LECTURE XXVI.

PERSPICUITY.

IN the last lecture, delivered by me from this place, I gave you a general idea of what is understood by elocution, when considered as the third of the primary divisions of the rhetorical science. I explained to you the meaning of the terms elegance, composition, and dignity, when associated as the constituent parts of elocution; and made it manifest, I hope to your satisfaction, that by these words no more was intended, than the collection of rules for the choice, the array, and the embellishment of the orator's words.

The laws of rhetorical elegance, or the characters, which ought to govern in the choice of words, from the universal concurrence of the writers, an

cient and modern, were stated to be purity and perspicuity; the former of which, standing upon grounds somewhat different in the modern languages, and especially our own, from those, which formed its ancient foundations, I traced through its variations and modifications from the inflexible rigor of Greek exclusion, down to the almost indiscriminate license of English facility. The consideration of perspicuity comes next before us; which I propose to treat in the same order, which was pursued with regard to its cooperating attribute, purity, by explaining, first what is intended by the term; secondly the reasons, upon which its influence is founded; and thirdly the means, by which it is to be obtained.

The

1. By analyzing the word itself we shall immediately discover, that it is itself figurative; and borrowed from the operations of the sight. combination is Latin; per aspicio, to look through. Perspicuity then is the quality of being easily seen through. It is according to Quinctilian the first virtue of eloquence. For every species of written composition it is doubtless a virtue of the highest order; but of public speaking it is the vital spark. It is the property, by means of which the orator makes himself understood by his

audience; and a discourse, deficient in perspicuity, is just so far as that defect extends like an harangue to a multitude of one nation in the language of another.

In the communication of ideas from mind to mind, by the means of writing or of speech, there is necessarily implied a double operation; the operation of the speaker or writer, and that of the hearer or reader. The object of the former is to impart, and that of the latter to receive the idea. The act of receiving is an operation less laborious, than that of imparting thought; yet is it such an act, as can by no means be performed in a passive state of mind. The communication of ideas in a continued discourse must always be imperfect; but of that which is written the reader may take his own time to search out the meaning. He can review, compare, and combine, at his leisure; giving time for the memory and the judgment to come in aid of perception. But oratory, considered as such, as independent of the pen and of the press, has no such resources. A long and complicated succession of ideas must be imparted, for the reception and arrangement of which the hearer has only the time necessary for the speaker to deliver them in speech. He must catch the thought,

as it flies on the wings of its words.

He has not

a moment for deliberation; not an opportunity for revision. The sound of the words, in which one thought is invested, still vibrates in his ear, and he must be prepared for the reception of its successor. However acute his perception, however retentive his memory, however capacious his intelligence, it is impossible, with the ordinary faculties allotted to human nature, that every idea of a long discourse should be completely received in so short a space of time. If some few extraordinary examples might be adduced as exceptions, I think they would appear rather as memory of sounds, than as reception of ideas.

There is indeed a material distinction between the imperfect reception and the imperfect retention of ideas. Every sentence of an oration may be well understood at the time of its utterance, and yet none of its hearers will be able to repeat any considerable portion of it afterwards. This defect being inherent not in the discourse of the speaker, but in the memory of the auditor, cannot be remedied by any perspicuity; the disorders of vision cannot be healed by any lucidness in the object, We are not to inquire, because we cannot provide for those imperfections of communication,