ing $30, 15 cents; exceeding $30 and not exceeding $40, 20 cents; exceeding $40, 25 cents.

SEC. 127. That mail matter shall be registered only on the application of the party posting the same, and the fee thereof shall not exceed 20 cents, in addition to the regular postage, to be in all cases prepaid; and all such fees shall be accounted for in such manner that the postmaster-general shall direct; provided, that letters upon the official business of the post-office department which require registering, shall be registered free of charge and pass through the mails free of charge.

SEC. 130. That mailable matter shall be divided into three classes: First, letters; second, regular printed matter; third, miscellaneous matter.

SEC. 131. That mailable matter of the first class shall embrace all correspondence, wholly or partly in writing, except book manuscripts and corrected proof sheets passing between authors and publishers.

SEC. 132. That mailable matter of the second class shall embrace all matter exclusively in print, and regularly issued at stated periods from a known office of publication, without addition by writing, mark or sign.

SEC. 133. That mailable matter of the third class shall embrace all pamphlets, occasional publications, transient newspapers, magazines, handbills, posters, unsealed circulars, prospectuses, books, book manuscripts, proof sheets, corrected proof sheets, maps, prints, engravings, blanks, flexible patterns, samples of merchandise not exceeding twelve ounces in weight, sample cards, phonographic paper, letter envelopes and wrappers, cards, plain and ornamental paper, photographic representations of different types, seeds, cuttings, bulbs, roots, scions, and all other matter which may be declared mailable by law, and all other articles not above the weight prescribed by law which are not, from their form or nature, liable to destroy, deface, or otherwise injure the contents of the mail-bag, or the person of any one engaged in the postal service. All liquids, poisons, glass, explosive materials and obscene books, shall be excluded from the mails. All matter of the third class, excepting books and other printed matter, book manuscripts, proof sheets and corrected proof sheets shall not exceed twelve ounces in weight, and all matter of the third class shall be subject to examination and to rates of postage as hereinafter provided. Samples of metals, ores, and mineralogical specimens shall not exceed twelve ounces in weight, and shall be subject to examination and to rates of postage as hereinafter provided.1

SEC. 131. That no package weighing more than four pounds shall be received for conveyance by mail, except books published or circulated by order of Congress.

SEC. 136. That the postmaster-general may prescribe by regulation the manner of wrapping and securing for the mails all matter not charged with letter postage nor lawfully franked, so that it may be conveniently examined by postmasters; and if not so wrapped and secured it shall be subject to letter postage.

1 Chromos, protected by thin boards, may be sent by mail in packages not exceeding twelve ounces in weight for 1 cent for each two ounces, etc. On packages of greater weight, letter postage is required.

Electrotype cuts are classed as matter of the third class, and are entitled to pass by mail at the prepaid postage of 2 cents for each two ounces or fraction thereof, in packages to one address, limited to 12 ounces in weight.

Maps bound in book form (in stiff covers) must be rated at book rates of postage.

SEC. 137. That postmasters at the office of delivery may remove the wrappers and envelopes from mail matter not charged with letter postage nor lawfully franked, when it can be done without destroying them, for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is upon or connected with any such matter any thing which would authorize or require the charge of a higher rate of postage thereon.

SEC. 138. That no newspapers shall be received to be conveyed by mail, unless they are sufficiently dried and inclosed in proper wrappers.

SEC. 139. That where packages of newspapers or other periodicals are received at a post-office, directed to one address, and the names of the subscribers to whom they belong, with the postage for a quarter in advance is handed to the postmaster, he shall deliver such papers or periodicals to their respective owners. SEC. 140. That postmasters shall notify the publisher of any newspaper or other periodical, when any subscriber shall refuse to take the same from the office or neglect to call for it for the period of one month.

SEC. 141. That publishers of newspapers and periodicals may print or write upon their publications sent to regular subscribers the address of the subscriber and the date when the subscription expires, and may inclose therein bills and receipts for subscription thereto, without subjecting such publications to extra postage.

