and the proceeds of the living were applied to the payment of the debts; and it was decided, that a sequestration so obtained did not override the previous sequestration of an ordinary creditor. Nor can we put a different construction upon sect. 135 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861. I agree, therefore, that there should be judgment for the defendant. Legislature seems to have been, that a bankrupt red clergyman should be in this somewhat anos position, viz. that the assignees should take profits for the purposes of administration, but that iring should not vest in them. I readily underI that the policy of the Legislature was, that while rofits of the living were to be made available for ayment of the debts under the bankruptcy, it ot proposed that this species of property, which lesigned for the furtherance of sacred purposes, d be placed upon the same footing as ordinary rty. We have been referred to cases which dethat the profits of a living do not vest in the ees of an insolvent by virtue of the provisions Insolvent Act, but that in order to bring them he estate to be administered it is necessary that estration should issue; and according to the de, the authority of which is undisputed, a sequesa prior in point of time to that issued by the ases would be valid as against a posterior sequestraNow, these provisions in the new Bankruptcy em to me perfectly analogous, and to the same The only difference is, that instead of its being hat the profits shall be made available" for the ent of debts," the words in the later act are, that 'shall form part of the bankrupt's estate," which tically the same thing. I think, therefore, that [Before ERLE, C. J., WILLIAMS, BYLES, and KEATING, Legislature intended to make a corresponding at under the Bankrupt Act, and that this of property should be realised, in case of a yan becoming bankrupt, in the same manner, y means of sequestration. MELLOR, J.-I agree with Mr. Mellish so far, that sects. 184 and 135 must be construed as though they were parts of the same statute; but I am further of opinion that sect. 184 is inapplicable, because there is this essential difference between the two sectionsthat the one has reference to the ordinary property, and the other to the ecclesiastical property, of a bankrupt. It was thought necessary to introduce a clause, having for its object the subjection of the clergy to the bankruptcy laws; and I agree with the rest of the Court, that the profits of a benefice can only be brought into the estate by sequestration; and that the assignees can get possession thereof in no other way.— Judgment for the defendant. on the other question raised by Mr. Mellish, dy. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. JJ.] FRYER V. KINNERSLEY.-Nov. 13 and 24. Libel-Privileged communication-Language in excess of the occasion. A. being dissatisfied with B., his gardener, gave him notice J., after Trinity Term, 1863. The plaintiff was a gardener. The defendant was a member of the Royal Horticultural Society, and, being in want of a gardener, applied to a Mr. Eyles, who was superintendent of that society. Mr. Eyles was in the habit of recommending gardeners to members, and on receipt of the defendant's application recommended the plaintiff, who thereupon was engaged by the defendant from February, 1862. In 1863 the defendant, being dissatisfied with the plaintiff, gave him notice to leave; but before the notice and an altercation ensued respecting some work in the had expired, a fresh cause of dissatisfaction occurred, garden; and the plaintiff also accused the defendant of having opened one of his letters. another situation; and this fact was known to the deThe plaintiff then applied to Mr. Eyles to get him fendant when he wrote the following letter to Mr. Eyles, which letter was the alleged libel: "Binfield Manor, Bucks, April 20, 1863. "Dear Sir,-On Saturday I had another scene with Fryer in my garden. He was extremely violent, came towards me several times with an open clasp knife in his hand, and his eyes starting from their sockets with rage-a perfect raving madman. I was, fortunately, accompanied by my upper servant. He accused me of having opened a letter of his, and said he had written to the General Post-office about it, and would take proceedings, as it was an indictable offence. I have found in my post-bag, since my notice to him to leave, a letter and a dirty newspaper. The letter was delivered to him unopened, and certainly no letter for him was ever opened by me. I went to-day to inquire at the Bracknell post-office if he had made any complaint there about me, but found that no complaint had been made there. Mr. Bartlett told me, that some time ago