This was to isolate France in Europe, and it was the most serious attack made upon that alliance between France and England which had been so strictly maintained since the acces sion of Louis Philippe to the French throne. M. Guizot had already foreseen this. "The Eastern question occupies me much," he wrote; "it was drooping, when Mohammed Ali's proposals to the sultan after the fall of Khousreff Pasha caused it to revive. This is regarded as the exclusive work of France, and has given offence. It is said, Since France has her separate policy and follows it, let us do the same.' The four Powers at once set at work; Lord Palmerston is preparing a quadruple arrangement with this twofold basis: no Syria for the pasha; coercion if necessary. I do not understand that the matter is settled. If the proposition of Mohammed Ali to the sultan should succeed, and bring about a direct settlement of difficulties, it will be for the best, and everybody must needs be content. But if nothing comes of it, we must not shut our eyes to the fact that our influence with the other European Powers will be enfeebled, and an agreement between them. from which we are left out, will have a very good chance of success."

When the convention of the 15th of July was known, the anger in France was great, greater and more general than Lord Palmerston and the English Cabinet had foreseen. "Everything that I heard from Paris showed me how strong and general was the feeling, the displeasure, I may say, on this subject," writes M. Guizot in his Mémoires; "it arose as much from the unfriendly act of the English Cabinet as from the public good-will towards Mohammed Ali, and the French anger helped along the Egyptian cause. The public temper is incredibly warlike,' some one wrote to me, on the 30th of July; the coolest heads, the most timid natures are carried away by the general impulse; all the deputies whom I see,

pronounce in favor of a great display of strength; the most peaceable among us are wearied with this question of war, always put off, but always recurring again; we must put an end to this, they say. This disposition has reacted upon our anniversaries this month; on the 28th there were between sixty and eighty thousand men under arms, and everybody was delighted to see so many bayonets at one time. Yesterday when the king appeared on the balcony of the Tuileries he was received with acclamations that were really very cordial, and when the orchestra performed the Marseillaise, there was a genuine outburst of enthusiasm.""

In England war was not desired. Lord Melbourne said to M. Guizot: "Lord Palmerston asserts that we shall succeed promptly and easily. In this expectation the experiment is made; if we are mistaken, we shall not go on. The pasha is not a madman, and France is always there. France has indicated the terms of an agreement: Egypt and Syria made hereditary for the pasha; Candia, Carelia, and Adana restored to the sultan. The pasha can always fall back upon this proposition. Why should he not at once, if he declines the propositions of the Porte? And if it is refused now, why should he not bring it up again in the course of events when he has proved his strength, and has begun to prove Lord Palmerston in the wrong? England wishes neither to quarrel with France nor to set Europe in a blaze. Austria is of the same mind with England. It is a pity, and it would be very serious; but it can be avoided, and we desire to stop it, and France, who would not assist the four Powers in moving, will at least help them to stop."

Lord John Russell was as anxious as Lord Melbourne; the Tories were more uneasy than the Whigs, although they had not the responsibility of the decision. "We shall remain silent," said Sir Robert Peel; "we shall leave all the responsibility to

the Cabinet. We shall be like France in the East, motionless and watchful, waiting for events." The Duke of Wellington wrote to one of his friends: "God send that we may preserve peace between these two great countries, and for the world! I am certain that there is no desire in this country, on the part of any party,—I may almost say of any influential individual, to quarrel with, much less to do anything offensive towards, France. But if we should be under the necessity of going to war, you will witness the most extraordinary exertions ever made by this or any country in order to carry the same on with vigor, however undesirable we may think it to enter into it."

M. Thiers was disposed to commence at once the warlike preparations whose possibility the Duke of Wellington had regretfully foreseen. "Stand firm," he wrote to M. Guizot, in a letter desiring him to return to Paris to decide, in a personal interview, upon the course to be pursued; "be cold and severe, except with those who are our friends. I have no wish to change anything in your conduct, except to render it more decided, if that be possible without exciting against yourself the ill-will of those who can influence the conduct of England." The sultan had already accepted the convention of the 15th of July, and had, in accordance, addressed to the pasha a summons to return to his allegiance. Mohammed Ali replied with the most explicit refusal. "That which I have gained by the sword I shall abandon only to the sword," he said to the consul-general of England. France intervened, and had obtained important concessions from the pasha, but the English fleet was already off Beyroot before the treaty of the 15th of July had been ratified. On the 14th of September, without replying to the propositions of Mohammed Ali, the sultan pronounced sentence of removal upon his viceroy, and appointed a new Pasha of Egypt. Three days later, September

17th, Beyroot was first summoned to surrender, and then bombarded by the English squadron, while Turkish troops, or those in the service of Turkey, landed in Syria. The treaty of July 15th was executed in all its consequences, whilst at London and Paris efforts were still making to prevent these results. The situation was critical in France. Preparations for war, already for some time in progress, were every day hastened more and more. The nation felt herself offended, and believed herself menaced. In the treaty of the 15th of July she saw an attack upon her dignity; and the alliance of the four Powers to settle the Egyptian question without her, seemed in her eyes the presage of a new coalition against her, perhaps to come into existence in the near future. The enemies of the government of 1830 fomented this twofold sentiment, promising themselves an opportunity for the gratification of their passions and the success of their designs. The French Cabinet felt all the pressure of the public anger and alarm, and took measures as serious as they would have done if the perils which seemed to threater had in reality burst upon them. An augmentation of sea and land forces was ordered; it was decided to fortify Paris. On the 8th of October the French Cabinet declared its determination not to consent to the overthrow of Mohammed Ali as Pasha of Egypt, and the Chambers were convoked for the 28th of the same month.

M. Guizot did not believe that the war was necessary. On the 22d of September he wrote to the Duke de Broglie: "Ought France to make war for the sake of preserving Syria to the Pasha of Egypt? Plainly that is not an interest of sufficient importance to become a casus belli. France, who did not make war to save Poland from Russia, or Italy from Austria, cannot reasonably do it in order that Syria may belong to the pasha rather than to the sultan. The war would be either in the East and maritime, or continental and general. If maritime,