the other streets for a period not to exceed twenty-five years from now. He would endeavor to secure possession by purchase at a valuation to be determined by arbitration. The next step would be for either Mr. Johnson or the city government to begin the tearing up of the rails on some street where it was plain that the franchise had run out. Of course, it would not be intended to proceed further than to provoke the company to issue an injunction and it might easily be arranged for this to be done before a single rail had been removed. Then the matter would be referred to the courts, the operation of the railway would go on as now, and Mr. Johnson would bear the expense of maintaining his rights under the ordinance.

He says that he thinks final decision could be reached within two years, and attorneys of good standing scout the idea that it would take any such long period of five to ten years, as is claimed by friends of the company. This experienced street railway magnate holds that, if the proposed new company won a victory in the courts with regard to possession of the streets upon which the rights of the old company are most doubtful, and which happen to be by far the best paying lines, the latter would soon be willing to sell out all its tangible property, and then to sell existing franchises at such a fair valuation as might be fixed by the board of arbitrators. Further, Mr. Johnson declared on his honor as a gentleman that he stood ready to put up any bond that the council might order for the full performance of the above and other terms of the ordinance that he presented. These terms included, as just observed, not only full guarantee of better treatment of employees than now, but also complete publicity of accounts and the ultimate turning over to the city, through sinking fund payments, in either low fares or otherwise, of all the profits of the enterprise after the retirement of the capital, which would never be allowed to have a return of over 6 per cent.

Mr. Johnson's ordinance, it was shown at the time, could be improved in certain minor particulars, especially with reference to the control by the city government of the number and heating of cars and other matters relating to the comfort and convenience of the traveling public, and he expressed himself as ready to incorporate such improvements. In all respects, however, his proposed ordinance was far superior to that of the existing company.

The friends of the Street Railway Company at once raised three objections to these very attractive propositions, as follows:

1. Mr. Johnson probably was ambitious to be the United States senator from Ohio, and his proposition was for political effect. The reply that seemed to be conclusive was that while, in view of the past history of senatorial contests in the Buckeye State, it might be evidence of criminal intent or of bad character to run for the United States senate, yet this was no particular concern of the people of Columbus, provided Mr. Johnson were willing, as he claimed, to furnish any bond that the city might require as evidence of his good faith. No one doubted his extensive and successful street railway experience and possession of sufficient capital to carry out the proposition.

2. It was again objected that he would inevitably lose money and throw up his contract, and at the same time hypnotize the city council into relieving him of any forfeit. This was too serious an indictment of their own capacity for self-government to have much weight among the people of Columbus. With regard to the possibility of making money on three-cent fares, it was truly said that the street railway traffic in Columbus had grown 72 per cent. in ten years, without any material reduction in fares, and would almost certainly grow at least 50 per cent. in the next five years with a reduction of one-third in fares and the removal of the necessity of bothering with tickets. Such an increase of 50 per cent. in traffic oc

curred in Toronto in the six years, 1893-99, without any change of fares, and with a cost of operation and taxes per passenger, for the 10,611,930 new passengers, of only $112,728 per year, or 1.06 cents per passenger. This brought down the average cost for the entire number carried in this Canadian city from 2.53 cents in 1893 to almost exactly 2 cents in 1899. The operating expenses and taxes in 1899, in Columbus, were only 2.4 cents per passenger, with seven more miles of track than in Toronto, and with two-thirds as many passengers per year. Such increase of traffic as would come from a large reduction of fares would be in the short rides which are the most profitable to the company and in the more extensive use of all of the track, and would not call for increase of capital expenditure, save to a moderate extent in equipment. There is every reason, therefore, to believe that such a company, carrying 20,000,000 passengers for 2.4 cents per passenger, could carry another 10,000,000 for I cent per passenger. This would bring the average below 2 cents. Because of its level area and comparatively little snow and only moderate wages, the Columbus street railways can be operated at much less expense per passenger than in the smaller Eastern cities.

