was reversed by the Appellate Division. The defendant then took the case to the Court of Appeals, assenting, as required, that, if the order should be affirmed, judgment absolute should be rendered against him. As we have said, the order was reversed. The ground on which a review is asked here is that the Court of Appeals by its reasoning implies that it finds probable cause in its own opinion that the decree in the former case was wrong, whereas not to assume it to be correct is to fail to give it the faith and credit required by Rev. Stats. § 905.

It is unnecessary to consider whether a court bound by a previous judgment would not be warranted in saying that if the question had come before it in the first instance it would have decided the case the other way, and therefore that there was probable cause for a mistake of law into which it would have fallen itself. A mistaken view of the law may constitute probable cause in some instances, as is shown by the case cited above. Probable cause does not mean sufficient cause. But this last proposition shows that the former decree could not have decided the question now before the court, and therefore that the case is not properly here. The former decree was conclusive on the merits of the suit in which it was rendered, of course, Lyon v. Perin & Goff Manuf. Co., 125 U. S. 698, but it only decided that that suit was brought without sufficient cause. It decided nothing as to whether the plaintiff had probable cause for expecting to prevail. If the Court of Appeals had affirmed the judgment of the trial court for the reason that a preliminary injunction fairly obtained from any court conclusively established probable cause, or that there was no evidence of a want of it, there would have been nothing to bring here, whether that reason was right or wrong. The only ground on which our jurisdiction is maintained is that the opinion of the Court of Appeals shows that it gave a different and inadmissible reason for the result to which it

came.

No doubt an opinion may be resorted to for the purpose of

showing that a court actually dealt with a question presented by the record, or that a right asserted in general terms was maintained and dealt with on Federal grounds. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 184 U. S. 530, 534; San José Land & Water Co. v. San José Ranch Co., 189 U. S. 177, 179, 180; German Savings & Loan Society v. Dormitzer, 192 U. S. 125. But it would be going further than we are prepared to go if we took jurisdiction upon the ground stated in this case. Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126, 137. The record discloses no question under the Constitution or laws of the United States until we come to the assignment of errors in this court. Then it was too late. Hulbert v. Chicago, 202 U. S. 275, 280. It is true that the complainant alleged the decree, but that was merely to show that the litigation complained of was ended, as was required by the law of New York, Marks v. Townsend, 97 N. Y. 590, 595, not to suggest a Federal question, which at that moment probably was not dreamed of. Even the opinion of the Court of Appeals, which is not part of the record in New York, does not disclose that there had been presented to it any argument or claim of right based upon the effect due to the previous final decree under the Revised Statutes, or indeed, in a specific way, upon the effect of the decree in any light. Furthermore, notwithstanding a few broad words relied upon by the plaintiff in error, we doubt if the Court of Appeals meant to lay down the proposition which we have said that we would not discuss, or to go further than to decide that the whole evidence was not sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to go to the jury in an action for malicious prosecution, as that action is limited in New York.

It is argued that the Court of Appeals exceeded its functions under the constitution of the State, and in that way denied the plaintiffs due process of law. We see no reason to think so, but with that question we have nothing to do. French v. Taylor, 199 U. S. 274; Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U. S. 638.

Writ dismissed.

Argument for the United States.

203 U.S.

UNITED STATES v. RIGGS.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND

CIRCUIT.

No. 167. Argued October 23, 1906.-Decided November 12, 1906.

Under par. 313, as construed in connection with pars. 306, 307 of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, figured cotton cloth is subject not only to the specific duties imposed by par. 313, but also to the ad valorem duty imposed by pars. 306, 307.

The evident purpose of these paragraphs precludes the application of the rule that any doubt as to the construction of a tariff statute should be resolved in favor of the importer.