Fryer obtained a post-office order for some one in London, and, not having given the correct name and address, the money was not paid. He came to the post-office, and abused Mr. Bartlett in very rude language. I think it right that you should be informed of Fryer's violent conduct, as you might unwittingly recommend him, without being aware of his temper and faults. I have engaged the gardener of whom I spoke to you; he has been here, and likes the place." On receipt of the above letter, Mr. Eyles declined to have anything more to do with the plaintiff, who thereby suffered damage. The present action was then brought. The jury found that the letter was libellous, but that the publication was bonâ fide, and without malice, and the verdict was entered for the plaintiff, with 107. damages, leave being reserved to the defendant to move to set the verdict aside, and enter a verdict for the defendant, or a nonsuit, on the ground that the communication was privileged. A rule having been obtained accordingly, Laxton shewed cause, and contended that the communication was not privileged, and referred to the following authorities:-Rogers v. Clifton (3 B. & P. 594); Brooks v. Blanshard (1 Cr. & M. 779); Toogood v. Spyring (1 C., M., & R. 181); and Martin v. Strong (5 Ad. & El. 535). Shee, Serjt., and Kingdon, in support of the rule, referred to Harrison v. Bush (5 El. & Bl. 344) and Coxhead v. Richards (2 C. B. 569). [Erle, C. J., mentioned Wright v. Woodgate (2 C., M., & R. 573).] Cur. adv. vult. 30 upon a prior life estate to R., by his codicil, made twenty-five years afterwards, devised all his estates and property of every description, to B., which latter clause would, taken by itself, have carried the estate devised by the will to R.:-Held, that, under the various circumstances of this case, R. was entitled to the life estate devised to him by the will. This was an action of ejectment, tried at the Pembrokeshire Summer Assizes, before Channell, B. At the trial a verdict was entered for the plaintiff, with leave reserved to the defendants to have the verdict set aside, and entered for them. The facts of the case are fully set out in the judgment. H. Giffard having obtained a rule in Michaelmas Term, cause was shewn by Mellish, H. Allen, and Owen.-It is clear that the testator believed that the will and codicil could stand together; and therefore, if any means can be found of reconciling the two, we should adopt them. If the will and codicil had been two parts of one will, the devise would certainly stand. [They cited Doe d. Hearle v. Hicks (1 Cl. & Fin. 20); Williams v. Erana (1 El. & Bl. 727); Doe d. Murch v. Marchant (6 Man. & G. 813); Molyneux v. Rowe (25 L. J., Ch., 570); Freeman v. Freeman (Id. 838); Snape v. Neville (11 Q. B. 466); and Re Arrowsmith's Trusts (30 L. J., Cl.. 148).] Dart and C. E. Coleridge, contra.-A will and a codicil executed so long after cannot be considered as forming part of the same instrument. (Jarm. Wills, c. 7, p. 158, and the cases referred to therein). Cur, adr, tull The judgment of the Court was now delivered by POLLOCK, C. B.-This was an action of ejectment brought to recover certain premises situate at Hoges ton, in the county of Pembroke, and was tried before my Brother Channell, at the Summer Assizes for that county, in the year 1862. Evidence was given, and it is not now disputed, that one Robert Robertson, who died on the 31st December, 1820, was at the time of his death seised in fee of thirteen-sixteenths of the property in question. It was not proved that he died seised of the other three-sixteenths. By consent, a verdict was entered for the defendants for three-sixteenths, and for the plaintiff as to the other thirteensixteenths, leave being reserved to the defendant to enter a nonsuit, or to enter a verdict for the defendant for the whole. A rule nisi to this effect was ac cordingly granted, and came on for argument last Hilary Term, before myself and my Brothers Chan ERLE, C. J., now delivered the judgment of the Court. This was a rule to set aside the verdict for the plaintiff, and to enter a nonsuit, or a verdict for the defendant, in an action of libel, on the ground that the defamatory letter complained of was privileged. Whatever our opinion might have been about the communication being privileged-on the ground that the letter was written to Eyles, who had found a situation for the plaintiff, as servant to the defendant, and who, as head gardener or superintendent to the Royal Horticultural Society, was in the habit of finding gardeners for masters, and masters for gardeners-nell if the letter had been confined to a simple statement of the servant's conduct, the letter clearly goes, in our judgment, beyond what was justified by such a communication. There are some expressions about the plaintiff being a raving madman, and other expressions, in our judgment, excessive, and beyond what would be justified by any such privilege as was contended for, assuming it to exist. We are, therefore, of opinion that the rule must be discharged, and the verdict for the plaintiff will stand.