"The present declaration is not and shall not be binding except among the Powers which have signed or may accede to it."

On the 16th of April the signatures of the plenipotentaries were formally affixed, and the seven governments of France, Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sardinia and the Porte stood committed to the Declaration. On the proposition of Walewski, "and recognizing that it is to the common interest to maintain the indivisibility of the four principles mentioned in the declaration signed to-day, MM. the plenipotentiaries agree that the Powers which have signed or may accede to it shall not enter for the future, into any arrangement concerning the law of neutrals in time of war, which does not rest on all four of the principles of the said declaration." The Russian plenipotentiaries suggested that this agreement ought not to interfere with any previous conventions; which suggestion was fully approved by the others.

To the casual reader the Declaration, in its completed form, is apt to seem a monumentum aere perennius to the wisdom, as well as the philanthropy, of its authors. It cannot be denied, however, that closer examination discloses much that calls for criticism. The professed object of the plenipotentiaries was to establish a "uniform doctrine" on an "important point" which had long been the subject of "unfortunate controversies." Of the four principles enunciated, only one, the principle that free ships make free goods, came within this description. The third and fourth principles had been perfectly settled before, and the contrary of the first, that is, that all nations have a right to fit out. privateers, had never been questioned; so that these three principles must have been introduced into the declaration for some other purpose than to settle "unfortunate contro1 Protocol 24, Br. and For. St. Papers, Vol. 46, p. 137.

versies." Then the "indivisibility" of the four principles is, to say the least, unnatural; and if the plenipotentiaries considered its admission necessary for accession to the Declaration, it was at any rate questionable policy to bind themselves not to "enter, for the future, into any arrangement concerning the law of neutrals in time of war, which does not rest on all four of the principles of the said Declaration." It will readily be seen that this agreement prevents any signatory power from engaging separately with a non-signatory one for the observance of principles. (3) and (4), although the latter were simply declaratory of existing International Law; or of principle (2), although the two powers might consistently have practised it, and might have included it in all their former treaties. It was, indeed, rather a defect in the declaration to include principles (3) and (4) at all, especially when there was, as there is yet, a crying need for the definition of contraband, which the Declaration left untouched. The reason for coupling principles (1) and (2) was not a logical, but a diplomatic one. Great Britain, as the strongest naval power, had the greatest interest in abolishing privateering, and without its abolition would never have consented that free ships should make free goods. Of course, if the principles were to be severable, other powers would be enabled to avail themselves of her concession without paying her price; which would indeed be unfair. But that does not excuse the prohibition -suggested by Count Walewski himself-to enter into separate agreements; which strongly savors of discourtesy toward non-signatory powers. Still further, it would have been, it is submitted, in much better taste to word the first article more like a treaty and less like a statute. La course est et demeure abolie" was a very broad statement; it is not too much to say that, in 1856 at any rate, it was a false statement; since it assumed that a principle absolutely new

and untried was thereby, with the support of only seven powers, definitely incorporated into International Law. It must be remembered that the first article was the only one which contained an innovation; for (3) and (4) were already admitted by all, and (2) by all except two powers (Great Britain and Spain); yet it is precisely this first article which is worded in the most sweeping and uncompromising way. It was, indeed, this first article which was the chef d'œuvre of the Paris Congress.

It is impossible to suppose that the seven great powers who signed the Declaration of 1856 were moved by philanthropy merely. The philanthropic motive was perhaps strongest in France, which has, indeed, always led the way toward a liberal maritime policy, and whose political philosophy was dominated by men who had already come to look with disfavor upon the capture of private property at sea in any way at all. But even France had other motives for her conduct. Her navy was the second in the world, and constantly increasing; and the Declaration, therefore, gave her a tremendous advantage in a maritime war with any of her neighbors except England. Moreover the French privateer, when he existed, was of a more uncontrollable and piratical type than the privateer of England or America; and several decades of spoliation claims had suggested to the French nation that perhaps it was better to save the money which they would have to pay for his depredations, and use it toward carrying on the war. As for the other powers, Russia, Prussia, Austria and Sardinia were no privateering states, and had more to fear from them as neutrals than to gain from them as belligerents; moreover, they received the great concession, Free Ships Free Goods; and Turkey was too young a member of the "Concert" to thwart, by any undue display of individuality, the wishes of all its guardians. The attitude of England, after the Declaration was signed,