SEC. 142. That any person who shall inclose or conceal any letter, memorandum, or other thing in any mail matter not charged with letter postage, or make any writing or memorandum thereon, and deposit or cause the same to be deposited, for conveyance by mail at a less rate than letter postage shall, for every such offense, forfeit and pay $5, and such mail matter or inclosure shall not be delivered until the postage is paid thereon at letter rates; but no extra postage shall be charged for a card printed or impressed upon an envelope or wrapper.

SEC. 148. That no obscene book, pamphlet, picture, print or other publication of a vulgar or indecent character, or any letter upon the envelope of which, or postal card upon which scurrilous epithets may have been written or printed, or disloyal devices printed or engraved, shall be carried in the mail; and any person who shall knowingly deposit or cause to be deposited, for mailing or for delivery, any such obscene publication, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall, for every such offense, be fined not more than $500, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both, according to the circumstances and aggravation of the offense.

SEC. 151. That all mail matter deposited for mailing on which, at least, one full rate of postage has been paid as required by law, shall be forwarded to its destination, charged with the unpaid rate, to be collected on delivery.

SEC. 156. That on all mail matter which is wholly or partly in writing, except book manuscripts and corrected proofs passing between authors and publishers, and local or drop letters; on all printed matter which is so marked as to convey any other or further information that is conveyed by the original print, except the correction of mere typographical errors; on all matter which is sent in violation of law, or the regulations of the department respecting inclosures; and on all matter to which no specific rate of postage is assigned, postage shall be charged at the rate of 3 cents for each half-ounce or fraction thereof.

SEC. 158. That on newspapers and other periodical publications, not exceeding four ounces in weight, sent from a known office of publication to regular subscribers, postage shall be charged at the following rates per quarter, namely: On publications issued less frequently than once a week, at the rate of 1 cent for each issue; issued once a week, 5 cents; and 5 cents additional for each issue more frequent than once a week. And an additional rate shall be charged for each additional four ounces or fraction thereof in weight.

SEC. 161. That persons known as regular dealers in newspapers and periodicals may receive and transmit by mail such quantities of either as they may require, and pay the postage thereon as received at the same rate, pro rata, as regular subscribers to such publications who pay quarterly in advance.

SEC. 162. That the postmaster-general may prescribe by regulation an affidavit, in form, to be taken by the publisher or by the clerk, agent or servant of the publisher, of any newspaper or other periodical which may, by law, be sent to regular subscribers without prepayment of postage at the mailing office, to the effect that neither he nor any other proprietor, clerk, agent or employee, within his knowledge, will send, cause, or permit to be sent through the mail, without prepayment by postage stamps, any copies of such newspaper or periodical (naming it), except to bona fide and regular subscribers thereto; and if any such newspaper or periodical shall be thus unlawfully sent, with the knowledge or consent of such proprietor or his agent, clerk, servant in charge of such business, or if such affidavit shall, when required by the postmastergeneral, or any special agent of the post-office department, be refused, the person guilty of the offense or refusing to make the affidavit shall forfeit and pay $50 in each case.

SEC. 163. That on mailable matter of the third class, except as herein stated, postage shall be charged at the rate of 1 cent each two ounces or fraction thereof. Double these rates shall be charged for books, samples: of metals, ores, minerals and merchandise.

SEC. 165. That the rate of United States postage on mail matter sent to or received from foreign countries with which different rates have not been established by postal convention or other arrangement, when forwarded by vessels regularly employed in transporting the mail, shall be 10 cents for each half-ounce or fraction thereof on letters, unless reduced by order of the postmaster-general; 2 cents each on newspapers; and not exceeding 2 cents per each two ounces or fraction thereof, on pamphlets, periodicals, books and other printed matter, which postage shall be prepaid on matter sent and collected on matter received; and to avoid loss to the United States in the payment of balances, the postmaster-general may collect the unpaid postage on letters from foreign countries in coin or its equivalent

