a distinguishing mark of a peculiar kind, by way of so marked is actually a vendible article in the market; contradistinction from other kinds of liquorice. At and, thirdly, that the defendants, knowing that to be me time in August (the exact date does not appear) so, have imitated the mark for the purpose of passing a case of that liquorice, so stamped, containing a con- in the market other articles of a similar description. derable quantity, was delivered by the warehouse- Now, I have all those qualities and all those requisites man to a trader of the name of Johnston. By John- in the case before me. The letter of the 13th Sepon it would appear to have been distributed among tember abundantly proves that the plaintiffs' manuretail dealers. That is a fact not directly proved, but facture was known, and was upon the market. The is to be immediately inferred from what is proved, letter of the 13th September is frequent with proof, because it appears, by a letter of the 13th September, that it was accepted in the market as an improved duced by the defendants, that certain druggists in manufacture, and was an article likely to be in demand. Sinner-street, Euston-road, in the parish of St. Pan- The letter of the 13th September is abundant proof ras, were possessed, as vendible articles, of part of that the defendants, with that knowledge, imitated the the liquorice marked with the word "Anatolia." It mark. The letter of the 13th September is proof stated by Messrs. Voile that they obtained that that they imitated the mark in order that their own Liquorice from a person of the name of Edwards, manufactures might come into the market, and fruit dealer. Edwards makes no affidavit; but as plainly, as they must have known, for the purpose of there has been no attempt on the part of the defend- competing with the article so marked that previously nts to shew that, at this time, there was any other was there. It is impossible, therefore, to say that a nufacturer of liquorice stamping it with the word case so circumstanced has not all the elements of Anatolia" besides the plaintiffs, in the market, I the cases that require the interposition of this Court. ast, of course, infer that the articles which Voile & There is the deliberate imitation of the mark prehad for sale were articles of the plaintiffs' manu-viously existing in the market. The thing is done in facture. Then, on the 13th September, an order is order that the rival articles of the defendants' manusent to the defendants for 5 cwt. of this description facture may be brought into the market in rivalry of liquorice; and the order contains an express direc- with that which is there. There is not one single thing tion, that it shall be stamped " Anatolia ;" and part of necessary for the interposition of the Court which is the goods manufactured by the plaintiffs is sent with wanting on the present occasion. There is nothing the letter to the defendants as a sample. Now, the wanting in the case. letter does not stop there, but it concludes in these words-There are large buyers, and this is only a sample order, much wanted." From that letter I am bound to infer, that the article had become known in the market, and that the person who gave the defendants the order anticipated that much more would be required. Upon receiving that order, it appears that the defenduits immediately caused a stamp to be prepared for be purpose of exactly imitating the stamp on the aricle sent to them, and that they continued to use that tamp, substituting it for the stamps that they had reviously used in their manufacture. There can be doubt, therefore, that, whether knowingly or not, by became imitators of the articles sent to them. here can be no doubt that they desired that their poda, so manufactured, should for the future be reerved in the market upon the footing of that sample rticle which had been sent to them. I have been much pressed by the defendants' counsel o declare that there was not sufficient time between the amination of the month of July and the 13th Sepmber following, for the plaintiffs to acquire a right property in this particular trade-mark. The subce of the argument of the defendants is this, that posing the Court interferes upon the ground of perty in a trade-mark, that property must be reded as the offspring of such an antecedent user will be sufficient to have acquired, for the article imped, general notoriety and reputation in the rket, and that the property cannot be held to exist il the fact of that general user, that notoriety, and public reputation, have been proved to exist. I am by no means driven to the necessity of ermining when, for the first time, property may be I to be established in a trade-mark. The elements the right to that property may be represented as ag, the fact of the article being on the market, as ndible article, with that stamp or trade-mark, at rime when the defendants imitate it. The essenqualities for constituting that property probably ald be found to be no other than these-first, that