ftandings, which we can bring in fight, and make the objects of our thoughts, without the help of those fenfible qualities which firft imprinted them

there.

Attention and repetition help much to the fixing ideas in our memories: but those which make the

deepest and most lafting impreffions are those which are accompanied with pleasure or pain. Ideas but once taken in and never again repeated are foon loft; as those of colours in fuch as loft their fight! when very young.

The memory in fome men is tenacious, even to a miracle: but yet there feems to be a constant decay of all our ideas, even of those which are ftruck deepest; and in minds the most retentive: fo that if they be not fometimes renewed, the print wears out, and at last there remains nothing to be feen. Thofe ideas that are often refresh'd by a frequent return of the objects or actions that pro duce them, fix themfelves beft in the memory, and remain longeft there: fuch are the original qualities of bodies, viz. Solidity, Extenfion, Figure, Motion, &c. and those that almost constantly affect us, as heat and cold: and those that are the affections of all kinds of beings, as Existence, Duration, Number: these and the like are feldom quite loft while the mind retains any ideas at all.

In memory the mind is oftentimes more than barely paffive; for it often fets itself on work to

fearch fome hidden ideas; fometimes they start of their own accord and fometimes turbulent and tempeftuous paffions tumble them out of their cells. The defects of the memory are two.

First, that it lofes the idea quite, and fo far it =produces perfect ignorance.

Secondly. That it moves flowly, and retrieves not the ideas laid up in store quick enough to ferve the mind upon occafions. This, if it be to a great degree, is ftupidity. In the having ideas ready at hand on all occafions, confifts what we call Invention, Fancy, and quickness of parts.

This faculty other animals feem to have to a great degree, as well as Man, as appears by birds learning of tunes, and their endeavour to hit the notes right. For it seems impoffible that they should endeavour to conform their voices (as 'tis plain they do) to notes, whereof they have no i deas.

CHA P. XI.

Of Difcerning, and other operations of the mind.

A

Nother faculty of the mind is, that of difcern

ing between its ideas : on this depends the evidence, and certainty of feveral even general pro. pofitions, which pafs for innate truths: whereas indeed they depend on this clear difcerning facul

ty of the mind, whereby it perceives two ideas to be the fame or different. In being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another, where there is the leaft difference, confifts in a great measure that exactness of judgment and clearness of reafon, which is to be observ'd in one man above another; which is quite opposite to wit, which confists most in the affemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, which have the leaft resemblance, to form agreeable vifions: whereas judgment feparates carefully thofe ideas, wherein can be found the least difference to prevent error and delufion.

To the well diftinguishing our ideas, it chiefly contributes that they be clear and determinate; and when they are so, it will not breed any confufion or mistake about them, tho' the fenfes fhould convey them from the fame object differently on different occafions.

The comparing of our ideas one with another in refpect of Extent, Degree, Time, Place, or any other circumftances, is another operation of the mind about its ideas, which is the ground of Rela tions. Brutes feem not to have this faculty in any great degree. They have probably feveral ideas diftinct enough; but cannot compare them farther than fome fenfible circumstances annex'd to the objects themselves. The power of comparing general ideas, which we may observe in men, we may probably conjecture Beafts have not at all.

Compofition is another operation of the mind, whereby it combines feveral of its fimple ideas in. to complex ones: under which operation we may reckon that of Enlarging, wherein we put feveral ideas together of the fame kind, as feveral unites to make a dozen. In this alfo I fuppofe brutes come far fhort of Man, for tho' they take in and retain together feveral combinations of fimple ideas, as poffibly a dog does the shape, fmell and voice of his Mafter; yet these are rather fo many diftinct marks, whereby he knows him than one complex idea made out of those feveral fimple ones.

Abstraction is another operation of the mind, whereby the mind forms general ideas from such as it receiv'd from particular objects, which it does by confidering them as they are in the mind fuch appearances, feparate from the circumftances of real existence, as Time, Place, &c. These become general representatives of all of the fame kind, and their names applicable to whatever exifts conformable to fuch abstract ideas. Thus the colour which I receive from Chalk, Snow and Milk, is made a representative of all of that kind; and has a namie given it (Whitenefs) which fignifies the fame quality, wherever to be found or imagin'd. And thus 'Univerfals, both ideas and terms, are made.....

This puts the great difference between Man and Brutes: they feem to reafon about particular ob

D

jects, and ideas,but there appear no footsteps of Abftraction in them, or of making general ideas.

CHAP. XII.

Of Complex Ideas.

N the reception of fimple ideas the mind is only

I paffive, having no power to frame any one to

its felf, nor have any idea which does not wholly confist of them. But about thefe fimple ideas it exerts feveral acts of its own, whereby out of them as the materials and foundations of the reft, the other are fram'd: the acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its fimple ideas, are chicfly these three: first, it combines feveral fimple ideas into one compound one, and thus all complex ideas are made. Secondly, it brings two ideas whether fimple or complex together, and fets them by one. another, fo as to take a view of them at once with-out uniting them into one; by which way it gets call its ideas of relations. Thirdly, it feparates them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence. And thus all its general ideas are made. I fhall here begin with the firft of thefe, and come to the other two in their due placcs. As fimple ideas are obferv'd to exift in feveral combinations united together, fo the mind may confider them as united, not only as they are really united in external objects, but as it felf has join'd