SEC. 170. That to facilitate letter correspondence and provide for the transmission of the mails at a reduced rate of postage, of messages, orders, notices, and other short communications, either printed or written in pencil or ink, the postmaster-general shall be and he is hereby authorized and directed to furnish and issue to the public, with postage stamps impressed upon them, "postal cards," manufactured of good stiff paper of such quality, form and size as he shall deem best adapted for general use; which cards shall be used as a means of postal intercourse, under rules

and regulations to be prescribed by the postmaster. general, and when so used shall be transmitted through the mails at a postage charge of 1 cent each, including the cost of their manufacture.

SEC. 182. That all books or publications which may be procured or published by order of congress shall be considered as public documents and may be franked as such.

SEC. 184. That the following mail matter shall be allowed to pass free in the mail:

First. All mail matter sent to the president or vicepresident.

Second. Official communications addressed to chiefs, heads of bureaus, chief clerks, or franking officer of either of the executive departments.

Third. Letters and printed matter sent to senators, representatives, or delegates in congress, the secretary of the senate or the clerk of the house of representatives.

Fourth. Petitions to congress.

Fifth. Copyright matter to the librarian of congress, if marked on the package "copyright matter." Sixth. All publications sent or received by the Smithsonian Institution, marked on each package "Smithsonian Exchange."

Seventh. Newspapers, periodicals and magazines, reciprocally interchanged between publishers and not exceeding sixteen ounces in weight; to be confined to a single copy of each publication.

Eighth. Weekly newspapers, one copy to each actual subscriber within the county where the same is printed and published; but carriers shall not be required to distribute such papers unless postage is paid upon them at the usual rates.

Ninth. Notice to the publishers of the refusal or neglect of subscribers to take newspapers, magazines, or other periodicals from the post-office to be sent under such regulations as the postmaster-general may prescribe.

Tenth. Dead letters returned to the writers thereof.

BOOK NOTICE.

General Statutes of the State of New York for 1872. Weed, Parsons and Company, Albany, N. Y.

This volume contains all laws of a public and general nature, passed at the ninety-fifth session of the legisla ture of New York State, carefully collated with the originals in the office of the Secretary of State, and bearing his certificate of correct transcript. It is provided with copious and valuable references to former statutes and decisions, and with marginal subdivisions. The advantages of such a publication are quite obvious. The session laws will not be placed in the hands of the profession for months yet, and much uncertainty and vexation must prevail unless removed by some such work as the General Statutes. Besides, to a large pɔrtion of the profession, the General Statutes are all that is essential; the expense of purchasing two or more large volumes of session laws is not incurred, and the inconvenience of having to look through all the laws, local, special and private, as well as general and public, is avoided. We venture to assert that there is no more interesting, curious and indispensable information for the profession than is found within this book.

The bar of Santa Cruz, Cal., have refused admission to a female applicant.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1872.

RIAGE.

It is the well-settled rule that a promise of marriage need not be express in order to be binding. A valid promise is often inferred; and, under what circumstances such an inference may be drawn, it is the design of this article to set forth in a review of the leading cases on the subject in Great Britain and America.

Ambe very early case of Hutton v. Mansell, decided

in 1705 by Chief Justice Holt, and reported in 6 Mod. Rep. 172, S. C., 3 Salk. 16, 64, holds, that where the promise of the man was proved, but no actual promise on the woman's side, yet, the fact that she carried herself as one consenting and approving the promise, was sufficient evidence that she likewise promised, and would enable her to maintain an action for a breach. This doctrine does not seem to have been questioned for a century, and in Daniel v. Bowles, 2 Carr. & P. 553, decided in 1826, it was precisely affirmed. In this case it appeared that plaintiff, plaintiff's mother and defendant had an interview in the drawing-room, when defendant introduced the subject of marriage, and said that he hoped there was no objection on the part of the young lady's parents. The mother replied that there was none, upon which he took her hand and said to her, "from this time consider me as your son." It did not appear that plaintiff made any observations at the time, but she received his visits and finally eloped with him. Best, Ch. J., said, "I think that her being present and not making any objection, coupled with what happened | afterward, shows that she consented, and would be sufficient to enable the defendant to maintain an action against her. It would be indelicate to expect that she should consent in words. No doubt the jury must be satisfied that there were mutual promises, but I think there is evidence from which they may be inferred."