-Rule discharged. and Wilde, when the Court took time to consider its judgment. I have now to deliver the judgment of myself and Baron Channell. The ques tion is, whether a life estate devised to the plaintiff by a will of the said Alexander Robertson, dated the 22nd October, 1802, and which life estate was exper tant on the deaths of two persons, sons of the testator viz. Bowen Robert Robertson and George William Wheeler Robertson, without issue, was revoked by a testamentary instrument of the date of the 31st De cember, 1819, described by the testator as a codicil to his will of the 22nd October, 1802. At the date of his will the testator had two estates-the Westbury estate (not the subject of this action) and the Hogeston estate (the property now in dispute). He had two sons-an elder son, George William Wheeler Robertson, and a second son, Bowen Robert Robertson-and he had two illegitimate children by one Elizabeth James, his housekeeper, viz. a son, the present plaintiff, and a daughter. By the will the testator devised Testator, having given a life estate in remainder expectant | court. Wilde, B., had in the meantime resigned his seat in this 30 his estate, called the Westbury Hall estate, to trustees, to the use of his eldest son, George William Wheeler Robertson, for life; with remainders to the sons and daughters of George in tail; with remainders to his second son, Bowen Robert Robertson; with remainders to his sons and daughters in tail; with remainder to the plaintiff for life; and a remainder in fee to one Alexander Thomson. The testator then proceeded to dispose of the Hogeston estate, the property now in Espute. This estate, subject to certain rents, charges, and annuities, he devised to trustees, to the same uses as were limited with respect to the former estate, the Westbury Hall estate, but placing, as to the estate Low in question, Bowen Robert Robertson, the second son, before George William Wheeler Robertson, the eldest son. The annuities given by the will by way of rent-charge were-an annuity of 217. to the plaintiff; E to his illegitimate daughter Mary; 127. to his housekeeper, Elizabeth James, mother of the plaintiff and of the illegitimate daughter; and 30l. to one Mrs. Letitia Robertson. The testator then, after various pecuniary and specific bequests to his executors and ther friends, and a legacy of 57. to his servant Elizabeth Powell, if in his service at the time of his death, becathed all his leaseholds to Bowen Robert Robertkon, his second son; and the residue of his personal estate to George William Wheeler and Bowen Robert equally. After the date of the will, and before the date of the codicil, George, the eldest son of the testator, died unmarried, viz. in the year 1806. In the year 1918, Alexander Thomson, to whom the testator had devised the ultimate remainder in fee, died. In the year following, by a testamentary instrument, duly signed, and scaled, and attested, dated the 31st December, 1819, which the testator therein declares to be a codisil to be added to, and taken as part of, his will dated the 23rd October, 1802, he gives to the plaintiff, by the description of his son Willliam Robertson, by Elizabeth James the further sum of 217. annually, in addition to the 217 left him by this said will, making together the sum of 421., to be paid half-yearly, on two equal payments, the first to commence six months after his d-case; and he gave to his natural daughter Jane, then with Mary Morginis at Haverfordwest, the sum of 107. per annum, to be paid during her natural life. He also gave to the female servant living with him at the time of his decease the sum of 51., provided she had lived in his service twelve months, and 57. more if she had lived two years; and he then gave to his son Bowen Robert Robertson all his estates and property of every description whatsoever, discharging the above legacies. The said Bowen Robert Robertson died in the year 1861 without issue, and the present plaintiff thereupon claimed the property in question, under the life estate devised to him by the will of 1862. The defendants contend, that the life estate was revoked by the testamentary instrument of the 19th December, 1819. Their first contention is, that that instrument is to be taken as a new will, revoking enurely the former will. This point we may