mark has been applied by the plaintiffs properly, at is to say, that they have not copied any other on's mark, and that the mark does not involve y false misrepresentation; secondly, that the article I am told that the defendants were unwilling to contest the right of the plaintiffs. Undoubtedly, at the time when they knowingly imitated the mark, they knew there was that mark, and they intentionally imitated it. At that time they probably were not aware that it was the mark of the plaintiffs'. But if a man finds an article sent to him from the market, bearing a stamp, and he intentionally appropriates that stamp, and thenceforth uses it for the purpose of designating his own article, laying aside the mark that he had previously used, and appropriating that which he ought to have inferred was the property of another, he must take the consequences. If, upon the first notification of their having done wrong to the plaintiffs, the defendants had offered to give up the practice, had entered into an engagement for that purpose, and had not contested the plaintiffs' right, the question of their being liable to the costs of the suit would, of course, have deserved much consideration. But, upon being served with notice of the plaintiffs' right, and of the fact of their imitation of it, the course that they think proper to take is to come into court, and contest the plaintiffs' title to the interposition of the Court. The result, therefore, is, that the whole of the costs of the suit, which they have thought proper to defend and oppose as an ungrounded suit, must fall upon the defendants, who have been in the wrong. I am told that this word, " Anatolia," being a general expression-being, in point of fact, the geographical designation of a whole country-is a word common to all; and that in it, therefore, there can be no property. That is nothing in the world more than a repetition of the fallacy which I have frequently had occasion to expose. Property in the word, for all purposes, cannot exist; but property in that word, as applied by way of stamp upon a stick of liquorice, does exist the moment the liquorice goes into the market so stamped, and obtains acceptance and reputation in the market; whereby the stamp gets currency as an indication of superior quality, or of some other circumstances that render the article so stamped acceptable to the public. All these, as I have already said, are undoubtedly found in the present state of things. I am undoubtedly warranted in ascribing to the thing stamped, the circumstance of its having value by the very terms of the letter which first introduced it to the defendants, Notes for reference-Tud. Merc. Law, 487, 493; Lloyd on COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. GALLOWAY V. THE CITY OF LONDON.-April 26. Municipal corporation-Compulsory powers-Trustees for the public. effect :-" The company and corporation may into and carry into effect agreements with refe to the formation of the new street from Vic street to the Metropolitan Meat and Poultry M for powers to construct which application is made in the present session by the said corpor and the use for railway purposes of the under s thereof, and with reference to the sale and le any lands to the company by the corporation of the payments to be made in respect thereof. another act, called the Metropolitan Meat and P Market Act, 1862 (Western Approach), the co tion was empowered to make a new street, an this purpose to take lands, including those of the tiff; and it was also enacted, that it should be for the corporation to sell and dispose of all o part of the lands purchased or acquired by them the act, and not laid into, or forming part of, the required to be made, either with or without first demised or leased the same on building This act received the royal assent on the 29th 1862, and on the 30th April, 1863, the plaintiff re The corporation of London were by statute empowered to notice that the corporation intended to take cer construct a market within the city; to lay out a new his lands for the purposes of the Metropolitan Me street as an approach thereto; to purchase property Poultry Market, 1862. The plaintiff objected compulsorily for the above purposes; to grant leases of his land, but if compelled to sell it, he der property taken, and if any purchased property were not 65,000l. The corporation thereupon took proce required, to appropriate the same by sale or otherwise, under the Market Act of 1862, for summoning as the corporation might think fit. It was likewise pro-and the plaintiff then filed his bill against the vided by statute, that the rents reserved by the above- ration, praying an injunction to restrain furt mentioned leases should be applied for keeping up market. The plaintiff was seised of property which the It appeared that the corporation on the 26th June ceedings by them, under the following circums corporation were authorised to take, but of which only a a month before the royal assent to the Market small portion was required