erty passed to the heirs. The maxim, 'Le mort saisit le vif,' was expressly recognized." Both decisions, therefore, must be considered as correct interpretations of the code of the State. It is not our province to pronounce one more decisive than the other, or to pronounce a contradiction between them, which the court which delivered both of them has declared does not exist. We must assume that the Tulane case approved the view expressed in the case at bar of the rights of legatees, as follows: "Furthermore, we have said, the legatees acquired no vested right to the property bequeathed which could enable them to successfully defend their inheritance against the demand of the State for the inheritance tax. It was property within the limits of the State, which the State could tax, for purposes mentioned, until it had passed out of the succession of the testator." Plaintiffs in error also contended that the statute denied them the equal protection of the laws. This contention is based on the following provision of the statute: "This tax to be collected on all successions not finally closed and administered upon, and on all successions hereafter opened." Successions which have been closed, it is said, are exempt from the tax, and a discrimination is made between heirs whose rights have become fixed and vested on the same day. Counsel say: "The closing of the succession cannot affect the question as to when the rights of the heirs vested; and cannot be a cause for differentiation among the heirs; and such a classification is purely arbitrary. Besides, such a classification rests on the theory that the tax is one on property, when in fact it is one on the right of inheritance." But, as we understand, the Supreme Court made the validity of the tax depend upon the very fact which counsel attack as an improper basis of classification. The court decided that the property bequeathed was property the State could tax, "until it had passed out of the succession of the testator." It was certainly not improper classification to make the tax depend upon a fact without which it would have been invalid, In 203 U.S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. other words, those who are subject to be taxed cannot complain that they are denied the equal protection of the laws because those who cannot legally be taxed are not taxed. Judgment affirmed. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE KENTUCKY ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH v. ILLINOIS. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS. No. 103. Argued November 14, 1906.-Decided December 24, 1906. The fact that, as construed by the highest court of that State, the exemp tions in the inheritance tax law of Illinois of religious and educational institutions do not apply to corporations of other States, does not render the provisions of the law applicable to foreign religious and educational institutions void as discriminatory and counter to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is not an unreasonable or arbitrary classification for a State to exempt from inheritance taxes only such property bequeathed for charity or educational purposes as shall be bestowed within its borders or exercised by persons or corporations under its control. THE facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Charles H. Aldrich, with whom Mr. Henry S. McAuley and Mr. Lawrence Maxwell, Jr., were on the brief, for plaintiff in error: Appellant, by probating the will through which its succession is derived, appearing before the state appraiser in the inheritance tax proceeding, appealing from the action of such appraiser to the County Court of Cook County, and from its action to the Supreme Court of Illinois, brought itself within the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Black v. Caldwell, 83 Fed. Rep. 880, 885; Christian Union v. Yount, 101 U. S. 352, 356. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 203 U.S. This is especially so as there are no rules prescribed by the laws of Illinois regarding the admission to the State of corporations not for pecuniary profit, and the right of such corporations to take and hold property in Illinois is fully established. Academy v. Sullivan, 116 Illinois, 375; Christian Union v. Yount, 101 U. S. 352; Pennsylvania Co. v. Bauerle, 143 Illinois, 459. The imposition of the succession tax necessarily implies that the person whose right to succeed is so taxed is within the jurisdiction of the State. Passenger cases, 7 How. 283, 422; McGehee's Due Process of Law, 218; Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 204; Louisville v. Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385, 396; Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 204. The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all state agencies, whether executive, legislative or judicial. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 45; Chicago &c. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 234; Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U. S. 165, 170; Huntington v. New York, 118 Fed. Rep. 683, 686. An inheritance tax is not a tax upon property, but upon the privilege or right of succession to property. United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 628; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283. A different rule obtains as to claimed exemptions from a general and a special tax, to which latter class the imposition. in the case at bar belongs. Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578, 583; Catlin v. Trustees, 113 N. Y. 133, 140; Re Swift's Estate, 137 N. Y. 77, 86; Gurr v, Scudds, 11 Exch. 190; United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369; United States v. Watts, 1 Bond, 580. While the respective States have plenary power to regulate the tenure of property within their respective limits, the modes of its acquisition and transfers, the rules of its descent, and the extent to which a testamentary disposition may be exercised by its owners, that power is subject to the equal rights clauses of the Constitution of the United States. Mager v. 203 U. S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. Grima, 8 How. 490, 493; United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 292, 294; Atchison, Topeka &c. Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 105. The Constitution of the United States was largely the result of the demand that there should be no discrimination between the several States in commercial regulations and rights of persons or property. Passenger cases, 7 How. 283, 407, 449, 492; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43, 48; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 140, 147; Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148, 152. This court has repeatedly denied to the States the right of discrimination in the exercise of their sovereign power of taxation. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430; Welton v. State of Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 466. Corporations are not "citizens" within Article IV; Section 2, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 259; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 561. Corporations are "persons" within the Fourteenth Amendment. Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 189; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 606; Charlotte &c. R. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 391; Covington &c. Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 592; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 154; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 522. The right of a State to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which foreign corporations may transact business within its borders or to exclude such corporations altogether, is conceded, subject to the limitation that unconstitutional requirements cannot be made. This case is to be distinguished from the general principle, however, in that Illinois has not attempted through any agency to prescribe conditions upon which a foreign, religious or charitable corporation may succeed to property in Illinois. See Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; Doyle v. Continental In. Co., 94 U. S. 535; Barron Argument for Defendant in Error. 203 U.S. v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186; Cable v. United States Life Ins. Co., 191 U. S. 288, 306; Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Barton, 183 U. S. 23; Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S.. 246. When the corporation or the property is within the jurisdiction of the State, it is entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and different rates of taxation, either upon property or succession to property, cannot be applied as between foreign or domestic corporations. Philadelphia Fire Assn. v. New York, 119 U. S. 110; Erie Railway Co. v. State, 2 Vroom, 531; S. C., 86 Am. Dec. 226, 236; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 606; Pembina Consolidated M. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 189; New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658, 663; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 255; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 566; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369. Mr. Edward M. Ashcraft, with whom Mr. William H. Stead, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, was on the brief, for defendant in error: If plaintiff in error seeks to reverse the judgment below on the ground that its construction of the amendatory act of 1901 is erroneous and repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, without drawing into question the validity of the act, then there is no Federal question involved, this court is without jurisdiction and the writ of error should be dismissed. Sec. 709, Rev. Stat.; Santa Cruz v. Railroad Co., 111 U. S. 361; Balt. & Pot. R. R. Co. v. Hopkins, 130 U. S. 210; United States v. Lynch, 137 U. S. 280; Sage v. Louisiana Board of Liquidation, 144 U. S. 647; Morley v. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co., 146 U. S. 162; Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 153 U. S. 380; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103; Union National Bank v. Louisville &c. Ry. Co., 163 U. S. 325; Turner v. Wilkes County, 173 U. S. 461; Johnson v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 491. If plaintiff in error seeks to reverse the judgment below |