the enormous increase of our expenses, and to follow the noble lord in his statements of hundred of thousands, or of millions, without adverting to the manner in which they had been unavoidably expended? By such a proceeding, deception would be doubled, and the House, instead of rectifying error, would become itself the instrument of delusion. He wished to say a few words upon the general nature of the peace establishment of 1792, and upon the opinion of a great statesman, to which the noble lord had adverted. From a date previous to 1792, he could say that he had lived upon terms of the closest intimacy with Mr. Pitt, and if the question had been put, whether it was not the opinion of that minister that he had in 1792 reduced the peace establishment lower than was consistent with the public safety, he (lord Liverpool) should have had no hesitation in answering in the affirmative; and he would add, that if, after the opening of the new war, which had lasted for five and twenty years, there was no prospect of bringing it to an honourable conclusion at the end of two years, the protraction beyond that term might probably be ascribed to the low state of the establishment, as settled by Mr. Pitt at the period referred to. In making any comparison, therefore, he must set out with the conviction, that the peace establishment of 1792 was not such as was best calculated to secure the permanent interests of the country. As, however, for the purpose of illustration it was necessary to make a contrast between the present and some former period, he had no objection to take that to which the noble lord had more especially referred. The first point to be considered was, the army to be kept up in France and in the East Indies. By the treaty, the House was aware that the force in France was to be 30,000 men, and in acts of parliament it had been several times recognised, that the troops in the East Indies were not to be reduced below 20,000 men, making the whole army for the service of Great Britain and her colonies, 95,000 men. In 1792 the amount of force for the same duties was yesterday said to be 40,000 men, but the fact was, that it exceeded that number by 6,000, being 34,000 for Great Britain and the colonies, exclusive of the East Indies, and 12,000 for Ireland, In order, however, to give the comparison with greater distinctness, he would divide it into three heads, and consider, 1st. the establishment for the colonies; 2dly, that for Ireland; and 3dly, the establishment for Great Britain. With respect to the first, the House could not fail to reflect upon the difference between the extent of the colonies in 1792 and at present, and of course these acquisitions would demand an additional force for their protection. This force constituted a separate amount of 20,000, or, to speak with precision, of 19,400 men, whose duty was to occupy garrisons and stations in colonies that did not belong to the crown of England in 1792. If the noble lord should ask, did these colonies, during a long peace, require that that amount of force should be constantly kept upon them? he had no difficulty in stating, that in time it no doubt would admit of diminution; but regarding them in their present state, and with reference to the existing situation of things in Europe, after the fullest consideration, it had been thought that 19,400 men was the lowest estimate of the troops now required by our newly acquired colonies. As to the old colonies, those which had long continued in our hands, he was ready, point by point, to state the force now devoted to each, to notice the difference between that amount and the num bers in 1792, and to justify the augmentation by reasons which he considered satisfactory. First, as to the colonies of British North America, including Upper and Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and the Ber mudas; it was proposed that the force for these situations should be augmented from 6,600, which was the amount in 1792, to 10,000; and with regard to Canada, that the population since the former date had been nearly double; indeed, the whole district of Upper Canada might be said to be almost a creation within the last twenty years. The same argument would apply to New Brunswick, and other situations; and his lordship confidently put it to the House, whether the addition of 3,400 men was more than the altered circumstances of those colonies required. The Leeward Islands and Jamaica claimed the next consideration, where a force of 5,600 men was to be disposed, being an increase of 2,100 men upon the numbers in 1792. The portion that would be stationed in Jamaica was 4,000 men, being 1,000 more than at the former period. Their lordships were aware, that during the war, the black corps had been | of very great service, and had enabled mi- upon it was, that the question must stand nisters to dispose a considerable number upon its own merits; but he confidently of the regular troops previously posted in believed that no person acquainted with Jamaica, in situations where their services the present state of that country would could be more actively beneficial; it dissent from the opinion, that 25,000 would likewise be recollected, that it men for the service of the sister kingdom would be a work of time and difficulty to was not a larger force than circumstances reduce these black corps, and he appredemanded. Those circumstances might hended that no man would wish that these be changed, and no man more ardently valuable possessions should be left merely wished that they might be ; but the questo the care of the