for the purposes of the sta- 1862, had entered into an agreement that the tute. The corporation gave the plaintiff notice, that they tion should use their utmost reasonable endear required all his land; their object being to dispose of procure the passing of the bill then pending (the the portion not required to a railway company, in ac- Act of 1862), and if it should be passed, should p cordance with an agreement made with the company be- and procure to be vested in themselves certain fore the passing of the statute, under which they proposed including those of this plaintiff, as was neces to take. The corporation were restrained from exer- enable the company to make certain operatio cising their compulsory powers against the plaintiff, on cified in subsequent articles, and would clear the ground that the agreement with the railway fettered the buildings and erections thereon, and would the discretion which the corporation were bound to exerto the company so much of the lands shewn cise as a public body. Whether the railway company had power to buy the land, that the consideration for the conveyance plan lying to the north of the intended stre sh quære? 70,000l. in cash or debentures of the company. appeared, that the corporation only required part of his land for the street, and that they of the rest in order to sell to the railway compan the This was an appeal from an order of the Vice-Chancellor Wood, refusing an injunction to restrain the defendants, the city of London, from exercising the compulsory powers of purchase given to them under the acts hereafter mentioned. By the Metropolitan Meat and Poultry Act, 1860, with which the general city act, called the Model Act, 10 & 11 Vict. c. 280, was incorporated, the corporation were authorised to buy certain lands, including the plaintiff's, and to construct a market, and to let the under surface land to the Metropolitan Railway Company, and they were empowered to grant building leases of any lands purchased and cleared, but not required for the improvements contemplated, and to sell the ground rents and the reversion of the leases; and it was enacted, that if any lands to be purchased and cleared by virtue of the act should not be wanted for the market, it should be lawful for the corporation to appropriate the same for any other purpose. The corporation were also empowered to take tolls for the use of the market, but after all the monies expended in making the market had been repaid, the tolls were to cease, and the remaining rents employed towards the maintenance and improvement of the market. By the Metropolitan Railway Act, 1862, the Metropolitan Railway Company was authorised to make a communication with the market, and there was a clause to the following Sir W. P. WOOD, V. C., on the 25th February the injunction, and delivered judgment to the to effect:-Supposing, in the first instance, that the ment of the 26th June, between the corporat the railway company, had not been made thre previous to the passing of the Market Act of 1 subsequently. Then it must be considered the is a clear distinction between an ordinary co as a railway company, constructing works as a speculation, and a public body, like the corp undertaking a public improvement, and obtai profit; for even the tolls of the market were to defray expenses, and the surplus rents we applied in keeping up the market. There was, then, all the more reason that means should be given to the corporation of ing the large outlay which they were called make. Under the Model or Improvement Act, 1 corporation were free to take any part of t duled lands for the purposes of the act, had I grant building leases of the superfluous lands sell the reversions of the same. This power, without restriction. It was not incumbent corporation, as it was upon an ordinary compan Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, to give to the is the option of repurchase. Now, the purposes City Improvement Act, 1847, and of these Market were clearly twofold-first, the carrying out of a improvements; secondly, the raising of money. refore, the only powers of taking land, given to rporation under these Market Acts, had been the s given by means of the incorporation therein provisions of the City Improvement Act of 1847, uld have held that, for the purpose of raising the corporation was authorised to take any f the land scheduled, but that the modes of money upon the superfluous lands were limited grant of building leases, and the sale of the rein the buildings comprised in these leases. But e powers a material addition was made by the ction of the Market Act of 1862, which enabled poration to sell any part of the lands acquired under the act, and not wanted for the purf the act, without having first granted building and the reason of the removal of this obligagrant building leases was to be found in the xtion of the Railway Act of 1862, passed a previously. That section had authorised the tion to enter into agreements to sell to the company any of the superfluous