out," when, if the attention of a chemical professor were called to her hand, he would surely find a "spot," whether there was one there or not. Microscopism is outdone, for, while this method of minute observation only reveals what is actually in existence, chemical analysis brings to light what never had any actuality. The two great trials mentioned have been as much a trial of the reliability of chemical analysis as of the guilt or innocence of the accused; and they demonstrate clearly that a professor of that wondrous science, to whose keeping and inspection the elements of a man's exculpation or condemnation are committed, should employ every resource, avail himself of every assistance, and apply every conceivable test in the analytical process. Let us hear of no more defective analyses of anatomized human stomachs suspected of containing poison.

The institutions of law learning of the State of New York, which are about to begin their working year, have an increased responsibility resting upon them. The demands for thorough preparation on the part of the student at law before his admission to the bar are constantly augmenting; and the fact that our law schools are practically the means of neutralizing the effect of the three-years' rule renders it all the more incumbent upon them to secure a complete conformity to the requirements of the curriculum and a rigid examination at the end of the course. As the law regulating admission to the bar in this State now is, the law schools are and must be crowded to overflowing, that being a short-cut to admission, and if they fail in their task of graduating men fit for the bar, the profession will hold them responsible.

To-day it is understood that the decision of the arbitrators under the treaty of Washington will be officially announced. While the pecuniary compensation awarded our government can scarcely be much more than nominal, yet the moral and jural, the political and international results flowing from the settlement of the Alabama claims must be immeasurable. Every ruling of the Geneva board must have its effect especially upon the condition of international law; for, while the points decided are conventionally confined to the case under consideration, and the rules laid down are limited ostensibly in their application to the conduct of the British and American governments; yet the principles evolved must have their influence upon the relations of all civilized nations, and help to form a new and more certain Code of international law.

Even extradition treaties do not suppress litigation, although they approach the threshold of international justice, and do not leave runaway criminals to absolute impunity and perfect freedom to renew their villainies. There are many points in positive law, which are necessarily the subject of adjudication and

interpretation; and the cases which have arisen, under the extradition treaties of this government, with foreign nations, show conclusively, that compliance with the provisions of such treaties is far from a mere mechanical action. A case has arisen under the treaty with Sweden, which has been elaborately argued, both on the question of jurisdiction and of evidence. The case was taken before the United States com

missioner at New York. It appears that the defendant, M. Ahlander, who is a Swedish subject, is charged with having, while acting as a public officer, to wit, a chamberlain in the penal prison, at Landscrona, embezzled about six hundred rix dollars, the property of the Swedish government. Ahlander having escaped to this country, the Swedish authorities made demand upon the United States for his extradition under the treaty. The matter is still under advisement.

The

The Philadelphia Enquirer, in commenting upon the rise of the movement in favor of allowing women to practice law, alludes to the familiar dramatic law suit, in which a woman is represented as an advocate. Our contemporary says "Shakespeare wisely believed that he could produce a grand dramatic effect in his play of the Merchant of Venice, by allowing 'Portia,' in the assumed character of a lawyer, to plead for the life of Antonio.' In his time it seemed no more possible that a woman should be a lawyer than that the infant in its mother's arms would be able to plead before court and jury, in some doubtful cases. In fact, there have been critics, who have urged that the incident in which 'Portia' appears as an advocate, is unnatural. What would have those learned Thebans have said, if they could have known that in a few years after their pertinent objections had been uttered, the ranks of the lawyers would be invaded by the fair sex, who might be addressed, according to modern usage, with full title, as for instance, Mrs. Mary Smith, Esq.'" It seems to us, on the contrary, that Shakespeare was not obtuse or inartistic, but that he wrote with his usual naturalness and insight, when he represented woman in the character of a lawyer; for what being is there more ingenious, fertile in resource, apt to argue, clear in perception, able to call forth the emotions, than an intelligent woman. Indeed, the seminaries of learning do not consider that it is at all necessary for young ladies to study Whately or Butler, because their logical powers are born perfect!

