Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 720; Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13; Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U. S. 476. In the Sinking Fund Cases, it was said that whatever regulations of a corporation could have been inserted in its charter can be added by amendment. All the cases are reviewed and their principles affirmed in Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin C. & I. Co., 192 U. S. 201, and water rates fixed by the board of supervisors of the county of Stanislaus under a law of the State, sustained through the income of the company, were reduced from one and a half per cent per month to six per cent per annum. In the light of these cases let us examine what the statutes of Connecticut require of plaintiff in error. By its original charter (1862) plaintiff in error was required to keep the street between its tracks, with a space of two feet on each side of the tracks, in good and sufficient repair. In the amendment of the charter in 1864 this obligation was retained, and also in the public acts of 1893. In the act of 1895 the duty of paving and repairing was imposed on all railway companies. We shall assume, for the purpose of our discussion, that the duty to repair did not include the duty to pave and repave, although much can be said and cases can be cited against the assumption. Does the change and increase of burden upon the plaintiff in error come within the limitations upon the reserved power of the State? Has it no proper relation to the objects of the grant to the company or any of the public rights of the State? Can it be said to be exercised in mere oppression and wrong? All of these questions must be answered in the negative. The company was given the right to occupy the streets. It exercised this right first with a single track, and alterwards with a double track. Before granting this right the State certainly could have, and reasonably could have, put upon the company the duty of paving as well as of repairing Such requirement would have been consistent with the object of the grant. It is yet consistent with the object of the grant. It is not imposed in sheer oppression and wrong and the good faith of the State cannot be questioned. It is imposed in the exercise of one of the public rights of the State, the establishment, maintenance and care of its highways. The extent of this right is illustrated by West Chicago Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 506, and cases cited. Judgment affirmed. CHATTANOOGA FOUNDRY AND PIPE WORKS v. CITY OF ATLANTA. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. No. 94. Argued November 9, 12, 1906.—Decided December 3, 1906. By express provision of the act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209, a city is a person within the meaning of section 7 of that act, and can maintain an action against a party to a combination unlawful under the act by reason of which it has been forced to pay a price for an article above what it is reasonably worth. A person whose property is diminished by a payment of money wrongfully induced is injured in his property. Where Congress has power to make acts illegal it can authorize a recovery for damage caused by those acts although suffered wholly within the boundaries of one State. Although the sale may not have been so connected with the unlawful combination as to be unlawful, the motives and inducements to make it may be so affected by the combination as to constitute a wrong. The five year limitation in § 1047, Rev. Stat., does not apply to suits brought under 7 of the act of July 2, 1890, but by the silence of that act the matter is left under § 721, Rev. Stat., to the local law. The three year limitation in § 2773, Tennessee Code, for actions for injuries to personal or real property, applies to injuries falling upon some object more definite than the plaintiff's total wealth and the general ten year limitation in § 2776 for all actions not expressly provided for controls actions of this nature brought under § 7 of the act of July 2, 1890. 127 Fed. Rep. 23; 101 Fed. Rep. 900, affirmed. THE facts are stated in the opinion. 203 U.S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. Mr. Frank Spurlock, with whom Mr. Foster V. Brown was on the brief, for plaintiff in error: The city of Atlanta has no cause of action under the Antitrust Act. While the declaration alleges that the defendant in error was injured in its business of supplying water to its inhabitants, the averment can only mean that it was injured by the payment of an excessive price for the pipe bought to extend its water mains. There is no allegation showing an injury of any other character either to the business or property of the defendant in error. The action can only be maintained, if at all, on the ground that the defendant in error, as a consumer, has been compelled to pay more for the goods it purchased by reason of the fact that the seller was a party to an illegal combination. Brown & Allen v. Jacob's Pharmacy, 115 Georgia, 429; Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vermont, 1; Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Illinois, 608; Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 15 Q. B. Div. 476; S. C., 21 Q. B. Div. 544; S. C., 23 Q. B. Div. 598. From the nature and purpose of a combination to restrain and monopolize, it was expected that every contract, combination or conspiracy to restrain