67TH CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 1st Session. LONGEVITY PAY CLAIMS OF ARMY OFFICERS. APRIL 26, 1921.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union and ordered to be printed. Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following REPORT. [To accompany H. R. 28.] The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill H. R. 28, whose purpose it is to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to certify certain findings of fact, and for other purposes, having considered the same, beg leave to suggest that the bill be amended and that as amended the same do pass. Amend on page 2, lines 19 and 20, by striking out the following language: "of the existence of blood relations to whom the fund would be distributed" and insert in lieu thereof the following words: "that the claimant is the widow or a child or grandchild of the person entitled to the longevity pay.' In the Sixty-sixth Congress a bill identical with this was reported favorably from this committee, and a bill also identical with this, Senate bill No. 411, passed the Senate January 19, 1920, and was favorably reported by the House committee on the Judiciary May 6, 1920, House Report No. 933. The following from the report on the bill in the Sixty-sixth Congress is submitted in explanation of this bill: This bill is intended to secure the payment of certain just debts owed by the United States to certain officers of the United States Army for what is known as "longevity" pay. In all branches of the military service the amount of pay which an officer receives is dependent upon the length of time he has served. Each grade has a certain fixed pay, and additional pay is given for each period of five years, for four successive periods. Originally this extra pay was made in the form of rations, but this was changed by act of June 15, 1870, and instead of rations the officer received an allowance of 10 per cent of the salary of each officer in money. On February 24, 1881 (21 Stat. L., 346), Congress provided "the actual time of service in the Army or Navy, or both, shall be allowed all officers in computing their pay." In the test case of Morton v. United States (19 C. Cls., 200), the Court of Claims held that the term "actual time of service," as used in the act of 1881 covered the time spent as a cadet at the Military Academy. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court this decision was affirmed on October 27, 1884 (U. S. v. Morton, 112 U. S., 1). About five years ago Congress by statute discontinued pay based on service at the Military Academy. This bill is intended to cover certain claims arising prior to the last-named action of Congress. There is no question raised, nor can any be raised, as to the legality of the claims in question. They are lawful debts owing by the United States to these officers. After the decision of the Supreme Conrt above quoted, many claims for this additional or longevity pay were allowed and paid by the Treasury Department of our Government. Had it not been for a change of comptrollers in the Treasury Department all of these claims would have been allowed and paid. But in 1890 a man came to that office who, in defiance of the Supreme Court ruling, refused to count the period served at the academy in computing the pay, and from 1890 down to 1908 this was the ruling of the Treasury Department. All whose claims were presented within those dates had their claims for the period of service in the academy disallowed. In 1908 a new comptroller returned to the original ruling and the decision of the Supreme Court, and allowed the disputed period of time spent at the academy in computing the longevity pay. This did not help those whose claims were disallowed in the interval, 1890 to 1908, for the comptroller held he had no power to reverse the ruling of the former comptrollers. After 1908, 1,136 officers, whose claims aggregated nearly $1,000,000, were paid. By reason of the act of Congress passed July 6, 1914, the claims of about 140 Confederate officers for longevity pay due them prior to entering the Confederate Army, viz, prior to April, 1861, were paid, aggregating about $150,000. The bill if passed will cover the batch of claims disallowed between 1890 and 1908. Some of these claims were proved in the Court of Claims, but remain unpaid. These, the bill provides, shall be certified to the Treasury Department and paid. As to the remainder, the act provides that they shall be paid by the accounting officer of the Treasury Department. The bill confines recovery to the claimant or his widow, or his blood relations. No assignee of any claim can recover on it. The claims can not become the prey of attorneys, for the fee is limited to 20 per cent on amount recovered, which seemed to the committee, to be a just allowance and one in keeping with precedents already established by Congress. These claims can not be presented to the Court of Claims, for there the statute of limitations would bar them. They can not be presented to the Treasury Department, for the decision of the comptroller, which will not be reversed by a succeeding comptroller, is a complete bar. Nothing but an