Opinion of the Court. [18 App. it is a valid and binding covenant, and that the appellant is entitled to one renewal of the lease, if the lease itself is valid and binding. This concession, which is a just and proper one, dispenses with the necessity of any discussion of this point; and being of the opinion, as we have already stated, that the lease is a good and valid lease, it follows in our judgment that the appellant is entitled to the renewal of it from the first day of August, 1897, for the term of five years thereafter which it seeks under the bill of complaint in this case. Being so entitled, it is not liable to proceedings for dispossession or any other similar proceedings; and the proceedings instituted against it and which it is sought by this suit to restrain should be perpetually enjoined. But there is another and a higher ground upon which our conclusion in this case can be based. That the appellant entered upon the use and occupation of the property in controversy with a view to its purchase when such purchase could properly be effected, we think is very clear. And that this purchase was postponed for a time merely on account of some alleged or supposed deficiencies in the title, which could be removed, and which, if Mr. Winslow's statement in 1899 be correct, were in fact removed at or before that year, we think to be a fair inference from the record. What the character of the use and occupation of the land by the company was to be, and was understood by all the parties to be intended to be, we think also to be entirely clear. Over and through this land the railroad company constructed what is known as its Metropolitan branch, part of a great highway between Washington city, the adjoining States and the great West. This great highway is not a merely private enterprise, nor a matter of purely private concern; it is a public road, constructed for public purposes, under sanction of the public authority, and over which the public have rights, which cannot be permitted to be obstructed, much less destroyed, either by the company itself to which the franchise has been granted as a public trust to construct and operate this road, or by antagonistic parties claiming the ownership of the land upon D. C.] Opinion of the Court. which it has been permitted to enter without previous payment therefor, or as the result of any private controversy between the railroad company and such parties. It is very clear that the appellees knew the purpose for which the land was needed, and for which it was subsequently and is now used; and that, with full knowledge of such purpose and intending that such purpose should be carried into effect, they authorized the railroad company to enter upon the land and to construct the road thereon. The best evidence of the license so given to enter is to be found in the lease given at the time and the successive leases executed thereafter; and it is beyond question that such license was given to the company. This license was not solely for the benefit of the railroad company, but primarily for the benefit of the public, which required this construction for its use. The license was in effect a dedication of the land for a highway, subject, of course, to the right of compensation therefor, which can be enforced in a proper way, but not by the dispossession of the company or the destruction of the public easement. The license to enter and construct the road is in its nature irrevocable. It cannot be recalled, except as the result of the destruction of the railroad company and the abandonment of the franchise. It is well-settled law that an action at law for the dispossession of the railroad company cannot be maintained in such a case, if the company is willing to make compensation for the use and occupation of the land. Railroad Co. v. Stanley, 35 N. J. Eq. 283; Railroad Co. v. Bruce, 102 Pa. St. 23; Taylor v. Railroad Co., 63 Wis. 327; Provolt v. Railroad Co. 57 Mo. 256; Railroad Co. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494. Assuming that there is grave doubt whether the trustees under the will of Catherine Pearson had authority under that will to enter into the contract of sale to the railroad company, which they incorporated into their several leases, we do not think that the contract is one of which specific performance should be decreed in equity under the circumstances of this case. Even when a contract is free from doubt, it is well-settled law that specific performance will not Opinion of the Court. [18 App. always be decreed. Specific performance generally rests in the sound judicial discretion of the court of equity. In the present case the railroad company has another remedy, plain and adequate, whereby to preserve its own rights and those of the public in the premises, that of the exercise of the right of eminent domain vested in it by its charter and by the act of Congress which authorized its entrance into this city and District; and it is both its right and its duty to exercise that right by taking steps in the present suit or otherwise, as it may be advised, to ascertain the value of the use and occupation which it desires of the land in question. and to make compensation therefor to the owners of the land. Railroad Co. v. Stanley, 35 N. J. Eq. 283; Drury v. Midland RR. Co., 127 Mass. 571; Railroad Co. v. Bruce, 102 Pa. St. 23; Railroad Co. v. Johnston, 59 Pa. St. 290; Taylor v. Railroad Co., 63 Wis. 327; Provolt v. Railroad Co., 57 Mo. 256; Railroad Co. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494; Gilman v. Railroad Co., 37 Wis. 317; Railroad Co. v. Lewton, 20 Ohio St. 401; Trenton Water Co. v. Chambers, 1 Stockt. 471; Railroad Co. v. Booraem, 1 Stew. Eq. 450. The case of Railroad Co. v. Stanley, above cited, is directly in point. There the owners of land, on which a railroad company proposed to construct its railroad, entered into an agreement with the company for the use and occupation of the land by the latter, in consideration of the establishment of a depot or station thereon by the company, and certain arrangements for the running of trains. The company took possession of the land and constructed its railroad, but failed to build the station. It became insolvent, and its property and franchises were sold under foreclosure, and another company, organized under the general laws of the State, became the owner and possessor of them. Ejectment was instituted by the owners of the land against this latter company to recover possession of the property; and the company thereupon filed a bill in equity to stay the proceedings. The Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of New Jersey held that the complainant company was entitled to the injunction which it prayed. The other cases cited are substantially to the same effect; and the principle established by them, adverse to the right of the owners of the land to repossession, seems to be fair and just, and to afford a proper criterion for the determination of the case now before us. In view of what has been said, we are of opinion that, under the provisions of the lease of 1892, executed by Francis Winslow, trustee, for and on behalf of the life tenant, Mrs. Eliza W. Patterson, the appellant was and is entitled to one renewal of such lease for the term of five years from and after the first day of August, 1897, upon the terms and conditions of said lease as to the rents to be paid therefor; and that during the continuance of such term no suit for the dispossession of the appellant can be maintained. We are, also, of opinion that, for the time subsequent to the determination of said renewed lease for which the appellant shall require the use and occupation of said land, the appellant is entitled, and it is its duty, to acquire the right to such use and occupation, under the exercise of the right of eminent domain conferred upon it by the act of Congress, by the ascertainment of the value of such use and occupation, and payment to the owners of the land of the just compensation so to be ascertained. And the bill of complaint in this cause may be retained for the purpose of such ascertainment of value and just compensation. It follows that the decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dissolving the injunction granted in this cause and dismissing the bill of complaint, must be reversed, with costs; and that the cause will be remanded to that court, with directions to vacate said decree, to restore the injunction and make the same perpetual, and for such further and other proceedings as may be just and proper, according to law and in conformity with this opinion. And it is so ordered. An appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was prayed by the appellees and allowed. WASHINGTON, ALEXANDRIA AND MOUNT VERNON RAILROAD COMPANY. APPEALABLE ORDERS; TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS; MUNICIPAL REGULATIONS. 1. An order overruling a motion to dissolve a temporary restraining order granted ex parte and continuing the same, is in effect an order granting a temporary injunction, and is appealable, under section 7 of the act of Congress of February 9, 1893, creating this court; and such an appeal brings up the question of the propriety of the temporary injunction; following Electric Lighting Co. v. Met. Club, 6 App. D. C. 536, and Parsons v. Hill, 15 id. 532. 2. The fact that an electrical switch and appliances erected by a railway company without first obtaining the permission of the municipal authorities, as required by law, was installed for use in case of emergency only, and that no danger can result from temporarily enjoining the municipality from removing them, will not justify the continuance of a restraining order enjoining their removal until proof can be taken. 3. Where the Commissioners of the District ordered a railway company to remove an electric switch and appliances, installed by it at the intersection of certain streets without having obtained permission to do so, and the company, in a suit for an injunction, obtained an order temporarily restraining the Commissioners from executing their official order, it was held, on an appeal from an order overruling a motion by the Commissioners to dissolve the restraining order, that, as it did not appear that they had exceeded their powers or abused their discretion or acted oppressively in ordering the removal of such construction, that the restraining order should be dissolved. 4. A statute or regulation looking to the public interest and safety will be upheld by the courts unless it is plain that it has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental iaw. No. 1089. Submitted June 4, 1901. Decided June 18, 1901. HEARING on an appeal by the Commissioners of the Dis |