EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE.

EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENTS.

EQUITABLE LIEN.

See PATENTS, 13, 14.

See EQUITABLE LIEN.

1. An oral agreement to pay attorneys a specific sum as compensation
for services to be performed in securing an appropriation from
Congress, which sum is to be, to that extent, an interest in the
money to be appropriated, will create a charge upon the proceeds
of such an appropriation, enforceable as an equitable assignment
or lien. Sanborn v. Maxwell, 245.

2. Parties holding such a lien, and in favor of whom an award of a
specific sum of money has also been made in proceedings under an
agreement to arbitrate, may maintain a creditor's bill in equity
upon such award without first reducing their demand to judgment,
the award, if regularly made, being as conclusive of the demand,
both in respect of its validity and amount, as a judgment would
be; or being, at least, sufficient foundation for the enforcement of
their equitable lien. Id.

3. Where one of two parties has an equitable lien upon a fund to be
realized by the other for services to be performed, and in arbitra-
tion proceedings between the parties to determine the amount due
for such services, is awarded a sum certain for such services, the
lien is not merged in the award, but remains enforceable for the
full amount of the sum awarded. Id.

4. Where government contractors induce a third person to indorse their
note in order to procure money to complete one of their several
contracts under a promise to pay the note out of the money to be
derived from such contract, the transaction will not constitute
an equitable assignment so as to entitle the indorser to priority
over other creditors of the contractors in a distribution by re-
ceivers of funds received by them upon the completion of all the
contracts. Richards Brick Co. v. Rothwell, 516.

EQUITABLE SET-OFF. See EQUITY, 2.

EQUITY. See BONDS; EQUITABLE LIEN; ESTOPPEL; INJUNCTIONS;

INTERPLEADER, 1, 2; LACHES, 1, 2.

1. Where a telephone subscriber by a suit in equity for an injunction
sought to compel a telephone company to continue furnishing him
telephone service at a rate fixed by statute, which was less than
the former rate charged by the company and paid by him, and to
restrain the company from removing its instrument from his
place of business, and a large mass of testimony was taken by the
parties to determine whether the rate as fixed by law was reason-
able, and the lower court, while expressing the opinion that the
proper remedy was by mandamus, considered the case
on its
merits and dismissed the bill, and the defendant on appeal by the
complainant to this court declined to raise the question of juris-
diction, it was held that this court would not of its own motion

raise the question of jurisdiction, although upon consideration
it might appear that the complainant had an adequate remedy
at law. Manning v. Telephone Co., 191.

2. A creditor having a claim ex contractu against another, not reduced
to judgment, may maintain a bill in equity to set off such claim
against a judgment on a claim ex delicto recovered against him
by such other person, if the latter is insolvent; and equitable
relief under such circumstances is not precluded where, at the
time of the filing of such a bill, complainant has an action at
law pending to enforce his claim, and, during the pendency of the
equity proceedings, the action at law is dismissed for want of
prosecution, such dismissal not constituting an adjudication of
the claim so as to prevent further litigation of it; distinguishing
Droop v. Ridenour, 9 App. D. C. 95. Fedarwisch v. Alsop, 318.
3. Where receivers of insolvent government contractors assume and
carry out contracts of such contractors for the building of school-
houses for the municipal government and life-saving stations for
the Federal government, and in so doing use funds derived from
the schoolhouse contracts in the completion of the life-saving sta-
tions, persons supplying material and work in the erection of the
schoolhouses are not entitled to follow such funds or to have
preference over the claims of persons furnishing work and ma-
terial in the erection of the life-saving stations. Richards Brick
Co. v. Rothwell, 516.

4. It is only in cases where a person advancing money to pay the debt
of another stands in the situation of a surety or is compelled to
pay it to protect his own rights, that equity will substitute him
in the place of the creditor as matter of course without any agree-
ment to that effect; but in other cases the demand of a creditor
which is paid with the money of a third person and without agree-
ment that the security shall be assigned or kept on foot for the
benefit of such third person, is absolutely extinguishable. Id.
EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE. See APPELLATE PRACTICE;
DIVORCE, 5; INJUNCTIONS, 1, 3, 4; INTERPLEADER, 1, 2.

