residence in Wales. The articles were all ordered | wife, and some of them at the defendant's of the plaintiffs' traveller. They were articles thing, such as would, in ordinary course, be used defendant's presence, though there was no proof e observed them. The orders given by the wife plaintiffs were given without the knowledge of fendant, and against his directions. jury found that all the goods supplied by the ils were necessaries—i. e. articles suitable and for the condition of the wife and daughters of feadant, who was a country gentleman in Wales; xfore the supply the husband had revoked his general authority to purchase necessaries, proto make her what, if regularly paid, would bea sufficient allowance for that purpose; but hole of that allowance had not been paid, at so much of it as had been paid was not suffiprovide any of the necessary articles supplied plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had no notice of any tion of the wife's authority. ward "necessaries" is not free from ambiguity. import simply things suitable to the station of supplied, without reference to the supply, or of supply, from other sources. Or it may imags not only suitable, but requisite or indisbecause not supplied from any other source. se last, again, are divisible into two classesTh are indispensable, without any fault of applied, and those which are indispensable, de party supplied has wasted supplies, or the atsapply from other sources. case now under consideration the jury have effect, that the goods sold by the plaintiffs defendant's wife were necessaries, not only in st sense, but indispensable; and not only indisde, but indispensable without any fault or waste wife. question is, whether a private arrangement bebastand and wife, limiting her ordinary and at authority, without notice to the tradesman as supplied to the wife necessaries in the strictest is an answer to an action by the tradesman the husband. eive that the power of the wife living with ad to contract for necessaries rests on the pal and agent. It is a part of that law if the principal's representations or acts clothe get ith an appearance of authority larger than really possesses, the principal is bound by 4s acts within the limits of that apparent The wife's power to bind her husband therefore, repose, not merely on her actual aubat on the apparent authority with which the rests her by cohabitation. He thereby, as it me, represents her to tradesmen as being, 1 certain limits, his domestic manager; and is, responsible for her contracts within the of that apparent authority. No private revoof authority, or private agreement between d and wife, not communicated to a tradesman dealing with the wife, by supplying necesfor the family in the ordinary course of doaffairs, can affect the tradesman's right to rely spparent authority of the wife. dgment of the Court of Exchequer in the nt case on the subject, the case of Johnston (3 H. & Norm. 261), is in conformity with of the law, and is, as I conceive, in harmony principle and with the old authorities. "The le say the Court, "is merely that of agency. ty may be express or implied, or arising from as where one person holds out another in such as to induce a belief of authority." The Court adds, "that if a man and his wife live together, it matters not what private agreement they may make; the wife has all usual authorities of a wife." (p. 266). In the note to Manby v. Scott (2 Smith's L. C. 388), the result of all the authorities, and more particularly of Etherington v. Parrott (Salk. 118; Ld. Raym. 1006) is said to be this-" that during cohabitation there is a presumption, arising from the very circumstance of the cohabitation, of the husband's assent to contracts made by the wife for necessaries suitable to his degree and estate." By the word "presumption," the learned author, as appears from the subsequent part of the note, means a presumption which the creditor had a right to make, and which could not be repelled by a secret revocation, but only by a revocation to the tradesman. Such was plainly Lord Holt's meaning in the case of Etherington v. Parrott, as may be seen by consulting either report of the case, especially the fuller report in Lord Raymond. The expression" presumed authority," however, though not inappropriate, is ambiguous, and does not appear to me to express so precisely what is meant as the expression "apparent authority." The American law and the Scotch law coincide with this view of the case. In 2 Kent's Commentaries, 139, the learned author lays it down, that the husband is bound by the wife's contracts for ordinary purposes, from a presumed assent on his part. The Scotch law is the same. In 1 Bell's Commentaries, 676, it is said, that "she is empowered, as by presumed mandate, to bind the husband for furnishings to the family." There are two recent cases, which have been cited as at variance with this view of the law (Read v. Teakle, 13 C. B. 627, and Reneaux v. Teakle, 8 Exch. 680); but both those cases are subject to observation. In Read v. Teakle the case was not argued by the defendant's counsel, but abandoned; and Jervis, C. J., expressed a doubt "whether, if a woman orders what is strictly and properly necessary, her husband can repudiate her agency." In Reneaux v. Teakle the Court seem to have granted, or at least may have granted, a new trial on other grounds. I think, therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to keep their verdict, and that the rule should be discharged.