The senate met at the capitol, on Tuesday, to hear the closing argument in the case of Judge Prindle. Counsel for the prosecution were absent, but the judge and his counsel were present. Only twenty senators were present, and an adjournment was resolved upon until November 20th, at ten o'clock A. M., when it is proposed to dispose of the case of Judge Prindle immediately, and then take up the case of Judge

Curtis. We had hoped that the senate could free themselves from the excitement and exactions of a great political contest long enough to properly dispose of the cases of Judges Prindle and Curtis now. Justice to the accused and to the people seemed to demand this.

✔The second trial of Mrs. Fair, who killed the eminent California lawyer, Mr. Crittenden, two years ago, has at last begun, and, if a jury can be successfully drawn, after so much has been said, published and thought about the affair, the trial will immediately proceed. Delay is always favorable to the accused in cases of this character, and the shaft of justice, if not broken, is often blunted and tempered by the warm sympathies which will ever reside in the breast of juries for woman.

Numerous inquiries have been made in reference to the forthcoming session laws of this State. The secretary of State informs us that the volume, which is somewhat larger than usual this year, and well-furnished with side notes, is now in print and will be ready for distribution in a week or ten days. The difficulty of collating, arranging and providing with side-notes, index, etc., of a volume of more than two thousand pages is arduous and great, and abundantly accounts for the seeming delay in publication.

The rumored appointment of Judge Van Voorst, by the governor, to fill the vacancy in the supreme bench, caused by the removal of Judge Barnard, is, to say the least, premature, as nothing is known of it in official circles. The announcement, however, did not gain sufficient currency and credit to excite extended comment upon the fitness of the appointment, which is often the case, thus subjecting an individual to a quasi ordeal, the reality of which he never tries, or to a double criticism when the reality is experienced.

M. Bigot, a distinguished French advocate, while addressing a tribunal in behalf of a prisoner, was taken suddenly ill. The president of the court, perceiving that he began to falter, requested him to rest awhile, but the advocate wished to proceed, and made an effort to continue his address, but he suddenly became silent and fell down. A physician was summoned, when it was found that the great lawyer had been stricken with apoplexy. After remaining in a state of unconsciousness until the following morning, he died.

mansion on the banks of the Thames with a large garden frontage thereon, the river was embanked under authority of an act of parliament, a large strip of dry land was thus formed where the river had formerly flowed up to the garden, and a public road was made between this strip of land and the river. Plaintiff claimed compensation under the act, and the claim was referred to arbitration. Held, that the loss of the use of the river frontage, and the consequent loss of privacy, and the increase of dust and noise by the

creation of the embankment and road, were subjects for the arbitrators to consider as occasioning deterioration in the selling value of the property for which he was to determine the amount of compensation. One great point in the case may be inferred from the following observation in the opinion of Baron Martin, who was one of the seven judges who were summoned to aid the lords in the determination of the case: "In my opinion the duke's right to compensation under the two acts (25 and 26 Vict. ch. 93, and 8 and 9 Vict. ch. 18) is not less extensive than it would have been to damage (excluding vindictive damage) in an action of tort in the event of the defendants in error having made the embankment without the authority of parliament." Another great point was, whether the duke could claim compensation for the depreciated value of his residence (Montagu House) resulting "from the loss of privacy and the noise and dust caused by a public road between it and the river.' Mr. Justice Blackburn thought such damages too remote, but his view was not sustained, and the lords and a majority of the judges were of the opinion that such damages were properly awarded.

