Opinion of the Court.

[18 App.

the transcript of the proceedings prepared for appeal shall show in the caption nothing more than the title of the case, the names of the parties in full, and the time of the commencement of the suit or proceeding; and that has been conformed to. Consequently there is nothing in the record before us by which to test the sufficiency of the actual entries of the minutes, either in form or substance, beyond the indictment itself with its recitals and indorsements, and the recital of its presentation in open court on a day of the April term. The transcript containing a formal indictment duly filed in open court in regular term, raises the presumption of regularity in all the proceedings prior thereto, which must continue until rebutted by facts and conditions properly presented in a bill of exceptions.

The bill of exceptions contains nothing more than the motion to quash, the action overruling it and the reservation of an exception thereto. Turning to the recitals of the motion itself and accepting the facts stated therein as true, together with all reasonable deductions therefrom, we cannot find that the court erred in overruling it.

The Supreme Court of the District is a court of general jurisdiction, and its terms are fixed by law, of which we are bound to take notice; and it is not necessary to the legality of the session of its several branches that the minutes should recite the appearance of the clerk and marshal at the opening of the term, or that the sitting was in the District and in the building designated for the purpose. Regularity in these respects is necessarily presumed. It appears from the recitals of the motion that a grand jury was empanneled at the April term; that a foreman was duly appointed, and that an indictment in due form was returned in open court indorsed, "a true bill," over the signature of the foreman. From these it must be presumed that the grand jury empanneled was the grand jury required by the Constitution and the law, and that the true bill returned in open court was concurred in by the requisite number. That the foreman's name, as written, was W. H. H. Cissel instead of William H. H. Cissel, as recited in the minutes,

is a fact of no consequence. In our opinion, the record shows, substantially, all that is required to sustain a conviction in an appellate court: A formal indictment presented and filed as a true bill; an arraignment and plea; trial, verdict and sentence. Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 396, 418, 419; Crain v. United States, 162 U. S. 625.

2. The eleventh and twelfth specifications of the motion to quash attack the sufficiency of the indictment upon the following grounds, substantially: 1st. It does not set forth "the estate, or degree or mystery" of the defendant; 2d. It does not aver "the town, hamlet or place or county in which the defendant was conversant."

These are founded on the requirements of the ancient English statute of 1 Hen. V, Ch. 5, (A, D. 1413) which reads as follows:

"That in every original writ of actions personals, appeals, and indictments, and in which the exigent shall be awarded in the names of the defendants in such writs original, appeals and indictments, additions shall be made of their estate or degree, or mystery, and of the towns, or hamlets, or places, and counties, of which they were or be, or in which they be or were conversant; (2) and if by process upon the said original writs, appeals, or indictments, in which the said additions be omitted, any utlagaries be pronounced, that they be void, frustrate and holden for none; (3) and that before the utlagaries pronounced, the said writs and indictments shall be abated by the exception of the party, wherein the same the said additions be omitted. (4) Provided always, that though the said writs of additions personals be not according to the records and deeds, by the surplusage of the additions aforesaid, that for that cause they be not abated; (5) and that the clerks of the chancery, under whose names such writs shall go forth written, shall not leave out, or make omission of the said additions as is aforesaid, upon pain to be punished and to pay a fine to the king by the discretion of the chancellor; (6) and this ordinance shall begin to hold place at the suit of the party, from the feast of St. Michael next ensuing forward.”

Opinion of the Court.

[18 App.

The contention that this statute was in force in Maryland at the time of the cession, and, as such, was continued in force by the terms of the act of Congress of February 27, 1801, has some support, it must be admitted, in the authorities cited by counsel.

It appears in full in the Compiled Statutes of the District (p. 460, Sec. 83); and in 1790, the General Court of Maryland is reported as having quashed an indictment because of the omission of the additions therein required. State v. Hughes, 2 H. & McH. 322. Bishop says, however, that in a more extended report of that case by Kilty, it is said: "A reference was made by one of the judges to several acts of assembly in which the process of outlawry was mentioned." 1 Bishop's Crim. Proc., Sec. 674, note 2.

The question does not appear to have again arisen, and the statute was expressly repealed by act of legislature as late as 1852. See statement in Hammond v. State, 14 Md. 135.