lands, and, had secured a useful and proper occupaitose lands. gestion, then, remained whether the fact that nement was entered into before the act of 1862 eived the royal assent, made any difference? the Court rescinded that agreement, the parties awfully enter into a precisely similar agreement next day. There was nothing furtive or frauabout it; nor was there any wanton taking 3 for the purposes of the railway company, as from those of the corporation. The corporak them in order to make a profit out of them le to the company, as authorised by the LegisThe conduct of the corporation seemed to him it of a very natural explanation. The bill had passed the Houses of Parliament, and was on of receiving the royal assent. Might not the tion, under these circumstances, very well say, exercise our judgment now as to what land be taken. You (the railway company) have under your act (Railway Act, 1862, sect. 13) with us for the purchase of the land we take. treat with us?" And so the agreement was Under these circumstances, his Honor would to interfere with the corporation, so as to preem from valuing the plaintiff's lands. this decision the plaintiff appealed. and Bagshawe, for the plaintiff, cited The StockDarlington Railway Company v. Brown (9 246) and Webb v. Manchester (4 My. & C. 1. Cairns and Swanston, for the corporation, ed that the cases cited were those of comsing the powers obtained from Parliament for profit, not, as in this case, solely for the public ge. The distinction appears from the manner Parliament deals with them, giving in the absolute power to purchase and keep, wheated or not, in the other case giving the landhe option of purchasing back. The corporadistinctly empowered to buy land, in order to street, and then to sell such part of the land ailable for other purposes, to the best profit, y not to this company? There is nothing to the company from buying of the corporation. in reply. L KNIGHT BRUCE, L. J.-The present apnot from a decree, but from the refusal of an interlocutory injunction. I think that he agreement between the corporation and the Metropolitan Railway Company must be taken, in effect, to have incapacitated the corporation from forming a just judgment, as between themselves and the plaintiff, concerning the quantity of land which they should require the plaintiff to sell to them under their parliamentary powers, and that the defendants' course of action had been unduly biassed against the plaintiff to his damage and injury. On this ground, I should hold the plaintiff entitled to an injunction, but whether or not there is also a wider ground to justify an injunction I decline to intimate. Sir G. J. TURNER, L. J.-This is a motion for an injunction, which has been refused by the Vice-Chancellor Wood, and the question depends mainly, if not wholly, upon the provisions contained in several acts of Parliament, and upon the agreement between the corporation and the railway company. The position of the case, as I understand it, is this:-The defendants, the corporation, have, under the Metropolitan Meat and Poultry Market (Western Approach) Act, 1862, the right to purchase the whole of the plaintiff's property; and they must also, as it seems to me, have the right to sell the property, when purchased or acquired by them, to some persons, and under some circumstances. The 20th section of the last-mentioned act must, I think, be held to give them this power. But then, what is the extent of this power? A power to sell, even though given by Parliament, cannot, as I apprehend, be construed to authorise an incapacitated person to buy; and unless, therefore, it can be shewn, not merely that the corporation were empowered to sell, but also that the railway company were empowered to buy, I cannot at present see my way to holding that the corparation could sell to the railway company. The corporation are endeavouring to purchase the whole of the plaintiff's property. I cannot but doubt whether they are entitled to do this; unless, indeed, it can be shewn that the railway company are capacitated to buy from the corporation. Are they, then, so capacitated? It is true, no doubt, that by their act of 1862, power is given to them, in very general terms, to agree with the corporation for the sale of any lands by the corporation to them; but some limit must, of course, be put upon this power; we cannot suppose it to have been the intention of the Legislature to vest in this railway company the power to purchase any lands whatever belonging to the city of London-lands, for instance, in distant counties, or otherwise out of the range of the railway company's operations. What, then, is the limit to be put upon this power? I very much incline to think that it must be measured by the purposes of the act by which the power is given; and the purposes of this act, as I understand it, are the extension of the line of the railway to the meat and poultry market, so as to afford a convenient approach to that market from the west. It was not, as I conceive, intended by