Semmes v. City Fire Insurance Co., of Hartford, decided in the supreme court of the United States last winter, was an action on a policy of fire insurance, to which the defense was, that suit had not been brought within twelve months after the loss occurred, as provided in one of the conditions of the policy. To this plea replications were set up, stating that the late civil war prevented the bringing of the action within the twelve months provided in the condition, the plaintiff being a resident and citizen of the State of Mississippi, and the defendant of Connecticut, during the time of the civil war. Defendant's counsel argued that the rule, as to statutes of limitations, applied in this case, viz.: That the time of disability should be subtracted from the whole time before action brought, and the right of plaintiff to sue should be determined by the difference as compared with the time limited. But the supreme court overruled this point and decided that the disability to sue, imposed upon plaintiff by the war, relieved him from the consequences of failing to bring suit within twelve months after the loss, because it rendered a compliance with that condition impossible, and removed the presumption which that contract says shall be conclusive against the validity of the plaintiff's claim.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

ACTION.

Action to recover possession of a house and lot. At the time of the commencement of the action the premises in question were occupied by M., as tenant of defendant. S. served the summons and complaint. Defendant told him at the time, in substance, that he lived in and owned the house, and thereupon the papers were served upon him.

Held, that the defendant was estopped from denying that he was in the actual occupation of the premises at the time of the commencement of the action, by his declaration, and by receiving and retaining the complaint without objection that he was not the proper party. Also held, that in an action to recover possession of real estate occupied by the tenants of the person claiming title adverse to the plaintiff, the landlord is a necessary party, and the presence of the tenant is not essential to defendant to enable him to litigate the title, and he may waive the omission to make the tenant a party. Not objecting by demurrer or answer is such waiver. Opinion by Allen, J. Finnegan v. Carraher.

See Married Woman; Practice.
AGENCY. See Ratification.

This proceeding was commenced under chapter 338, Laws of 1858, for the purpose of vacating an assessment made upon the lands of the petitioner to defray the expense of constructing sewers, upon the ground that it is voidable for fraud or legal irregularity in the proceedings, by virtue of which it was imposed.

The assessment in the present case was made under chapter 381, Laws of 1865. No fraud in the proceedings prejudicial to the petitioner or otherwise was proved upon the hearing before the judge. The petitioner claims that the assessment was shown to be void upon these grounds: 1st. Because the Croton Aqueduct Board of the city had not devised a plan for the drainage of the entire city, and caused maps, etc., as required by the first section of the act, to be made before contracting for the construction of the sewers in question. 2d. For the reason that the contract for such construction embraced work in more than one sewerage district. 3d. That copies of the map or plan for the drainage of sewerage district No. 8, in which the lands in question are situated, had not been filed as required by section 4 of the act.

Held, that, under the provision of chapter 381, Laws of 1865, in relation to sewerage and drainage in New York city, the devising of a plan for the drainage of the entire city is not a condition precedent to the power of contracting for doing the work in any of the sewerage districts.

Also held, that the omission to file a copy of the map showing the plan of drainage of the sewerage districts with the clerk of the common council, according to the provisions of section 4 of said act, which does not contain any provision prohibiting the contracting of the work until the filing of such copy, does not vitiate the assessment. This provision as to the filing the map is directory only. In re N. Y., P. E. Public School. Opinion by Grover, J.

COMMON CARRIER.

Action to recover damages for a breach of a contract made by defendant as a common carrier. Defendant

undertook to forward a lot of cattle from Goderich to Buffalo, under the following conditions: 1st. That the owners of the cattle undertake all risks of loss, injury, damage and other contingencies in loading, unloading, conveyance and otherwise. 2d. The company do not undertake to forward the animals by any particular train or at any specified hour; neither are they responsible for the delivery of the animals within any certain time or for any particular market. The cattle were transported to Brantford, where the cars containing them were detached from the train and placed upon a side track, where the cattle could not be unloaded or fed or watered; they were left there two or three days. From exposure to the weather while there, and the want of food and water, some of the cattle died and the others were seriously injured.

Held, that leaving the cattle upon the side track at Brantford, for the length of time they were left, and under the circumstances of exposure to injury, can, in no sense, be regarded as an act of negligence in the execution of the contract. It was, for the time, an entire abandonment of all effort to perform, intentional on the part of the employees of the company. It was a breach of the contract, and defendant was liable. Keeney et al. v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co. of Canada. Opinion by Grover, J.

