DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Code, § 233, 31 Stat. 1189, 1127 (see Federal Ques- tion, 4): Taylor v. Taft, 461.
FLORIDA LAND CLAIMS, Act of June 22, 1860, § 3, and act of May 23, 1828, 4 Stat. 284 (see Jurisdiction, C): United States v. Dalcour, 408. HABEAS CORPUS, Rev. Stat. § 753 (see Territories): Matter of Moran, 96. INDIANS, Act of February 8, 1887, (see Indians, 3): Goudy v. Meath, 146. See also ante.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, Wilson Act of August 8, 1890, 26 Stat. 313 (see Commerce, 2, 3): Heyman v. Southern Ry. Co., 270.
JUDICIARY, Act of June 22, 1860, § 11, 12 Stat. 87 (see Jurisdiction, A 5): United States v. Dalcour, 408. Act of March 3, 1875, §§ 1, 2, 3, 18 Stat. 470, as amended by act of March 1, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, corrected by act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433 (see Jurisdiction, B 3): Ex parte Wisner, 449. Act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 443 (sce Jurisdiction, A 1, 2): McLean v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R., 38. Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826 (see Jurisdiction, A 5; Practice and Procedure, 6): United States v. Dalcour, 408; Nichols Lumber Co. v. Franson, 278. Rev. Stat. § 709 (see Federal Question, 6): Illinois Central R. R. v. Mc- Kendree, 514. Rev. Stat. § 720 (see Courts, 5): Mississippi R. R. Comm. v. Illinois Central R. R., 335. Rev. Stat. § 721 (see Actions, 1): Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 390.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS FOR PENALTIES, Rev. Stat. § 1047 (see Actions, 1): Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 390.
OKLAHOMA, Organie Act of May 2, 1890, § 10, 26 Stat. 85 (see Criminal Law): Matter of Moran, 96.
PATENTS, Rev. Stat. §§ 482, 483, 4904, 4910, 4911, and act of February 9, 1893, § 9, 27 Stat. 436 (see Practice and Procedure, 14): Lowry v. Allen, 474.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Act of July 1, 1902, § 10, 32 Stat. 691 (see Appeal and Error, 2): Fisher v. Baker, 175.
TARIFF ACT of July 24, 1897, pars. 306, 307, 313 (see Customs Duties): United States v. Riggs, 136.
TERRITORIES, Rev. Stat. § 1909 (see Jurisdiction, A 4): New York Foundling Hospital v. Gatti, 429.
ALIENATION OF LAND.
See CONVEYANCES. INDIANS.
AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION.
Generally, See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 21, 22, 23; PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 2.
Fifth Amendment, See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 15;
JURISDICTION, F 1.
Seventh Amendment, See INSURANCE,
Tenth Amendment, See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 18. Eleventh Amendment, See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 26. Thirteenth Amendment, See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 16, 18; JURISDICTION, D 2.
Fourteenth Amendment, See Constitutional Law;
Fifteenth Amendment, See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 16, 18.
AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY. See JURISDICTION, A 1, 2.
ANTI-TRUST ACT.
See ACTIONS.
1. Habeas corpus-Appeal from Federal court whose jurisdiction improperly invoked.
Although, regularly, one seeking relief by habeas corpus in the state courts should prosecute his appeal to, or writ of error from, the highest state court, before invoking the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court on habeas corpus, where the case is one of which the public interest demands a speedy determination, and the ends of justice will be promoted thereby, this court may proceed to final judgment on appeal from the order of the Circuit Court denying the relief. Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 222. 2. Habeas corpus-Review of final order of Supreme Court of Philippine Islands.
A proceeding in habeas corpus is a civil, and not a criminal, proceeding, and as final orders of Circuit or District Courts of the United States in such a proceeding can only be reviewed in this court by appeal, under § 10 of the act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 691, a final order of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in habeas corpus is governed by the same rules and can be reviewed by appeal and not by writ of error. Fisher v. Baker, 175.
3. Mode of review of judgment of adjudication in bankruptcy. A judgment of the bankruptcy court that a person against whom a petition has been filed is or is not a bankrupt, based upon the verdict of a jury demanded as of right under § 19 of the bankruptcy law, can only be reviewed by this court by writ of error and not by appeal. Grant Shoe Co. v. Laird Co., 502.
