ACCOUNTING. See PROBATE PRACTICE, 1.
ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW. See EQUITY, 1.
ADMINISTRATION. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; PROBATE
PRACTICE.
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
ADULTERY. See DIVORCE, 1.
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
AFFIDAVITS. See AFFIDAVITS OF DEFENSE; CERTIORARI, 2.
1. Where an affidavit of defense, in an action on a promissory note and
an open account, denies defendant's liability on the note upon
grounds stated in the affidavit, and claims credit upon the open ac-
count for a certain sum, and the plaintiff's attorney in his argu-
ment in this court on an appeal (specially allowed) from an order
overruling the plaintiff's motion for judgment, admits the credit
claimed by the defendant, but the record does not show such an
admission, the judgment of the lower court will be affirmed, with-
out regard to the sufficiency of the defense as to the note, as the
case stands upon the sufficiency of each defense set out in the de-
fendant's affidavit. Brewing Co. v. Tobin, 584.
2. Affidavits of defense under the seventy-third rule of the lower court
should be construed liberally and need not be drawn with such pre-
cision as to meet technical objections that might be urged, but must
allege facts indicating with reasonable distinctness and precision a
substantial legal defense and sufficient to satisfy the court of the
good faith of the defendant; following Cropley v. Vogeler, 2 App.
D. C. 28; Bailey v. District of Columbia, 4 id. 356; Pumphrey v.
Bogan, 6 id. 449; Gleason v. Hoeke, 7 id. 1; Strauss v. Hensey, 7
id. 289. Brown v. Bank, 598.
3. An affidavit of defense in an action by a national bank upon a prom-
issory note is insufficient which alleges that the note was given
to the bank in part payment for ten shares of its capital stock upon
the representation by an agent of the bank that the defendant
would be made a director; that the bank went into voluntary
liquidation before the maturity of a note given in renewal of the
original note; that the bank since going into liquidation has paid
AFFIDAVITS OF DEFENSE - Continued.
all its depositors and other creditors; that at the time of the pur-
chase, the shares of stock, as affiant is informed and believes and
expects to show at the trial, were of no value and have been of no
value since; that affiant was not made a director or offered the posi-
tion, and that he expects to show at the trial that it was never the
intention of the bank or those in charge thereof to offer him such a
position, but that he was induced by such fraudulent representa-
tions to enter into the arrangement set forth. Id.
AMENDMENT OF ANSWER. See APPELLAte Practice, 1, 2.
APPEALABLE ORDERS. See APPELLATE PRACTICE, 4, 5; INJUNC-
APPEAL BONDS. See APPELLATE PRACTICE, 5, 6, 7.
APPEALS. See APPELLATE PRACTICE; INJUNCTIONS, 3.
APPEALS, DISMISSAL OF. See APPELLATE PRACTICE, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11.
APPELLATE PRACTICE. See CRIMINAL LAW, 8, 9; DIVORCE, 2;
EQUITY, 1; INJUNCTIONS, 1, 3, 4, 6.
1. The adjudication of this court upon an interlocutory appeal from a
decree for an accounting in favor of the complainant, is so far
conclusive and binding upon the lower court as to preclude the
granting by that court thereafter of leave to the defendant to
amend its answer and to reopen the cause by taking additional
testimony in support thereof; but upon a special application made
for that purpose, leave may be granted by this court, under such
circumstances, to so file an amended answer and reopen the case.
Farrow v. Bicycle Co., 101.
2. The showing made in support of an application or suggestion that
this court, after its affirmance of an interlocutory decree in favor
of the complainant for an accounting, permit the defendant to file
an amended answer to the bill of complaint and take additional
testimony in support thereof, upon the grounds that the com-
plainant fraudulently concealed the existence of a certain patent
from the defendant, his assignee of an application for a patent,
and that the defendant was under a misapprehension as to the
nature of the suit and complainant's claim, held insufficient to
call for such action by this court. Id.
3. In construing an opinion of the court, the expressions contained
therein are to be construed with reference to the subject-matter
under consideration. Id.
4. An appeal raising the question as to which party should pay costs
which had accrued in the court below, prior to a former appeal, in
a suit by one party to recover from another a certain sum of
money to which both made claim by virtue of assignments, dis-
missed upon the ground that the matter was within the discre-
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Continued.
tion of that court, whose order in the premises was not appealable.
Insurance Co. v. Larner, 147.