CONTRACT. See Common Carrier.

DONOR AND DONEE. See Gift.
EJECTMENT. See Action.

FRAUD; APPEAL; COMMISSION.

This action was brought to recover back money paid on a note of $300, on the ground that the note was obtained by false and fraudulent representations, and was, therefore, void. This note was given in compromise and settlement of a suit brought by this defendant to recover installments due on a note of $500, executed by the plaintiff to the defendant, and was given in the place of the $500 note and exchanged for it.

Held, that a party defrauded in a contract is not barred from his right of action for the fraud, by the fact of his having compromised the claim against him upon the contract, unless it appears that he had, at the time of such compromise, knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud. A bare suspicion, not founded upon facts or upon any investigation, is not sufficient.

Also held, that on appeal to this court resort cannot be had to the evidence for the purpose of establishing error in the conclusions of law. Such error must be made to appear from a comparison of the conclusions with the facts found or admitted on the record.

Also held, that a deposition taken under a commission will not be excluded because a cross-interrogatory is not full. If the answer is not clearly evasive, if a party desired to elicit further facts, he could only do so by obtaining a re-execution of the commission. Baker v. Spencer. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

See Ratification; Married Woman.

GIFT.

On an appeal from a judgment of the general term, reversing a decree of a surrogate. - Held, that a mere parol declaration, made after the creation of a debt, would not transform it into a gift. But when money is delivered from father to son, and no writing is made, and no evidence of debt taken, and under circumstances rendering it uncertain as to whether it was intended as a loan or gift, and not incon

Action for fraud in a contract for the sale of the real estate of a wife by the husband, acting as her agent. Held, that it is not necessary to join the husband as a party to the action. The statutes of 1860 and 1862 provide, that "the wife may sue and be sued in all matters having relation to her sole and separate property, the same as if she were sole," and judgment may be enforced against her separate property as if she were sole.

Also held, that the statute has not altered the common-law liability of the husband for the mere personal torts of the wife, but when such torts are committed in the management and control of her separate property, the rule is changed, and she is liable the same as if she was unmarried, and can be sued in the same manner. Baum et al. v. Mullen. Opinion by Church, Ch. J.

MISTAKE. See Mortgage.

MORTGAGE.

Action to foreclose a mortgage. The mortgagor sets up in his answer a mistake in the terms of the mortgage, and asks for a reformation of the instrument according to the real agreement of the parties to it, and alleges that, when thus reformed, nothing was due thereon.

Held, that the mortgagor had a right to set up and prove a mistake in the drawing of the mortgage, and to have it reformed.

Also, held, that where a mistake is made in the terms of payment, delay in attempting to have the mistake corrected, and payment of the first installment, and promising to pay the second while protesting against his liability, on the ground of the mistake, furnish no ground for a denial, to the party injured, of the relief to which he was entitled. The absence of the assignor as a party will not bar him from such relief.

Also, held, it was not necessary to make the assignor a party to the action, for upon the coming in of the defendant's answer, the plaintiffs were notified of the claim of the defendant.

The plaintiffs might have given notice of this claim of the defendant to the assignor, and offered to her the future management of the suit, and this would have made the judgment binding upon her, in respect to the fact of the mistake. Andrews et al., executors, etc., v. Gillespie. Opinion by Grover, J.

PARENT AND CHILD. See Gift; Promissory Note.

PRACTICE: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Action to recover on an account. - The plaintiffs had proved their account. The defendant had given evidence, tending to prove that he had paid the same in a note against a third person, which the plaintiffs agreed to receive in payment; and the plaintiffs had given like evidence that the note was not received in payment, but as security for the debt. Upon this the judge ruled that an action could not be maintained upon the account, and directed the jury to find for the defendant.

