go, they would seem to sustain the positions here taken. See Vanderwerker v. People, 5 Wend. 530; Grovier v. Hall, 23 Mich. 7; Ten Eyck v. Farlee, 16 N. J. 348; Swasey v. Adair, 88 Cal. 179; Haskins v. Wilson, 5 Wisc. 106. Of course, no authority is needed to support the proposition that, when a trial by jury is demanded, the justice himself is then without authority to try the issues for which the trial is demanded; for such is the letter of the law. But it would not be correct to say that the authority is then absolutely at an end in such sense that it may not be revived and recalled into effect; for undoubtedly the voluntary withdrawal of the demand would restore it, and would reinvest the justice with the full authority which he had prior to the interposition of the demand. It is our conclusion, (1) that the discharge of the jury in this case, consequent upon its disagreement, did not terminate the cause, or take away from the justice the power to proceed further therewith; (2) that the failure of the justice after such discharge to continue the cause, by assignment thereof to some day certain thereafter, did not effect a discontinuance thereof, or operate to discharge the defendant therefrom; but that the cause remained in court, subject to be taken up again at any reasonable time thereafter upon motion and notice; (3) that, upon such motion and notice, it was the duty of the justice, without any further or other demand therefor, to summon and empannel another jury for the trial of the issue between the parties, unless such trial was waived; and that it was not competent for him to try that issue himself without a jury. In accordance with these conclusions we understand to have been the views of the court below; for such is the necessary inference from the order which it made and from which the present appeal has been taken. The order appealed from, therefore, will be affirmed, with costs; and the cause will be remanded to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in order to carry said order into effect. And it is so ordered. Syllabus. [18 App. LANCKTON v. THE UNITED STATES. APPELLATE PRACTICE; APPEALS; PRESUMPTIONS; CRIMINAL LAW; INDICTMENT; MOTIVE; INSTRUCTIONS; INTOXICATION. 1. Under Rule V of this court, requiring that a transcript on appeal shall show in the caption nothing more than the title of the case, the names of the parties in full and the time of the commencement of the proceeding, it will be presumed that all proceedings prior to the filing of an indictment set forth in such a transcript were regular, and such presumption will continue until rebutted by facts and conditions properly presented in a bill of exceptions. 2. The Supreme Court of this District is a court of general jurisdiction and its terms are fixed by law, of which this court is bound to take notice, and it is not necessary to the legality of the sessions of its several branches that the minutes should recite the appearance of the clerk and marshal at the opening of the term, or that the sitting was in the District and in the building designated for the purpose. Regu larity in these respects is necessarily presumed. 3. Where the transcript of the record on appeal, in a criminal case, shows that the grand jury was empaneled at a regular term; that a foreman was duly appointed and that the indictment upon which the accused was tried was returned in open court, indorsed "a true bill," over the signature of the foreman, it must be presumed that the grand jury empaneled was the grand jury required by the Constitution and the law, and that the true bill returned in open court was concurred in by the requisite number of the grand jurymen; and that the foreman's name, as written in the indictment, contains only the initial of his given name, while the minutes recite his full given name, is a fact of no consequence. 4. The British Statute of 1 Hen. V, Ch. 5 (A. D. 1413), requiring every indictment to set forth "the estate, or degree or mystery of the defendant," and to aver "the town, hamlet or place or county in which the defendant is or was conversant," is not in force in this District. 5. An indictment for murder which alleges that the crime was committed in the District of Columbia, and in a certain house situated therein, is not insufficient because it omits to allege the precise locality of the house. D. C.] Statement of the Case. 6. It is not error for the trial court, in a murder case, to instruct the jury that it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove a motive, but that absence of proof of motive may be considered as a circumstance in favor of the accused. 7. It is not error for the trial court in a murder case to refuse a prayer for instruction by the accused to the effect that if it were probable that the deceased came to her death from any other cause whatever than from violence inflicted on her by the accused, the jury should find him not guilty, where, in addition to a general charge showing the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the court instructs the jury, at the request of the accused, that if the death of the deceased can be accounted for on any other hypothesis whatever, than that she came to her death as a result of injuries inflicted by the accused, it is their duty to acquit him. 8. The refusal of a trial court to grant a prayer for instruction by a defendant indicted for murder to the effect that if the jury find the accused was intoxicated when the offense was committed they