"

3. A third objection raised against Mr. Johnson's proposition, and the one that influenced many, was the enormous depreciation in the stocks and even the bonds of the present company that would result if it were not given a new franchise upon practically its own terms. The most careful investigation that the writer could make, aided by some excellent expert engineering assistance, showed that the road could be duplicated to-day for about $25,000 a mile, or $2,500,000. This low figure need not surprise any who are familiar with the official inventories of the Massachusetts companies. The admirable plant at Springfield, Mass., for example, whose output, cars, power plant, etc., seem to be superior, per mile of single track, to those at Columbus, has been valued by the highest authority, the expert of the Massachusetts Railroad Commission, at about $33,000 per mile, and has capital stock and funded and other indebtedness of only $30,000 a mile. On the other hand, the Columbus road is stocked and bonded for $115,000 per mile. The way this arose is one of the most interesting and instructive chapters in stock watering. The road, in its present shape, was practically organized in 1892 by the purchase for $2,250,000 of the only road of any importance then existing in the city. The old road had cost scarcely one-half what was paid for it. The other half was payment for franchise, but bonds were issued to cover the entire amount of purchase, and on top of that, $3,000,000 of stock was issued, partly as a bonus for the buyers of the bonds, or for the syndicate that floated them, and partly for the promoters. Thus the road started, not only with all its stock watered, but with half its bonds of the same character. The defense for this financiering was twofold: First, it was necessary to issue this stock in order to float the bonds, and it was necessary to float the amount of bonds actually issued in order to buy the road, but of course it was not necessary to buy the road, and hence the issue of either stock or bonds was not, in the last resort, obligatory upon the existing company. In the second place, it was urged that the stock was issued in order to obey the Ohio law that forbids the issue of any more bonds than there is stock. In other words, with charming naïveté, this company claims that it issued the watered stock out of its supreme desire to obey the existing law.

This Columbus company, which in 1892 had just paid $2,250,000 for its property, took oath to the tax assessors through its vice-president, that it was worth only $144,000. Even as late as May, 1899, when it had outstanding $6,500,000 of par value of securities worth fully that in the market, the company declared under oath that its property was worth only $417,074, and in 1900, shortly before it sought the new

ordinance, it declared to the assessors that its physical property, apart from its franchise, could not be sold for $375,000. Yet real estate in the city in the hands of private individuals is in general assessed for one-half of its value.

In order to buy out other roads that had started in the city, the company after 1892 issued other bonds with which to pay not only for physical property, but for franchises, or for improvements to take the place of old equipment which was discarded, but whose cost was not written off the capital account. Hence at the present time the bonds of the company amount to $5,372,000, while through the same interesting obedience to Ohio law, as above described, the stock has been increased to $6,000,000. Not one dollar of the entire stock has ever been paid into the treasury of the company out of the pockets of the stockholders, while the bonds, as indicated, are more than double the value of the physical property of the road. Yet not only have the bonds been sold at par, but the $3,000,000 of preferred stock was selling at nearly 100 when a new franchise was sought, and the $3,000,000 common stock was selling at over 35. The entire value of this stock represented not the worth of their existing franchises, but the gamble of the investors that new franchises of enormous value would be soon freely given away by the city in return for very moderate concessions, as proved to be the case.

Mr. Johnson argued that the nearly 21,000,000 passengers carried in 1900 would increase to fully 31,000,000 within three or four years if the fare was reduced to three cents. He then held that the profit per passenger would be at least one cent, which would be equal to six per cent. on over $5,000,000, and with the prospect of still further increase long before the twenty-five years of the new franchise had expired, while he assumed that this $5,000,000 would not only pay for the present structural value of the old plant, but would pay over $1,000,000 for the value of any franchises they still possessed, and leave another $1,000,000 for the improvement of the track, rolling stock and power plant.

The company, however, secured the passage of the ordinance it desired. Seven tickets for twenty-five cents, with universal transfers, were conceded. This would mean, if every one bought tickets, an average of only 3.56 cents, and if three-quarters of the people bought tickets, an average of 3.92 cents. Columbus, therefore, has secured the lowest rate of fare of any city on the continent, although this is fully three-fourths of a cent higher than was offered by the present mayor of Cleveland.

When the ordinance extending the franchises came up for final passage in the city council, February 4, last, it was well understood that the council were determined to pass it. Rumors were rife of bribery, and threats of violence against those suspected of receiving the same were in the air. The then mayor, who believed in the extension of the old franchise, not only filled the lobby with police, but had a militia company drilling overhead, and declared that it would remain there until the council had adjourned.

Since the passage of the ordinance cases have been instituted in the courts by one or more Columbus citizens to test the legality of the new franchise and of the claims of the company to perpetual rights on the most valuable streets. It is proposed to carry the suits up to the United States Court, if necessary, and the briefs that have been filed on both sides constitute perhaps the most exhaustive treatment of the legality of unlimited franchises that ever has been prepared.

THE EMBELLISHMENT OF WASHINGTON.

PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON A PLAN FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

(Senate Report No. 166, 1902.)