this act to vest in the railway company the power to acquire land for an additional or more extended station, the purpose for which, as I collect from the evidence, this property is in part intended to be applied. Where the Legislature intends to give the power to acquire lands for those purposes, the intention is generally, if not universally, expressed in the act. Nor was it, as I conceive, intended by this act to vest in the railway company land to be afterwards sold by them as superfluous lands. I see no trace of any such purpose in the act, or of any intention to benefit the railway company otherwise than by the express provisions contained in the act. It was argued for the defendants, that they were the judges of the land which they would purchase; but if the construction of the Railway Company's Act be such as I have suggested, this argument cannot, in my judgment, avail them. They may be judges of what shall be done within the powers of their act, but they cannot exceed their powers: the points to which I have thus adverted seem to me to be well deserving of consideration. It is not necessary now to give, nor do I mean to give, any final opinion on these points. It is sufficient to say there is a question, and in my opinion a very serious question upon them, proper to be discussed at the hearing of the cause; and upon this ground alone, I think, speaking with all possible respect to the Vice-Chancellor, the injunction prayed by this bill ought not to have been refused. But the case does not rest here; powers such as those which are given to the corporation by this act of Parliament are at all times to be exercised bonâ fide, and with judgment and discretion: in this particular case this rule certainly ought not to be relaxed, for the corporation are in this case, to some extent, trustees for the public. The continuance of the market tolls depends upon the proceeds of the sales to be made by them. Now, in what position have they placed themselves? They have agreed to sell to the railway company before they purchased, and even before they acquired the power to purchase. It cannot, then, be said that they have exercised the judgment which they were bound to exercise, or even that they have ever been in a position to exercise that judgment, bound as they have been, and are, by the agreement into which they have entered. Again, therefore, speaking with all respect to the Vice-Chancellor, my opinion is that, upon this ground also, the injunction asked by this notice of motion was due. There were, as I have already said, other points argued before us, and I have only to add, in disposing of the case upon the grounds to which I have referred, I do not mean to prejudice the argument upon those points. They will be open at the hearing. As the case stands, I think there must be an injunction until the hearing or further order, in the terms of the notice of motion, omitting only the parts of the notice which have reference to the purposes of the proposed sale. Note for reference-Webb v. Manchester (4 My. & C. 116). ROLLS COURT. BROOKE v. LORD MOSTYN.-Feb. 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, and March 17. Release-Infant-Compromise sanctioned by Court-Set ting asule-Misrepresentation. Where a compromise has been entered into by the Court on behalf of an infant, with a full knowledge of the facts, the infant is bound by the compromise, even though it should afterwards turn out that the Court was mistaken in its judgment. But if, by suppression or mis-statement of facts intentionally made in order to mislead the Court, the Court has been led to an erroneous conclusion, it will set aside the compromise as against the innocent party, or, as far as possible, prevent its future operaCircumstances under which the Court refused to set aside a compromise. tion. The facts of this case sufficiently appear from his Honor's judgment. Selwyn, Q. C., Freeling, and Cutler, for the plaintiff. Baggallay, Q. C., and Jones Bateman, for Lord Mostyn. Sir Hugh Cairns, Q. C., and Speed; Southgate, Q. C., and Woodroffe; Hobhouse, Q. C., and De Gex; Dickinson, Druce, and Macnaghten, for other parties. Brydges v. Branfill (12 Sim. 369); Greencod Churchill (6 Beav. 314); The Attorney-General v. kins (17 Beav. 285); Finch v. Shaw (19 Bear. 50 H. L. C. 905); Joyce v. De Moleyns (2 Jo. & Lat. Phillips v. Phillips (8 Jur., N. S., 145); and Wa Gibson (1 H. L. C. 605) were cited. March 17.-Sir J. ROMILLY, M. R.