at once dispose of. We think that the express reference which te testator has made to his will, the date of which he mentions, and the obvious confirmation of some of the legacies given by the will, precludes our treating this instrument otherwise than as a codicil to the will of 1802. But the defendants further contend, that treating it as a codicil, the life estate devised by the will to the plaintiff, expectant on the deaths of Bowen Robert Robertson and George William Wheeler Robertson without issue, is revoked by the words of the codicil:—“I give my son Bowen Robert Robertson all my estate and property whatsoever, after discharging the above legacies." Now, the general rule in interpreting a will and codicil is, that the whole of the will takes effect, except in so far as it is inconsistent with the codicil. (See Doe d. Hearle v. Hicks, 1 Cl. & Fin. 20). The plaintiffs, in their argument, mainly rely on the above rule. They contend, that the life estate given by the will to the plaintiff is not inconsistent with anything in the codicil. They explain the gift in the codicil, of all the testator's estate and property to Bowen Robert Robertson, by suggesting that the testator intended to dispose of the ultimate remainder in fee, which, by his will, he had devised to Alexander Thomson, who had died in the year preceding the making of the codicil. They contend, that it was more probable that the testator should have been influenced at the time he made the codicil by the death of Alexander Thomson in the preceding year, than by that of his son George in 1806, thirteen years previously. The defendants, in the second branch of their argument, in which they assume that this instrument was a codicil, and not a new will, did not dispute the general rule as to the interpretation of a will and a codicil. They contend, however, that an intention to revoke the life estate given to the plaintiff by the will is manifested not only by the words of the codicil, giving all the testator's estate and property to Bowen Robert Robertson, but also by the gift of an additional annuity of 217. to the plaintiff, which they con| tend was intended to be in lieu of the contingent life interests in the testator's two landed estates. And the defendants further contend that, by the construction suggested by the plaintiff, no effect is given to the devise in the codicil to Bowen Robert Robertson, inasmuch as he was heir-at-law to the testator, and would have taken as heir. But so many cases of devises to heirs are found in the books, that a devise to one who is heir cannot be considered such a disposition of property as necessarily shews some other intention on the part of the testator, as, for instance, an intention to revoke a previous devise. Many cases were cited on both sides, but it is unnecessary for us to review them in detail, because we agree with a remark made by Mr. Jarman in his work on Wills (p. 146, last ed.), that the cases on this point are for the most part too special to be of much use as general authorities, and we think that each case must be decided from the particular words used, having regard, of course, to the main principles laid down on the subject. Now, in the same case (Doe d. Hearle v. Hicks, 1 Cl. & Fin. 20), in which we find the general rule above referred to, we find it laid down that, if the devise in the will is clear, it is incumbent on those who contend that it is not to take effect by reason of a revocation in the codicil, to shew that the intention to revoke is equally clear and free from doubt with the original intention to devise, for if there is only a reasonable doubt whether the clause of revocation was intended to include the particular devise, then, undoubtedly, such devise ought to stand. This principle was acted upon in Williams v. Evans (1 El. & Bl. 727), in which case a clear devise of tithes in the will was held not be revoked by a general devise of "all my real estates"-a case entitled to the more weight, because the Court, out of deference to the Vice-Chancellor of England, took time to consider, but finally overruled his judgment in Evans v. Evans (17 Sim. 108). In the present case the words of the gift to Bowen Robert Robertson in the codicil, though doubtless sufficiently large to pass the fee, are less clear than the exact limitations of estates contained in the will. It is also evident, from the reference to the will, and from the words giving legacies in the codicil, that the gift to Bowen Robert Robertson, though expressed to be after discharging the above legacies, is intended to be also subject to the legacies bequeathed by the will, for the new annuities are described to be additional an nuities, and it does not clearly appear to us, that it was not intended that that gift to Bowen Robert Robertson should be also subject to the life estate given by the will to the plaintiff. Therefore, on the principle above stated, that it is for the defendant in this case to shew the revocation, we give judgment for the plaintiff, and the rule obtained by the defendant will be discharged.