Wittgenstein at His WordA&C Black, 2004 M08 1 - 220 páginas Wittgenstein's work is notoriously difficult to understand and, at least superficially, deals almost exclusively with obscure and technical problems in logic and the philosophy of language. He once asked rhetorically: "What is the use of philosophy ... if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday life?". This book explains how Wittgenstein's idea of the value of philosophy shaped his philosophical method and led him to talk and write about the abstruse questions he dealt with in most of his work. This is not just another introductory overview of Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is one of the few that provide such an overview while also referring constantly to ethics and religion. Moreover, its interpretation of Wittgenstein is far from orthodox, as standard treatments of his work disregard or downplay his claims about what he was doing and why. Duncan Richter takes him at his word, showing the connections between Wittgenstein's aims, the various subjects he worked on (psychology, religion, aesthetics, etc.), and the way in which he worked on them. |
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Página 5
... wrong ways to go in language , that is to say because there are rules of grammar whose existence and nature is independent of each individual , that confusion is not a purely subjec- tive phenomenon . Therapy ? Emphasizing this ...
... wrong ways to go in language , that is to say because there are rules of grammar whose existence and nature is independent of each individual , that confusion is not a purely subjec- tive phenomenon . Therapy ? Emphasizing this ...
Página 7
... wrong with the way such people think about the mind . In this sense he must have theories , even if only nega- tive ones about the wrongness of other people's ideas . I prefer to speak here of suspicions rather than theories though ...
... wrong with the way such people think about the mind . In this sense he must have theories , even if only nega- tive ones about the wrongness of other people's ideas . I prefer to speak here of suspicions rather than theories though ...
Página 15
... wrong with this language. Wittgenstein's acceptance of ordinary language, though, is not a rejection of philo- sophy or a commitment to the beliefs of the person in the street. It is true that Wittgenstein believes that we already know ...
... wrong with this language. Wittgenstein's acceptance of ordinary language, though, is not a rejection of philo- sophy or a commitment to the beliefs of the person in the street. It is true that Wittgenstein believes that we already know ...
Página 16
... wrong kind of answer . 13 A philosophical problem , if it is a philosophical problem , is about concepts , not empirical facts . A scientific study of what goes on in the brain during imagination might require clarity about the meaning ...
... wrong kind of answer . 13 A philosophical problem , if it is a philosophical problem , is about concepts , not empirical facts . A scientific study of what goes on in the brain during imagination might require clarity about the meaning ...
Página 19
... wrong turnings . And so we watch one man after another walking down the same paths and we know in advance where he will branch off , where walk straight on without noticing the side turning , etc. , etc. What I have to do then is erect ...
... wrong turnings . And so we watch one man after another walking down the same paths and we know in advance where he will branch off , where walk straight on without noticing the side turning , etc. , etc. What I have to do then is erect ...
Contenido
1 | |
9 | |
2 Nonsense | 45 |
3 Certainty | 85 |
4 Ethics | 117 |
5 Religion | 150 |
Conclusion | 181 |
Bibliography | 188 |
Index | 194 |
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Términos y frases comunes
arbitrary argue Basil Blackwell Cavell Certainty Chapter claim Conant concepts confusion context Conway Cora Diamond course Culture and Value D.Z. Phillips described doctrines doubt ethics expression fact false feeling Fideism foundation foundationalism foundationalist G.E.M. Anscombe G.H. von Wright G.K. Chesterton genstein grammar guage Hacker human Ibid idea imagine important instance James Conant justify kind language-game later Lectures logic London look Ludwig Wittgenstein mathematics meaning mind moral philosophy Mounce nonsense Norman Malcolm ordinary language Oxford particular perhaps person Peter Winch philo philoso Philosophical Investigations philosophical problems picture possible practice private language propositions question quoted reading religion religious beliefs rules Rush Rhees seems sense sentence solipsism someone speak Stanley Cavell stein Stroll superstition talk theory things thought tion Tractatus Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus trans true truth understand University Press Witt Wittgen Wittgenstein says Wittgenstein's method Wittgenstein's philosophy Wittgenstein's view Wittgensteinian philosophy words writes wrong York
Referencias a este libro
Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker Guy Kahane,Edward Kanterian,Oskari Kuusela Sin vista previa disponible - 2007 |