4. Mode of review of judgment of territorial court. The proper way to review judgments in actions at law of the Supreme
Court of the Territory of Oklahoma where the case was tried without a jury is by writ of error, not by appeal. National Live Stock Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 296.
5. Right of appeal from Circuit Court to Circuit Court of Appeals and thence to Supreme Court.
Where complainant not only sets up diverse citizenship but also a con-
stitutional question he has the right to appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and from its decision an appeal or writ of error may be taken to this court. (Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U. S. 618, distinguished.) Mississippi R. R. Comm. v. Illinois Central R. R., 335.
Congress having provided by section 256 of the Bankruptcy Act that ap- peals may be had under such rules and within such time as may be prescribed by this court, the thirty day limitations in General Order in Bankruptcy XXXVI has the same effect as if written in the statute and the allowance of an appeal taken thereafter on certificate by the Circuit Court of Appeals cannot operate as an adjudication that it is taken in time. Conboy v. First National Bank, 141.
2. Appeals; running of limitations—Appeals do not lie from orders denying petitions for rehearing.
The time within which an appeal should be taken under section 256 of the Bankruptcy Act and General Order in Bankruptcy XXXVI runs from the entry of the original judgment or decree and not of the order denying petition for rehearing. Appeals do not lie from orders deny- ing petitions for rehearing which are addressed to the discretion of the court to afford it an opportunity to correct its own errors. Ib. 3. Appeals; time not extended by petition for rehearing or arrested by order of court.
The time for appeal cannot after it has expired be extended by an ap-
plication for rehearing or arrested by an order of the court, even though the application be made during the same term at which judgment. was entered.
The requirement of § 64a of the bankruptcy law of 1898 in regard to prefer- ence of taxes is a wide departure from the act of 1867 and prefers taxes due to any State and not only those due to the State in which proceed- ings are instituted. New Jersey v. Anderson, 483.
Generally speaking, a tax is a pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or property to support the Government, and § 64a of the bankruptcy law is very broad and covers all taxes, including yearly license fees imposed by the State on corporations organized under its laws for the privilege of doing business, whether such business is carried on in that or in other States. Ib.
Under the bankruptcy act taxes assessed on returns made prior to the adjudication are legally due and owing and entitled to the preference given by § 64a, although not collectible until after the adjudication. Ib. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 3.
The obligation of sureties upon bonds is strictissimi juris and not to be extended by implication or enlarged construction of the terms of the contract entered into. Crane v. Buckley, 441.
2. Supersedeas; right of recovery on.
Sureties on a supersedeas bond given by defendant to answer, in case of his failure to prosecute his appeal to effect, to plaintiff for loss in use and possession of premises, which, under decree of Circuit Court, plain- tiff was entitled to reënter on a date therein specified in default of payment by defendant of balance of purchase price, held not liable on the bond where the Circuit Court affirmed the decree as to plaintiff's right to reënter in case of non-payment, but modified it by giving
defendant until a later date to make the final payment, thereby also extending his right of possession until that date. Ib.
"BUCKET SHOP."
See PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 2.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
See FEDERAL QUESTION, 2.
Power of State to augment or lessen carrier's liability.
In the absence of action by Congress a State may by statute determine, and either augment or lessen a carrier's liability, and such a statute limiting the right of recovery of certain classes of persons does not deprive a person injured thereafter of a vested right of property. (Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, followed.) Martin v. Pittsburg & Lake Erie R. R. Co., 284.
Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U. S. 618, distinguished in Mississippi R. R. Comm. v. Illinois Central R. R., 335.
Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, explained in Heyman v. Southern Ry. Co., 270.
Allen v. Riley, 203 U. S. 347, followed in John Woods & sons v. Carl, 358. Illinois Central Railroad v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514, followed in Illinois Central Railroad v. Edwards, 531.
Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina Board of Agriculture, 171 U. S. 345, followed in McLean v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R., 38.
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, followed in Martin v. Pittsburg & Lake Erie R. R. Co., 284.
Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192, followed in Moyer v. Nichols, 221. West Chicago Railway v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 506, followed in Fair Haven & Westville R. Co. v. New Haven, 379.
CATTLE CONTAGIOUS DISEASE ACT. See COMMERCE, 7, 8.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
Sce LOCAL LAW (KAN.);
MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF TRUST.
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