—Rule absolute. This was a suit by a husband for dissolution of marriage. The petition alleged a marriage on the 15th February, 1849; cohabitation at various places in India and England; that there had been issue of the marriage one child. The third and fourth paragraphs of the petition were as follows: "3. That in or about the year 1853 the respondent, at Jubbulpour, had sexual intercourse with some man, other than your petitioner, and thereby committed adultery. "4. That in and during the months of February, March, April, and May, 1861, the respondent, without the knowledge of your petitioner, had frequent clandestine meetings at night with Frederick Dormer Plowden, in and near to the grounds belonging to your petitioner's then residence, and in the said residence at Palamcottah aforesaid, and on divers of such occasions committed adultery with the said Frederick Dormer Plowden." The respondent denied both the charges of adultery, and pleaded condonation. The petitioner, in his replication, traversed the condonation, and alleged that the adultery charged in the third paragraph of the petition had been revived by the subsequent misconduct and adultery of the respondent, set forth in the fourth paragraph. The rejoinder took issue. The co-respondent denied the adultery, and pleaded condonation. The replication took issue. The cause was heard by the Judge Ordinary, without a jury, on the 3rd and 4th February, 1864. Karslake, Q. C., Dr. Spinks, and Dr. Tristram, for the petitioner. The Queen's Advocate, Hawkins, Q. C., and G. Francis, for the respondent. Coleridge, Q. C., and Dr. Swabey, for the co-respondent. Cur, adv. vult. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment. Feb. 9.-Sir J. P. WILDE.-In this case the really material question is, whether the adultery alleged to have taken place at Palamcottah, in India, between the respondent and the co-respondent is satisfactorily established. That great and most improper intimacy sprang up between these parties during the petitioner's absence in the spring of the year 1861, is plainly proved. The evidence of Augusta Morrison shews that they used to walk in the high road together in the evenings, after dark, and the candour of the respondent herself has added to this the familiarity of kissing each other on more than one occasion. On the 13th or 14th May, 1861, a disclosure of this intimacy was made to the petitioner by Augusta Morrison. He did what an honourable and just man would do. He declined for some days to sleep with his wife; he investigated the facts as far as he could; he asked questions of the nurse, and talked the whole matter over with his friend Colonel Middleton. The result was, that both gentlemen came to the conclusion, that though great impropriety had been committed, still there was no adultery. The petitioner then made the co-respondent promise not to speak to his wife again, and resumed cohabitation with her. He continued from that time to cohabit with her, sleeping in the same bed for upwards of a month. I think it right to pause here, and remark, that if the petitioner had taken a different course, he might probably have entitled himself to relief from this Court. For it is alleged, that his wife had, in 1853, been guilty of adultery with a person named Clark, which he had condoned. We know nothing of the circumstances, and the fact is proved only by implication. But condonation would hardly have been an answer to a suit founded on that adultery, in the face of these familiarities with Lieutenant Plowden, had he not condoned them also. It is not necessary to decide the point, but I am of opinion that this latter misconduct would have inured to revive the original guilt, if that had been made out to the satisfaction of the Court. I pursue the course of events. The petitioner determined to remove his wife to Aden as a temporary measure. He accompanied her as far as Point de Galle, in Ceylon, staying at his friend's house on the way, and parting with her in terms of strong affection. Whilst at Aden, where the respondent remained for six or seven months, a cor respondence took place which has been studied at g length by the Court. The burthen of the petitioner's letters seems t as follows: "I still love you, and long for your love. I summon you to rejoin me, on one condition-th true religious repentance. Go to my sister in Eng she will help you to repent. You have never me, and are ungrateful for my past leniency." The tone of these letters is that of very stern proach, mixed with much religious exhortation eq stern. Mere penitence will not suffice. His wife "abhor herself in dust and ashes." She is to und deep humiliation and self-abasement before he pentance can be real. But there is a strong yearning for her affe and, in the earlier letters, an evident wish to s himself, that he might take her back with safety On the side of the wife, the letters may be epitomised:- which I don't entertain. "I won't pretend to an amount of religious fe "I can never sympathise with