the International Labor Office, which had just been established by the association, to institute researches concerning (1) the extent of the unhealthful conditions in industrial establishments and the laws relating to dangerous trades, especially in the manufacture of lead paints and the use of white phosphorus, and (2) the night work of women in industry.

In compliance with this direction, the International Labor Office arranged with persons in the different industrial countries for the preparation of reports and monographs on these topics.

These two volumes contain the results of the researches undertaken by the persons who cooperated with the International Labor Office.

The first-mentioned volume contains the following reports and monographs: Reports on dangerous industries in Belgium, Great Britain, New South Wales, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland; on the manufacture of matches in Belgium, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Roumania, Russia, Spain, and Sweden; and on the manufacture and employment of lead and lead preparations in Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. In addition to these, the volume contains reports and monographs on: The contentions against the dangers of phosphorus in industry; the danger to health of the production and employment of white lead; lead and phosphorus poisoning in Austrian industry; contributions to the critical examination of lead and lead preparations from the point of view of industrial hygiene; statistics of industries which may cause lead and phosphorus poisoning (compiled from the Belgian census of October, 31 1896); the French laws regulating labor in dangerous occupations; the danger of the use of white sulphur, and the legal provisions regulating the manufacture of matches in the Netherlands; the regulation and subsequent prohibition of the manufacture of sulphur matches in Finland; and the prohibition of the manufacture of white sulphur matches in Switzerland. The reports and monographs are preceded by an introduction by the Director of the International Labor Office giving an outline of the historical development of labor protection in dangerous industries, the extent of such industries, and an analysis of the legislation regulating the same in the industrial countries of Europe.

The volume on the night work of women has an introductory chapter similar to that in the other report, giving a history of the prohibition of night work by women, efforts made to secure the suppression of night work by international cooperation, the extent of the prohibition of night work in the different industrial countries, the results obtained, and their effects. The collection of reports and monographs consists of: Reports on the night work of women in

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Norway, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States; reports on the prohibition of night work in France and Germany; a monograph on the legal regulation of female labor in Germany; and a note by the Belgian bureau of labor concerning a memoir presented to the Congress of Cologne on the progress of Belgian labor legislation.

DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR.

[This subject, begun in Bulletin No. 2, has been continued in successive issues. All material parts of the decisions are reproduced in the words of the courts, indicated when short by quotation marks and when long by being printed solid. In order to save space matter needed simply by way of explanation is given in the words of the editorial reviser.]

DECISIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW.

EIGHT-HOUR LAW-MINES AND SMELTERS- CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-POLICE POWER-Ex parte Kair, Supreme Court of Nevada, 80 Pacific Reporter, page 463.-Peter Kair was convicted in a justice's court of a violation of chapter 10, acts of 1903, which limits the hours of labor of employees in mines and smelters to eight per day. The penalty imposed was a fine of $100 or 50 days in jail. On his failure to pay the fine, Kair was imprisoned, whereupon he made application for release by habeas corpus proceedings, on the ground that the law violated the constitution of the State, in interfering with his right to acquire and possess property, and also the eighth amendment of the constitution which prohibits excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments. The writ was denied and Kair remanded to custody, on grounds that appear in the following quotation from the opinion of Judge Talbot, who spoke for the court:

In re Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, 75 Pac. 1, 65 L. R. A. 47 [see Bulletin. No. 53, p. 952], we had occasion to give the act in question extended consideration, and held that it was constitutional, and enforceable. against one who worked longer than eight hours per day in an underground mine. After more mature reflection, we are still satisfied with the reasoning and conclusions reached in that opinion, and it is unnecessary to repeat them to any great extent. We there held, as a matter of common knowledge, that prolonged labor in the places mentioned in the statute was injurious, and, if necessary to resort to that power, that the legislature were warranted in passing the act as a police or health regulation for the protection of the men employed in those places, and the benefit to the State. In the present case it is sought to avoid this reason or justification for the enforcement of the act by stipulation that the occupation followed by petitioner was not injurious, and by testimony that labor performed in wet crushing quartz mills is not unhealthy except for the men working around pans and settlers. Adhering to our opinion in re Boyce, "we are not prepared to say that the mining, milling and smelting of ores are not avocations so unhealthy and hazardous that they may not come under the protecting arm of the legislature; but to recognize these conditions, and pass laws for their amelioration, and which may protect the health and prolong the lives of the men so employed, we think, is within the legitimate powers of the law-making branch of our Government. If these matters were uncertain, when their existence is