negro regiment. It tion was, whether a less force than 25,000 was intended to reduce them gradually; could now properly discharge the duties but until that was accomplished, a larger of the garrisons, &c. in Ireland? He regular force than was employed there in would admit, for the sake of argument, 1792 would be necessary. An additional that instant remedies could be applied to reason for this augmentation was the fact heal the wounds in Ireland; that a specific that Guadaloupe and Martinique were had been found, to accomplish all that the now in the hands of the British forces, most sanguine had for years hoped in and would remain so until garrisons could vain; still it could not be denied that the be sent out from France, and the period force stated was at present necessary, and of their departure it was at present impos- that for years it might be required, until sible to fix with any precision. For the the supposed medicine began to produce present year it seemed unavoidable, there- the desired effect. The third and last fore, that this country should sustain the topic was the military establishment for increased charge arising from the employ- Great Britain, and the amount of 25,000 ment of this larger force. The next item men was larger by 9000 men than the had not been noticed in any preceding number deemed requisite in 1792. But estimates, although no doubt some small if the amount of force was different, were force must have been stationed upon the not the circumstances of the country dif coast of Africa; it was now proposed to ferent also? And with reference to those engage 1000 men upon that duty. In circumstances, this was the only fair mode New South Wales the number of troops of viewing the question. First, he would employed in 1792 was 325, to which 475 ask, had not the population of Great men were now to be added. Under the Britain increased since the period named, peculiar circumstances in which the island to the amount of two millions? and would of St. Helena was placed, which he would it be contended that this was not one fit not now discuss, the House would not be cause of augmentation? All the civil surprised to learn, that an effective garrison establishments within the last twenty-five of 1200 men was intended to be quartered years had also been greatly multiplied and there. Besides the enumerations he had extended, and some of the naval departgiven, their lordships would be aware that ments, the dock-yards, for instance, in3000 men were supposed to be constantly stead of constables or watchmen to proafloat for the purpose of interchanging tect the public property, now employed with garrisons in various parts of our pos- soldiers. Even some of the regulations sessions. The result of the whole of the adopted for the army itself since 1792 had statement into which he had entered was, created a necessity for an augmented that with the exception of 3400 men for force, and among them, that which could North America, which he admitted was a not fail to meet the approbation of parliapositive addition, the garrisons of 1792 ment-the abolition of the system of had not been augmented in the old colo- drafting from one regiment into another, nies, excepting under pressing and evident which, in some instances, was formerly an necessity. The propriety of the increase instrument of cruelty. Prior to the of the garrisons of North America would destruction of this practice, vacancies in depend upon questions of general policy, regiments in the East or West Indies were upon which ministers had exercised their supplied by taking a number of men out best discretion. The next division related of other regiments not immediately emto the force which, under the peace estab-ployed; but now it must be obvious, that lishment, was to be employed in Ireland. The increase, compared with 1792, was 13,000 men, and all his lordship could say the whole regiment must be changed at once, or the station of no part of it could be altered. This, of course, would require an addition of force not requisite in 1792. He could never have advanced so extravagant a proposition as had been attributed to him-that the amount of force at home must be increased in proportion to the number of men employed in garrisons abroad; but though not a proportionate, yet some ratio ought to be fixed, unless it was to be said, that when once a regiment was stationed in the West Indies, or in any distant colony, it was never to be changed, or to be allowed to revisit its native country. It would not be argued, therefore, that a reasonable relief ought not to be given, and that that relief would require a greater or smaller number of men, in proportion as our foreign garrisons were many or few, large or small. Under all the circumstances that had, occurred since 1792, his lordship did not think that the addition of 9000 men was beyond what the necessities of the state demanded, and upon that issue he was ready to meet any noble lord who thought fit to maintain an opposite opinion. The chief ground of complaint, however, against the proposed peace establishment, was a jealousy lest the principles of the constitution should be infringed. Could any man say, that with a force of 25,000 men in this country, such fears were reaGonable? And the House would besides recollect, that they were not 25,000 effective men; but, in fact, that the general waste of the whole army must always fall upon the force retained at home. But even if the whole 25,000 men were effective, and fit for service, such constitutional jealousy as had been evinced by the noble