136 Fed. Rep. 583, reversed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General McReynolds, for the United States:

The history of tariff legislation and the connection in which it appears make the meaning of par. 313 sufficiently clear. Act 1865, 13 Stat. 208; act 1883, 22 Stat. 505, 506; act 1890, 26 Stat. 591, pars. 344, 348; act 1894, 28 Stat. 527, pars. 252257; Hedden v. Robertson, 151 U. S. 520, 526; United States v. Albert, 60 Fed. Rep. 1012; Claflin v. United States, 109 Fed. Rep. 562; S. C., 114 Fed. Rep. 257.

The amount and character of the duty imposed is made sufficiently manifest by the language of par. 313; the use of the word "value" was unnecessary.

The protective character of tariff laws and the policy of Congress to impose higher duties upon finer articles and to increase the same as additional processes enter into their manufacture, have been frequently recognized. Arnold v. United States, 147 U. S. 497; Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 171 U. S. 219; Bensusan v. Murphy, 10 Blatchf. 580; Fed. Cas., 1329, distinguished.

The construction of par. 313 advocated by respondents

would subject high-priced figured cottons to less duty than cheaper plain goods-an absurd result which should be avoided.

A result so preposterous plainly indicates the unsoundness of the construction which would occasion it. Bate R'f'g Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, 37; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 77.

The rule that duties should not be imposed upon vague or doubtful interpretations is inapplicable.

The intention of Congress being clear, any ambiguity of language should have been resolved in harmony therewith. Little doubts do not justify conclusions nullifying the manifest. purpose of the lawmakers. The intent of the lawmaker is the law. Jones v. Guaranty and Indemnity Co., 101 U. S. 626. Where the intent is plain the law should be construed in harmony therewith. Every doubt or dispute is not to be resolved in favor of the importer. Newman v. Arthur, 109 U. S. 132; Hedden v. Robertson, 151 U. S. 520; United States v. Wetherell, 65 Fed. Rep. 987, 990.

Mr. W. Wickham Smith, with whom Mr. John K. Maxwell was on the brief, for respondent:

Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to enforce it according to the obvious meaning of the words, without attempting to change it by adopting a different construction based upon some supposed policy of Congress in regard to the subject of legislation. Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1.

If there be any doubt at all as to the construction of the statute (and we submit there is not), that doubt cannot be resolved in favor of the imposition of a higher tax. United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369; Rice v. United States, 53 Fed. Rep. 910; Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609; Matheson v. United States, 71 Fed. Rep. 394; United States v. Davis, 54 Fed. Rep. 147; Adams v. Bancroft, 3 Sum. 384; McCoy v. Hedden, 38 Fed. Rep. 89.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This case comes here on a certiorari granted to bring up a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Circuit Court and reversing that of a Board of United States General Appraisers. The respondents imported "cotton cloth in which other than the ordinary warp and filling threads have been introduced in the process of weaving to form a figure," to quote the words of paragraph 313 of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, c. 11, 30 Stat. 175, 178. The Collector and Board of General Appraisers decided this cloth was liable to a duty of two cents per square yard under that paragraph and also, the different items being valued at over eleven, twelve and twelve and a half cents per square yard, to the ad valorem tax imposed by paragraphs 306 and 307 upon similar plain cloth above those values. The Circuit Court of Appeals, while admitting its belief that Congress intended to place an extra duty on figured cloth, felt bound to decide, upon the language of paragraph 313, that the tax placed by it upon figured cloth was to be added only to specific taxes imposed on less valuable cloths by paragraphs 306 and 307.

To explain: By paragraph 306 cotton cloth not bleached, etc., exceeding one hundred and not exceeding one hundred and fifty threads to the square inch, etc., and not exceeding four square yards to the pound, pays one and a half cents per square yard, with an increasing rate as the number of yards to the pound increases. But a proviso substitutes for the foregoing a different set of duties on all cotton cloth with. the same count of threads, not bleached, etc., if valued above a certain sum, for instance, if over nine cents per square yard, thirty per centum ad valorem, if over eleven, thirty-five, etc. Paragraph 307 is similar in form for cloths with between one hundred and fifty and two hundred threads.

By paragraph 313 figured cloth "shall pay, in addition to the duty herein provided for other cotton cloth of the same