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and who was leader of the Jackson-Harmsworth Arctic expedition and the man who found Nansen on the Polar ice, informs me that Nansen took spirits with him, and told Mr. Jackson that he very much regretted not taking more.

Why does not Sir John Lubbock suggest to his own countrymen to give up spirits and baccy? No doubt they would be even more prosperous than they are now. They might begin by making Bank Holidays fast days with regard to these two 'simple luxuries.'

Tobacco is one of the greatest, and indeed sometimes the only, luxury of the poor. Tea has become an absolute necessity to the poor of Ireland. We complain because these articles are heavily taxed; but the revenue must have its taxes, and if tea, tobacco, and spirits were not taxed other 'not even simple luxuries would be,' and no doubt Sir John Lubbock would vote that Ireland, poor as she is, is still to go on bearing her burden, and standing still under that burden instead of progressing like her richer sister.

Then Sir John goes into the question of Ireland's contribution to the Imperial Exchequer. With a fresh commission and the terms of reference to that commission hanging over our heads I will not argue

the point.

But I must answer this statement of Sir John's :

“ This session (1897) we have made a grant towards Irish local “expenditure which will probably amount to over 700,0001."

This, I regret to say, is not the case. What Sir John Lubbock means is that Mr. Arthur Balfour, the First Lord of the Treasury, announced last session that local government was to be granted to Ireland, and that half the poor-rate and half the county cess are to be paid out of Imperial funds! The Bill has not even been brought forward. It is most unfair that this statement, “We have “made a grant" (does Sir John Lubbock speak for the whole of the Front Bench ?), should go forth to the English public.

When the Bill becomes an Act and is placed on the Statute Book, then Sir John Lubbock can make a statement concerning the


I conclude with Sir John Lubbock's last statement. He says: Lastly, I may mention that Ireland has had subventions in aid of “rates far larger in proportion than England or Scotland, and liberal

grants of money, as, for instance, 8,000,0001. at the time of the “Famine."

This “instance' bears examination, and is unfortunately not a very appropriate one to the statement.

In 1853 Mr. Gladstone was Chancellor of the Exchequer, and having a surplus decided to reduce burdens on manufactures and articles of consumption. To effect these objects he extended the income tax to Ireland for, as he proposed, only seven years, and imposed an additional duty of 8d. per gallon on Irish whisky.

The income tax, according to Mr. Gladstone's estimation, would bring in about 660,0001. a year, and 8d. a gallon on spirits 198,0001. a year.

He declared his intention of relieving Ireland by remitting 4,000,000l. of consolidated annuities which remained as a debt from Ireland to the Exchequer, due to the establishment of the Poor Law and the relief measures of 1846, the first year of the Famine. This arrangement was a financial juggle, the effect being that there was a permanent increase of two millions of taxation during the period 1853-60.

These are Mr. Gladstone's own words :

The taxation we propose for Ireland would in the first two years be considerably higher than the taxation we propose to remove; but if we look to the time when, as I have said, Parliament will be in a position to part with the income tax, Ireland will enjoy, and enjoy for a long term of years, a much larger remission of consolidated annuities than it will have to bear of additional burdens in the shape of spirit duties.

Forty-four years have elapsed, and the promise remains unfulfilled.

I say in conclusion, having been permitted to answer the principal points in Sir John Lubbock's article, and space not admitting all being answered, it is well to remark that statements are made by men of standing and high authority in England, and these statements bear close examination, and even contradiction.

Irishmen who live and are taxed in Ireland can judge better of their needs than even a gentleman of Sir John Lubbock's experience, even though (as he states) he has sat in Parliament for twenty-seven years.




In 1888 it was my privilege to be present at a lecture given to the officers studying at the Naval War College at Newport, R.I. The subject—the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea in their strategic relations to the United States-was treated with consummate ability. A new light seemed to be thrown upon the whole question of naval warfare ; confused pages of naval history took form and order; great principles stood forth clearly revealed.

The lecturer was Captain Mahan, who was then preparing to write the books which have brought him well merited and lasting fame. The three volumes dealing with The Influence of Sea Power on History have themselves influenced history. The first appeared at a time when several writers were endeavouring by appeals to the past to awaken the British people to the facts that their ancient kingdom of the sea was in danger of being lost, and that the loss implied national extinction. The importance of the service thus opportunely rendered by the brilliant American writer can hardly be overrated. His book was doubtless intended primarily as an address to his countrymen ; but the history of maritime war in the modern world is in the main the history of the Anglo-Saxon race, and to us in a special sense the Influence of Sea Power af pealed. Speaking as an outsider, Captain Mahan wielded a force which could not have been exerted by any British writer, even if his equal had appeared among us, and others besides myself felt a sense of thankfulness that the stirring message had come from across the Atlantic. It is not correct to state that the lesson was entirely new.