-This is a instituted by an infant, who has become adult i course of the progress of it, asking the Court to clare that a compromise or arrangement entered in March, 1843, is not binding on him. This compromise sanctioned by the Court, after the r of the Master, finding that the arrangement wa the benefit of the infant, and it was carried into cution by and under the authority and orders by this Court. Before I proceed to examine the facts of this which I shall have to do in some detail, and al state my opinion on the evidence adduced, it i sirable that I should state what I consider to b law which applies to such cases, and what it is the plaintiff must prove to entitle him to the reh seeks to obtain. If, in the course of a suit or any other pro ing in this court, a compromise is proposed tween one or more adult persons and one or infants, the Court takes steps to ascertain wh it will be for the benefit of the infants tha proposal should be accepted. Formerly this was by a reference to the Master; at present it is sometimes by reference into chambers, and some without adopting that course, where the judge, considering the evidence presented to the Cou of opinion, that, without further investigation, sufficient to enable him to decide on the ma In dealing with such a question, it is the duty c judge (and, as I believe, a duty always performe him) to consider carefully the facts, and to deter upon such consideration, what is best to be do the infant in like manner as a father would act son in similar circumstances. No doubt, in such especially when the result of this evidence is dou the Court is much influenced by the opinion nearest relatives and guardians of the infant, have no interest in the matter, except to promo advantage of the child. When this has been and the Court has decided in favour of the art ment, and the arrangement has been thereupon & into execution, the whole thing is concluded. should afterwards turn out that the Court was taken, the infant has no redress; it is an erro judgment, for which there is no remedy, and w cannot afterwards be altered. But this is so when the whole of the facts which were necessa enable the Court to form an opinion have brought fully and honestly before the Court. Court is far froin being infallible; and if by sup sion or misstatement, the Court has been led erroneous conclusion, the persons who have bee same manner as they would have been had th cause of it, are amenable to justice in exactl ception been practised on others than the Court without the intervention of the Court to sancti This is an equity which extends far beyond th of infants; it extends to every case where the has been intentionally deceived, and has been the involuntary instrument of depriving oth their just rights. Whenever this occurs the Cour so far as possible, redress the injury inflicted case of Brydges v. Branfill (12 Sim. 369) is an in of this character; in all such cases the Court will wards, if possible, set aside the transaction as the innocent party; or if it will not, will, so fa can, prevent the further operation of it upon But in order to induce the Court to take this step, it must be shewn that the parties, or some of them, have intentionally suppressed truth, or suggested error, in order to mislead the Court. The question I have to decide in this case is, whether this has been done on the occasion to which I have referred, and if so, by whom. The facts are shortly as follows:-In 1818 Sir Thomas Mostyn made his will, by which, subject to a term of 500 years which he created therein, he devised the Cos-y-Gedol and the Plas-Hen estates to the use of the defendant, the second Lord Mostyn, for life, remainder to his first and other sons in tail male. The trusts of the 500 years term were declared to be for the raising and paying various large legacies, amounting together, provided all the contingencies therein stated happened, to 75,000l. Amongst them was a legacy of 20,000l. to Eliza Mostyn, to be paid to her at twenty-one. The testator republished his will in July, 1826, and died on the 17th April, 1831. The will was duly proved by the first Lord Mostyn and Richard Parry, who were the executors. The defendant Thomas Edward Mostyn Lloyd Mostyn, the eldest son of the second Lord Mostyn, attained his age of twenty-one years, barred the entail, and has since died, pending the proceedings in this suit. At the death of the testator the Cors-y-Gedol estate was subject to a mortgage for 45,0001., and the PlasHen estate was subject to a mortgage for 60,000l. The debts of the testator, which were also charged on the estates, amounted to 132,0907. 10s. 2d., making together a total sum of 237,0907. 10s. 2d. charged on the estates. In addition to this there were, as I have stated, legacies, amounting in the whole to 75,0001, charged on the 500 years' term; but this sum included two legacies, of 10,0007. each, to two sisters of the testator, the interest of which was payable to them during their respective lives; but the principal was payable only in the event of their marrying, which did not happen. In June, 1840, Eliza Mostyn married Captain Brooke, the father of the present plaintiff; and upon the marriage the legacy of 20,000l. was settled upon the following trusts:-The legacy was assigned to two trustees, namely, the defendants Edward Hyde Clarke and George Rochfort Clarke, upon trust, during the joint lives of Captain and Mrs. Brooke, for the sole and separate use of Mrs. Brooke; and after the decease of either, for the survivor for life; and after the decease of the survivor, upon trust for the children