(son) would seem to save the remark from the appearance of a threat which it would otherwise possess. Of all the powers invited to accede to the Declaration, only Spain, Mexico, and the United States returned any answer but an unqualified affirmative. With long coast lines and weak navies, none of these powers could afford unconditionally to abandon privateering; and Spain was not remarkably anxious to establish the rule Free Ships Free Goods, having usually contended for the contrary in her palmiest days. The Spanish nation, moreover, seems to have entertained grave doubts as to the disinterestedness of the greater maritime states in proposing the change. The position of the United States was a difficult one. Always the advocates of a liberal maritime law, it was impossible for us to rest in such bad company as that of Spain and Mexico; on the other hand President Pierce had firmly declared his intention not to agree to the abolition of privateering while capture of private property at sea was allowed at all. On the 28th of July, 1856, Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, wrote his famous letter to the Comte de Sartiges.3 After ably criticising the Declaration, pointing out the unfairness of its operation as between powers with weak navies and those with strong ones, and referring to the growing tendency of modern times to separate the government from the individual, of which the Declaration itself was an example, Mr. Marcy abruptly asks why not go the whole way? Why not exempt private property at sea entirely, and thus render the laws of war at sea consistent with the laws of war on land? "The President, therefore," says Mr. Marcy, "proposes to add to the first proposition in the 'declaration' of the Congress of Paris, the following words: And that (sic) the 1 Cf. the Crónica, Oct. 6, 1856. 2 Message of Dec. 4, 1854. 3 Senate Exec. Doc. No. 104, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. private property of the subjects or citizens of a belligerent on the high seas shall be exempted from seizure by public armed vessels of the other belligerent, except it be contraband."" And he concludes with the hope that the amendment will be accepted, or that the United States will be allowed to join in principles (2), (3), and (4) while holding aloof from principle (1); and with a casual suggestion that it would be as well, in furthering the great purpose of confining the hardships of war entirely to the belligerents, to abolish the law of contraband. This letter of Mr. Marcy's, at one stroke, took the United States out of the unpleasant position of appearing to obstruct progress, and enabled it, instead of being left an unwilling straggler, to pose as the leader of the van. The logic of the position, from an international point of view, was irresistible. It was difficult for the supporters of the Declaration as it stood to give any legal reason for abolishing privateering, while they recognized the general liability of private property at sea to capture. The arguments against privateering were open to the criticism that they were arguments from the abuse of a thing against its use, and that what privateering really needed was not abolition, but regulation. On the other hand, the world had been drifting toward the principle of the amendment for years. A numerical majority of the nations of the earth was certainly in favor of it. Sooner or later, if the future of International Law was to be judged by its past, it would have to come: why should it not come from the Paris Congress? The Declaration of Paris was unquestionably an advance -Mr. Marcy's proposition was an advance still greater -and yet it is a matter of grave doubt whether even the latter presented the true solution of the difficulty for the United States. From the international point of view, the Marcy proposition was most commendable; from the point of view of American diplomacy, it is doubtful whether it was wise. Pending the replies of foreign nations, the letter was vigorously discussed by the entire American press. Some papers went so far as to declare the proposed declaration unconstitutional. They maintained that no power was given to the President and Senate to declare away a belligerent right that existed at the formation of the Constitution; that it was even doubtful whether the right could be abolished by constitutional amendment, since, they said, it might well be one of the rights which the Declaration of Independence had referred to as