The Sumter, as we know, ran out from the Mississippi Chap. X. on the 30th June, and Galveston was never completely closed against vessels whose light draft enabled them to take the shallower channels across the bar. But on the whole the Gulf ports appear to have been effectively blockaded from the first. It was on the east coast, stretching from the Capes of Virginia to the southernmost point of Florida, that the disproportion of the naval force employed to the work which it was supposed to be performing was at first most palpable. Up to the 8th July hardly an armed ship was to be discovered anywhere between those two points, except at Savannah and Charleston. Wilmington and Beaufort remained perfectly open. On the 13th July, however, Commodore Pendergrast issued the following notice : "PROCLAMATION. "U.S. Flag-ship 'Roanoke,' off Charleston, July 13, 1861. "To all whom it may concern. "I hereby call attention to the Proclamation of his Excellency Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, under date of the 27th April, 1861, for an efficient blockade of the ports of Virginia and North Carolina, and warn all persons interested that I have a sufficient naval force here for the purpose of carrying out that Proclamation. "All vessels entering the ports of North Carolina, or hovering about the coast of the same, will subject themselves to capture. Those coming from abroad and ignorant of the blockade will be warned off. "All vessels bound to the Capes of Virginia will be allowed to proceed by having their papers endorsed, and will be allowed to enter any of the ports of Maryland. "Fifteen days after this date the above Proclamation will be rigidly enforced against all vessels. (Signed) "G. J. PENDERGRAST, Flag-Officer, "Commanding West India Squadron." The coast-line and ports south of the Fear River were not included in the terms of this notice; and, with the exception only of the main entrances to the harbours of Charleston and of Savannah, they continued unguarded, Chap. X. save by the occasional visits of ships cruising up and down. The general features which are common to a great part of this coast with that of North Carolina have been already described. Of the islands on the Georgian coast an American geographer, who wrote eighty years ago, says:-"These islands are surrounded by navigable creeks, between which and the mainland is a large extent of salt marsh fronting the whole State, not less on an average than 4 or 5 miles in breadth, intersected with creeks in various directions, admitting through the whole an inland navigation between the islands and mainland from the north-east to the south-east corners of the State. The east sides of these islands are for the most part clean, hard, sandy beaches, exposed to the wash of the ocean. Between these islands are the entrances of the rivers from the interior country, winding through the low salt marshes and delivering their waters into the sounds, which form capacious harbours of from 3 to 8 miles over, and which communicate with each other by parallel salt creeks."1 This description, which is substantially true at the present day, explains the ease with which, notwithstanding the blockade, the coasting trade was carried on. Sailing schooners, small steamers, and other lesser craft ran safely through the interior waters, stealing out into the sea when no cruiser was in sight, and kept up frequent intercourse with the various little havens south of the Savannah river. It explains also the difficulty which was really experienced - though it has sometimes been exaggerated-in enforcing the blockade of Savannah and Charleston. To Charleston harbour there are several entrances practicable for small vessels drawing little water; against these the blockade was ineffective, but it appears both there and at Savannah to have been effective against the larger craft which could penetrate only through the main channels. 1 The American Geography. By Jedidiah Morse. Second edition, p. 556. As autumn and winter drew on, the naval force at the Chap. X. disposal of the Federal Government increased rapidly, and the blockade became more stringent; but there were occasional instances of laxity. The following despatch, addressed to Lord Lyons in February 1862, expresses the views on which the British Government had up to that time acted, and afterwards continued to act : "My Lord, Earl Russell to Lord Lyons, "Foreign Office, February 15, 1862. "Her Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the state of the blockade of the ports of Charleston and Wilmington. "It appears from the reports received from Her Majesty's naval officers that although a sufficient blockading force is stationed off those ports, various ships have successfully eluded the blockade; a question might therefore be raised as to whether such a blockade should be considered as effective. ("Her Majesty's Government, however, are of opinion that, assuming that the blockade is duly notified, and also that a number of ships is stationed and remains at the entrance of a port, sufficient really to prevent access to it or to create an evident danger of entering or leaving it, and that these ships do not voluntarily permit ingress or egress, the fact that various ships may have successfully escaped through it (as in the particular instances here referred to) will not of itself prevent the blockade from being an effective one by international law.) "The adequacy of the force to maintain a blockade being always, and necessarily, a matter of fact and evidence, and one as to which different opinions may be entertained, (a neutral State ought to exercise the greatest caution with reference to the disregard of a de facto and notified blockade; and ought not to disregard it, except when it entertains a conviction, which is shared by neutrals generally having an interest in the matter, that the power of blockade is abused by a State either unable to institute or maintain it, or unwilling, from some motive or other, to do so. ) "I am, &c. (Signed) "RUSSELL." It is a settled rule of international law that blockades, to be binding, must be effective; that is, the number, strength, and disposition of the blockading force must be such that no ship can go in or out except at the riskand that a serious and manifest risk of capture. The Chap. X. reasons for this rule are, first, to restrain within definite and moderate limits a belligerent right of interference with neutral trade, which might otherwise be extended so widely as to interdict such trade altogether; secondly, in order that neutral ship-owners and captains may not be misled, to their own loss, by seeing a nominal prohibition set at nought with impunity. These objects are frustrated if there be not constantly on the spot, either at anchor or cruising to and fro, a sufficient force, sufficiently near, and acting with sufficient vigilance, to prevent ingress or egress, or at any rate to make it really hazardous: if these conditions be not satisfied, it is no blockade at all, and neutrals are entitled to disregard it, and to demand, if captures are made, the restitution of their ships and cargoes. The blockade of the southern coasts was certainly not free from irregularities, nor was it efficient at all points; it was instituted before the Government had a competent blockading force in readiness; it covered nominally more ground than the force could really occupy; and at more than one place it was intermitted and resumed without notice. The British Government was right, however, in forbearing to insist on these defects as grounds of complaint. The commencement of a blockade is seldom free from difficulties, and this had some peculiar difficulties. The Government of the United States was exerting itself to overcome them, and had every motive to exertion. Credit should be given to blockading officers for reasonable activity and vigilance, till the contrary is shown. If irregularities can be proved, recourse may be had to a Prize Court, which will decree restitution; and, unless they are manifest and long continued, or appeals to the tribunals of the belligerent be met by a plain denial of justice, the neutral Government will act wisely and properly in not taking the matter into its own hands. CHAPTER XI. Confederate Ships in Neutral Ports-(1) Unarmed Vessels; course pursued by Great Britain, Russia, Spain. -(2) Armed Ships; the Sumter visits successively Cuba, Curaçoa, Trinidad.-Remonstrances and Demands of the Government of the United States.Answers of the Governments of Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain. British Orders of January 1862. - Effect of them. The Nashville and Tuscarora at Southampton. - Rule of Twenty-four Hours. The Sumter and Iroquois at Martinique. TOWARDS the end of June 1861 a merchant-vessel under the Confederate flag made her appearance in the Port of London. This was the first case of the kind, and Mr. Adams lost no time in asking what treatment she would receive, especially in respect of her clearance outwards, which he feared might be regarded as involving some recognition of the Confederate States. He was informed that according to our laws the flag which a foreign vessel might carry was not material; that the production of her papers was not required; that the master had only to state the country to which she belonged, and that "America" would be quite enough. The Peter Marcy had been reported inwards as "of New Orleans in America;" and a like description would be accepted on her clearance. The Peter Marcy therefore remained unmolested in the Victoria Dock, flying her Confederate flag. As early as the preceding April the same question |