In March, 1831, the validity of an implied marriage promise was authoritatively announced in the house of lords, in Honeyman v. Campbell, 2 Dow. & C. N. S. 265. This was a case in which a copula had taken place between the parties. The lord chancellor said: "It may be proved by witnesses who heard it given, or by writing, * * it may be inferred from circumstances. * * * Now, if there had been any doubt, under these circumstances, as to the promise, from any ambiguity in the expressions, the subsequent copula would make it certain. The probability is turned to a certainty when she gives up her person as the consideration for the promise, as if, in an ordinary contract, I had any doubt as to the price stipu

* *

shall recover a verdict, unless his or her testimony shall be corroborated by some other material evidence, in support of such promise." In Hickey v. Champion, 20 W. R. 752, a very recent case, it appeared that when the plaintiff was in the company of a young man on one occasion, defendant took her away and gave her in charge of a friend; and, on another occasion, the defendant happening to be sick at a public house, plaintiff attended him, he saying, "Who has a better right to take care of me than my wife?" This being substantiated by other witnesses, was held to be sufficient to establish the promise of marriage. Pigot, C. B., said: "A promise to marry may be made without words. The conduct, demeanor and behavior of persons toward each other may constitute proof from which the contract might be inferred." "But," continues the learned Baron, "no doubt it is always considered that stronger evidence of the promise by a man should be required than of the promise by a woman. The delicacy and diffidence of the gentler sex forbids in them the more explicit expression of feeling and sentiment in respect of the marriage contract; but it is expected that a man will speak his mind. We should, therefore, be the more slow to infer a promise from the conduct of a man than from a woman."

In Wilcox v. Godfrey, 26 L. T. N. S. 328, 481, it appeared that plaintiff and defendant had been in the habit of meeting in retired places and at a certain inn; that plaintiff was delivered of a child; that defendant gave plaintiff a prayer-book; that on one occasion, as defendant was buttoning plaintiff's glove, a bystander asked her why she did not knit him a pair, upon which defendant said, "Oh, she will when she is my wife;" but she remarked, "Suppose I won't have you, Tom?" upon which he replied, "Oh, yes, you will." And although all this occurred previous to the date at which plaintiff alleged she accepted defendant, Martin, B., told the jury that these acts would corroborate. See, also, Watkins v. Davis, Weekly Notes, 1872, 146; Ryan v. Cleary, 5 Irish L. T. R. 178. Monahan, Ch. J., in Garrie v. Lindsay, cited in 6 Irish L. T. 348, lays down a rule which is commendable for its conformity to the times and its deference to the independence and strength of character of the female sex. The learned chief justice observes, that "of all contracts in the world, there is no contract that requires a more specific and distinct agreement than that of marriage. It would not be enough, that the man was willing to marry the woman, or, that he had made advances which ought to have resulted in a proposal of marriage. There are a great many men in the world who amuse them

selves by paying marked attention to ladies without intending ultimate marriage; but that is a mere matter of delicacy and taste, and all the attentions paid, all the letters written, will not be sufficient, unless they result in an express agreement between the parties to marry each other." Yet these observations are not sustained by the British authorities.

The American cases upon the point are quite numerous, and in the main they follow the early English decisions.