was somewhat peculiar. It is to be remembered that the authority of the British plenipotentiaries was only that of the ministry, who had not, in spite of the great importance of the principles involved, considered it necessary to gain the approbation of the House of Commons, much less that of the House of Lords, before taking the final step. Before very long there began to be an unpleasant feeling that England had been trapped, as the publication of the statistics of the Russian war showed how much more unfavorable to England than had at first been thought was the rule Free Ships Free Goods. One opposition journal declared “Clarendon and his colleagues," for agreeing to the second article, "guilty of a deliberate act of treason against the state, for which they should have been impeached," and Mr. Lindsay said openly in the House of Commons that "he did not wish to throw aside a solemn declaration, but he said the people of this country would not abide by it, and would appeal to the House for its abrogation," "and it yet remains to be seen," he said later in a letter to Lord John Russell, "whether the chief states of the Christian world would, by force of arms, interpose **"3 The prevailing opinion, however, was that of Lord John Russell, that the Declaration was a fait accompli, and that, without regard to the possibility of coercion, a breach of faith could not mend matters.

*

With its virtues and its faults, the Declaration was submitted for approbation to all the principal states of the world, even to some non-maritime states. Nearly all returned a favorable answer within a few months. Hanover and the Two Sicilies were the first to accede, both notifying the Cabinet of Paris of their intention on May 31; then followed, in order, the Papal States (June 2), Electoral Hesse (June 1 London Morning Herald, Aug. 21, 1856.

2 Quoted by Aegidi & Klauhold, Frei Schiff unter Feindes Flagge, p. 34.

8 Ibid., p. 45.

4), Tuscany (June 5), Belgium (June 6), the Netherlands (June 7), Oldenburg and Saxe-Altenburg (June 9), Sweden and Norway (June 10), Bremen and the Grand Duchy of Hesse (June 11), Saxony (June 16), Nassau (June 18), Lübeck and Greece (June), Saxe-Weimar and SaxeCoburg-Gotha (June 22), Denmark and Würtemberg (June 25), Bavaria (July 4), the German Confederation (July 10), Mecklenburg-Schwerin (July 22), Portugal (July 28), Baden (July 30), Chili (August 13), Parma (August 20), Mecklenburg-Strelitz (August 25), Guatemala (August 30), Hayti (September 17), Argentine Confederation (October 1), Ecuador (December 6), Peru (November 23, 1857), Brunswick (December 7, 1857), Brazil (March 18, 1858), and Switzerland (July 28, 1858). The notifications of accession are rather interesting documents. Many of them state no reason; a great many descant upon the advantages of the Declaration from the point of view of philanthropy; still others, such as those of Chili, Denmark, the Two Sicilies, the Netherlands, and Portugal, call attention, with much pride, to the fact that the principles just adopted have always been proclaimed by their governments; Baden, Bavaria and Würtemberg are thankful that there are to be no more conflicts about privateers; Guatemala frankly calls the Declaration a guarantee for weak nations; the Duke of Tuscany goes so far as to say that he will regard the principles as making part of his International Law-though it is doubtful whether by this expression any intention is signified to enforce them against non-acceding powers. The word "his"

1 British and For. St. Papers, Vol. 48, pp. 134-162.

2

2 Denmark says its "justice is so evident" (p. 143); Greece considers it (p. 147) a "véritable conquête de la justice et de la science du droit sur les maximes différemment conçues;" it is rigorous justice according to Guatemala (p. 148); Hanover calls it "un des plus beaux monuments de la civilisation moderne" (p. 149).