or perfect comprehenfion of whatfoever is, it yet fecures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the fight of their own duties. Men may find matter fufficient to bufie their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and fatisfaction; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own conftitution, and throw away the bleffings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grafp every thing. We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us; for of that they are very capable and it will be an unpardonable, as well as -childish peevishnefs, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there -are fome things that are fet out of the reach of it. It will be no excufe to an idle and untoward fervant, who would not attend his business by candlelight, to plead that he had not broad fun-fhine. The candle that is fet up in us, fhines bright enough for all our purposes. The discoveries we can make with this, ought to fatisfie ús. And we shall then use our understandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion, that they are fuited to our faculties; and upon thofe grounds they are capable of being propofed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately require

demonftration, and demand certainty, where proba-bility only is to be had, and which is fufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will disbelieve every thing, because we cannot certainly know all things; we fhall do much what as wifely as he who would not use his legs, but fit ftill and perifh because he had no wings to fly.

6. When we know our own strength, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of fuccefs. And when we haye well furvey'd the powers of our own minds, we fhall not be enclin'd either to fit ftill, and not set our thoughts on work at all, in defpair of knowing any thing; nor on the other fide, queftion every thing, and difclaim all knowledge, because some things are not to be underftood. Our Bufinefs here, is not to know all things, but thofe things which concern our conduct. if we can find out those measures whereby a rational creature, put into that state which man is in, in this world, may and ought to govern his opinions and actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled that fome other things fcape our knowledge.

7. This was that which gave the first rise to this effay concerning the understanding. For I thought that the first step towards fatisfying feveral enquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was to take a furvey of our Understandings, examine our own powers, and fee to what things

they were adapted. Till that was done, I fufpected we began at the wrong end, and in vain fought for fatisfaction in a quiet and fecure poffeffion of truths that most concern'd us, whilft we let loofe our thoughts in the vaft ocean of being, as if all that boundlefs extent were the natural and undoubted poffeffions of our understandings; wherein there was nothing exempt from its decifions, or that escaped its comprehenfion. Thus men extending their enquiries beyond their capacities," and letting their thoughts wander into thofe depths where they can find no fure footing, it is no wonder that they raise questions and multiply disputes, which never coming to any clear resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts," and to confirm them at laft in perfect feepticism. Whereas were the capacities of our understandings well confidered, the extent of our knowledge once difcovered, and the horizon found, which fets bounds between the enlightned and dark parts of things, between what is, and what is not comprehenfible by us, men would perhaps with lefs fcruple acquiefce in the avow'd ignorance of the one, and imploy their thoughts and difcourfe, with more ad-> vantage and fatisfaction in the other, yet di Ve

B of the understanding, when a man thinks

Y the term idea, I mean whatever is the object

or whatever it is which the mind can be employ'd about in thinking.

<

I prefume it will be eafily granted me, that there are fuch ideas in mens minds: every one is confcious of them in himself; and mens words and actions will satisfie him that they are in others. our firft inquiry, then fhall be, how they come into the mind.

It is an establifh'd opinion amongst fome men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles, fome primary notions, (Koray Errory) characters, as it were ftampt upon the mind of man, which the foul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it.

This opinion is accurately discuss'd, and refuted in the first book of this effay, to which I fhall refer the reader, that defires fatisfaction in this particular.

It fhall be fufficient here to fhew, how men barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help

of any innate impreffions; and may arrive at cer tainty without any fuch original notions or princi ples. For I imagine, any one will easily grant, that it would be impertinent to fuppofe the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom God hath given fight, and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects. I fhall fhew by what ways and degrees all other ideas come into the mind; for which I fhall appeal to every one's own experience and observation.

Let us then fuppofe the mind to be, as we say white paper, void of all characters, without, any ideas: how comesit to be furnished? whence has it all the materials of reafon and knowledge? to this I answer, in one word, from experience and obfervation. This, when employ'd about external fenfible objects, we may call fenfation: by this we have the ideas of bitter, fweet, yellow, hard, &c. which are commonly call'd fenfible qualities, becaufe convey'd into the mind by the fenfes. The fame experience, when employ'd about the internal operations of the mind, perceiv'd, and reflected on by us, we may call reflection. Hence we have the ideas of perception, thinking, doubting, willing, reaJoning, &c.

These two, viz. external material things, as the objects of fenfation; and the operations of our own minds, as the objects of reflection, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their

B