Its existence was recognized also in the following States: Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Maine and Virginia. Report of Judges, 3 Binney, 595, 614; Com. v. Jackson, 2 Grant's Cas. 262; State v. Moore, 14 N. H. 451; State v. Bishop, 15 Me. 122; State v. Nelson, 29 Me. 329, 334 (stating statutory change); Com. v. Sims, 2 Va. Cas. 374; Com. v. Clark, Idem, 401. In the last case decided in Virginia (A. D. 1823) it was said that the statute had been re-enacted in that State February 26, 1819, except in so far as the estate or degree "are inconsistent with the principles of our government." In Kentucky it was re-enacted in 1796, but is expressly confined to indictments in which the exigent may be awarded and outlawries pronounced." Com. v. Rucker, 14 B. Monroe, 184. And for that reason its application to the indictment in that case was denied.

Despite these supporting authorities, we cannot agree that this statute was in force and effect in Maryland, after the Revolution, in controlling the forms of indictments; and that, as such, it was continued in force in the District of Columbia by the act of Congress of February 27, 1801. The statute was passed in mitigation of some of the evils

of the cruel process of outlawry that, at certain stages of proceedings, civil and criminal, followed the failure of the defendant to appear, and was enacted in answer to petitions that no man might be outlawed without his sur-name, and the name of his town and county.

The object of the statute was to enable the person against whom the process ran, to be identified and thus prevent oppressions that had formerly resulted from want of certainty of description. 2 Reeves' Eng. Law (Finlason), 519, 520; 4 Bl. Com. 306. See also Morgan v. State, 15 Ala. 556, 559; Com. v. Rucker, 14 B. Monroe, 184; State v. McDowell, 6 Blackford, 49.

The exigent was the first process in outlawry and the statute, it will be observed, is limited to cases "in which the exigent shall be awarded."

Founded, then, on distinctions of estate and conditioni. e., rank in life and intended to operate only where outlawry might be declared, the life of the statute passed with the sudden subversion of rank and the gradual disappearance of the barbaric process of outlawry. No conditions whatever remained to furnish foundations for its application or operation. 1 Bishop's Crim. Proc., Sec. 673; State v. McDowell, 6 Blackford, 49; Com. v. Rucker, 14 B. Monroe, 184; Morgan v. State, 15 Ala. 556, 559.

It is possible, also, that some reasons for the requirement, in ancient indictments, of the additions of estate or condition, and mystery (i. e., trade or occupation), inhered in the special privileges of barons and knights to be arraigned by and before their peers, as well as in the benefit of clergy that was extended to certain ranks and other privileged persons.

It is proper to add, that, if we were inclined to the view that the aforesaid statute was in force in this District, because not expressly repealed, we would, nevertheless, sustain the indictment, for the reason that we could not agree to the contention that the averment of the addition was made, and must, therefore, necessarily, continue to be regarded as, matter of substance and by no means of form. Being

Opinion of the Court.

[18 App.

matter of form, it would be cured by the provisions of section 1025, R. S.

3. The last objection to the indictment is to the want of particularity in the allegation of the place of the commission of the crime. It alleges that the offense was committed in the District and in a certain house situated therein, but omits the precise locality of the house. The contention is that the location of the said house should have been averred, if not by square, street and number, at least by situation in the county or in the city of Washington, and by section thereof. Considering the nature of the offense charged in the indictment we see no reason for such particularity of statement. The allegation of place is necessary only as fixing the venue. It has no relation to the fact and constitutes no part of the description of the offense. In England, and anciently, the averment of the particular hamlet, township or place in the county was important because in the early days of jury trial, the jurors, for reasons directly opposed to those controlling the modern practice, were always summoned from the vicinage.

In and before Blackstone's time, the allegation of the particular township or place had become immaterial, that is to say, a mistake therein, like that in date, was immaterial, provided the place was within the jurisdiction of the court. 4 Blackst. Com. 306.

In this country it has been generally held that an indictment is sufficient which avers the commission of the offense in the jurisdiction of the court without specification of the particular locality. See cases cited on the brief of the District Attorney, and in Ledbetter v. United States, 170 U. S., at pp. 613, 614.

Certain language in the opinion in the last-mentioned case is relied on by counsel for the appellant, as showing the rejection, by the Supreme Court of the United States, of the doctrine above stated. The indictment was for carrying on the business of a retail dealer in liquors without license, "in the County of Appanoose in the Southern District of Iowa and within the jurisdiction of this court."