ESTOPPEL. See CRIMINAL LAW, 6; DEDICATION; MARRIED WOMEN;
TAX SALE CERTIFICATES.

Where, by a series of leases and renewals, land has been leased to a
railroad company by trustees to whom it was devised in trust
for the sole and separate use of a married woman for her life, and
she has received the rent reserved, neither she nor the trustees,
after the term created by the last lease has expired, will be per-
mitted in equity to repudiate the leases because the life tenant
failed to join in the execution of some of them, and because but
one of the three trustees executed the last one, one of his co-
trustees having been abroad and the other having resigned his

ESTOPPEL- Continued.

trust and been relieved and discharged therefrom. Railroad Co.
v. Winslow, 438.

EVIDENCE.

See CONTRACTS, 3; EJECTMENT, 1; MEASURE OF DAM-
PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 3-5; RAILROADS, 1;

AGES, 2, 3;

WILLS, 1, 2.

The common law (unlike the Roman law and the modern law of some
countries and States derived or adopted therefrom), indulges no
presumption of survivorship, whatever may have been the age,
sex or physical condition of the respective persons who have lost
their lives in a common disaster; but it requires evidence as the
basis of its action. Faul v. Hulick, 9.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

See JOINT OBLIGATIONS.

1. The Supreme Court of this District, holding a special term for Or-
phans' Court business, has the power to allow an executor who has
acted in good faith, expenses incurred and paid by him in em-
ploying counsel to resist a caveat interposed before the will has
been admitted to probate, as well as afterwards. Tuohy v. Han-
lon, 225.

2. Objections by one of several defendants in an action on a bond against
an executor and his sureties, that the declaration fails to state
that the executor ever entered upon his office; or that the bond
was ever delivered or approved by the Orphans' Court; or that
assets ever came into the executor's hands wherewith to pay the
claim of the plaintiff, or that there were any demand and refusal
to pay, or that the Orphans' Court ever ordered the executor to
pay- are immaterial, and, at most, constitute matters of defense
which, if true, should be pleaded. Blagden v. United States, 37Q.
EXPERT TESTIMONY. See MEASURE OF DAMAGES, 2.

FOLLOWING TRUST FUNDS. See EQUITY, 3.

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. See TELEPHONE SERVICE, 1, 3.

FOREIGN LAWS, PROOF OF. See MARRIED WOMEN, 1.

FRAUD. See AFFIDAVITS OF Defense, 3; APPELLATE PRACTICE, 10, 11;
INJUNCTIONS; LACHES, 1, 2.

FRAUDULENT COVEYANCES. See LACHES, 2.

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS. See BONDS; EQUITY, 3; PRIORITIES.

GRAND JURY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 9.

GUARANTY. See CONTRACTS, 5.

HABEAS CORPUS. See CRIMINAL LAW, 7; INFANTS, 2.

1. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the office of a
writ of error, and where a party by such means seeks to be dis-
charged from imprisonment under a judgment of conviction of a

HABEAS CORPUS- Continued.

court of competent jurisdiction, he must clearly show that the
judgment, for causes apparent upon its face, is an absolute nullity,
as the question of errors or defects in the proceeding upon which
the conviction is founded will not be entertained in a collateral
proceeding by habeas corpus. United States v. Davis, 280.
2. In reviewing the action of a committing magistrate, on habeas corpus
the courts may go into the merits of the case and where the evi-
dence shows the order of commitment to be void, or that an offense
could not have been committed, by reason of the undisputed facts,
the prisoner should be released; but where the magistrate is
shown to have acted in good faith and there is room for a trial
court to hold that an offense has been committed by the peti-
tioner, under any law, the order of the magistrate committing
to jail for default in giving bail, is a proper and valid judgment,
and should not be disregarded in a collateral proceeding. Palmer
v. Colladay, 426.

