thereof. The person bailed not appearing, the recogniAmet vere estreated, and the plaintiff incurred other thereunto incidental. The Court below having hed, upon the authority of Green v. Cresswell (10 Ad. & El. 453), that this was a promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another," within the merking of sect. 4 of the Statute of Frauds-Held (repersing such decision, and distinguishing Green v. Cresswell), that the statute did not apply, this being a mere promise to indemnify, and not a promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another. Appeal from the Court of Queen's Bench. mise of an indemnity is not within the Statute of Frauds. On the other hand, when the promise is to answer for the default of another, it is within the statute. No doubt some cases might be put where the promise to answer for the default or debt of another would also involve a promise of what might be called very properly and legally an indemnity. Where that is the case (as it is not here), in all probability it might come within the Statute of Frauds. We are not called upon to overrule Green v. Cresswell, nor are we called upon to say that we entirely concur in it; but we take this distinction, that in the present case the bail was given for the appearance of the criminal, and not bail for the purpose of answering a debt or default in a civil case. Upon these grounds we are of opinion that the judgment below must be reversed, and judgment given for the plaintiff. WILLIAMS, J., BRAMWELL and CHANNELL, BB., concurred.-Judgment reversed. [Before POLLOCK, C. B., WILLIAMS and WILLES, JJ., BRAMWELL and CHANNELL, BB., and KEATING, JJ.] TOMS v. WILSON and Another.-June 16. -Default-Measure of damages. The declaration stated, that the defendant requested the plaintiff to become bail for his (defendants) daughter, and to enter into recognisances for her appearance at the Central Criminal Court, to take her trial upon an indictment to be preferred ainst her, and agreed, in consideration thereof, to demnify the plaintiff against all liability, costs, &c., in respect thereof; that the defendant's daughter did not appear, whereby the recognisances were estreated, and the plaintiff obliged to pay 801.; and that the deflant did not indemnify the plaintiff. The facts stated in the declaration were proved at the trial, before Hill, J., when it was contended on behalf of the Bill of sale-Covenant to pay "immediately on demand” defendant, that under sect. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, inasmuch as it was sought to charge the defendant, upon a promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person, the agreement upon which the action was brought not being in writing, and there being no note or memorandum thereof. The learned judge nonsuited the plaintiff, reserving leave to move to enter the verdict for him for 187. 12s., if the Court should be of opinion that there was any evidence to support the plaintiff's case. A rule nisi, in pursuance thereof, was afterwards obtained, and discharged. The pleadings and arguments are fully set out in the port of the case below (8 Jur., N. S., 1010).] H. James, for the appellant (the plaintiff below) Jene 15), cited Batson v. King (4 H. & Norm. 739); Fizgerald v. Dressler (7 C. B., N. S., 385); Hargreaves v. Persona (13 M. & W. 561); Green v. Cresswell (10 Ad & El. 453); Reader v. Kingham (9 Jur., N. S., 797; S.C. 32 LJ, C. P., 108); Foxall v. Barnett (2 El. & Bl. 928; 8. C., 18 Jur. 41); Highmore on Bail, 204; Jones v. Orchard (1 Jur., N. S., 936; S. C., 24 L. J., C.P., 229); and Fisher v. Fallows (5 Esp. 171). The plaintiff being indebted to the defendants, executed in In such case the measure of damages is, not the value of cision of the Court of Queen's Bench. Archibald, for the respondent (the defendant below), cited Petersdorff on Bail, c. 7, p. 517; Jones v. Orchard The facts of the case (which, with the pleadings, are 15 C. B. 614; 8. C., 1 Jur., N. S., 936); Kirkham v. fully set forth in the report of the case below, 9 Jur., Marter (2 B. & Al. 613); Eastwood v. Kenyon (11 Ad. N. Š., 492), were, that the plaintiff, being indebted to El 438); and Thomas v. Cook (8 B. & Cr. 728). the defendants in the sum of 2007., executed in their H. James, in reply. Cur. adv. vult. favour, by way of security for the said sum, a bill of POLLOCK, C. B. (June 16).