slaves was prohibited, and the condition of those actually on those islands was much improved, would, in the course of time, diminish the necessity of a large force being employed with a view to protect the inhabitants from their tumultuary attacks: but at present the condition of those islands was not such as would warrant any diminution of the military strength: and he was sure the House would feel, that even in reference to the welfare of the slaves themselves, it was a more humane and benevolent course, to maintain such a force as would overawe any attempt at rebellion, rather than to expose them to the temptation of risking one, the ultimate consequences of which must always be so fatal and disastrous to the blacks. It appeared, then, upon a general comparison of the force kept up in our colonial garrisons in 1791, with that which it was now proposed to keep up, that there was an aggregate increase at present of no more than about 7000 men; and surely if the House concurred with him in the views which he had taken of our actual situation, they would not regard that increase as disproportionate or excessive. With respect to our new colonies, they could not have the same point of comparison to direct their judgment; but though they did not possess such a criterion, they had another, and one which, under all the circumstances, would not be considered as inadequate or fallacious; he alluded to the amount of force which the enemy had in those garrisons at the time they surrendered to this country-[Hear, hear! from the opposition benches] He could easily anticipate the sort of objection to that reference, which was implied in the cheers of the hon. gentlemen; he was aware it would be urged that those garrisons were then defended for a time of war, and not for a time of peace; but if he could show that what his majesty's government now proposed to keep up, was much below the amount of force maintained by the enemy, he should then be justified in assuming the latter as a fair ground of comparison, by which to judge of the former. The colonies to which he alluded were those of Ceylon, the Mauritius, the Cape of Good Hope, the settlements on the coast of Africa, Trinidad, Tobago, St. Lucie, Demarara, Berbice, Essequibo, Malta, and the Ionian islands. It was difficult to state the precise amount of force which the enemy at various periods kept up in those colonies, because the only documents to which he could refer related to the amount which actually capitulated: whereas it was highly probable that a considerable number was lost by sickness, by other casualties, and during the engagements which preceded their surrender. With the exception, however, of those deductions, he was enabled to state to the House, that the aggregate number of troops which capitulated and marched out from those garrisons, amounted to between 29 and 30,000 men, while the force which it was now intended to maintain in them, did not exceed 22,000. It was to be remembered also, that those 30,000 were all of them effective troops, and that the 22,000 were to be taken only as the estimated establishment. If, also, to that 30,000 they added, at a moderate computation, 3000 as the number of those who perished from sickness, war, and other causes, it would make the whole force maintained by the enemy, for the defence of those colonies, between thirty-two and thirty-three thousand-a force very considerable indeed, but yet, as the event proved, not sufficiently considerable to save them from fall- . ing into our hands. When, therefore, it appeared that our proposed amount of force would not be more than two-thirds of that which the enemy thought it necessary to keep up, he did not apprehend that the House would consider that number as too high. He should now proceed to enter upon a few details connected with those garrisons. In the Island of Ceylon it was intended to have 3000 troops; but it should be observed that there were two principal stations in that island, Trincomale and Columbo, situated on opposite sides of the coast, and between which the communication was so difficult at particular seasons of the year, that each station might be regarded, in a manner, as a separate and independent post. In the Mauritius there were also to be 3000 troops maintained, and an equal number at the Cape. With respect to the former, it was a recent acquisition, and the population of it was entirely French; a circumstance by no means to be overlooked, for when, in the course of last year, intelligence arrived there of the enterprise of Buonaparté and his usurpation of the sovereignty in France, the conduct of the people proved that they still entertained feelings and views calcu lated to endanger the security of our possession, if a sufficient force were not maintained to overawe and check them, The Mauritius, however, was a most important naval station, and one which it would be most impolitic to lose. The same, indeed, might be said of all our new colonies, and that constituted a circumstance which remarkably discriminated them from our old ones. The latter had been solicited either by individuals, or by the Crown, mostly with a view to commercial speculations, and to enlarge the sphere of our commer. cial enterprises; but the former were either conquered in the first instance, or retained afterwards, as military positions, and calculated to afford protection to our com. mercial frontier. Their value and importance, therefore, were not to be estimated merely by the criterion of pounds, shillings, and pence, but by the degree of efficient protection which they afforded to our trade in every part of the world. With respect to the coast of Africa, the principal object of our settlements there was to establish commercial relations with the various tribes bordering on the coast, and through those relations gradually to diffuse the blessings of knowledge and civilization. In the new Leeward islands, including six different