Held, that an exception to this direction raises the question whether, upon any finding warranted by the testimony, the plaintiffs were authorized to recover the balance claimed upon the account, and is sufficient to present the question of law upon appeal. Plaintiff was not required to request the courts to submit the question of fact to the jury.

Also held, that section 2 of the "act concerning the rights and privileges of persons in the military and naval service of the United States" (ch. 578, Laws of 1864) is not retroactive. The time a person is absent in such service, prior to its passage, is not excluded in computing the time limited for the commencement of an action. Stone v. Flower. Opinion by Grover, J.

PROMISSORY NOTE.

Defendant on a settlement of accounts with his father found himself indebted to him $425, for which sum he gave his note. After the father's death an action was brought upon the note, on the trial defendant produced it canceled, he testified that it had not been paid. It was proved that he had access to the papers

of deceased. The referee before whom the case was tried, found that the possession of the note by defendant was presumptive evidence that it had been discharged; and, further, as a matter of law, the fact that the note had not been satisfied by payment, set-off or the delivery of property, is not sufficient to reject the presumption that it had been discharged.

Held, that possession of the note by defendant, under the facts in the case, was not evidence of its discharge. The law does not presume a gift. Grey et al. v. Grey. Opinion by Peckham, J.

See Fraud.

RATIFICATION.

This action is to recover money paid for an interest in a farm, purchased on the false representations of an agent of defendant, who afterward paid over the money to the defendant, who, in turn, shared it with his partners, who were strangers, in the transaction, to plaintiff. Held, that the receipt of the money by defendant was a ratification of the agency and an adoption of the means by which it was obtained, and the purchaser, being ignorant of the partnership, it was not necessary to join the other partners in an action to recover back the money paid for fraud, on the part of the agent, or mistake.

Also, held, that the defendant became liable immediately upon the receipt of the money, and his subsequent division of it among persons who were strangers, in the transaction, to the plaintiff, could not affect his liability. Leslie v. Wiley. Opinion by Church, Ch. J. REAL ESTATE. See Action; Mortgage. SOLDIERS. See Practice. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

See Practice.

DIGEST OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.*

(Continued.)

LIEN.

1. W. sold lands to M. and T., giving bond for title. T. became insolvent without having paid any of the purchase-money, and left the State. M. assigned the bond to B. in consideration of his paying the balance of the purchase-money due, and the satisfaction of a judgment recovered by him against M., and as agent

* Supreme Court of Alabama, January Term, 1872.

for P. sold the lands to B., who paid the purchasemoney due and gave his notes to P. for the additional price. W. conveyed the legal title to P., from whom B. accepted a bond for titles when his notes should be paid. Held, that the lands were subject to the payment of the notes. Davenport v. Pressley.

2. A vendor who sells real estate, and takes a promissory note for the payment of the purchase-money, and gives the vendee a bond for titles, when the note is paid, has a lien on the estate to secure the payment of the said note, and if the vendor indorses the note to a third person, the lien is transferred to the indorsee, and he may enforce the same in equity in his own name. Edmonds v. Torence.

3. A party who buys the estate of such a vendee, who has only a bond for titles, and takes an assignment of the bond for titles as the evidence of his purchase, is charged with notice that the purchase-money is unpaid, and is a lien on the estate; in other words, he will not be regarded as a bona fide purchaser, for valuable consideration, without notice. Ib.

4. B. purchased certain lands of S., gave his note for the purchase-money and received S.'s bond for titles when the said notes were paid. A few days after said purchase, and before B. was let into possession with the knowledge and consent of S., B. sold said note to C. and C. at an advance of a thousand dollars, and by an understanding between all of said parties, C. and C. were to take up and cancel B.'s notes and give their note to T. for said advance, expressing that it was given in part payment of said lands, and S. then and there delivered said note to B., and B. transferred said bond for titles to C. and C., and they went into possession for several years, and then moved away, and H. went into possession, whether under a purchase from C and C. was not known to B., but claiming some interest in said lands. In the mean time S. died. Afterward B. filed his bill, making the widow and heirs of T., C. and C. and said H. defendants, and prayed that said thousand dollar note be declared a lien on said lands, and, if necessary, that said land be decreed to be sold for its payment. On motion of H. the bill was dismissed for want of equity. Held, 1. That said note was a lien on said lands. 2. That the bill was improperly dismissed for want of equity. 3. That if H. purchased said lands in good faith for valuable consideration and without notice, after a conveyance by S. to C. and C., it would defeat B.'s lien, and be a good defense to his bill. Bulger v. Holly.