5. Money deposited in the court below in lieu of an appeal bond and to
operate as security for the costs of appeal only and not as a
supersedeas of the judgment appealed from, cannot properly after
the dismissal of the appeal be subjected by an order of that court
to the payment of the judgment and costs which have accrued
in the court below; and an appeal lies to this court from an order
of that court granting a motion by the judgment creditor so to
subject such deposit and overruling a counter-motion by the judg
ment debtor to direct the clerk to pay the money so deposited to
his attorney, to whom it belongs, and the appeal is properly taken
in the name of the judgment debtor; Associate Justice MORRIS
dissenting. Mitchell v. Evans, 254.
6. An appeal to this court will not be dismissed upon the ground that
the appeal bond was approved by one of the justices of the lower
court without notice having been first given to the appellee to show
cause against the approval; Rule X of this court not requiring
that such a notice be given as a prerequisite to the approval of
the bond by the lower court. Richards Brick Co. v. Rothwell, 516.
7. Under Rule XV of this court requiring an appellant to file a tran-
script of the record in this court within forty days from the time
of the appeal entered and perfected in the court below, unless such
time be extended by that court, the forty days, in case of an appeal
by the District of Columbia, begins to run from the day that the
appeal is entered and not from the day of the approval of the ap-
peal bond, as in ordinary cases, as the District of Columbia is not
required under the law to give an appeal bond for costs or to stay
execution. District of Columbia v. Roth, 547.
8. An order of the lower court extending the time within which to file
a transcript of the record on appeal to this court, passed after the
expiration of the forty days within which such transcript must be
filed under Rule XV of this court, is erroneous, and an appeal
docketed in this court under such circumstances will be dismissed.
Id.
9. Where an order of the court below extending the time for the filing
of the transcript in this court in the case of an appeal by the Dis-
trict of Columbia was not applied for and obtained until after the
expiration of the forty days within which a transcript of the
record must be filed in this court, such failure will not be excused
by the fact that it was due to an oversight on the part of an as-
sistant to the attorney for the appellant, who had been directed
to procure such order within the prescribed time, but had neglected
to do so, and such an appeal will be dismissed. Id.
10. The rules of this court regulating the matter of appeals and the
preparation of the same for hearing have the force of law and are
APPELLATE PRACTICE-Continued.
binding upon the court and suitors and those who represent
suitors and cannot be dispensed with by the court to meet the ap-
parent hardship of any particular case, in the absence of fraud..
Id.
11. An appellee, to defeat an appeal, would not be allowed to set up a
rule of this court requiring a transcript of the record on appeal to
be filed in this court within a prescribed time, where the filing of
the transcript within such time was prevented by the fraud or
contrivance of the opposite party, or by the contumacy of the
clerk, without any want of diligence on the part of the appellant.
Id.
ARBITRATION AND AWARD. See CONTRACTS, 4; EQUITABLE LIEN,
ARMY OFFICERS, DISMISSAL OF. See MILITARY LAW,
ASSIGNMENT OF GOVERNMENT CLAIMS.
There is nothing in section 3477, R. S. U. S., rendering void all
transfers and assignments made of any claim upon the United
States, or of any part or share thereof or interest therein, unless
executed in a certain manner, that will prevent any court of com-
petent jurisdiction as to the subject-matter and parties from mak-
ing such orders as may be necessary and appropriate to prevent
one who has a claim for money against the Government from
withdrawing the proceeds of such claim from the reach of his
creditors; provided such orders do not interfere with the examina-
tion and allowance or rejection of such claim by the proper
officers of the Government, nor in any wise obstruct any action
that such officer may legally take under the statutes relating to
the allowance or payment of claims against the United States;
following Manning v. Ellicott, 9 App. D. C. 71, and Marble Co. v.
Burgdorf, 13 id. 506. Sanborn v. Maxwell, 245.
ASSIGNMENTS OF PATENTS. See PATENTS, 20.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. See EQUITABLE LIEN.
AUCTION SALES. See MEASURE OF DAMAGES, 3.
AWARD. See CONTRACTS, 4; EQUITABLE LIEN, 2.
BANKS. See NATIONAL BANKS.
BILLS AND NOTES. See PROMISSORY NOTES.
BONA FIDE PURCHASER. See PROMISSORY NOTES, 1, 2, 3.
BONDS. See APPELLATE PRACTICE, 5, 6; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRA-
TORS, 2; JOINT OBLIGATIONS.
Sureties on bonds given by government contractors as required by
the act of Congress of August 13, 1894 (28 Stat. 278), providing
that every such contractor before commencing work shall give a
bond conditioned upon the payment of all persons supplying ma-
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