what I consid extreme views of yourself and your sister in m of religion. Still I am most truly sorry. I am sinful wicked woman, but I do sincerely rep past misconduct. Pray take me back to live wit I feel more true longing for your society than but I make no pretences. You must take me all, as a weak sinful woman, who will try hard to you wish," and who earnestly repents conduct she now sees in its true light-complete subm absolute prostration before her husband's will tender entreaty on the one side-reiterated reproa bitter words, an austere and uncompromising cel on the other, with a vast amount of religious all on both sides-these are the principal features o most distressing correspondence. It came to a cruel end. For six or seven n had the hope of being received again been held he eyes of the wife. In December that hope apj to be realised. The husband wrote letters which, as interpre himself, actually offered her the option of ret his home. She misunderstood them, and waited for $ sure welcome. Then came the letter of the 31st December. a final blow to all for which the wife had yes an explicit withdrawal of all that had been h to her. What was the true reason of the change? Hi letter of the 20th January, 1862, explains it:"Your letter of the 26th spoke volumes of th unfitness you possess to rejoin me, and now I m quest you to take this letter as final. Go home. But on referring to that letter of the 26t Court looks in vain for words to justify suc ception or character. "I try to keep myself," says the wife, "from ing of the coming mail, and pray to be res From the softened tone in which you have writ me lately, I feel sure God has heard my prayer, is an encouragement." And again, in her next letter, of the 5th Dece probably also received before the 20th Januar pray God, with the deepest earnestness, to pern to return to my husband and protector, if he se but I try to leave it entirely in his hands." There is nothing here to induce the change of ing which had now possessed itself of the petiti mind. Driven from this explanation, and forced to clude, that the reason put forward by the peti handy the real one, the Court looks in another letter of the 20th January, 1862, goes on to I am willing to believe that you have some o do your duty, and atone for the past; and I believe this, I will just take at present no seps towards procuring a divorce, which would your conduct public. I will tell you, that I then the opinion of one of the best lawyers in Force Court, and he is of opinion that I can get re on the ground of adultery with Lieutenant for though that cannot be proved, adultery Mr Clark can; and if I prove that you were hat of meeting Plowden at night, and that acourse, such as kissing, &c., existed; that ad had the opportunity of committing adultery; the Court would consider the condonation of with Clark cancelled, and that would revive; st, in conjunction with your behaviour with a would be taken as actual adultery commitPlowden; for not having scrupled to commit with Clark, it is not to be supposed that you ruple to do so with Plowden; and I can prove onden is not a man likely to scruple to do so a, both from hospital returns of sickness, and atiments expressed by him at mess. All this I promised you on the 21st December, er from Virduputti, to receive you back." the difficulty. "I have taken the opipener had communicated with England for his legal rights. He had learned for the that the full charge of adultery could be thome to his wife. Whether he had really this as early as he says may be doubted. He t Lowever, believe the fact of adultery himthis case in this court that he did not, and so, for its doors would otherwise be closed condonation; and the Court gives entire ce to that fact. Is it likely that she would keep back all mention of the very meetings which had thus brought about the climax, and induced her to break silence? But what was the petitioner's conduct when thus told? The nurse says, 66 That evening he went out about ten o'clock from the house; she was going to undress;" and she then describes that he went to the gate, found Plowden there, and came back and charged his wife. It is somewhat painful to reflect, that the comtion with England which produced this legal mast probably have passed contemporaneously gent entreaties to his wife to repent, and bi fit to return to him-so that while holdthe hope of return, he was consulting This power to put her from him. Would the legal on had never been asked or given. alving on his own judgment, and obeying the dichis affection, all most probably would have vel the possibility of divorce opened new views, 3 it is the result. He says. Now, what induced him to go out that night? Would the knowledge that she used to meet Plowden while she was away from home account for it, or does his conduct point to a knowledge that these meetings had continued since his return, and at about the time of their retirement for the night? This is the first difficulty. But again, does the nurse tell us the whole truth? The fact of Plowden being found at the spot on the night of the 13th, is strong to shew that there was some truth in the story, in reference to the two previous nights. But is it the whole truth? Did the servant, who had