In Southard v. Rexford, 6 Cow. 254, the supreme court of New York held, that the question whether there were mutual promises of marriage between the parties or not was a question of fact for the jury. And the court, per Sutherland, J.,went further and said: "The promise on the part of the defendant was clearly proved. In January, 1819, he admitted to an Eliza Peck that he had promised to marry the plaintiff and intended to fulfill his engagement. About the same time he told the brother of the plaintiff that he intended soon to marry her. A number of witnesses testified that, from June, 1818 to 1823, the defendant visited the plaintiff as a suitor, and was apparently well received by her; and it was matter of public notoriety that he was courting her. The fact of an engagement of marriage between the parties; of a promise on the part of the plaintiff as well as of the defendant, is necessarily to be inferred from this evidence." See, also, McKee v. Nelson, 4 Cow. 355. In Wells v. Padgett, 8 Barb. 323, it appeared that defendant had admitted that he had promised to marry plaintiff, and had also promised to a third person that he would marry plaintiff; it also appeared that plaintiff had given birth to a child of which defendant admitted himself to be the father. Mason, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "In an action by a woman for breach of promise of marriage, it is not necessary * * * to prove that the plaintiff, by words, consented to accept the defendant." "It would be indelicate to expect that she should consent in words."

In Hotchkins v. Hodge, 38 Barb. 117, Hogeboom, J., observes that "it is too late, after the frequent adjudications in our State and elsewhere, to consider the question whether long bestowed and particular attentions, having apparently an honorable object, furnish sufficient evidence from which the jury may imply a promise of marriage," and cites, Southard v. Rexford, supra; Wells v. Padgett, supra; Hubbard v. Bonestell, 16 Barb. 360; Willard v. Stone, 7 Cow. 22; Hutton v. Munsell, supra; 1 Pars. on Cont. 545. See, also, Kniffen v. Mc Connell, 30 N. Y. 285.

The rule in Rhode Island is embodied in Perkins v. Hersey, 1 R. I. 493, where Greene, Ch. J., in charging the jury, said: "The ordinary politeness and civility which a gentleman extends to a lady are not to be considered as furnishing any proof of such a promise. The safest rule we can lay down is this: If you find that the attentions which the defendant paid the plaintiff, and the intercourse between them were such as are usual with persons engaged to be married, and such as are unusual with persons between whom there exists no such relation, they are competent for you to consider as evidence which may or may not, as you may determine, suffice to prove a promise of marriage. It is not necessary for you to consider that there was an express promise made and accepted in terms; but if his conduct was such as to induce her to believe that he intended to marry her, and she acted upon that belief, the defendant permitting her to go on, trusting that he would carry the intention into effect, that will raise a promise upon which she may recover."

In Lawrence v. Cook, 56 Me. 187, the supreme court of Maine held, that in a trial of a breach of promise case, the plaintiff's testimony, as to what declarations the defendant's mother made to the plaintiff, in the absence of the defendant, and not communicated to him, was not admissible either as tending to prove the alleged promise on the part of either plaintiff or defendant.

VIn Massachusetts it was early decided that young persons might have "their mutual engagements inferred from a course of devoted attention and apparently exclusive attachment," and that a mutual promise to marry may be proved by those circumstances which usually accompany such a connection. Wightman v. Coates, 15 Mass., decided in 1818. In Ray v. Smith, 9 Gray, 141, the plaintiff introduced evidence that the defendant expressed satisfaction that she had refused to walk with another man, and said, that man "could not get her away as long as he had a claim upon her." And this was held admissible, although the occurrence was before the mutual promises relied upon. In Russell v. Cowles, 15 Gray, 582, it was held, that preparations, made by plaintiff in defendant's absence, for performing the alleged contract of marriage are provable, as bearing on the question of plaintiff's tiff's assent to a mutual promise.

The law of Vermont is embodied in Munson v. Hastings, 12 Vt. 346, where it was held, that mutual promises of marriage may be presumed from proper and sufficient circumstances; but mere attentions, though exclusive, long continued and manifesting an apparently serious attachment between the parties, are not sufficient to establish a contract to marry.

Waters v. Bristol, 26 Conn. 398, in which the general doctrine is enunciated, that marriage contracts may be inferred, "and, in the absence of direct evidence, con