trade or to monopolize the same would include among its purposes that of an assault upon the business of independent rival traders. For such action is necessary to complete the illegal scheme. So by §§ 1 and 2 of the act Congress struck at the initial step towards the creation of these injurious combinations by imposing heavy penalties for joining in them, and by §7 penalties, in the nature of treble damages and attorneys' fees, were provided to protect the independent trader by giving him a right of action if injured in his business or property by the combination of those endeavoring to create the monopoly. There is not only no language in the act from which it could be inferred that Congress meant to protect the business of those engaged in trade wholly within the States, but Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 247, held that Congress has no jurisdiction over that part of a combination Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 203 U.S. or agreement which relates to commerce wholly within the State and which is subject alone to the jurisdiction of the State. Whenever, therefore, the business of a waterworks company, or the like, is injured by a combination or monopoly, redress therefor must be sought under the laws of the State under which the business is carried on. To extend the operation of the act so as to give a right of action, under the seventh section thereof, to every consumer seeking to recover back, as excessive, a part of the price paid for goods bought and shipped from another State, would include a class of actions not contemplated by Congress, and not necessary to insure competition in interstate trade. Such damages could only arise from fraud or deceit in making the sale, and would be governed by the laws of the State under which the contract was made and to be performed. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38; Gibbs v. McNeeley, 118 Fed. Rep. 127; Whitwell v. Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. Rep. 545. Defendant in error contracted for the purchase of pipe at an agreed price fixed in the contract. This agreement was legal and binding under the laws of Georgia, where it was made and to be performed, notwithstanding the fact that the selling company was a party to a contract in restraint of trade, which was illegal under the laws of the United States. National Distilling Co. v. Cream City Importing Co., 86 Wisconsin, 352; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540. The Anti-trust Act is not a legal method of regulating prices. While denying to interstate traders the right to form combinations that would have the power to prescribe prices, Congress did not undertake itself to do, either directly or indirectly, what it prohibited to others. An action for threefold damages will only lie where there has been an actual, direct injury inflicted by something done in violation of the act (Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U. S. 48, 70), and this injury must have been done to the person suing in his business of interstate commerce, or in his property while the subject of interstate commerce. 203 U.S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. Under the statute of limitations of Tennessee applicable to this case the suit is barred either in one year as a statute penalty or in three years as an injury to property for tort. State v. House, 2 Shannon's Cases, 610; State v. Shaw, 113 Tennessee, 536; Hogan v. Chattanooga, 2 Tennessee, 339; Greenwood v. State, 6 Baxt. 567, 576; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 667; Merchants' Bank v. Bliss, 35 N. Y. 412; Stokes v. Stickney, 96 N. Y: 326. A statute may not be penal in the international sense of that term, but penal within the meaning of the statutes of limitations applicable to private actions only. The following cases, brought to enforce statutory liability, were held to be penal actions within the meaning of the statutes of limitations barring civil suits for statute penalties. Beadle v. Railroad Company, 48 Kansas, 379; 51 Kansas, 252; Savings Bank v. Bailey, 66 N. H. 334; Gridley v. Barnes, 103 Illinois, 211; Baker Wire Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 106 Iowa, 239; A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Tanner, 19 Colorado, 559; State Savings Bank v. Johnson, 18 Montana, 440; Raticon v. Terminal Assn., 114 Fed. Rep. 666; Davis v. Mills, 113 Fed. Rep. 678; S. C., 121 Fed. Rep. 703; Patterson v. Wade, 115 Fed. Rep. 770; Goodridge v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 35; Barry v. Edmonds, 116 U. S. 550, 565; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 522; Minneapolis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 35. If the penalty, or recovery in excess of compensatory damages, is imposed for a failure to pay a debt, and not in the exercise of the police power which concerns the interest of the public, then the statute is unconstitutional. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150; Railroad Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96; Railroads v. Crider, 91 Tennessee, 490. The suit was brought not only to recover treble damages for the injury sustained, but attorneys' fees besides. The actual damages as found by the jury were $1,500; but the judgment rendered was for $7,000, or nearly five times the damages actually suffered. This judgment can be sustained upon no other principle than that declared in the cases cited |