threatened to tell her master before, and who certainly told him a day after, really shut down the window and refuse to see what became of her mistress after she got to the gate? and this not on one occasion, but on two succeeding nights? or did she stay where she was and see her mistress return after a few minutes, or remain in sight, talking to Plowden, till her return, as on former occasions ? These are momentous questions; for it is this abrupt ending of the nurse's account of these nights, which gives them their sting and significance. She conducts the wife to the gate, and then leaves her open to every charge, and subject to the worst interpretations. It is this shutting down of the window that creates the cloud of doubt, mystery, and suspicion in which the dishonour of the husband is said to stand revealed. The Court cannot think this testimony natural, or to be relied on, and here is a second and graver difficulty. But it is not the last; for suppose it all true, is adultery thereby clearly, or with reasonable certainty established? That there was a most improper intimacy was not denied; that it had already proceeded so far as evening meetings at the gate, and some personal, though not indecent, liberties, is also admitted. What is there in the character of the two meetings now under discussion essentially different from the previous familiarities from which the peti petioner no doubt assigns a far different rea- aelusion. tioner himself drew no such conclusion? All is to be surmised; nothing is proved. Whether she found Plowden at the gate when she went (as no doubt she expected); whether they were together one minute or an hour; whether they passed the time, whatever it was, at the gate, or walking on the road, as on former occasions or elsewhere, duration of time, place, and even the presence of the paramour, none of these things are in proof, all in the region of suspicion. Can the Court reasonably condemn the wife upon such materials? But then the wife's dress. To a suspicious mind it would seem to have been studiously adopted to favour the worst designs. But is not a more natural and less degrading solution at hand? May it have been, that catention is open to many difficulties. since her husband's return home, she had no opporit is it true that the nurse withheld this in-tunity of getting out in the evening before she had from the petitioner in May, when she told attired herself for the night? Constantly in his prethe rest? The date she gives to the first of sence up to that time, the interval between then and etings is two or three days before the 14th the moment when her absence in the tent would be The second was after that, and also before the remarked, offered her, perhaps, the sole occasion for escape. Bearing this in mind, together with the country and climate, and that Mrs. Winscom had necessarily to cross the compound in this dress, to get to the tent where they slept, it requires no great amount of charity to acquit her of a guilty design in this dress, about ay. De 13th May, which thus must have been imly upon the occurrence of these meetings, she what she had before threatened, and exMrs. Winscom's conduct to her husband. which so much has been said. And if so, the last feature of suspicion is removed. The result is, that I do not believe Mrs. Winscom committed adultery with Lieutenant Plowden. With a most anxious desire to hold the balance fairly, assigning full weight to the facts proved, and casting the alleged sin of 1853 into the scale of guilt, my mind still vibrates back to the conclusion which the petitioner and Colonel Middleton formed at the time-much levity-great misconduct- -no actual adultery. And it is, therefore, my duty to declare, that the respondent is dismissed from this suit. It is impossible not to feel the deepest interest in the future fate of this unhappy couple. If the petitioner is disappointed at the end arrived at, he will bear in mind, that while human judgment is always fallible, he has no cause to quarrel with the means. The case has been most fully sifted, and with the most earnest attention of all who had it in hand. And the thought is not without some solace, that human judgment, impartially applied, has absolved his wife, and confirmed his own early conclusions. Thus fortified, he may safely take her back to his home. No one can read the entire submission and pitiful appeal of his wife without indulging the conviction that the future will not be with her as the past. She owes all to his generosity and forbearance, and she will not disgrace that which does him so much honour. May it be so; and should the day come when peace and mutual confidence shall be established between himself and the mother of his only child, haply he may not regret that it has not been permitted to this Court to undo the most solemn and sacred act of his life. "Forsan et hæc olim meminisse juvabit." As to the co-respondent, I forbear to say anything, except that he must pay his own costs. Solicitors for the petitioner, Chilton & Co.; for the respondent, B. F. French; for the co-respondent, T. Johnston. COURT OF PROBATE. In the Goods of WILLIAM KENNETT LOFTUS, De- Administration de bonis non-Executors renounced—Also and John Gray as such guardians. The said E