-We are all of opinion sale of his furniture and effects, whereby it was deat the judgment of the Court below ought to be clared and agreed, that if the said plaintiff should not, Mersed. That Court held that it was bound by the immediately upon demand thereof in writing, by or on decision in Green v. Cresswell, and that in order to behalf of the defendants, being delivered to the said ng the case within the Statute of Frauds, the debt plaintiff, &c., pay the principal and interest, it should default in respect of which the promise is made be lawful for the defendants to take possession of the ast be towards the promisee. We think, however, said property and effects, and sell the same. On the at there is a substantial distinction between that 11th March, 1861, the sum secured by the bill of sale and the present. Here the bail was given in a being unpaid, the defendants' attornies, pursuant to minal case, and under such circumstances there is instructions, drew up a notice in writing, whereby he to contract on the part of the person bailed to in- demanded immediate payment thereof, together with demnify the person who bailed him, against his non-interest, &c., which was signed and delivered for serpearance. There is in this case no debt; and with vice to a sheriff's officer. The officer (who was aurespect to the person who gives bail, there is hardly a thorised to receive the money, but did not communiy and it may well be, that a promise to indemnify cate that fact to the plaintiff) swore that on the same the bail in a criminal matter should be considered day, about half-past two in the afternoon, he went to purely as an indemnity, and not as the case of a pro- the plaintiff's house, and served him with a copy of Rise to answer for the default or debt of another. It the demand. The plaintiff immediately went to the has been laid down in many cases, that a mere pro-defendants, and requested to be allowed twenty-four hours to find the money, which was refused, and on his return found a man in possession. The goods were afterwards sold by public auction. The only question left to the jury was, whether or no a demand in writing had been served on the plaintiff. The jury having found in the affirmative, a verdict was entered for the plaintiff for 157., the value of certain goods which, it was admitted, were not comprised in the bill of sale, and for the defendants upon the other issues; leave being reserved to the plaintiff to increase the damages by such sum as an arbitrator should award, if the Court should be of opinion that there was no sufficient demand, or default after demand. A rule having accordingly been obtained in pursuance thereof, was afterwards made absolute; against which decision the defendants now appealed. H. Mills, Q. C. (Phear with him), for the appellants, the defendants below.-There was a sufficient demand, and the plaintiff having made default, the sale was within the terms of the deed. [Williams, J.-The question turns entirely upon the meaning of the word "immediately."] The plaintiff covenanted to pay immediately, which word is to be construed according to its natural signification. [Pollock, C. B.-Take the case of a man afflicted with paralysis, who could not go up stairs for his money, and return under twenty minutes. Again: in the notice, interest is claimed after a certain rate, but no sum is mentioned as absolutely due; should you not have specified the amount? A debtor may be a bad arithmetician, and it might take him a considerable time to calculate what was due.] The demand was according to the terms of the deed, and is, therefore, sufficient. It was not necessary that the agent, who is to receive the money, should be mentioned in the notice; and the jury found that a demand in writing was duly served upon the plaintiff. [Willes, J., referred to Shep. Touchst. 134.] O'Malley, Q. C., for the respondent, the plaintiff below. The demand was invalid. By the terms of the bill of sale, the plaintiff is to pay the sum secured to Wilson, who, no doubt, may authorise his attorney to receive it; but the attorney cannot delegate this authority to a third party. (Člark v. Dignum, 3 M. & W. 319; S. C., 2 Jur. 67.) [He was then stopped.] POLLOCK, C. B.-We are all of opinion that the judgment of the Court below should be affirmed. We think there was a demand, but there was clearly no intimation in the demand that the bearer (the sheriff's officer) was the person to be paid; and payment, therefore, could not have been safely made to him; and then arises the question, has there been default on the part of the plaintiff? We are of opinion that there was not. If the bearer was not authorised to be paid, it follows that payment could only have been made to the defendants or their attorney; and the seizure took place before payment could have been made to either. We think, therefore, there was a demand, but no default, and that the action is, therefore, maintainable. It is agreed that the amount of damage is to be assessed by an arbitrator; and it is clear that if the arbitrator were to award the value of the goods seized as the amount of damage, the defendants would lose all benefit to which they are entitled under the bill of sale. We are, however, relieved from all difficulty upon this point by the case of Brierly v. Kendall (17 Q. B. 937; S. C., 16 Jur. 449), where it was held, that the measure of damages was, not the value of the goods, but the value of the plaintiff's interest in them at the time of the trespass, in respect of which the action was brought. We are, therefore, of opinion, that there being a demand, but no default, the action is maintainable, and that the Court below were right in their decision. WILLIAMS, J.