lord, would be misplaced, and, consider ing the fact, was completely groundless. It was not necessary to use any arguments to prove that such apprehensions ought not to be excited, since the facts spoke for themselves, and were the best refutation of what had been advanced. Having thus gone through the various items of the estimates for which the motion had been made, the noble earl again asserted, that the peace establishment of 1792 had been reduced too low for the security of the interests of the country, and he reminded the House that that establishment was fixed after the nation had been ten years at peace, while the present arrangement was to be made in the first year after a war that had continued for five and twenty years. With respect to the 30,000 men to be quartered in France, he had nothing to say upon the present occasion, because they had, in fact, no reference to the peace establishment: doubtless, upon any resumption of hostilities, it would be right to take them into the calculation; but at present they might be withdrawn or reduced, as circumstances might render necessary. Upon the whole, his lordship submitted, that the troops included in the estimates for the peace establishment were only equal to the guards and garrisons which, under the circumstances, it was necessary to maintain; and upon this ground he was now, and should be hereafter, prepared to contest with any noble lord, who, enter. taining a different sentiment, should think fit, to endeavour to maintain it. The Marquis of Lansdowne said, that having been one of those who entreated the people of this country to bear their great and grievous burthens, on the principle that they would be relieved from those burthens by peace, he could not now hear, without the deepest regret, that in this just hope they would be deceived, even after every object had been accomplished to the attainment of which they could look, and that it was now in contemplation to render our permanent establishments equally incompatible with the pecuniary means of the country, and with constitutional principles. Even after the statement which had been made by the noble earl, he would assert, that great and unnecessary burthens were meant to be imposed, and would shortly advert to the grounds on which such expensive establishments were recommended. The noble earl had naturally enough divided the consideration of the subject into three parts; the military force required for the colonies, for Ireland, and for the home servicc. As to the first of these, he had told the House that a large increase of force was necessary to be kept up in Canada; and the reason he assigned was not a little extraordinary, namely, that the population of that colony was doubled since 1792, leaving it to be presumed that that population was a hostile one, not the bred-up subjects and supporters of the British government, but its betrayers and opposers. Was it in this view that a large increase upon the establishment of 1792 was required for Canada? If increase of population was to be deemed a reason for an increase of mili tary force, then it might equally apply to the Ionian islands, to Ceylon, and other recent acquisitions. After a few years, the noble earl might come down to the House, and say that all these possessions had thriven so much in population under our fostering care, that he must propose 40 or 50,000 more men for our colonial establishments, in which case it might be said, that the country would actually die of its own prosperity. Had we not been told also, that the very reason why many of our colonial acquisitions had been retained was, that they afforded defence and protection to the rest; that the Cape of Good Hope, for instance, and the Mauritius, afforded a valuable security to our eastern possessions? If it was not meant by this that they gave us the power of maintaining our old possessions at less expense than before, then it was needless to have them at all, and they were a dead weight on the finances of this country. The noble earl had also stated, that a considerable portion of our West India force consisted of negro corps, which could not be immediately reduced. Now, as these black regiments were chiefly in our old colonies, what was there in the climate or constitution of the men to hinder them from being transferred to our new colonies, and thus rendering unnecessary a part of the 19,000 men destined for our colonial establishments?—He next came to the military establishment for Ireland; and here he would not say that the situation of that part of the empire did not require such a force as 25,000 men; but, at the same time, parliament should have before them the facts which proved its necessity. He now came to England; and here again the noble earl resorted to his favourite position, that an increase of population required an increase of military establishment-as if here there was reason to dread disaffection and hostility. But, in defending the proposed military establishment for this island, the noble earl had left out of view this most material fact, that we were to have 30,000 men in France on the one side of us, and 25,000 in Ireland on the other, from either of which government had the power of drawing supplies at any time it thought proper. What sudden emergency was then to be dreaded, that could make any standing army necessary at all, except what was absolutely required for our few garrisons, and the protection of our dock yards? But the noble earl had even forgotten, that last year the proposed peace establishment was to be only nineteen millions. Why was