stations-Trinidad, Tobago, St. Lucie, Demarara, Berbice, and Essequibo -4000 men were to be maintained: and when they considered the number, the nature, and the character of those islands, that amount of force would not, he was sure, be regarded as too great. In Malta and the Ionian islands there were to be 7000 troops: 4000 for Malta, and 3000 for the Ionian islands. With regard to Malta, he need not expatiate on its value or importance: every one who heard him must be acquainted with both the one and the other, and every one must also recollect, how great and prominent a feature it formed in our diplomatic discussions with France, previously to the rupture of the peace of Amiens. Perhaps, however, it would be urged by the hon. gentlemen opposite, that it was so strong, both in its natural and artificial defences, that it required scarcely any other protection; but he would beg leave to remind those hon. gentlemen, that walls and ditches were no very formidable or secure defences, unless they had soldiers behind them. He could not, in fact, persuade himself that 4000 troops would be thought too much for the protection of so valuable a possession. With respect to the 3000 men who were to be stationed in the Ionian islands, he would, perhaps be fully justified in affirming, that the force, both there and at the Mauritius, were in the nature of an experiment, till it could be ascertained, from the disposition manifested by the inhabitants, what degree of military strength it would be necessary permanently to maintain. If any grounds should arise hereafter to authorize a reduction, he could only say, that there existed every disposition on the part of his majesty's government to avail themselves of such an oppor tunity. It should not be forgotten, however, that of those islands, the island of Corfu was a very important one, the defence of which ought not to be entrusted to too small and inadequate a force. It appeared, therefore, that the whole amount of force required to garrison our new colonies, was about 22,000; or, if the proportion required for St. Helena and the coast of Africa were struck off, about 21,000. To that number were to be added the 3000 to be kept up for the purpose of affording relief to those garrisons, The propriety and necessity of that arrangement, would not, he apprehended, be disputed. It certainly could not be desired that our officers and men who were sent to garrison those colonies should be placed in a condition of perpetual ba nishment: they ought to be permitted to look forward, after a certain time of service, to the cheering prospect of returning to their native country. As, however, by the recent regulations introduced into the army, we could not now draft the men from one regiment to another, it became obvious that there must always be a cer tain amount of force maintained as a sort of fund of reserve, and occupied in passing to and fro. Calculating that the force employed in the colonial garrisons would not be kept abroad for more than ten years, which was as long a period as could reasonably and fairly be contemplated, there then ought to be annually sent out from this country one tenth of the whole amount of force employed upon our colonial stations; and to supply that proportion, it would require from six to seven thousand men to be annually sent out as reliefs. But, as the position of the army of occupation in France might be justly considered as adding to the security of our colonial possessions, only 3000 men were to be taken for reliefs. He now came to consider the last quota of the 99,000 men which were to be maintained; namely, the 25,000 which were wanted for the home station. That amount exceeded what was kept up in to be kept up within the realm was not more than would be found requisite to guard against such improvident dilapidations. 1791, by about 7000 men; but when he reflected upon the enormous increase of our colonial possessions, and the amount consequently required for foreign service, he could not regard an increase of 7000 With regard to the difference in the as exceeding the fair proportion of what amount of expenditure between the prethat increase might be expected to be. sent period and that of 1791, there were The House should recollect, that in pro- circumstances connected with our foreign portion as our colonial force was inevita- and domestic policy which at once acbly augmented, in the same necessary counted for that difference, and justified proportion must be the increase of our it. He presumed no one would venture depôt at home, from which the former to say that our new colonies were not was to be supplied. They were also to worth keeping, and if they were worth look to the possibility, though, he hoped, keeping, then they must be garrisoned. not to the probability, of our army in If the hon. gentlemen opposite were preFrance being called into action. That pared to affirm the contrary of that prothere was a possibility of such an event position, let them do so distinctly and taking place, was obvious, from the very explicitly; let them lay their finger upon nature of the engagements under which this or that colony and say, here is one that army remained in France; for if there which is of no value to this country; or were no such possibility, why was the here is another which requires more exarmy stationed there at all? In such a pense to retain it than it is worth. Let case, therefore, reinforcements to a consi- them follow up that doctrine by an address derable extent might be required, and to the Crown, and if the Crown should would it be wise or prudent, or even eco- concur in the wisdom and policy of their nomical, to reduce our army at home so suggestion, it would then be for the golow, as to be unable, upon the emergency vernment to say to such colonies, so proof the moment, to afford those reinforce- scribed, you must either provide for your ments? The hon. and learned gentleman own expenditure, or you must transfer