D. C.] Opinion of the Court. informal and without jurisdiction in the magistrates who heard the case. But that objection was overruled, and Hughes was convicted by Bramwell, L. J., before whom the case was tried. The case, however, was reserved to be heard by a full bench of judges assigned to hear in review crown cases reserved. The bench consisted of ten judges, and all, with the exception of Kelley, C. B., who gave no reason for nonconcurrence, concurred in affirming the conviction of Hughes, and in maintaining the jurisdiction of the magistrates before whom Stanley was tried. They held that Stanley was rightly convicted notwithstanding that there was neither written information nor oath, to justify the issue of the warrant against Stanley, and that the justices had jurisdicion to hear and determine the charge, though the warrant upon which the party was arrested and brought before them had been illegally issued. In the present case the record from the police court does not disclose how or by what means the defendant was brought before that court, though the police officer testified that he had arrested the defendant several days before the trial, and we may, therefore, assume that the party was brought into court in custody of a police officer. But from what subsequently occurred in court, the manner of bringing the defendant before it is quite immaterial to the question of jurisdiction of the court to try and convict the defendant on the information before it. The question of the illegal arrest of Stanley in the case of Reg. v. Hughes, supra, was much pressed in argument by counsel to show the want of jurisdiction; but the whole nine judges who concurred in affirming the conviction of Hughes, concluded, that the illegal arrest of Stanley did not affect the jurisdiction of the justices to try the case. It was brought before them, and they were bound to try and dispose of it. Mr. Justice Hawkins, in a most thorough and able opinion, and which seems to have been the leading opinion in the case, in treating of that contention, said: "The information, which is in the nature of an indictment, of necessity precedes the process; and it is only after the information is laid, that the question as to the particular form and nature of the process can properly arise. Process is not essential to the jurisdiction of the justices to hear and adjudicate. It is but the proceeding adopted to compel the appearance of the accused to answer the information already duly laid, without which no hearing in the nature of trial could take place (unless under special statutory provision). If a mere summons is required, no writing or oath is necessary. A bare verbal information is sufficient. If a warrant is required, then, and for that purpose only, an oath substantiating the information is requisite, not only by the provisions in the Jervis's acts, so often referred to, but by the common law, of which it was always a doctrine that a warrant which deprives a man of liberty ought not to issue without oath of the truth of the information. To justify a warrant, I am also of opinion that a written information is necessary." In another part of the same opinion, the learned judge said: "If the contention on the part of the defendant be correct, then Stanley, even though he had suffered the whole imprisonment to which he was sentenced, would be liable to be tried again, and could not plead autrefois convict; and if he had been acquitted would have been in no condition to plead autrefois acquit. Two very startling consequences. A flood of authorities might be cited in support of the propo sition that no process at all is necessary when, the accused being bodily before the justices, the charge is made in his presence, and he appears and answers to it. In 2 Hawk. 28, it is said: 'It seemeth plain, from the nature of the thing, that there can be no need of process when the defendant is present in court, but only where he is absent.' In Rex v. Stone, 1 East, 649, Lord Kenyon said: Justice requires that a party should be duly summoned and fully heard before he is convicted; but if he be stated to be present at the time of the proceeding, and to have heard all the witnesses, and not to have asked for any further time to bring forward his defense, if he had any, this at all times has been deemed sufficient."" There are many other authorities cited and quoted from in the course of the opinion to the same effect. D. C.] Opinion of the Court. There are many well-considered American cases that fully accord with the principle of the English case just cited. Indeed, the principle would seem to be universal that where an information or complaint is filed charging a crime over which the court has jurisdiction, the court has the power to cause the defendant to be brought before it to answer the charge, and when he is actually before the court and is called upon to plead, if he has any objection to make as to the manner in which he was brought before it, he ought to make the objection then, and move to quash the information, or that he be discharged therefrom. As has been well said, public policy, as also protection to parties accused of