-I am of the same opinion. There seems to me to have been a demand of payment wit the terms of the deed, but no default; inasmuch as sheriff's officer appears to have served the notice, immediately thereupon to have seized; thus rende compliance with the demand impossible. The rest of the Court concurred.—Judgment affir [Coram POLLOCK, C. B., WILLIAMS and WILLES, and BRAMWELL and CHANNELL, BB. RIST v. FAUX.-June 16. Master and servant-Seduction-Service. The daughter of the plaintiff was employed by the dej ant as an out-door farm servant from February to vember, being absent during the usual working i from her father's house, where she passed the remai of her time, sleeping there, and assisting in the hi hold duties. In April of the following year she birth to a child, of which the defendant was the fat -Held, that these facts constituted a sufficient se to the father to support an action at his suit for seduction. This was a bill of exceptions to the ruling of Wi man, J. The action was for the seduction of the plaint daughter. Plea, that the daughter was not the vant of the father. At the trial, which took place at the Hunting shire Spring Assizes, 1862, it appeared that the fendant was the father of a child born of the plain daughter, on the 10th April, 1862. The daug from February to November, 1861, was in the en of the defendant as an out-door farm servant, a per week, working from seven o'clock in the mot until six in the evening, from April to September from eight until dusk during the remainder year. It also appeared, that from the time sh tered into the service of the defendant, down short time before the birth of the child, she live her father's house as a member of the family, s ing there, assisting in his domestic affairs, and nu his wife, who was in ill-health; being, in fact, al to be found there, except when engaged at the fendant's farm as aforesaid. Upon this evidence the learned judge directed jury that there was sufficient evidence of servi the father to support the action; to which rulinį counsel for the defendant tendered a bill of excep The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. D. D. Keane, for the plaintiff in error, the de ant below.-There was no evidence of service to port the action. In Ross v. Thompson (29 L. J. 1), Bramwell, B., says "I do not think it impos that there may be two masters of one servant; a son may have a form of contract, that, in the time, he or she should render such and such ser to one person, and another contract, that, after day is over, other services should be rendered to other person. I am not prepared to say that su state of things might not exist, and that there m not be two masters entitled to enforce the law the loss of service in case of injury done to the son." The case contemplated in the above judgn has actually occurred, the mother in this insta being the servant of the defendant during a por of the twenty-four hours, and of her father for remainder; and the gist of the action for seduc is the loss of service. (Grinnell v. Wells, 7 Mac. & 1033; S. C., 8 Jur. 1101). [Pollock, C. B.-It has b decided over and over again, that the smallest serv are sufficient to enable the father to sue as mast But no case has gone the length of deciding that can be servant to her father while in the service another person. Secondly, assuming the father to be master during the hours when his daughter was not actually in the employ of the defendant, there is no evidence to shew in whose employ the daughter was the time when the intercourse took place; and Das Williams (10 Q. B. 725; S. C., 11 Jur., 750) is an authority to shew, that where the implied relation of master and servant did not subsist between the plaintiff and his daughter at the time of the seduction, the action was not maintainable. O'Malley, Q. C., for the defendant in error, the plaintif below, was not heard. POLLOCK, C. B. We are all of opinion that the judgment below should be affirmed. It appears to us that there was evidence that the daughter was sufficiently the servant of her father, the plaintiff, to support the action-Judgment affirmed. MICHAELMAS VACATION. [Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas.] [Chram POLLOCK, C. B., BRAMWELL, and CHANNELL, BB., and BLACKBURN and MELLOR, JJ.] GORE V. GREY and Others.