On January 15, 1902, Mr. McMillan, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, presented the following preliminary report:

The District of Columbia was created to be the seat of government of the United States, and Washington was laid out as distinctively a capital city. The first consideration in its planning was the location of the public buildings and the grounds relating to them. In determining these locations each site was selected in reference to every other site. The lines of communication between the various departments were studied, and care was taken to provide not alone for convenience, but also for beauty and dignity. The original plan of Washington, having stood the test of a century, has met universal approval. It is the departures from that plan that are to be regretted and, wherever possible, remedied.

NECESSITY FOR COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT.

The development of Potomac and Rock Creek parks, the creation of a park along the Anacostia, and the increasing use of the Soldiers' Home grounds for park purposes, all call for a study of a means of connection among the parks, so as to bring into one system the diversified attractions that the parks, when developed, will offer. The positive squalor which to-day mars the entrance to almost every one of the parks is too apparent to need discussion.

Aside from the pleasure and the positive benefits to health that the people derive from public parks, in a capital city like Washington there is a distinct use of public spaces as the indispensable means of giving dignity to government buildings; and of making suitable connections between the great departments. When the city of Washington was planned under the direct and minute supervision of Washington and Jefferson the relations that should subsist between the Capitol and the President's House were closely studied. Indeed, the whole city was planned with a view to the reciprocal relations that should exist among public buildings. Vistas and axes; sites for monuments and museums; parks and pleasure gardens; fountains and canals; in a word, all that goes to make a city a magnificent and consistent work of art were regarded as essentials in the plans made by L'Enfant under the direction of the first President and his Secretary of State.

Nor were these original plans prepared without due study of great models. The stately art of landscape architecture had been brought over seas by royal governors and wealthy planters; and both Washington and Jefferson were familiar with the practice of that art. L'Enfant, a man of position and education, and an engineer of ability, must have been familiar with those great works of the master Lenôtre, which are still the admiration of the traveler and the constant pleasure of the French people. Moreover, from his well-stocked library Jefferson sent to L'Enfant plans "on a large and accurate scale" of Paris, Amsterdam, Frankfort, Carlsruhe, Strass

burg, Orleans, Turin, Milan, and other European cities, at the same time felicitating himself that the President had "left the planning of the town in such good hands."

CHANGES MADE IN THE L'ENFAnt plan.

It has so happened that the slow and unequal development of the city during the century of its existence has worked changes in the original design, and to a certain extent has prevented the realization of the comprehensive plan of the founders. As a result there has been a lack of continuity in the parks, and spaces like the Mall, that were designed for development as a unit, have been cut into pieces, some of which have been improved, some have been sold to private persons, and some have been diverted to uses so absolutely at variance with the original idea as seriously to detract from the dignity of the buildings these spaces were intended to enhance.

Happily, however, nothing has been lost that can not be regained at reasonable cost. Fortunately, also, during the years that have passed the Capitol has been enlarged and ennobled, and the Washington Monument, wonderful alike as an engineering feat and a work of art, has been constructed on a site that may be brought into relations with the Capitol and the White House. Doubly fortunate, moreover, is the fact that the vast and successful work of the engineers in redeeming the Potomac banks from unhealthful conditions gives opportunity for enlarging the scope of the earlier plans in a manner corresponding to the growth of the country. At the same time the development of Potomac Park both provides for a connection between the parks on the west and those on the east, and also it may readily furnish sites for those memorials which history has shown to be worthy a place in vital relation to the great buildings and monuments erected under the personal supervision of the founders of the Republic.

The question of the development of these park areas forces itself upon the attention of Congress. Either this development may be made in a haphazard manner, as the official happening to be in charge of the work for the time may elect; or it may be made according to a well-studied and well-considered plan devised by persons whose competence has been proved beyond question. Such a plan, adopted at this time and carried out as Congress may make appropriations for the work, will result in making Washington the most beautiful capital city in the world.

SENATE ORDERS THE PREPARATION OF A PLAN.

The action of the Senate in ordering a comprehensive plan for the development of the entire park system of the District of Columbia is the resultant of two movements-one popular in character, the other technical.

APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSION.

On March 19, 1901, the subcommittee of the District committee having the matter in charge met the representatives of the Institute of American Architects and agreed to the proposition of the latter that Mr. Daniel H. Burnham, of Chicago, Ill., and Mr. Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., of Brookline, Mass., be employed as experts, with power to add to their number. These gentlemen accepted the task, and subsequently invited Mr. Charles F. McKim and Mr. Augustus St. Gaudens, of New York, to act with them in the preparation of plans.

THE RAILROAD PROBLEM.

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After a detailed examination of the topographical features of the District of Columbia, the Commission drew up preliminary plans. They were then forced to