it now to receive an increase of from three to four millions? What were the circumstances that should now render it more extensive? Was Buonaparté in less security at St. Helena than he was at Elba, where, by-the-bye, we were told last year that he had been most wisely placed? Was there any thing in the state of the French military or naval power to afford ground of uneasiness? The military force voted for England, after the peace of Amiens, was indeed 43,000 men; but at that time Buonaparté had the complete control of Spain and Portugal, and was master of Italy, though even then that vote was proposed for only six months, and was expressly stated as not meant to be the permanent military establishment of the country. Yet it was now proposed to vote a larger permanent establishment, upon the whole, than even at that period of danger. Was it fair, that, when the people of this country had, by the lavish expenditure of their blood and treasure, destroyed the French navy, and succeeded in compelling the reduction of the French army, they should be sub jected to the same burthens as if the power of so systematic an enemy remained entire? He could not but give credit to the noble earl for the wise measures he had adopted for raising the financial credit of the country: but it was equally important that he should remove from the springs of internal action that immense pressure which he was preparing to impose upon it, The attention of the people was alive to this subject; and he hoped that, by the information which his noble friend's mo tion would procure, parliament would be enabled to fix a due proportion between the means and the establishments of the country. Lord King considered the present attempt of his majesty's ministers as an experiment to try how far the country would endure an expense of this nature,-an experiment, if he might say so, how far the servility of parliament would be carried in submitting to an establishment of such a magnitude. He believed it to be neither more nor less than an attempt to place this country on a level with the great military powers of the continent. The noble earl opposite had been asked, if this was a fit reward to the country after all the exertions which it had made? To this no answer, however, had been returned by him. He had been asked in like man ner what would have been the establishment he would have thought of proposing if Buonaparté had remained on the throne تو of France? To this also no answer had been returned. In alluding to the establishment of 1792, it had been said by the noble earl that regret was expressed by Mr. Pitt after his having then reduced it to such a low scale; and the noble earl had thought proper to add, as his own opinion, that if our establishments had not been so reduced we should have been enabled to have put an end to the war in a short time. What, did the noble earl still regret that he was disappointed in his march to Paris? Did he really think that any military force which could possibly have been kept up in this country would have enabled us to carry on a war on the Continent at that time with any effect, or to baffle the exertions which France made with such effect in the beginning of the revolutionary war? The noble earl had said, that as the pay and allowances of our forces were increased, the expense of our establishments must also necessarily be augmented. But was this a fair way of stating the case ? Was it not contended on this side of the House, and would it not be admitted by the noble earl, that the increased expense of our establishments arose not so much from an increase in the rate of that expense as from the number of men? The expense was four or five times greater than before, and we had three times the number of men. The whole drift of the argument drawn by the noble earl for an increase of our forces in the colonies, from the increase of the whole number of men in all the colonies was, that it furnished his majesty's minis ters with an argument for the necessity of maintaining an equally large number of troops at home. Those persons who recommended the keeping up of a large military force in this country, showed themselves ignorant of the true nature and resources of this country. This country had made such efforts as had never been heard of; but in proportion as great efforts were made during war we ought in the same proportion to sink into a state of calm at the termination of that war, in order that we might be able to recommence the same efforts on the breaking out of a new war. Did not every body see that the powers of the Continent, who were always at the full stretch with their exertions, were not able to make such efforts as this country in cases of emergency? This was the peculiar advantage of our situation, and those who recommended that we should equal the continental powers in our establishments, would have us cast away that peculiar advantage, and prevent us from making in future those exertions which we had hitherto made to the astonishment of the world. The Marquis of Lansdowne shortly explained, that the approbation he had expressed of part of the financial system of measures, did not extend to what was proposed with respect to the property tax The question was then put, and the mo tion agreed to. ACCOUNT OF THE PEACE ESTABLISHMENTS ington presented the following Account, viz. HOUSE OF COMMONS. Wednesday, February 14. FROM 1783 TO 1793.] Mr. Lush An ACCOUNT of the Peace Establishments of the Army, Navy, Ordnance, and Miscellaneous Services, for each of the Years from 1783 to 1793, both inclusive. |