Upon the ticket obtained as we have stated, the plaintiff was carried to Atlantic City; and on the 24th of August, 1885, without having the ticket stamped according to requirement, the plaintiff boarded a train of the Camden & Atlantic Railroad for the city of Camden, on his way home. When the tickets were called for by the conductor of the train, the plaintiff offered his ticket, which was refused, because it had not been stamped as required. Upon the plaintiff refusing to pay regular fare, he was, in a loud and peremptory tone, told by the conductor that he must leave the train, or he would be put off. By remonstrance, however, the matter was deferred until the train reached Camden, where the plaintiff was arrested by officers, called upon to act by the conductor, under circumstances and notoriety very mortifying and humiliating to the plaintiff, and he was taken before the superintendent of the road, by whom he was at once discharged, with the announcement that the stamping of the ticket had been, for some time before, dispensed with.

The condition on the ticket requiring the holder thereof to have it stamped by the agent of the road upon which it was intended to be used on the return passage, has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be a valid condition, the noncompliance with which renders the ticket void. Mosler v. St. Louis Iron Mountain Railway, 127 U. S. 390; Boylan v. Hot Springs RR. Co., 132 U. S. 150. But here, so far at least as the Camden & Atlantic Railroad was concerned, the condition had been waived or ig nored, and it may, therefore, be treated as immaterial in this

case.

For the purpose of identifying the Baltimore & Potomac Railroad and the Camden & Atlantic Railroad with the Pennsylvania Railroad, and to show that the two former roads were in fact operated and controlled by the Pennsylvania Road, certain items of proof were offered. There were offered certain advertisements, published in a newspaper in the city of Washington, of special excursions to Atlantic City via the Pennsylvania Railroad; but published

some time prior to the 21st of August, 1885. One of these advertisements read thus: " On Friday, the 10th inst., the Pennsylvania Railroad Company will run a select excursion to Cape May and Atlantic City, at the very low rate of $5 for the round trip." But this advertisement was published some time in July, 1885. It was also shown in proof that the general passenger agent of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company was also the general passenger agent of the Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Company, and of the Camden & Atlantic Railroad Company, and had his office for those roads in the building of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.

The plaintiff also gave in evidence certain schedules of through trains from Washington city to Atlantic City, in which the Baltimore & Potomac and Camden & Atlantic roads are embraced, published in the "Travellers' Official Guide," under the heading, "Pennsylvania Railroad System; " and also gave in evidence, for the same purpose, certain extracts from the Thirty-ninth Annual Report of the Board of Directors of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to its stockholders for the year 1885, as showing that the two roads just mentioned were treated as belonging to the Pennsylvania Railroad System. But the report does not show that those two railroad companies were embraced in the accounting department of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, but only as companies in which the Pennsylvania Company had large investments of stocks and bonds. It was also shown in evidence that the officers who arrested the plaintiff at Camden city wore buttons on their uniforms upon which were the letters "P. RR.," supposed to stand for Pennsylvania Railroad; and thus showing that that company was in control of the Pennsylvania Company.

Upon all the facts of the case, the court below, upon the request of the defendant, directed a verdict to be entered for the defendant, to which exception was taken by the plaintiff. It is difficult to perceive how the court below could have ruled otherwise than it did, with the case of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Jones, 155 U. S. 333, 345,

Opinion of the Court.

[18 App. before it. All the facts in proof in this case were in proof in that, with some additional proof that made that case stronger for the plaintiff than the present. The two cases relate to precisely the same time, and each was and is based upon substantially the same theory of liability, with the exception that the case of Jones was an action in tort for personal injuries, and the present is an action upon contract for personal wrong to the plaintiff; the one founded upon the common-law obligation of a carrier to carry safely, and the other upon an alleged special contract to carry safely. To main tain the action in either case, however, there must be shown that there was a legal duty to perform, and a breach of that duty, such as would sustain an action. And upon the same facts that are shown in proof in this case, the Supreme Court. held that there was nothing in those facts that would render the Pennsylvania Railroad Company liable, as one of the defendants in the case of Jones.