3. Where a committing magistrate before whom a party was charged
with attempting to defraud the United States by co-operating
with a candidate for appointment in the Civil Service in making
a false statement as to the eligibility of such candidate for ap-
pointment, held the prisoner to bail to await the action of the
grand jury, a preliminary examination having been waived, an
order of the lower court discharging the prisoner from custody
upon habeas corpus proceedings instituted by him, was reversed
upon the ground that the showing made before the Commissioner
was of such a character as to justify his action. Id.
HOMICIDE. See CRIMINAL LAW, 1-4, 12, 15.

HUSBAND AND WIFE. See DIVORCE; EJECTMENT, 2; INFANTS, 2;
MARRIED WOMEN.

INDICTMENT. See CRIMINAL LAW, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17.

INFANTS.

1. Where the custody of children is involved, the courts do not act to en-
force the rights of either parent, but to protect the interest and
welfare of the children; following Slack v. Perrine, 9 App. D. C.
128, and Wells v. Wells, 11 id. 392. Stickel v. Stickel, 149.
2. An order in a habeas corpus proceeding instituted by a wife against
her husband awarding the custody of their two-year-old child to
the mother, against whom no charges were made showing that
she was unworthy or incapable of giving the infant proper care,
affirmed as not showing that the trial court erred in the exercise
of its sound discretion. Id.

INFORMATIONS. See CRIMINAL LAW, 5, 6, 7.

INFRINGEMENT. See INJUNCTIONS, 5.

INJUNCTIONS. See ASSIGNMENT OF GOVERNMENT CLAIMS; EQUITY,
1; MUNICIPAL ORDERS AND REGULATIONS, 1.

1. Where a bill in equity by the maker of a promissory note to enjoin
the issue of execution upon a judgment against him, obtained by
the defendants as holders of the note by indorsement from the
payee, states that the note was fraudulently procured from him
by the payee and that he believes and expects to prove that the
defendants had knowledge or notice of the fraud, but no facts are
stated either upon personal knowledge or upon information rea-
sonably sufficient upon which to base his belief, a temporary re-
straining order granted upon the filing of the bill is properly dis-
solved, especially where the defendants in their answers expressly
deny any fraud on their part or any knowledge or notice of fraud
by them. Magruder v. Schley, 288.

2. Where, under a lease of land to a railroad company, containing a
provision which is not enforceable, giving the company the right
to purchase the land for a specified sum, the company is given a
license to enter upon the land and construct its road, and does so,
an action at law by the lessor for the dispossession of the company
will be enjoined in equity, if the company is willing to make com-
pensation for the use and occupation of the land, such compensa-
tion to be fixed by condemnation proceedings. Railroad Co. v.
Winslow, 438.

3. An order overruling a motion to dissolve a temporary restraining or-
der granted ex parte and continuing the same, is in effect an order
granting a temporary injunction, and is appealable, under section
7 of the act of Congress of February 9, 1893, creating this court;
and such an appeal brings up the question of the propriety of the
temporary injunction; following Electric Lighting Co. v. Met.
Club, 6 App. D. C. 536, and Parsons v. Hill, 15 id. 532. Macfar
land v. Railroad Co., 456.

4. The fact that an electrical switch and appliances erected by a railway
company without first obtaining the permission of the municipal
authorities, as required by law, was installed for use in case of
emergency only, and that no danger can result from temporarily
enjoining the municipality from removing them, will not justify
the continuance of a restraining order enjoining their removal
until proof can be taken. Id.

5. Where the licensee of a former owner of phonograph and graphophone
patents, having the right under his contract to lease phonographs
and graphophones at specified rates within a designated territory,
seeks to obtain a temporary restraining order enjoining a third
party who has become the owner of the patents from infringing
upon his rights within the territory designated, the fact that the
licensee sells only graphophones and not phonographs, thereby
discriminating against the latter, is not a ground for refusing
the restraining order, although that fact might be availed of by