inalienable !1 soon seen, however, that this objection was untenable, nearly all our treaties having surrendered some right that "existed at the formation of the Constitution," in exchange for similar concessions on the part of other nations. A more valid objection was that the amendment as worded annihilated the Declaration, making articles (1), (2) and (3); or articles (2) and (3) at any rate, unnecessary and tautological, so that it would be scarcely proper to adopt it as an "amendment" in the form presented. Even this, however, was an objection only to the form of Marcy's idea, and not to the idea itself. The genuine and serious objection, from an American point of view, was that Marcy's idea of exemption extended only to the high seas, and thus left untouched the system of commercial blockade.3 The consequences would 1 Cf. The National Intelligencer, Apr. 15, 1857; London Morning Herald, Sept. 4, 1856. 2 London Globe, Dec. 22, 1856. 3 London Spectator, Aug. 30; London Morning Herald, Sept. 4; Washington Union, April 28, 1857; N. Y. Journal of Commerce, Dec. 5 (amendment not safe unless blockades [meaning probably commercial blockades] are abolished); London Times, July 16, 1857 (would have given England maximum efficiency of navy and minimum risk to commerce). The Manchester Examiner and Times, however, Nov. 26, 1856, believed that Marcy's principle, pushed to its legitimate conclusions, would have entailed the abolition of all blockades. be disastrous in case of war with Great Britain or France, for although they could not capture our property on the high seas, they could, with their immense navies, keep a great deal of it in our ports, while we, not powerful enough at sea to blockade their coasts, would have no means of retaliation. The amendment as worded by Mr. Marcy, therefore, presented in one respect a false issue, and would have been almost as unequal in its operation as the Declaration itself. The English Press was almost evenly divided,' but most of the continental papers approved the amendment as offered." Marcy pushed the proposition vigorously, as indeed he did all things. At the same time, it appears that he did his utmost to prevent the smaller states which had not yet acceded to the original Declaration, from doing so. "It does appear to me," wrote Marcy to Dallas, Aug. 4, 1856,3 "that the proceedings of the Congress at Paris were resorted See for the amendment London Morning Chronicle, Aug. 23 and Sept. 2, 1856; Telegraph, Aug. 21; Evening Star, Aug. 28; Shipping and Merc. Gazette, Aug. 20; Daily News, Aug. 27; Times, Sept. 3; Star, Nov. 25; Manchester Examiner, Nov. 26; Leeds Mercury, Nov. 27, etc. Against the amendment London Standard, Aug. 20; same, Nov. 25; Globe, Dec. 22; Morning Herald, Aug. 21; same, Sept. 4; Morning Post, Aug. 21; same, Aug. 22; same, Aug. 23 (Marcy amendment too favorable to the U. S.), same, Nov. 26; (not practical: England would enlarge her definition of contraband and so continue to capture private property), etc. 2 See, for the amendment Allgemeine Zeitung, May 7, 1856 (Decl. not fair); same, Oct. 21; Cologne Gazette, Sept. 3 (but see same, May 11); L'Assemblée Nationale, Nov. —; La Presse Belge, Sept. 5, 1856 (cannot escape from Marcy's dilemma: allow privateering, or else no capture at all); Le Constitutionnel, Dec. 16 (amendment good, but not new); L'Independence Belge, Aug. 27 (cabinet of Washington justified in looking to its interest) Le Nord, June 12, etc. Against the amendment Paris Pays, in Brussels Le Nord, Aug. 23 (U. S. selfish); Paris Siècle, Aug. 27 (threatens U. S. with coercion), etc. 3 MS. * to as a device to defeat our negotiations on the 2nd and 3rd Thus matters stood when the Pierce cabinet retired in March, 1857. In mercantile and shipping circles Marcy was hailed as the champion of humanity and progress; a splendid dinner was tendered to him by the prominent merchants of Baltimore, and the members of the New York Chamber of Commerce, as individuals, united in a petition to Presidentelect Buchanan to retain him in office.3 Buchanan, however, observed the danger to the United States that lurked in the proposed amendment perhaps more clearly than its philanthropic author, and caused the British Government to be notified that the United States would be pleased to consider the negotiations suspended. The friends of Marcy, comparing the attitude of the President with his utterances 1 Marcy to Dallas, MS. 2 Baltimore Sun, March 29, 1857. 3 Troy Budget, Feb. 7, 1857. |