-Rule discharged. mages, as having been guilty of laches in arresting the vessel without having previously had a valuation made of the property, in accordance with sect. 50 of the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act, 1862. Milward, for the plaintiffs, submitted that the Court had no jurisdiction, and contended that it could neither award costs or damages for the detention of the vessel. (Tinniswood v. Pattison, 3 C. B. 243; Lawford v. Partridge, 1 H. & Norm. 622). COURT FOR DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL case, to determine whether it has authority to decree CAUSES. WELLS v. WELLS AND COTTAM, falsely called WELLS. Petition for nullity of marriage by father of minor against husband and wife-Wife's costs. In a suit for nullity of marriage, instituted by the father against the husband and wife, the wife is not entitled to have her costs taxed against the petitioner. Feb. 2.-Dr. LUSHINGTON.-The Court has, in this to the defendants costs and damages as prayed, and if it has authority so to do, whether the circumstances of the case would justify it in making such an order, either as prayed or in part. The defendants pray a decree for costs and damages, but the plaintiffs, who arrested the vessel, now say the Court has no autho rity to comply with their prayer, no jurisdiction whatever, and therefore none to give costs and damages, though they themselves resorted to that jurisdiction; and that, under these circumstances, the defendants' remedy, if any, must be by action at common law. The practice at common law, in certain cases when a Court has no jurisdiction, has been alleged, and two or three cases have been cited. In Tinniswood v. Pat This was a suit for a decree of nullity of marriage, by reason of undue publication of banns. The petition was filed by the father of the husband, who was a minor, not as guardian, but in his own right. The wife, a minor, appeared by her guardian, and filed antison, after plea of liberum tenementum, the county answer. court continued to entertain the cause, and it was decided that the Court could not proceed, and of that I really see no reason to doubt at all; but that was a question of proceeding with the cause, not of costs only. Lawford v. Partridge is substantially to the same effect; perhaps it goes further, for there Pollock, C. B., states, what is no doubt true, that after prohibition, the Court prohibited cannot give costs. I have no disposition to assume a right to question these authorities, but I will observe, that they are all founded on express enactment, declaring that in given cases the Court below shall not proceed further. The present case, however, appears to me to be in some respects different. The Court had original jurisdiction in all cases of salvage. The 460th section of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, regulates the exercise of that jurisdiction, and the 49th section of the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act, 1862, also does so. Now, a direction that the magistrates shall take cognisance, appeared to me, looking at the whole, to be equivalent to a prohibition to this Court to exercisa jurisdiction. But admitting that the law is truly laid down as stated by Mr. Milward in argument, and the cases cited by him, neither that state of the law, nor any authority of which I am aware, applies to the respond-present proceeding, which is of a totally different nature, a proceeding in rem, the arrest of the ship Now, can the Court order the release of the vessel if its hands are tied altogether? And if it is incompetent for the Court to make such an order, the vessel must remain under arrest, as without the directions of the Court, the marshal cannot release her. Again: unless the Court can proceed thus far, who is to pay the legal expenses of the custody? The case must remain in statu quo, and nothing could be done to set the matter right. Redress, in the form of costs and damages, is a just remedy, approved by the Judicial Committee in the case of The Evangelismos (12 Moo. P. C. 352), and as far as I am able to discover, and as far as my recollection goes, has been the undisputed and A cause of salvage having been instituted against uniform practice of this Court, from the beginning this vessel, she was arrested on the 3rd December last, down to the