who spoke last, said it was perfectly ridi- your allegiance to some other potentate, culous to suppose that any increase of our who has more power and more wealth naval arsenals and magazines should rethan Great Britain to defend and support quire an increase of military force to pro- you. But, until that direct course was tect them in time of peace; that a maga- taken, and until parliament had so prozine of a mile long need not be more ex-nounced itself with respect to our new tensively guarded than one of only a furlong; but that sort of argument, if indeed it might be called an argument, carried its own refutation along with it; for if the object were only such as the hon. and learned gentleman himself supposed, namely, to secure a magazine from the depredations of a midnight robber, still it was obvious, that the more you increased the line of that building, the more men you would require to watch it in different parts. But the House would commit a gross blunder, if they limited their views only to the supposition of the hon. and learned gentleman. It should be remembered, that a great many different works for the defence of the country had been constructed, and after having incurred the expense of erecting those works, would it be a very economical plan to suffer them to go into a state of dilapidation and decay, in order to be put to the same expense again whenever another occasion should arise to render them necessary? The force now proposed colonies, he apprehended it was incumbent upon his majesty's ministers, in the solemn and conscientious discharge of their duties, to prepare such establishments of military force, as they thought necessary for the defence of those possessions. If they did not do that, or if, from any base and mean desire to court popularity, they were to put those valuable colonies in hazard, and if any disastrous consequences were to ensue from their neglect, they would incur an awful responsibility, and he would venture to say, that the hon. and learned gentleman opposite, would not be the last person in that House to pour down upon ministers the torrent of his invective and accusation [Hear, hear!]. The plain question, then, for the House to consider was, whether they would reduce all the military establishments of the country below their just level, and whether, if they did so, the savings would bear any comparison to the injury that might be done? For after all, even if the plans of retrenchment so loudly called for | army in the funds necessary for the supwere adopted, the diminution of expen- port of various charitable institutions of a diture would not be so great as the coun- military character. These two millions, try and that House seemed to imagine. however, were likewise included in the Would, it therefore, be a wise or expe- general estimates for the army for the dient course, under those circumstances, current year; but if they were deducted to abdicate the high rank we now main- together with the one million which, as tained in Europe, to take our station he had already stated, would cease to be among secondary powers, and confine a charge upon the public after the present ourselves entirely to our own island? He year, the aggregate amount would be would again repeat, that the question was reduced under six millions. It was to be not whether they should carry into effect considered also, when comparing this such diminutions of the military establish- peace establishment of six millions with the ments of the country as would save the peace establishment of 1791, that since people from the income tax, for he con- that period a very great increase of pay tended that no possible reductions in those to every department of the army had establishments could accomplish that end; taken place. The pay of the soldier had but whether they should compel the been doubled, that being now one shilling Crown to abandon all our colonial pos- a day, which used to be sixpence. The sessions, the fertile sources of our com- pay of the officers also had been raised, mercial wealth, and whether we should though not exactly in the same propordescend from that high and elevated sta- tion; and a variety of regimental allowantion which it had cost us so much labour, ces had been granted. All those different so much blood, and so much treasure to augmentations had been submitted to parattain [Hear, hear!]? He wished also to liament, and had received its deliberate remind the House of a circumstance which sanction; and he must say, that as far as was constantly overlooked, though it ought it had fallen to his share to propose those to be always borne in mind. The present augmentations, he had always found the estimates were not to be regarded as the liberality and benevolence of parliament estimates for a permanent peace establish- disposed to outstrip the measure of allowment. They were, in fact, no such thing. ance which the government thought it They referred to a sort of intermediate prudent or necessary to propose. When, state between peace and war. Of the therefore, all those circumstances were 9,800,000l. which were to be voted for taken into consideration, and all those dethose establishments, one million was ex- ductions were made which distinguished clusively appropriated to expenses which the present period from that of 1791, he would be incurred this year, and not the was convinced that the proposed peace next: it was to be applied to those land establishment was one which could not forces which would be reduced in the justly be regarded as stretching beyond course of the year, to the embodied militia, what the interest of the country imperiand including also the charge for foreign ously demanded. He would not trespass corps, the whole of which was to be re- longer on the attention of the House, but duced. Some of those were already re- should reserve himself for any further exduced, and others were in progress of re- planations which might be necessary, when