5. M. sold a tract of land to F., which was incumbered by a mortgage executed by M. to O. prior to the sale; but it was agreed between F., M. and O. that M. might sell the land to F. if F. would give his note to O. for the amount of this mortgage debt, and also give a mortgage to O. on the same land to secure this debt, and that this second mortgage should be preferred to the vendor's lien in favor of M. for his part of the purchase-money to be paid by F. above the debt to O. The sale was concluded by a deed from M. to F., and a mortgage by F. to O., as agreed upon, all of the same date. F. gave his notes to M. for the balance of the purchase-money above the amount of O.'s mortgage. One of these notes was afterward transferred by M. to B., who filed his bill against F., M. and O., to enforce his vendor's lien arising on the note held by him; held, that the lien of O.'s mortgage was to be preferred to the vendor's lien in favor of B., and upon a sale of the land under decree of the court, O.'s mortgage must be first paid, and

then the residue, if any, applied to the discharge of B.'s debt. Bulkam v. Owen.

MARRIAGE.

A marriage contracted and celebrated in the State of South Carolina between a man, a citizen of this State, domiciled in this State, with a woman, a citizen of the former State and residing there, with the intention of coming immediately to this State to reside at the husband's domicile here, will be treated in our courts as a marriage contracted in this State, for the purpose of regulating the marital rights of both parties, and the marital rights of the wife will be regulated by the laws of the husband's domicile, if there is no marriage contract. Glenn v. Glenn.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. An action may be brought against one member of a partnership firm on a contract made by the firm. Ex parte Ware.

2. In such an action, on the death of the defendant, the same survives against the personal representative of the deceased, and may be revived in the name of such representative as defendant. Ib.

PROMISSORY NOTE.

It is no defense to a suit upon a promissory note that the consideration was a horse purchased from the plaintiff for the military service of the Confederate States within the knowledge of plaintiff, and that horse was so used. Thedford v. McClintock.

REBELLION.

1. An order of sale and a decree confirming the sale of lands of an estate, rendered by the probate court of Alabama in 1863, are not void as being the acts of a court of the State while in insurrection against the United States. Snedecer v. Gibbs.

2. An injunction bond taken by a register in chancery, in pursuance of an order of the chancellor granting an injunction, in 1863, is not void on the ground that these officers represented a government in rebellion against the United States. Estes v. Sarlick.

SEALED INSTRUMENT.

A promissory note containing the word "seal." surrounded by a scroll, appended to the signature of the maker, is not a sealed instrument. Blackwell v. Hamilton.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

J. gave a mortgage to T. on two mules and his crop of cotton, to secure the payment of $500. He was indebted to him about the same amount in addition. He and T. disputing about the debt to which the cotton should be applied, D. proposed to give his note to T. for the unsecured debt, and take a mortgage on the mules for his re-imbursement, the existing mortgage to be satisfied with the cotton, and J. to join with him in renting land from T. for the next year. T., in pursuance of the agreement, received the cotton in satisfaction of his mortgage, and J., after promising to execute the agreement on a subsequent day, and obtaining the credit on his mortgage debt, refused to consummate it. He insisted all the time that his payment should be so appropriated. Held, that the agreement was void, because not in writing, and that J. had a right to apply his payment as he preferred. Townsend v. Jones.

WILL.

1. The undue influence necessary to overthrow a testamentary disposition of one's estate must be of such