of the marriage. The plaintiff is the sole issue of the marrage, and he attained his age of twenty-one years in Be course of the suit. The first Lord Mostyn had been advised, in the first instance, that all the legacies secured by the 500 years' term were, by the will of the testator, charged on all the devised estates, and thereupon he paid the legacy duty in respect of all the legacies. He was subsequently better advised, and by the highest authority 4t the bar, that this was erroneous, and that the CorsGedol and the Plas-Hen estates were alone liable to pay the legacies; and thereupon he presented a memonal to the Commissioners of Stamps and Taxes for a return of the legacy duty, on the ground that the estates comprised in the term were not sufficient to pay the legacies, and that the full value of the estates. would be absorbed in payment of the debts, which the personal estate was insufficient to pay. The first meCorial was presented in 1842. The Commissioners of Stamps and Taxes would not entertain the subject without proof that the legatees had released the estates from their legacies. This was accordingly done. In order further to facilitate the administration of the estate, a private act of Parliament, intitled "The Mostyn Estate Act," was passed in July, 1842, whereby the fee-simple in the Cors-y-Gedol and Plas-Hen estates was vested in trustees, upon trust for sale. It is unnecessary to state in what manner the release was effected with respect to the other legacies; but with respect to the legacy for 20,000l., the release of the estates was effected as follows:-The first and second Lord Mostyn proposed to Captain and Mrs. Brooke, and their trustees, that they should accept the security of the bond of the second Lord Mostyn for the amount, to be paid in January, 1851, when his eldest son would attain twenty-one; interest at 47. per cent. to be paid in the meantime. The trustees of Captain and Mrs. Brooke were assured that the estates were insufficient to pay the legacy of 20,000l., or any part thereof, and that the proposal to give the bond arose from a desire to serve them; and more especially from a desire to fulfil the wishes of the testator, as far as it was possible; that by this means the 20,000l. would eventually be paid; and that otherwise they would get nothing. After some negotiation this proposal was accepted; but in order to make it binding on the infant plaintiff it was necessary to obtain the sanction of this Court. Accordingly, in November, 1842, a bill, Brooke v. Lord Mostyn, was filed, praying that the legacy of 20,0007. might be raised and paid, by a sale of the said estates, or a competent part thereof. In February, 1843, a petition was presented in the name of the infant plaintiff, stating the proposed arrangement, and praying for an inquiry whether it was proper to be acceded to on the part of the infant; and on the 17th February, 1843, an order was made, referring it to the Master to ascertain and report to the Court. The necessary evidence was laid before the Master, which led him to the conclusion that the arrangement was a beneficial one. On this evidence I shall have to comment presently. On the 14th March, 1843, Captain and Mrs. Brooke released their interests in the estates comprised in the term. On the same day the Master made his report, finding that the arrangement was an advantageous one for the infant. On the following day, the 15th March, 1843, the trustees of Captain and Mrs. Brooke's settlement released the estates included in the 500 years' term from all claim; and on the 17th March, 1843, the Court made an order confirming the arrangement on the part of the infant plaintiff. On the 20th March, 1843, Lord Mostyn executed a deed of covenant for the payment of 20,000l. to the trustees of Captain and Mrs. Brooke on or before the 20th January, 1851, and to pay interest in the meantime at the rate of 47. per cent. per annum. The property has since been sold. The Plas-Hen estate has produced 187,8821. 15s., exclusive of twenty-one lots remaining unsold; and the Cors-y-Gedol estate has produced 124,4287. 28. 9d., making a total of 312,3407. 17s. 9d. The portion remaining unsold is estimated to be of the value of 80001, and probably, as the estimate is made on behalf of the defendants, it is a low one. In addition to all this, there is to be added the personal estate of the testator not specifically bequeathed, amounting in the whole to 46,2627. 15s. 11d. Since the hearing of this case, I have been furnished, at my request, with a statement by the defendants, giving all the details by which the results are arrived at, accompanied by the comments and mode of stating the accounts of the advisers of the plaintiff. Few things require a more careful consideration than an argument founded on figures; and few things, I regret to say, are more deceptive than figures they may be dealt with, and what different results may be produced from different modes of stating the same sets of figures, is well exemplified in this case. How |