duction. The House, therefore, even they went into the committee. upon the face of the estimates then before them, might calculate upon the diminution of one entire million after the lapse of the present year. There was another consideration also, which had been very properly urged by his right hon. friend. Even if every officer and man composing that part of the British army, which it was intended to keep up, were annihilated to-morrow morning there would still remain a charge of upwards of two millions, which had no connexion whatever with the proposed establishments, but which would be absorbed in the half-pay, in the gratuities to the Mr. Ponsonby said, that as every gentleman must be satisfied it would be impossible to bring the important debate then before the House to a close that night, he should move the adjournment of it. Lord Castlereagh was anxious that an extensive and minute scrutiny should be applied to the estimates, as the fullest discussion and examination would, he was convinced, only tend to establish the wisdom and just application of the policy on which they were framed. Ministers were desirous of nothing so much as an investigation, which he confidently anticipated, would redound to their credit. + The motion for adjourning the debate to country to its lowest possible scale,and by the next day was then agreed to. HOUSE OF COMMONS. Tuesday, February 27. PETITIONS AGAINST THE PROPERTY TAX.] Petitions against the Property Tax were this day presented from Kincardine, St. Mary Whitechapel, Oxford, Wantage, Tavistock, Malton, York, Royston, Boston, &c. Mr. Brand, on presenting a petition from the inhabitants of the parishes bordering on Hertfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, and Bedfordshire, said, it stated the great distress that prevailed, of which taxation was the cause, and of which the reduction of taxation could be the only remedy. The petition proceeded to pray the House to take such measures as would put an end to that odious, inquisitorial, and detestable measure the property tax, a measure so destructive of that constitution which their forefathers had bled to maintain. He had trespassed on the time of the House in describing the nature of the petition that he might avoid the errors and misrepresentations so prevalent on the subject. Mr. Madocks in presenting a petition from Boston, insisted on the entire contents of it being read. It was signed, he said, by a number of persons, all of great respectability, and the signatures would have been much more numerous had the petitioners not been afraid of being too late. He was directed by his constituents -especially charged to give every support in his power to their petition, and to lose no opportunity of accomplishing its object, namely, that of preventing the continuance or renewal of the income tax -the most odious burthen that was ever imposed on this or any other country-a burthen to be submitted to only in cases of imperious necessity in time of war, and to be discontinued on the first recurrence of peace, even though the faith of parliament did not stand, as in the present instance, so solemnly pledged to that effect. He obeyed his constituents, not only from a due attention to their wishes, but from a full conviction of the propriety of their prayer, the justness of their complaints, the extent of their distresses, and the reasonableness of their view, as to the various modes of relief therein stated. He felt, with the petitioners, that much might be done by reducing the expenditure of the resorting to retrenchment and economy, the two best features of finance, except those other measures now become indispensably necessary, namely the checking the extravagance of the court, and the suppressing the corruptions and overgrown patronage of the government. He participated in their just apprehensions of danger to their finances and their liberties from the large military establishments in contemplation of ministers, and their constitutional and well-founded jealousy of a vast standing army, at all times the fear of good men, and the ready instruments of bad He was astonished at the obstinacy and pertinacity of the chancellor of the exchequer. He was surprised, too, at his shortsighted policy in shaking the reliance of the country, on the promise of ministers, and on the word of parliament, in the event of having to draw largely on the resources and efforts of the nation, on future exigencies. He complained of the chancellor of the exchequer pressing this great subject with such indecent haste through the House, with so little respect to the voice and feelings of the people, and with such ungrateful return for their unexampled patience in the time of need and peril. The chancellor of the exchequer had said it was necessary to get the bill into the House, without loss of time, because the 6th of April was so near at hand. Why was not parliament summoned sooner to take these two great questions into full consideration, namely, the property tax, and the amount of the standing army. He thought the disposition shown by ministers to consult parliament as little as possible, their proneness to get the country into difficulties, and their practice of hurrying these measures through the House at so late a period of the year, without due deliberation and information, was a system that ought to be resisted and amended, and that parliament ought to be considered any thing rather than a mere registry of their edicts, and their ready instrument for laying burthens on the nation. Surely, a main part of the functions of the House of Commons was, to cherish the industry of the people, to better their condition, encourage knowledge and improvement, to foster genius and reward merit in every department of the state, and in every calling of human life. For these important objects the great council of the nation was instituted, and it ought to have time and opportunity to sit and deliberate upon |