present time. For these reasons, I do not and on the 12th December an appearance was entered consider I am prevented, by what has occurred, from on behalf of the owners, and affidavits were filed, doing what I apprehend to be justice in this case; but shewing her value to be less than 1000l. On the 16th I shall look to all the merits of the case, and decide December the vessel was released by the plaintiffs. accordingly. I am of opinion that the Court ought Lushington (Jan. 26), for the defendants, now moved to decree the costs, but with regard to damages, 1 the Court to condemn the plaintiffs in costs and da-think the Court ought not to give them. I have no Dr. Wambey, for the wife, moved the Court for an order, that the respondent's costs should be taxed against the petitioner; and cited Bird v. Bird (1 Lee, 209) and Beavan v. Beavan (2 Swab. & T. 652). Dr. Spinks, for the petitioner, contra.-The father is not instituting the suit against the wife on behalf of his son, but in his own right against both the parties to the de facto marriage. Sir J. P. WILDE.-I am of opinion that there is no authority for this application. The principle upon which the Court acts in ordering the husband to pay the wife's costs is, that the husband is supposed to have the whole of the wife's property; but that principle has no application where a third person is suing both husband and wife-a proceeding common enough in the courts of common law, and in other courts. Nor do I think there is anything in this particular case to call for an extension of the rule of this court. The affidavits shew that the husband is not colluding with his father, the petitioner, but that he is opposed to the suit. It will certainly take a very strong case to induce the Court to strain the princple upon which the husband is made liable for the wife's costs, one step further than it at present goes.-Motion rejected. Attornies for the petitioner, Batt & Son; for the ent, Eaden. COURT OF ADMIRALTY. THE KATE.—Jan. 26 and Feb. 2. Salvage-Property saved not of the value of 1000l.—Costs and damages. A vessel arrested in a cause of salvage, and subsequently released by the plaintiffs on affidavits that her value was under 1000l.:-The Court held that it had jurisdiction to give costs and damages; but under the circumstances of the case, gave costs only. 30 reason to doubt the arrest was bonâ fide; but I agree | posterior to the original demand. The suit is instiagain with the principles of The Evangelismos; indeed, tuted as a cause of necessaries, and if it had happened they are principles which must govern my decision, that the owner of this vessel had not been resident in beause they have been laid down by the superior England, I am strongly inclined to think it would have Court, namely, that unless there has been mala fides, been well so instituted, for I think that between the or gross negligence, the Court of Appeal considers that repairs that are mentioned in this account and necesno damages should be given. I shall make an order saries in the general explanation of the term, there is that the plaintiffs shall pay the costs in the case, but very little distinction to be found. But, however, it not give damages. appears that the suit was instituted as a cause of necessaries; and the first is a technical objection, whether the Court under these circumstances ought, if I THE SKIPWITH.-Feb. 16. Claim for repairs to vessel-Subsequent mortgagee liable may use the expression, to nonsuit the parties, or -Maritime lien-Amendment. A subsequent mortgagee is liable for repairs previously done to the mortgaged vessel. The institution of a suit as a cause of necessaries does not stop the plaintiff from afterwards pleading, and proving that his claim is in respect of repairs; but the title of the cause must be amended. The schooner Skipwith having been arrested in a suit for wages, this action was entered as a cause of Decessaries on behalf of the plaintiffs, Charles Hill and others, of Cardiff, shipbuilders. Their claim was for repairs done to the vessel in July, 1863. The defendant was an assignee of a mortgagee, the mortgage having been transferred to him on the 17th September, 1863. The answer stated (inter alia), that the repairs were done on the personal responsibility of the owner; that the vessel belonged to the port of London, and, at the time of the institution of the case, her owner resided at Swansea. F. Lushington, for the plaintiff, moved the Court to reject the material portions of the answer. The acten is properly for repairs, under sect. 4 of the Adalty Court Act, 1861. The action has been enAnd as one of necessaries; but-repairs are necessaries. The mortgagor can be in no better position