Mather and John Gray having renounced, as tors, probate, and, as residuary legatees in tru ministration with the will annexed of the goods deceased, on the 11th April, 1859, administratio the will annexed was granted to Charlotte Lof widow, relict and residuary legatee for life. Loftus died on the 10th December, 1862, leavi of the estate of her husband unadministered, minor children, the eldest of whom, Alfred K Loftus, is eighteen years of age. The estate n ministered consisted of the Newcastle Race which was built on a leasehold property. I Mr. Loftus assigned by deed this race stand to Mather, Gray, and James Radford, in trust certain annuities, and the interest of the mone on mortgage of the property, and afterwards. debts mentioned therein, which debts have bee paid off. The trustees obtained the sanction Court of Chancery to a scheme for the impre and future management of the grand stand; order to carry it out, it was necessary there sl a representative of the estate of the deceased. Tristram moved, that administration sho granted to Messrs. Mather and Gray, as testa guardians of the minor children of the unadmi estate, and that the limitation should be "for and benefit of the minor children during thei rity, and until such time as one or more of the attain the age of twenty-one years, and sha for, and obtain, a grant of administration." eldest son is at sea, it might be very injuriou estate, that the grant should expire on his con age. Messrs. Mather and Gray, although th nounced as executors and residuary legatees in of the substituted residuary legatees. (In the are still entitled to a grant as testamentary gu of Robert Morrison, Deceased, 2 Swab. & T. 129) Sir J. P. WILDE.-This is an application grant of an administration de bonis non of th of William Kennett Loftus, deceased, to th mentary guardians, after the death of their of the minor children of the deceased, the sul residuary legatees named in his will. These men were also executors and residuary leg trust named in the will, but as such they ren and, on their refusal to act, administration will annexed was granted to the widow as I legatee for life. She is now dead. Messrs, and Gray apply, as I have said, as guardians, objected, that to grant the application would trary to the 50th rule (Rules and Orders, 1862) is as follows:-"No person who renounces pro a will or letters of administration of the pers tate and effects of a deceased person in one ch is to be allowed to take a representation to th deceased in another character." No doubt, it i to adhere to the rules of practice, but it is m portant to facilitate the administration of Still the rules of practice are generally binding Court, and I am not at liberty to consider they will or will not operate beneficially in a William Kennett Loftus, late of Newcastle-upon- ticular case. Turning to this rule, I find it is Tyne, gentleman, died on the 27th November, 1858. a class headed "Rules and Orders for the regis He duly executed a will, dated the 19th September, the principal registry;" and on asking the re 1853, and thereof appointed Edward Mather and John its being made, I am informed that it is Gray, both of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, executors and against a special class of cases wholly differen residuary legatees in trust. By this will he gave his the present. The question then arises whether wife Charlotte Loftus a life interest in his residuary to treat these Rules, made for the instruction estate, and directed, that after her death it should be registrars, as under no circumstances capable of equally divided amongst his children. He also ap-fication by the Court, not even if sufficient res pointed Charlotte Loftus, his wife, guardian of his shewn. In the present case it would be ext children during her life or widowhood; and after her hard and unjust to the parties, and injurious death or second marriage, the said Edward Mather estate, if I held that the rule applied. Messrs. limitations. and Gray have never renounced their rights as guardians indeed, could not have done so when they signed the renunciation, because they did not then hold their resent character, which they only acquired on the death of the widow. I will, therefore, order the grant toise to them, but I cannot allow it to be extended beyond the period of the eldest son coming of age. Tht would be quite contrary to the ordinary prac HOUSE OF LORDS. [Before the LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord WESTBURY), Land CRANWORTH, Lord CHELMSFORD, and other Loris.] LAUTOUR V. THE QUEEN'S PROCTOR.-March 8. Divorce-Decree nisi—Intervention of Queen's proctor Adultery of petitioner-20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 31-23 24 Vict. c. 144, s. 7—Costs. 