might take the fact of intoxication into consideration in determining the grade of punishment which should be inflicted, if error at all, is not prejudicial error, where the accused is convicted of manslaughter only. 9. The voluntary intoxication of a person accused of a crime cannot be considered in determining the character of the crime committed, voluntary intoxication being neither an excuse or palliation for crime, following Harris v. United States, 8 App. D. C. 20. No. 1070. Submitted May 8, 1901. Decided May 23, 1901. HEARING on an appeal by a defendant indicted for murder from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia entered upon the verdict of a jury finding him guilty of the crime of manslaughter. Affirmed. The COURT in its opinion stated the case as follows: The appellant, James Lanckton, was indicted on May 11, 1900, for the murder of one Betty L. Wren in the District of Columbia. On November 17, 1900, he was convicted of manslaughter, and was subsequently sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for eight years, after motions in arrest of judgment and for new trial had been overruled. The evidence on behalf of the Government tended to show the following facts: Bettie L. Wren was a clerk in the office Statement of the Case. [18 App. of a pension attorney and was about fifty-four years of age. She occupied a house in the City of Washington, No. 634 E street, southwest. Lanckton was about sixty-six years of age, and first met Mrs. Wren in the office where she was employed. He shortly afterwards went to live in her house by her invitation, and apparently without charge. He claimed to have become engaged to be married to her. He was sometimes intoxicated, and then used abusive language to her, and threatened to kill her and another man who occupied a room in the house. On the night of the 12th of March Mrs. Wren called in a policeman and complained that Lanckton had struck her. He was intoxicated. He was intoxicated. She, at first, wanted him taken away, but finally consented to his remaining. March 14th she kept her bed, complaining of pain and weakness. She sent for a servant to nurse her, to whom she said, in Lanckton's presence and hearing, and without his denial, that he had struck her. The left side of her face was swollen and one eye closed. March 17th, a physician was called in. He found her in a semi-comatose state. eye was dilated; the other contracted. blackened and had an abrasion upon it. presence of Lanckton that he had struck her a blow. He was drunk, and the physician compelled him to leave the house. She was removed to the Columbian Hospital, in the city of Washington, on March 19th, and died there March 29, 1900. An autopsy made by the deputy coroner, a competent surgeon, disclosed a large and fresh blood clot within the left side of the skull, and an exceedingly small one at or in the base of the brain at the back of the head. Other organs of deceased were in apparently healthy condition. The opinion formed was, that the blood clots were the result of a blow received upon the left side of the head; or might have been caused by falling and striking the head upon the floor. The pupil of one She said in the An aged, crippled and practically deaf and dumb sister of the deceased was examined by the Government, and was the only witness who saw the assault. She testified by signs, and these were interpreted by a servant who was familiar with them and could communicate with her. D. C.] Statement of the Case. Before she was permitted to be introduced as a witness, the justice presiding caused her to be carefully examined by Doctor Gallaudet, of the Institute for the Deaf and Dumb, who pronounced her competent to testify, and the servant competent to interpret her signs. The court was satisfied from her signs that she comprehended the nature of an oath. No objection was offered to her competency, or to that of the interpreter. Her testimony was very brief, indicating that she saw Lanckton strike her sister on the head with his hand or fist. Lanckton, testifying on his own behalf, denied striking the deceased. He attributed her injury to a fall that she had received. He said that she had been complaining of weakness, and asked him to assist her to rise from her bed and sit upon a stool by its side. Whilst seated upon the stool, she fell to the floor, striking her head, and was unconscious for a time. He also denied He said he had 12th of March, that she had charged him with striking her. been drinking heavily before and after the and that he was intoxicated when ordered by the physician to leave the premises. Medical experts, on behalf of the accused, testified that the formation of the blood clots might have been, and most probably had been, caused by a diseased state of the blood vessels of the brain. They had not seen the deceased, either before or after death, and formed their opinions on the general evidence and the statement of the deputy coroner of the details of the autopsy. They thought his opinion unreliable because he had not made an examination of the brain and the blood with a microscope. On cross-examination of the defendant it appeared that he had spent the bulk of his life in a circus as an exhibitor of feats of strength. The defendant was duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty, but was, subsequently, permitted to withdraw the plea and file the following motion to quash the indictment: "1. Said indictment purports to have been found and re |