than the orner, and the plaintiff's claim would, therefore, take precedence. (The Caledonia, Swab. 19). E. C. Clarkson, for the defendant. The cause was entered as one of necessaries, and by that the plaintif is bound. He could only recover under sect. 5 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861; but he cannot Roover under that section, as the owner is domiciled in Wales. The 4th and 5th sections above referred to are as follow: Sect. 4. "The High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction over any claim for the building, equipping, or repairing of any ship, if, at the time of the titation of the cause, the ship, or the proceeds thereof, are under arrest of the Court." Sect. 5. "The High Court of Admiralty shall have jrisdiction over any claim for necessaries supplied to y ship elsewhere than in the port to which the ship belongs, unless it is shewn to the satisfaction of the Court, that at the time of the institution of the cause, any owner or part owner of the ship is domiciled in England or Wales: provided always, that if in any ach cause the plaintiff do not recover 20., he shall act be entitled to any costs." Dr. LUSHINGTON.-There might be many circumstances which would raise questions of considerable difficulty with regard to the construction of the 4th and also of the 5th sections of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861, but I cannot say that upon the present occasion I feel much embarrassed. Now the facts of the case are these that these articles, whether you all them repairs to the vessel, or whether you call them necessaries, were done and furnished in the month of July last, and the plaintiff in this case took transfer of the mortgage on the 17th September folowing. He, therefore, in point of time, is clearly whether it ought not to allow some means in order to remedy that which is a mere technical accident. Reference has been made to the past practice of this Court, and I have no doubt that Mr. Clarkson is right, when he says it has always been customary to state that a cause was of this or that description; but there never was a case, to my knowledge, in which, in consequence of an erroneous description in the title of the cause, the person who was unfortunately guilty of that mistake, by negligence or otherwise, was estopped from suing in this court. There has been no such case, and I apprehend the Court has ample means of reforming that difficulty, supposing it to occur; for I should have nothing to do but to give leave to the plaintiff to amend, and say it was a case of repairs, and not a case of necessaries. Now, with respect to the meaning of the 4th section, which is as follows:-[The judge read the 4th section above cited, and continued.] I am of opinion, that however the claim originally arose, whether it arose from giving credit to the master of the vessel or not-provided that the claim was not satisfied at the time, and that the work for building, equipping, or repairing had been done and provided, also that the ship and proceeds were under the arrest of the Court-it was and is competent to the party to proceed here. A difficult question might arise, whether, in the wording of this section, the claim which has been given in can be called a maritime lien or not, and if not, what would be the proper denomination of it. But Mr. Clarkson has argued, and very properly argued for his client, that his client never would have been responsible for these repairs, because the mortgagee was not in possession. That is perfectly true, but I do not see how that benefits him in the slightest degree, because he stands in the position of the original owner of the property, and takes his mortgage cum onere, and is, therefore, liable to all the repairs and all the debts legally attaching to the ship. I will give leave to amend the title of the cause; and with regard to the other questions, I have expressed my opinion.-Answer rejected, but without costs, the question being one prima impressionis, and depending upon an ambiguous section of an act of Parliament. COURT OF PROBATE. CATHRELL V. JEFFREE and KIDDLE.-March 8. Testamentary suit discontinued-Right of the same party to recommence-Practice-Pauper. On the death of the testatrix, probate of her will was granted in common form to the executors named therein, Subsequently the plaintiff, as executor of a will of later date, called in the probate in order that it might be revoked, but in consequence of non-prosecution, the suit was dismissed. The will of later date was filed in the registry. The Court refused to allow the plaintiff to recommence in formâ pauperis the contentious proceedings. Eleanor Saunders, late of No. 3, Walnut-tree-walk, |