themfelves: thus by feeing two men wrestle, we get the idea of wrestling.

Secondly, By invention or voluntary putting to gether of feveral fimple ideas in our own minds; fo he that first invented Printing, had an idea of it first in his mind, before it ever existed.

Thirdly, By explaining the names of actions we never faw, or notions we cannot fee; and by enumerating all thofe ideas which go to the making them up. Thus the mixed Mode which the word Lie ftands for, is made up of thefe fimple ideas : First, Articulate founds. Secondly, Certain ideas in the mind of the fpeaker. Thirdly, Those words, the figns of thefe ideas. Fourthly, Thofe figns put toge ther by Affirmation or Negation, otherwife than the ideas they ftand for, are in the mind of the fpeaker. Since languages are made, complex ideas are ufually got by the explication of thofe terms that stand for them: for fince they consist of fimple ideas combined, they may by words standing for thofe fimple ideas be reprefented to the mind of one who understands those words, though that combination of fimple ideas was never offer'd to his mind by the real exiftence of things..

Mixed Modes have their unity from an act of the mind, combining thofe feveral fimple ideas together, and confidering them as one complex one: The mark of this union is one name given to that combination. Men feldom reckon any number

of ideas to make one complex one: but fuch coflections as there be names for. Thus the killing of an old man, is as fit to be united into one complex idea, as that of a father: yet there being no name for it, it is not taken for a particular complex idea; nor a distinct fpecies of action, from that of killing any other man.

Those collections of ideas have names generally, affix'd, which are of frequent ufe in converfation: in which cafes men endeavour to communicate their thoughts to one another with all poffible difpatch. Those others which they have feldom occafion to mention, they tie not together, nor give

them names.

3

This gives the reafon, why there are words in every language, which cannot be rendred by any one fingle word of another. For the fashions and customs of one nation, make feveral combinations of ideas familiar in one, which another had never any occafion to make. Such were, 'Ospanioμòs· among the Greeks, Profcriptio among the Romans. This alfo occafions the conftant change of langua ges; becaufe the change of custom and opinions, brings with it new combinations of ideas, which, to avoid long defcriptions, have new names an-. nex'd to them, and fo they become new species of mixed modes.

Of all our fimple ideas, thofe that have had moft mixed modes made out of them, are Thinking, and

Motion; (which comprehend in them all Action) and Power, from whence thefe actions are conceiv'd to flow. For actions being the great business of mankind, it is no wonder if the feveral modes of Thinking and Motion should be taken notice of, the ideas of them obferv'd and laid up in memory, and have names affign'd them. For without fuch complex ideas with names to them, men cou'd not eafily hold any communication about them. Of this kind are the modes of actions diftinguish'd by their Caufes, Means, Objects, Ends, Inftruments, Time, Place, and other circumstances; as also of the powers fitted for those actions: thus Boldness is the power to do or fpeak what we intend without fear or diforder: which power of doing any thing, when it has been acquir'd by the frequent doing the fame thing, is that idea we call Habit: when forward and ready upon every occasion to break into action, we call it Difpofition. Thus Te ftiness, is a difpofition or aptnefs to be angry.

Power being the fource of all action, the fubftances wherein these powers are, when they exert this power, are call'd Causes: and the substances thereupon produc❜d, or the fimple ideas introduc'd into any fubject, effects. The efficacy whereby the new fubftance or idea is produc'd, is call'd in the fubject exerting that power, Action; in the subject wherein any fimple idea is chang'd, or produc'd, Paffion: which efficacy in intellectual agents, we

can, I think, conceive to be nothing else but mode's of Thinking and Willing: in corporeal agents, nothing else but modifications of motion. Whatever fort of action, befides these produces any effect; I confefs my self to have no notion, or idea of. And therefore many words which feem to exprefs fome action, fignifie nothing of the action, but barely the effect, with fome circumstances of the fubject wrought on, or caufe operating. Thus Creation, Annihilation, contain in them no idea of the action or manner, whereby they are produc'd, but barely of the caufe, and the thing done. And when a country-man fays the cold freezes water, tho' the word Freezing, feem to import fome action, yet it truly fignifies nothing but the effect, viz. That water that was before fluid, is become hard, and confiftent, without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.

T

CHA P. XXIII.

Of our Complex Ideas of Substances.

HE mind obferving feveral fimple ideas to

go conftantly together, which being prefum'd to belong to one thing, are call'd fo united in one fubject by one name, which we are apt afterward to talk of and confider as one fimple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas to

gether. We imagine not these simple ideas to fub · fift by themselves, but fuppofe fome Subftratum, wherein they fubfift, which we call Subftance. The idea of pure fubftance is nothing but the fup-pos'd, but unknown fupport of these qualities, which are capable of producing simple ideas in us..

The ideas of particular Substances are compos'd out of this obfcure and general idea of Substance, together with fuch combinations of fimple ideas, as are obferv'd to exist together, and fuppos'd to flow from the internal constitution, and unknown effence of that fubftance. Thus we come by the ideas of Man, Horfe, Geld, &c. Thus the fenfible qualities of Iron, or a Diamond make the complex. ideas of thofe fubftances, which a Smith or a Jeweller commonly knows better than a philofopher.

The fame happens concerning the operations. of the mind, viz. Thinking, Reasoning, &c. which we concluding not to fubfift by themselves, nort apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produc'd by it; we think them the actions of fome other fubftance, which we call Spirit: of whofe fubítance or nature we have as clear a notion as of that of body; the one being but the suppos'd Subftratum of the fimple ideas we have from without; as the other of those operations which we experiment in our felves within fo that the idea of corporeal Subftance in matter, is as remote from our

conceptions as that of /piritual Subftance...

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