-Nov. 28. Insolvent debtor-Lunatic-Secretary of State-Jurisdiction-Quen's Prison Act, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 22, s. 14— Insolvent Debtors Act, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 102-Lumatic Act, 8&9 Vict. c. 100. The Queen's Prison Act, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 22, s. 14, proriding that lunatic prisoners are to be removed to Bethlee Hospital on a warrant of one of her Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, is inconsistent with, and therefore repeals, the provisions contained in the Insolvent Debtors Act, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 102, relating to lunatic prisoners, and the provisions of the former act are not affected or altered by the statutes relating to Iactics, 8 & 9 Vict. 100, and the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 96. The first count of the declaration stated, that the plaintiff being, on the 9th February, 1856, a prisoner in the custody of the defendant John Hudson, the keeper of the Queen's Prison, under a commitment in execution for costs in a certain action in her Majesty's Court of Queen's Bench, at Westminster, pending between the plaintiff, as plaintiff, and one John Baker, the defendant therein, and not from any criminal or other matter or cause, and being, as such prisoner, entitled to the benefit of several acts of Parliament then in force for the relief of insolvent debtors; the defendants, nevertheless, maliciously intending and contriving to deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of the said acts of Parliament, and to detain him longer in custody, and to prevent him from pefining the Court for Relief of Insolvent Debtors under the same acts of Parliament, or any of them, for his discharge out of custody, assaulted the plaintiff, and seized and laid hold of him, and forced and compelled him to enter a certain vehicle, and by that means carried and removed him, as a prisoner and in custody, against his consent, and without any necessity, from and out of the said Queen's Prison to another and different prison and place of confinement, to wit, Bethlehem Hospital; to which last-mentioned place, and the prisoners and persons confined therein, the said several acts of Parliament, or any of them, do not apply, or the jurisdiction of the last-mentioned Court erted; and there, then, by force, and against his Consent, imprisoned and detained the plaintiff, and disqualified and prevented him from obtaining his discharge as an insolvent debtor, or otherwise from taking the benefit of the said acts of Parliament, or any of them, or from petitioning the said Court for Relief of Insolvent Debtors, or applying to any other court for his discharge, for the space of two years and eighty-five days, contrary to law. Pleas-first, not guilty; secondly, that before and at the time of the removal of the plaintiff from and out of the Queen's Prison, as in the said first count mentioned, the defendant Sir George Grey was one of her Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, the defendant Hudson was the keeper of the Queen's Prison, the defendant Evison was the deputy-keeper of the said prison, the defendant Colwell was a turnkey of and in the said prison, the defendant Wakem was the surgeon of the said prison, and the defendant Griffiths was one of the physicians of St. Thomas's Hospital: that on the 26th January, 1856, the plaintiff being then such prisoner, as in the said first count mentioned, became of unsound mind; whereupon the defendant Hudson, so then being such keeper of the Queen's Prison as aforesaid, on the day and year aforesaid, duly, and in pursuance of the statute in that case made and provided, reported to the defendant Sir George Grey, Bart., so then being such Secretary of State as aforesaid, that that on the day and year aforesaid, the defendants the plaintiff had become and was of unsound mind: Wakem and Griffiths, so then being such surgeon and physician as aforesaid, duly and in pursuance of the said statute, certified under their hands, to the said defendant Sir George Grey, Bart., so being such Secretary of State as aforesaid, that the plaintiff then was of unsound mind; whereupon the said defendant of State as aforesaid, afterwards, to wit, on the 4th Sir George Grey, Bart., so then being such Secretary February, 1856, by his warrant and order under his hand, bearing date the day and year last aforesaid, and directed to the keeper of the Queen's Prison, and to all others whom it might concern, duly, and in pursuance of the said statute, did authorise and direct them to cause the defendant to be removed from the said Queen's Prison to the Royal Hospital of Bethlehem, there to remain until further order should be made therein: that afterwards, to wit, on the 9th February, in the year last aforesaid, the defendants, Hudson, Evison, and Colwell, so then being such keeper, deputy-keeper, and turnkey as aforesaid, in obedience to the said warrant and order, and in pursuance of the said statute, did remove, and cause to be removed, the plaintiff from and out of the said Queen's Prison to the said Royal Hospital of Bethlehem, and the President, Treasurer, and Governor of the said Royal Hospital of Bethlehem, in pursuance of the said statute, did then receive the plaintiff, him safely to keep according to the provisions of the said statute in that behalf, which were the same several trespasses whereof the plaintiff had, in the first count mentioned, against the defendants Sir George Grey, Bart., John Hudson, John Crouchley Evison, Charles Colwell, John Wilcocks Wakem, and Samuel Griffiths. Issue thereon. The cause was tried before Erle, C. J., at the Sittings at Westminster after Trinity Term, 1862, when a verdict was found for the defendants. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection, non-direction, and for judgment non obstante veredicto on the second plea. The Court of Common Pleas, after taking time to consider, delivered judgment refusing the rule. The appellant was now heard in person. The Solicitor-General (Sir R. P. Collier), Welsby, and T. Jones, for the Crown, were not heard. POLLOCK, C. B.-I am of opinion that the judgment of the Court below must be affirmed. The plaintiff contends, that he, being an insolvent debtor, ought to have been treated in the manner directed by the 102nd section of the Insolvent Debtors Act. But since the passing of the statute, called the Queen's Prison Act, the provisions contained in sect. 102 of the Insolvent G. 155; S. C., 15 Jur. 261); and Chabot v. Lord Mor Debtors Act, which provides the mode of treating lu- peth (15 Q. B. 446). Cur. adv. vult. natic prisoners, are repealed; the provisions contained WIGHTMAN, J. (July 4), delivered the judgment o in the latter statute being wholly inconsistent with the Court.-In this case a rule has been obtained fo the provisions in the former statute. Sect. 45 of stat. a certiorari to remove into this court an inquisitio 8 & 9 Vict. c. 100, provides, that no person, not being taken before the sheriff of Middlesex on the 8t a pauper, shall be received as a lunatic into any hos- January, 1862, in order that it might be quashed, pital without the certificate described in the act. the ground that the jury, under the direction of th But that act provides that the enactment shall not learned assessor, had exceeded their jurisdiction in de apply to Bethlehem Hospital. This last provision is termining that the complainant was not entitled repealed by stat. 16 & 17 Vict. c. 96. Bethlehem Hos- any compensation, and that he had not been inju pital, therefore, becomes subject to the provisions of riously affected by the execution of the works of th stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 100. Stat. 16 & 17 Vict. c. 96, s. 4, company. provides that no person, not being a pauper, and save where otherwise provided or authorised under that or any other act, shall be received as a lunatic into any licensed house without a certificate. The case is then within the exception as provided for by another act. The other judges concurred.-Judgment affirmed. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. REG. v. THE METROPOLITAN RAILWAY COMPANY.- Lands Clauses Consolidation Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 18, It appeared that the defendants, acting under th powers of their act of Parliament, had caused a larg excavation to be made, for the purposes of their rail way, under a public street or road. The claimant, M Horrocks, was possessed of a house, 66, Euston-road with a fore-court or garden abutting on the said street or road, and had, in the year 1859, excavated a portion of such fore-court for the purpose of building, and had, in fact, built thereon a new building adjacent to the road. Upon these facts appearing, it was contended, on the part of the company, that the claimant was not entitled to recover any damages in respect of the cracking or falling in of a portion of such building and ground, there being, under the circumstances, no right on the part of the claimant to have his land and premises supported by the soil of the adjoining street or road. The jury, in answer to questions asked by the assessor, found, that "if there had been no building by the claimant, the ground would not have sunk, and that the sinking had been caused by the erection of the new building;" whereupon the assessor directed the jury, as matter of law, that the claimant had not sustained any legal damage, and ultimately, under his direction, the jury found that "the claimant's property had not been injuriously affected;" and he withdrew from their consideration any assessment of damage. The defendants acting under the powers of their act of Parliament, made a large excavation for the purposes of their railway, under a public street, abutting upon which was a fore-court appurtenant to a house of the claimant, who had previously himself excavated a portion of the forecourt, and built thereupon. The building being damaged by the execution of the company's works, it was contended on their behalf, at the inquisition before the sheUpon the argument before us, it was contended riff, that the claimant had, under the circumstances, no that this case was not governed by the case of Reg. right to have his premises supported by the soil of the The London and North-western Railway Company (3 El adjoining road, and the assessor having directed the & Bl. 443; S. C., 18 Jur. 993). However, we are or