crime, requires that such principle should be applied. A great many arrests are made without warrant, and, if the character and circumstances of such arrests could, after trial and judgment, be inquired into and proved, to defeat the jurisdiction of the court and render the judgment void, not only would the administration of justice be obstructed, but the judgment, whether of conviction or acquittal, would be no protection to the defendant; no bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, even though he should have suffered the punishment inflicted on first conviction; as was the case in the present instance. The legality or illegality of the arrest of the accused does not affect the jurisdiction of the court, nor the guilt or innocence of the accused. Trial courts, whether State or Federal, will not, upon the trial of an indictment or information against an accused, upon a plea of not guilty, inquire as to whether or not the defendant was properly or improperly brought within the jurisdiction of the court. A party accused cannot claim immunity from crime upon any such ground. New Jersey v. Noyes, 18 Fed. Cases, 84; Brown v. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn. 534; Com. v. Gregory, 7 Gray, 498; People v. Velarde, 59 Cal. 457; State v. Longton, 35 Kans. 375; State v. Dibble, 59 Conn. 168; State v. Regan, 67 Me. 380; Elmore v. State, 45 Ark. 243; State v. Day, 58 Iowa, 678; Ledgerwood v. State, 134 Ind. 81; Aderhold v. City of Anniston, 99 Ala. 521. To state the special facts of each of the several cases just cited would unduly prolong this opinion; but, upon examination, they will all appear fully to support the principles that we have stated. And as we find no error in the rulings of the court below its judgment must be affirmed; and it is so ordered. Judgment affirmed. Mr. Justice SHEPARD dissented. UNITED STATES v. DAVIS. HABEAS CORPUS; CRIMINAL LAW; INFORMATION; POLICE COURT; COLLATERAL ATTACK. 1. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the office of a writ of error, and where a party by such means seeks to be discharged from imprisonment under a judgment of conviction of a court of competent jurisdiction, he must clearly show that the judgment, for causes apparent upon its face, is an absolute nullity, as the question of errors or defects in the proceeding upon which the conviction is founded will not be entertained in a collateral proceeding by habeas corpus. 2. A judgment of conviction of the police court of this District based upon an information alleging that the defendant is charged upon the oath of a person named therein, is not a nullity, under the act of Congress of June 17, 1870, requiring the information to be under oath, although there is no separate affidavit made by the prosecuting witness or some other person possessing knowledge of the facts, and a defendant in custody under such a judgment is not entitled to be released upon habeas corpus proceedings; following Latney v. United States, ante, p. 265; Associate Justice SHEPARD dissenting. No. 1056. Submitted April 9, 1901. Decided May 22, 1901. HEARING on an appeal by the United States, from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a habeas corpus proceeding, discharging the petitioner from custody of the warden of the jail. Reversed. D. C.] Opinion of the Court. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. Mr. T. H. Anderson, United States Attorney, for the District of Columbia, and Mr. Ashley M. Gould, Assistant United States Attorney, for the United States. Mr. A. S. Colyer for the appellee filed no brief. Mr. Chief Justice ALVEY delivered the opinion of the Court: This is an appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in matter of habeas corpus, wherein the petitioner for the writ, the present appellee, was discharged, and the United States have appealed. The petitioner for the writ alleged that he was arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison on November 1, 1900, by the police court of this District, for an assault, and that he was sentenced to jail for 11 months and 29 days. He alleged that he was illegally and unlawfully restrained of his liberty and held in jail by the warden thereof, by virtue of a commitment issued by the said police court. The only ground alleged as constituting illegality in the proceedings, is that the information upon which he was tried was not an information such as is required under section 1064 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia, and was also in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The proceeding in the police court is not exhibited as part of the petition, nor was there issued a writ of certiorari as ancillary to the writ of habeas corpus to have the record of conviction in the police court produced. But a copy of the information upon which the party was tried appears filed in the case; and we shall assume that it was properly filed. The information filed in the police court, upon which trial and conviction were had, recites and states that the attorney of the United States for the District of Columbia comes here into court, at the District aforesaid, on the 15th day of |