1861, should not be made absolute, alleges:-First, that the petitioner has been acting in collusion with the respondent Une Cameron Barclay Lautour, for the purpose of obtaining a divorce contrary to the justice of the case. Secondly, that divers material facts, respecting the conduct of the said petitioner and the respondent, have not been brought before the Court. Thirdly, that at the time when the said petitioner presented his petition for the dissolution of this marriage, he was, and had been for about twenty-five years prior thereto, cohabiting with a female other than the respondent, and habitually committing adultery with her at divers places (naming such places), and the said petitioner and the said female are still cohabiting as man and wife. Her Majesty's proctor, therefore, prays that the Court may be pleased to refuse to make the said decree nisi absolute; and further, may be pleased to dismiss the petition of the said Peter Augustus Lautour, and to condemn him in the costs arising from this intervention." The Court afterwards made an order that the parI 1838 L. obtained a decree for a divorce a mensâ et tharo from the Ecclesiastical Court, on the ground of ticulars should be furnished by her Majesty's proctor, the adultery of his wife, but took no steps to dissolve the of the material facts referred to in the second paramarriage until the Divorce Act was passed in 1857, graph of this plea; and on the 31st July, 1861, her when he presented a petition for the dissolution of his Majesty's proctor filed a statement that the material marriage, and obtained a decree nisi. The Queen's facts were those which were more particularly set proctor intermed by leave of the Court, and alleged forth in the third paragraph. Affidavits were aftercollusion, and that L. had been and was living in adul-wards filed in support of the allegation in the third tery. The Judge Ordinary, upon the evidence of adul- paragraph. No affidavits were filed by the petitioner. tery, rescinded the decree nisi, and condemned L. in the The case came on for hearing before the Judge Orcosts of the Queen's proctor. On appeal-Held, that the dinary on the 19th November, 1862, when his Lordship adultery having been proved, the learned judge had exer- rescinded the order nisi made on the 18th April, 1861, rised a proper discretion, under sect. 31 of the 20 & 21 and dismissed the petition filed in the cause on behalf Vict. e. 85, in refusing to confirm the decree nisi, but of the petitioner, and condemned him in the costs ininsuch as no case of collusion had been proved, the curred and to be incurred on behalf of her Majesty's Court had no jurisdiction to give costs to the Queen's Proctor. The petitioner then brought the present appeal. proctor The right of the Queen's proctor to costs, under sect. 7 of the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 144, is confined to cases of collusion. Sir Hugh Cairns, Q. C., and Searle appeared for the appellant, and referred to the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, sects. 22, 29, 30, 31, 51; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 144, s. 7; Major This was an appeal from a decree of Sir Cresswell Campbell's case (Macq. H. L. C. 590); Pearman v. PearCresswell, J. O., reversing a decree nisi, for the disso-man (29 L. J., N. S., Divorce Cases, 54); and Goode v. tion of the appellant's marriage. The facts were Goode (30 L. J., N. S., Divorce Cases, 105). shortly these: On the 21st April, 1859, the appellant General Lautour filed his petition in the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, praying for a dissolution of his marriage with his wife Une Cameron Barclay Lautour, on the ground of adultery committed by her with George Miles Weston, who was made a co-repondent in the suit. The wife appeared, but did not awer. The co-respondent did not appear. The parties were married in 1826. In 1832 they adalbery. 6th June, 1861. Her Majesty's proctor intering herein, to shew cause why the decree nisi olving the marriage of the petitioner Peter AuStus Lautour, pronounced upon the 18th April, No. 482, VOL. X., NEW SERIES. The Solicitor-General (Sir R. P. Collier) and Dr. Spinks were called upon to support that part of the decree ordering the appellant to pay the costs of the Queen's proctor. [They referred to Gray v. Gray (2 Sw. & Tr. 263); Boulton v. Boulton (Id. 551); and Anichini v. Anichini (2 Curt. 210).] LORD CHANCELLOR.-This is a case arising under very peculiar circumstances, and although I think your Lordships will not hesitate to arrive at the conclusion which has been arrived at by the Court below, yet the nature of the case deserves that it should not be dismissed from your Lordships' bar without a more particular statement of the reasons of your decision. It appears that General Lautour obtained a decree for a divorce à mensâ et thoro from the Ecclesiastical Court in 1838, and there is no reason to doubt that that divorce was rightly obtained, on the ground of the adultery of his wife. From that time until now the parties have not been living together; and it also appears that the wife, who at that time was divorced in that form, has ever since been living with the adulterer. General Lautour alleges, what may easily be believed, that he was not in circumstances to comply with the exigency of the then existing law, namely, to apply to Parliament for an act dissolving his marriage. But, treating himself as thus divorced, he has since lived and cohabited with another person as his wife. After the passing of the Divorce Act, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85 (which was passed in 1857), he applied to the Court for a dissolution of the marriage. In the petition for that dissolution he did not in any way m |