jury, as a matter of law, that the claimant had not sus-opinion that the present case cannot be distinguished tained legal damage-Held, upon the authority of Reg. v. The London and North-western Railway Company (3 El. & Bl. 443; S. C., 18 Jur. 993), that such direction was wrong, the jury, under sect. 68 of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18, having no power to inquire into the right of the claimant to the support of the soil of the road, but only to assess compensation upon the assumption that it existed. Rule calling on the defendants to shew cause why a writ of certiorari should not issue to the clerk of the peace of Middlesex, to remove an inquisition, verdict, and judgment had and taken before the sheriff of Middlesex, on the 8th January, 1862, under sect. 68 of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18, touching the claim to compensation made by Joseph Horrocks against the company in respect of his house, land, and premises having been injuriously affected by the execution of the works of the company; against which, Horace Lloyd (Nov. 20, 1862) shewed cause. The circumstances under which the rule was granted, the facts and arguments of counsel, sufficiently appear from the judgment of the Court. The following cases were cited in addition to those mentioned in the judgment:-Reg. v. The Lancaster and Preston Railway Company (6 Q. B. 759; S. C., 9 Jur. 303); Chapman v. The Monmouthshire Railway and Canal Company (2 H. & Norm. 267); The East and West India Docks and Railway Company v. Gattké (3 Mac. & from that. It was the considered judgment of th majority of this Court, and although the dissent o Erle, J., diminishes its weight, still we think that it i an authority binding upon us. There the existen of a legal right of way was submitted to the jury b the assessor, and determined in the negative. In the present case, the right of the claimant to the later support of the adjoining soil was submitted by th assessor to the jury, and was determind by them the negative. Upon the authority of Reg. v. The Lo don and North-western Railway Company, before r ferred to, we think that this was not the course whi should have been pursued. It is plainly open to the objections referred to in the judgment of t Court in that case. It is manifest, that if the findi of the jury be allowed to stand, the claimant's right concluded, without appeal; whereas, if the functi of the jury on such an inquiry be restrained to t consideration of the damage in point of fact, the le right of the claimant is not concluded by the findi but the company may, as was recently decided by t Court of Exchequer in Read v. The Victoria Stat and Pimlico Railway Company (9 Jur., N. S., 106 by proper pleading, raise the question of title for termination in the action on the judgment. In th case it was held, that a plea in such an action, "t by the making and excavation of the said works, said messuages, lands, &c., and the plaintiff's said terest therein, were not damaged and injuriou fected as alleged," was a good plea; and we are informed that an action was brought on the inquisition ticed in the case of Reg. v. The London and NorthRailway Company, and that in such action pleas ersing the existence of the right of way were ed, and held good upon demurrer by the Court. the case of Mortimer v. The South Wales Railway mpany (1 El. & El. 375; S. C., 5 Jur., N. S., 784) r pleas were pleaded, but the defendants' case in point of proof, and there being no finding ting the title of the claimant, the inquisition was to be conclusive as to the amount of damages. case of In re Penny and the South-eastern Railway asy (7 El. & Bl. 660; S. C., 3 Jur., N. S., 957) reed upon by the counsel for the company; but that are an item of claim to compensation had admitted by the sheriff, and submitted to the r a claim in respect of an alleged injury refrom the overlooking of the claimant's preby the railway embankment. That was a claim pect of which no legal right could exist, and it is tore clearly distinguishable from a lateral right support, which not only may exist, but presumpyis a right in respect of which an action may be ntained at law. On these grounds, we are of opiin that the rule in this case must be made absolute. -Bak absolute. MICHAELMAS TERM. term of one whole year, as required by the stat. 6 Geo. 4, c. 57: 66 Memorandum of agreement entered into on the 20th day of March, 1858, between Henry Piper, as agent for the trustees of Mrs. Henley, and Thomas Wilsher, of Dobie-court.-Henry Piper agrees to let, and Thomas Wilsher agrees to take, the house No. 6, Windsor-court, from the 25th day of March, 1858, at the monthly rent of 17. 