them. Ideas thus made up of feveral ones put together, I call complex, as Man, Army, Beauty, Gratitude, &c. By this faculty of repeating and joyning together its ideas, the mind has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts. But it is still confin'd to thofe fimple ideas which it receiv'd from the two fources of fenfation and reflection. It can have no other ideas of fenfible qualities, than what come from without by the fenfes, nor any other ideas of the operations of a thinking fubftance, than what it finds in its felf: but having once got thefe fimple ideas, it can by its own power put them together and make new complex ones, which it never receiv'd fo united.

Complex ideas however compounded, and decompounded, tho' their number be infinite, and their variety endlefs, may all be reduc'd under these three heads, firft Modes, fecondly Substances, thirdly Relations.

Modes, 1 call fuch complex ideas which contain not the fuppofition of fubfifting by themselves, but are confider'd as dependences on, and affections of substances, as Triangle, Gratitude, Murder, &c. These modes are of two forts, firft Simple, which are combinations of the fame fimple idea, as a Dozen, Score, &c. which are but the ideas of fo many diftinct unites put together. Secondly, Mix'd, which are compounded of fimple ideas of feveral kinds, as Beauty, which confilts in a certain com

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pofition of colour and figure, caufing delight in the beholder. Theft, which is the concealed change of the poffeffion of any thing without the confent of the proprietor. Thefe vifibly contain a combination of ideas, of feveral kinds.

Secondly, Subftances, the ideas of fubftances are only fuch combinations of fimple ideas as are taken to represent diftinct particular things fubfifting by themselves; in which the confufed idea of fubftance is always the chief. Thus a combination of the ideas of a certain figure, with the powers of Motion, Thought, and Reasoning joyn'd to fubftance, make the ordinary idea of Man.

Thefe again are either of single substances, as Man, Stone; or of collective, or feveral put toge ther, as Army, Heap: Ideas of feveral fubftancesthus put together, are as much each of them one fingle idea, as that of a Man, or an Unite.

Thirdly, Relations which confift in the confideration and comparing one idea with another. Of thefe feveral kinds we fhall treat in their order.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Simple Modes, and first of the Simple Modes of Space.

Concerning Simple Modes we may obferve that

the modifications of any Simple Idea, are as

perfectly different and distinct ideas in the mind, as thofe of the greatest distance or contrariety; thus Two is as diftinct from Three, as Bluenes from Heat. Under this head I fhall firft confider the modes of Space.

Space is a fimple idea which we get both by our fight and touch. When we confider it barely in length between two bodies, 'tis called Distance; when in length, breadth and thickness it may be called Capacity. When confider'd between the extremities of matter, which fills the capacity of fpace with fomething folid, tangible and moveable, it is called Extension; and thus Extenfion will be an idea belonging to body: but Space may be. conceiv'd without it.

Each different diftance is a different modification of space; and each idea of any different space is a Simple Mode of this idea. Such are an Inch, Foot, Yard, &c. which are the ideas of certain ftated lengths which men fettle in their minds for the ufe, and by the custom of measuring. When these ideas are made familiar to mens thoughts, they can in their minds repeat them as often as they will, without joyning to them, the idea of body, and fraine to themfelves the ideas of Feet, Yards, or Fathoms beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies, and by adding these ftill one to another, enJarge their idea of space as much as they pleafe. From this power of repeating any idea of Distance,.

without being ever able to come to an end, we come by the idea of immensity.

Another modification of Space is taken from the Relation of the parts of the termination of Extenfion or circumfcrib'd fpace amongst themselves: and this is what we call Figure. This the Touch discovers in fenfible bodies, whofe extremitics come within our reach and the Eye takes both from bodies and colours, whofe boundaries are within its view; where observing how the extremities terminate either in ftraight lines, which meet at difcernible angles; or in crooked lines, wherein no angles can be perceiv'd; by confidering these as they relate to one another in all parts of the extremities of any body or space, it has that idea we call Fi gure: which affords to the mind infinite variety.

Another Mode belonging to this head, is that of Place. Our idea of Place is nothing but the relative pofition of any thing with reference to its distance from fome fix'd and certain points. Whence we fay, that a thing has or has not changed Place, when its diftance either is or is not altered with respect to those bodies with which we have occafion to compare it. That this is fo, we may easily gather from hence; that we can have no idea of the place of the Universe, tho' we can of all its parts. To say that the world is fomewhere, means no more, than that it does exift. The word Place is fometimes

perfectly different and distinct ideas in the mind, as thofe of the greatest distance or contrariety; thus Two is as diftinct from Three, as Blueness from Heat. Under this head I fhall firft confider the modes of Space.

Space is a fimple idea which we get both by our fight and touch. When we confider it barely in length between two bodies, 'tis called Distance; when in length, breadth and thickness it may be called Capacity. When confider'd between the extremities of matter, which fills the capacity of fpace with fomething folid, tangible and moveable, it is called Extenfion; and thus Extenfion will be an idea belonging to body: but Space may be. conceiv'd without it.

Each different diftance is a different modification of space; and each idea of any different space is a Simple Mode of this idea. Such are an Inch, Foot, Yard, &c. which are the ideas of certain stated lengths which men fettle in their minds for the ufe, and by the cuftom of measuring. When thefe ideas are made familiar to mens thoughts, they can in their minds repeat them as often as they will, without joyning to them, the idea of body, and fraine to themfelves the ideas of Feet, Yards, or Fathoms beyond the utmost bounds, of all bodies, and by adding these ftill one to another; enlarge their idea of space as much as they pleafe. From this power of repeating any idea of Distance,