The injury sued for in that case occurred on the Washington & Alexandria Railroad. The action was brought against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and four other companies, and the theory upon which the action was founded was, that all of the defendant companies were engaged as common carriers, in the transportation of passengers, persons and freight, upon and along the several lines of the railroads belonging to them, and along the line, among others, of the Alexandria & Washington Railroad Company, under an arrangement or contract for their common benefit, by which they were interested jointly in the running and management of these roads, and that through the negligence of the defendant companies the collision occurred which caused the injury complained of.

In referring to the facts shown in evidence in that case, the court said: "It is conceded, or sufficiently appears in the evidence, that the running and management of the road of the Alexandria & Washington Railroad Company were not within the scope of the ordinary powers of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company as a corporation of the State of Pennsylvania. To render the latter company responsible for what

might take place on a railroad in another State some contract or arrangement to that effect must be made to appear."

After referring to the annual reports of the board of directors of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to their stockholders, for 1884 and 1885, and what was shown thereby, the court proceeded to say: "It was also shown by said report that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company owned, on December 31, 1885, $1,000,000 of the bonds of the Alexandria & Fredericksburg Railway Company, and $2,000,000 of the bonds of the Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Company, and 60,852 shares of the Baltimore & Potomac Company's stock, and 217,819 shares of the stock of the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Company."

There was also put in evidence in that case a railroad map showing a continuous line of railroad between Philadelphia and Quantico, with letters signifying that the roads embraced therein were the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore, the Baltimore & Potomac, the Alexandria & Washington, and the Alexandria & Fredericksburg Companies.

It was also proved, says the court, "that a ticket issued by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company was sold in Baltimore, at the office of the Northern Central Railroad Company, on account of the Alexandria & Fredericksburg Railway Company, and it was likewise proved that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company owned stock in the Alexandria & Washington and the Alexandria & Fredericksburg Railway Companies, and that some persons who were officers of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company were likewise officers of these companies. It was also shown that the employees of the Baltimore & Potomac, the Alexandria & Washington, and the Alexandria & Fredericksburg were paid from a pay-car, whose brakeman and conductor wore a blue uniform with silver buttons, which was said to be the uniform of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.

"Newspaper advertisements were put in evidence, calling the attention of the traveling public to the great Pennsylvania Route to the Northwest and the Southwest, and it was shown that J. R. Wood was general passenger agent, and

Charles E. Pugh, general manager, of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, stationed at Washington; and it likewise appeared that they occupied similar positions in the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore, the Baltimore & Potomac, Alexandria & Washington, and the Alexandria & Fredericksburg Companies."

In conclusion, upon the evidence relating to the liability of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, in that case, the court say: "That the Pennsylvania Railroad Company advertised that it ran trains, or connected with trains of other companies, so as to form through lines, without breaking bulk or transferring passengers, did not tend to show any contract or agreement between the companies to share profits and losses. Nor was there evidence, in the present case, that there was any actual participation by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company in the earnings of the other companies which used the road between the cities of Alexandria and Washington. On the contrary, the evidence affirmatively showed that such earnings, including what was paid by the United States for the transportation of mails, were divided between the other companies, and went, none of them, to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company."

That case would appear so entirely to cover and conclude the present, as to leave no room for question or doubt on the facts of the present case.

It is, however, very earnestly argued for the plaintiff that the recent case of the Chesapeake & Ohio RR. Co. v. Howard, 178 U. S. 153, affords strong support to the case of the plaintiff; and though the facts of that case are different, yet, it is contended the principle upon which that case was de cided, has direct application here. But we do not so read

that case. That was an action to recover for personal injuries, and the action was against the railroad company that issued the ticket for safe passage. There was no question as to the identity of the company that made the contract for carriage, but whether the defendant company was liable for the negligence of the agents and servants of the particular road upon which the accident occurred, was the question.