act of Congress can relieve this situation. The debt is a just one. The Congress is conferring no favor by this legislation, but merely remedying a wrong done to these claimants. The Confederate claims, although a third of a century old, were paid. The mass of claims already paid were largely outside the statute of limitations. The age of these claims should not stand against them. In fact, to deny them now is to penalize those who were vigilant, for it is these claims which were presented and disallowed by an unjust ruling. This wrong should be righted. It is unfair to pay some and not pay all. This bill is intended to wipe out the wrong and remove a gross injustice. Not only have committees of this House repeatedly recommended these payments, but bills have several times passed one House and failed in the other, being lost in the mass of legislation left without action. In addition, the present Secretary of War wrote to the Military Affairs Committees of both the Senate and this House saying these claims should be paid. The following is a copy of the letter from the Secretary of War: WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, D. C., January 24, 1917. The CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS, House of Representatives. SIR: I have the honor to call your attention to what appears to be unjust discrimination against certain officers of the Army in the loss by them of the amounts rep resented by their claims for longevity pay provided for in the act of July 5, 1838, that "Every commissioned officer of the line or staff, exclusive of general officers, shall be entitled to receive one additional ration per diem for every five years he may have served or shall serve in the Army of the United States.' The question of counting cadet service and service as enlisted men arose some years ago, and the then Comptroller of the Treasury ruled that service as a cadet at West Point was not considered service in the Army. The matter finally reached the Supreme Court, and on March 11, 1889, that body ventured a decision that— "Cadets at West Point were always part of the Army, and that service as a cadet was always actual service in the Army," etc. It appears that the claims of all of those officers which were presented prior to 1908 were disallowed, but that the officers who presented identical claims after another decision of the assistant comptroller in May, 1908, had their claims allowed and paid. The present Comptroller of the Treasury declares himself powerless to reopen such claims, no matter how just they may be, 'unless authorized by Congress to do so. Accordingly, I have the honor to recommend that suitable legislation be enacted authorizing the Comptroller of the Treasury to reopen the claims of all officers who are entitled to longevity pay under the act cited. Very respectfully, H R-67-1-vol 1—11 NEWTON D. BAKER, TO AMEND SECTION 858, REVISED STATUTES. APRIL 26, 1921.-Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed. Mr. VOLSTEAD, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following REPORT. [To accompany H. R. 2376.] The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill H. R. 2376, a bill to further amend section 858 of the Revised Statutes as amended by the act approved June 29, 1906, report the same back with the recommendation that it do pass. Section 858, above referred to, is as follows: The competency of a witness to testify in any civil action, suit, or proceeding in the courts of the United States shall be determined by the laws of the State or Territory in which the court is held. It will be observed that this bill proposes to amend the above section by adding the two words "or criminal." There seems to be no good reason why the competency of witnesses to testify in Federal courts should not be the same in both civil and criminal actions. If the law of the State determines the competency of witnesses in civil actions, apparently there is no good reason why the same law should not determine the competency of witnesses in criminal actions. The question involved was discussed in the case of Mixey v. United States (vol. 207, Federal Reporter, p. 327). In that case the court said: The competency of witnesses to testify in criminal cases in the courts of the United States is determined by the common law, except where Congress in special cases may otherwise provide. (Logan v. United States, 144 U. S., 263; 12 Sup. Ct., 617; 36 L. Ed., 429.) The Supreme Court in the case cited had under consideration section 858, Revised Statutes, United States (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 659), and after full consideration determined that the provision of that section reading as follows: 'In all other respects, the laws of the State in which the court is held, shall be the rules of decision as to the competency of witnesses in the courts of the United States in trial at common law, and in equity and admiralty" referred to civil cases only, and in so deciding used the following language: 66 'And the section above quoted was merely intended to confer on the courts of the United States the jurisdiction necessary to enable them to administer the laws of |