necessary to sustain the law the doubt should be resolved in favor of the statute, for, as held by this court in severa' decisions, its validity will be presumed until it is clearly shown to be unconstitutional." It is a matter of common knowledge that the health of many men is impaired by labor in quartz mills. If, by taking proof that others are not injured, the statute is to be declared void or inoperative as to them, we enter a wide field of uncertainty and speculation, and, instead of having the constitutionality of the act rest upon solid ground and a sure foundation, its enforcement would become subject to the more or less speculative opinions of interested parties and others, and to the conclusions of various justice courts and juries regarding the probability of injury to men working longer or shorter periods in the places mentioned; and witnesses could testify regarding the consequences to health from labor in these employments, and thereby indirectly regarding the necessity for legislative action and the validity of the statute, in each case as it arose. If exceptions based upon such proof are to be made to the enforcement of the act, they might depend not only upon the character of the mill and the distinguishing features of the work of the various men employed, but upon the age, constitution, vitality, and probable endurance of the different employees, the ingredients used in working the ores, such as quicksilver, cyanide, or other chemicals injurious to health, the quantity and effect of dust and fumes, the character of the ores, and whether they contained lead, arsenic, or other harmful substances, from day to day, or upon other conditions and uncertainties, which would multiply litigation, and lead to doubt and difficulty in securing the benefits intended by this legislation.

The fact that the avocations mentioned in the statute, including the one of milling ores, are injurious to the health of many of the men following them, if not to some extent to all, justified the action of the legislature; and we think that, in order to give due effect to its terms, it should be enforced against all coming within the classes specified.

EMPLOYERS'

LIABILITY-EMPLOYMENT

OF

CHILDREN-VIOLATION OF STATUTE-American Car and Foundry Company v. Armentraut, Supreme Court of Illinois, 73 Northeastern Reporter, page 766.— This case was before the supreme court of Illinois on an appeal from the appellate court of the fourth district, in which a judgment was given against the appellant company on account of injuries received by Koss Armentraut, an infant, unlawfully in its employment. Armentraut was 12 years of age at the time of the accident occasioning the injury, while the law forbids the employment of children under 14 years of age in designated occupations, among which is working in manufacturing establishments. The appeal resulted in an affirmation of the judgment of the court below, on grounds that appear in the following extracts from the opinion of the court as given by Judge Scott:

Plaintiff was a mere child. He was set to work on a dangerous machine. He was told how to operate it, but the perils of the

employment were not pointed out to him. One of the purposes of the statute is to protect children from the effects of their own immaturity, inexperience, and heedlessness. The result of appellant's reasoning, followed to its logical conclusion, is that, inasmuch as appellant violated the statute, the purpose thereof, which we have just mentioned, is thereby defeated, and that appellee, having been guilty of contributory negligence, has no more right to recover than if the statute did not exist. To this conclusion we can not yield our assent. So long as the child continued in the performance of the work he had been directed to do, appellant would be liable for any injury resulting to him, even though the negligence of the child may have contributed to the accident. If the child left the task which he had been directed to perform, and, while not engaged in doing work which he had been directed to do by his master, was injured through an accident to which his own negligence contributed while he was still in or upon the premises of the master, a different question would present itself.

The injury resulted from the unlawful employment, and while appellee was engaged in doing the precise thing that appellant directed him to do. To hold that contributory negligence under such circumstances is a defense would be to defeat one purpose of the statute.

Evidence offered by appellant tended to show that at the time the boy was employed he stated that he was 16 years of age. Appellee denied this. The appellant offered to prove that if the boy had correctly stated his age he would not have been employed. The evidence so offered was excluded, and appellant asked instructions to the effect that if the boy falsely represented at the time of his employment that he was 16 years of age, and that he obtained his employment by reason of such false statement, there could be no recovery. These instructions were refused, and it is argued that the appellant was not liable unless it appeared that it had knowingly violated this statute. The dramshop act forbids the sale of intoxicating liquors to minors. This court has held, under that statute, that it is immaterial whether the dramshop keeper knew the purchaser to be a minor, and that it is no answer to say that the seller may be imposed upon and made to suffer the penalties of the law when he had no intention to violate its provisions. (McCutcheon v. People, 69 Ill. 601.) The reasoning which led to that conclusion obtains here. Appellant was, by the statute, permitted to employ in its shops only persons above the age of 14 years. It must ascertain, at its peril, that the persons it employs are members of the class of persons it may lawfully employ.

Appellant also questions the refusal of an instruction to the effect that if the appellee, knowing that he was under the age of 14 years, obtained his employment by falsely representing that he was 16 years of age, he can not take advantage of his false statement and recover in this action, and it is said that this instruction should have been given, on the theory that the law will not permit a plaintiff to recover where his own unlawful act concurs in causing the injury of which he complains. This doctrine is not applicable, for the reason that the statute under consideration is aimed at the master, and not at the servant. The act of the child in accepting or entering into the employment is not unlawful. Moreover, if