The idea that sea power exercised a peculiar sway over the destinies of nations had been dimly understood at least as far back as the time of Thucydides. Our own naval historians had fully grasped the fact that maritime strength was vital to the security and the prosperity of Great Britain. The Lancastrian poet who could write

The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future. By Captain A. T. Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D., United States Navy. London: Sampson Low, Marston, & Co.

Keep then the sea that is the wall of England,
And then is England kept in God's hand;
So that, for anything that is without,
England were at peace withouten doubt,

had a clear vision of truth. But no one had ever been able to explain in what maritime strength consisted, to trace its action with unerring hand through the long pages of history, to unravel the tangled threads of causation and show forth the controlling influence of naval operations over land campaigns. No one had ever built up a philosophy of the sea. This is the great work which Captain Mahan accomplished, and it is as a philosophic historian of the profound influence of maritime activity in moulding the destinies of the world, rather than as a naval strategist, that he will always be remembered.

The secret of this success was the breadth of view of the writer. One felt, in reading his calm and often stately periods, that he was regarding history from a pinnacle whence nothing petty was visible, that he addressed his fellow-men of all nations, and that his judgment in matters where bias might have been looked for was serenely impartial. The books bore the impress of statesmanship in the highest meaning of the word.

In magazine articles dealing with questions of the day, descending from the general to the particular, and directed to a limited and special purpose, it would not be just to expect the same lofty standard. Nevertheless, while making full allowance for the change of conditions, I have read this volume of collected essays with disappointment. Only here and there is it possible to trace the hand of the author of The Influence of Sea Power on History. No great nation ever needed guidance more than does the United States to-day-the strong guidance of a master mind, fearlessly offered, in language which could not be misunderstood. No one is so welt qualified as Captain Mahan to render this service to his country; but the needed guidance is not forthcoming, for the statesmanship is too frequently wanting.

The general purpose of these eight essays is to awaken public opinion in the United States to the importance of a strong navy, and to bid them to look outwards, taking their rightful place among the nations. All true friends of the American people—and there are many in this country-will cordially agree with Captain Mahan's object. It is a loss to the world that the United States, with their growing trade interests, second only to our own, have so far failed alike to accept the position of a great Power, with its corresponding responsibilities, and to conform to the usages of the family of nations. There are occasional indications that Captain Mahan feels that the external policy of his country has been wanting in dignity; but he cannot be said to have enforced the lesson with all the power at his disposal, and it is sometimes exceedingly difficult to extract a definite meaning from his pages.

The first three articles, entitled The United States Looking Outwards, Hawaii and our Future Sea Power,' and The Isthmus and Sea Power,' deal with questions in which the interests of America and Great Britain appear to the author to clash. We have no right to expect that an American, writing for Americans, should accept our views; we do expect recognition of patent facts. Thus it seems to be assumed throughout that, in regard to Hawaii and the construction of an isthmus route to the Pacific, Great Britain is seeking to thwart the legitimate aspirations of the United States, and the superior claims of the latter to the possession of the Sandwich Islands are argued at some length with little relevance to the existing situation. Hawaii stands midway between the Canadian seaboard and the Australian continent, and is a link in a chain of maritime communication of which Great Britain holds the ends. To the United States it is simply an outpost in the Pacific. I cannot, therefore, admit that * the interest of the United States in 'the Sandwich Islands 'surpasses that of Great Britain,'? or that this superior interest is dependent upon a natural cause, nearness, which has been admitted always as a reasonable ground for national self-assertion.' Still less effective is the argument that 'the interests of our sixty-five million people, in a position so vital to our part in the Pacific, must be allowed to outweigh those of the six millions of Canada.' If relative national interests are to be measured by population, it is not the six millions of Canada' but the three hundred millions of British citizens who must be placed in the balance. In face of facts, however, reasoning of this nature is wholly beside the mark. It is true that, in the past, the natural wishes of Great Britain and her Colonies' pointed to the occupation of the Sandwich Islands. It is equally true that, in deference to the aspirations' of the United States, the step was never taken, and Captain Mahan must surely be aware 3 that if these islands are now annexed, not the smallest protest, opposition, or resentment will be forthcoming from this country. For many years we have recognised the group as belonging to the sphere of influence of the United States, who have never accepted the responsibilities which such recognition involves. * Have we no right or no call to progress further in any direction ?' asks Captain Mahan. Are there for us beyond the sea horizon none of those essential interests, of those evident dangers, which impose a policy and confer rights?' No one ever has denied, or ever will deny, either the interests or the rights; but interests and rights involve responsibilities, which the United States have so far declined to recognise.

? Elsewhere the author refers to the preponderating natural interest' of Great Britain'in every new route opened to commerce.'

* This article, written in 1893, might have been modified with advantage before republication.

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