferve to diftinguish substances. For our fenfes fail us in the difcovery of the Bulk, Figure, Texture, &c. of the. minute parts of bodies on which their real conftitutions and differences depend: and fecondary qualities are nothing but powers with relation to our fenfes. The ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal fubftances, are of three forts. First, The ideas of primary qualities of things, which are difco, ver'd by our fenfes : fuch are Bulk, Figure, Motion, &c. Secondly,The fenfible fecondary qualities, which are nothing but powers to produce feveral ideas in us by our fenfes. Thirdly, The aptnefs we confider in any fubftance to cause, or receive fuch alterations of primary qualities, as that the substance fo alter'd, fhould produce in us different ideas, from what it did before: and they are call'd Active and Paffive Powers. All which, as far as we have any notice, or notion of them, terminate in Simple ideas.

Had we fenfes acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies, it is not to be doubted, but they would produce quite different ideas in us

as we find in viewing things with microscopes. Such bodies as to our naked eyes are colour'd and opaque, will through microscopes appear pellucid. Blood to the naked eye appears all red; but by a good microscope we fee only fome red globules fwimming in a tranfparent liquor.

The infinite wife Author of our beings has fitted our organs, and faculties to the conveniences of life and the business we have to do here: we may by our fenfes know and distinguish things fo far as to accommodate them to the exigencies of this life. We have alfo infight enough into their admirable contrivances, and wonderful effects to admire, and magnifie the wifdom, power and goodnefs of their Author. Such a knowledge as this which is fuited to our prefent condition, we want not faculties to attain; and we are fitted well enough with abilities to provide for the conveniences of living.

Befides the complex ideas we have of material Substances; by the fimple ideas taken from the operations of our own minds, which we experiment in ourselves, as Thinking, Understanding, Willing, Knowing, &c. co-exifting in the fame fubftance, we are able to frame the complex idea of a Spirit. And this idea of an immaterial fubftance, is as clear as that we have of a material. By joining these with Substance, of which we have no diftinct idea, we have the idea of a Spirit, and by putting together the ideas of coherent, folid parts, and power

of being mov'd, join'd with Subftance, of which likewife we have no pofitive idea, we have the idea of Matter. The one is as clear and diftinct as the other. The fubftance of Spirit is unknown to us; and fo is the substance of Body equally unknown to us: two primary qualities or properties of Body, viz. Solid coherent parts, and impulse, we have diftinct clear ideas of: fo likewise have we, of two primary qualities or properties of Spirit, Thinking and a power of Action. We have alfo clear and diftinct ideas of feveral qualities inherent in bodies, which are but the various modifications of the extenfion of cohering folid parts, and their motion. We have likewife the ideas of the feveral modes of Thinking, viz. Believing, Doubting, Hoping, Fearing, &c. as alfo of Willing and Moving the Body confequent to it.

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If this notion of Spirit may have fome difficulties in it, not eafie to be explain'd, we have no more reafon to deny or doubt of the existence of Spirits, than we have, to deny or doubt of the existence of Body because the notion of Body is cumbred with fome difficulties very hard, and perhaps impoffible to be explain'd. The divifibility in infinitum, for inftance, of any finite extenfion involves us whether we grant or deny it in confequences impoffible to be explicated, or made confistent. We have therefore as much reafon to be fatisfied with our notion of Spirit, as with our notion of Body;

and the existence of the one, as well as the other. We have no other idea of the Supream Being, but a complex one of Existence, Power, Knowledge, Duration, Pleafure, Happiness, and of feveral other qualities, and powers which it is better to have than be without, with the addition of infinite to each of these.

In which complex idea we may obferve that there is no fimple one, bating Infinity, which is not also a part of our complex idea of other fpirits; because in our ideas, as well of fpirits as other things, we are restrain'd to those we receive from Senfation and Reflection.

T

CHA P. XXIV.

Of Collective Ideas of Subftances.

Here are other ideas of Subftances which may be call'd Collective, which are made up of many particular fubftances confider'd as united into one idea, as a Troop, Army, &c. which the mind makes by its power of compofition. Thefe collective ideas are but the artificial draughts of the mind bringing things remote, and independent into one view, the better to contemplate and dif course of them united into one conception, and fignify'd by one name. For there are no things fo

remote, which the mind cannot by this art of compofition, bring into one idea, as is vifible in that fignified by the name Universe.

TH

CHA P. XXV.

Of Relation.

Here is another fet of ideas which the mind gets from the comparing of one thing with another. When the mind fo confiders one thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and fet it by another, and carry its view from one to the other, this is Relation or Respect: and the denominations given to things intimating that Respect, are what we call Relatives, and the things fo brought together Related. Thus when I call Cajus, Husband, or Whiter, I intimate fome other perfon, or thing in both cafes, with which I compare him. Any of our ideas may be the foundation of Relation.

Where languages have fail'd to give cor-relative names, there the Relation is not so easily taken notice of: as in Concubine, which is a Relative name, as well as Wife.

The ideas of Relation may be the fame, in those men who have far different ideas of the things that are Related. Thus those who have different ideas, of Man, may agree in that of Father.

G