16s. 8d. Henry Piper agrees to pay all landlord's rates and taxes, and Thomas Wisher agrees to pay all tenant's rates and taxes, to keep the house in quiet and tenantable order, and to mend all squares of glass broken during his occupation. It is lastly agreed, that one month's notice, to expire either on the 25th day of March, the 25th day of June, the 25th day of September, or the 25th day of December, shall be a good and sufficient notice on either side for Thomas Wilsher to quit and deliver up possession of the house to Henry Piper, or other agent for the time being of Mrs. Henley's trustees." The said Thomas Wilsher occupied the said dwellinghouse, under such written agreement, up to Midsummer, 1860-a period of two years and a quarter; and during the whole of such period was assessed to, and paid the poor rates of, such parish of St. Olave, Silverstreet, in respect of the said dwelling-house. He paid the rent of the said house monthly during the whole period; and it was conceded by the appellants, that all other conditions of obtaining a settlement had been fulfilled by the said Thomas Wilsher, and that he had Before COCKBURN, C. J., WIGHTMAN, BLACKBURN, gained a settlement in the said appellant parish, if the and MELLOR, JJ.] RES, F. THE INHABITANTS OF ST. GILES WITHOUT, CRIPPLEGATE.-Nov. 11. Paper-Settlement-Renting a tenement-6 Geo. 4, c. 57, 8. 2. The paper entered into an agreement to take a house from the 25th March, 1858, at the monthly rent of 11. 16.84, and to pay all tenant's rates and taxes; it being further agreed that a month's notice, to expire either on the 25th March, 25th June, 25th September, or the 25th December, should be a good and sufficient notice on either aide to determine the tenancy. He entered upon and scaped the house for a period of two years and a quarter, paying rent, poor rates, &c.:-Held, that this amounted to a tenancy for a year, within the meaning of the 6 Geo. 4, c. 57, s. 2, and that the pauper thereby gained a edilement. Upon appeal against an order for the removal of Thomas Wilsher, his wife and children, from the parish of St. Giles Without, Cripplegate, to the parish of St. Olave, Silver-street, the sessions quashed the order, Eject to the following case: The only ground of removal alleging any settlement was the following:-That in March, 1858, the Thomas Wilsher hired for the term of one whole ear a separate and distinct dwelling-house, situate 4.6, Windsor-court, Monkwell-street, in the parish St. Olave, Silver-street, at a yearly rent of 221., and e immediately entered into the occupation thereof, d continued to rent and occupy the same thenceward for one whole year and upwards, and he acly paid upwards of 107. rent for the same in respect one whole year; and he was assessed to, and duly the poor rates in respect of the said dwellingfor one whole year and upwards, and he resided slept therein for forty nights and upwards after ment of the said poor rates. The question in disute on the said appeal was duly raised by the grounds appeal, and was, whether the following agreement, der which the pauper occupied the house in ques, constituted a yearly hiring or renting for the said written agreement constituted a yearly hiring or The question for the opinion of the Court was, whether such written agreement constituted such yearly hiring or renting, for the term of one whole year, of the said dwelling-house. If such question was answered in the affirmative, then the said order of sessions was to be quashed, and the said order of removal to stand confirmed; otherwise, the said order of sessions quashing the said order of removal to stand confirmed, and the costs of the said appeal were to follow the decision of the Court. H. Giffard and G. Tayler, in support of the order of sessions.-The question is, whether the agreement discloses a yearly renting of the tenement, and the ties at the time the agreement was entered into. Rex criterion is, what was in the contemplation of the parv. Herstmonceaux (7 B. & Cr. 551) is distinguishable. There there was a reservation of a yearly rent of 207., to be paid weekly, but here there is nothing more than a monthly hiring, determinable at any quarter by a month's notice. [Blackburn, J., referred to Reg. v. Chawton (1 Q. B. 247; S. C., 5 Jur. 245).] In that case the words "yearly rent" do not occur; but the Court say it was impossible for the tenancy to endure for a shorter period. So, in Reg. v. The Overseers of Willesden (32 L. J., M. C., 109), there was a yearly rent of 181. reserved. There Wightman, J., says"The question is, what appears to have been the intention of the parties? I think it was, that there should be a demise to the pauper for three months, at a yearly rent of 181.; but that if the parties should go on as landlord and tenant, after the expiration of such three months, there should be a yearly tenancy." There must be either a yearly tenancy in terms, or something equivalent thereto; something, in fact, which might be sued upon as a contract for a year. In the present case the character of the tenancy must be determined by the rent; the utmost, therefore, that it can amount to is a monthly tenancy, determinable quarterly. [They also cited Rex v. Bathwick (4 D. & Ry. 335); Reg. v. The Recorder of Pontefract (2 Q. B. |