War; and Captain Fox, of the Navy Department, had, without Lincoln's knowledge, a vessel ready to transport him from the capital, should its fall become absolutely certain.1 If Early had profited by the moment of consternation, he could have gone into Washington early on July 11, seized the money in the Treasury, the large stores of clothing, arms, and ammunition, destroyed a large amount of government property, and, while he might not have been able to hold the place, he could have escaped without harm from the veterans who were on the way to the rescue, having struck the prestige of the Union an incalculable blow.

The veterans of the Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac and of the Nineteenth Corps from New Orleans saved the country from the disaster of the capture of its capital. It was, however, little to the credit of Grant that Washington should be in so imminent danger, while Richmond was in none, and that the measures for its safety should have been so tardily taken. During these days the commander seemed to be stunned. Although his despatches are frequent, and evidence good attention to business, he did not realize the danger. He was not the man of prompt decision and ready purpose who commanded at Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga; rather was he the lethargic general of Shiloh. He refused to believe, while Early was marching down the Shenandoah valley, that the self-same Confederate corps had left Petersburg.2 It was not until July 5 that he became certain of it, and even then he did not show himself complete master of the situation.

Lee had in some measure reckoned on Grant's aversion to diminish his own army. "It is so repugnant to Grant's principles and practice to send troops from him," he had written Davis, "that I had hoped, before resorting to it, he would have preferred attacking me. But, as we have seen, Grant

1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 167.

2 O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. pp. 3, 15, 16.

8 Ibid., p. 60.

4 July 7, ibid., p. 593; see, also, p. 595.

was now too weak to assault the Confederates in their intrenchments, and he did not fall into the trap which had been laid for him. July 6 he sent Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps, about 5000 strong, an account of whose service has already been given, and 3000 of the cavalry corps, of whom, however, 2496 were sick, to Baltimore, deeming this reinforcement to the troops already in the field sufficient to guard against the threatened danger; indeed, he even cherished the hope that these veterans from his army, together with Hunter, might "succeed in nearly annihilating Early and Breckinridge." In response to Halleck's alarming telegram the night of the 8th,2 Grant ordered, the next day, before he had heard of Wallace's defeat, the remainder of the Sixth Corps. to Washington, and suggested that part of the Nineteenth Corps, then on its way from New Orleans to Fortress Monroe, should also be sent as succors to lend aid in capturing or destroying the Confederates who had invaded the North.3 As a later thought, he sent this word: "If the President thinks it advisable that I should go to Washington in person, I can start in an hour after receiving notice, leaving everything here on the defensive."4 Lincoln replied: "What I think is that you should provide to retain your hold where you are, certainly, and bring the rest with you personally, and make a vigorous effort to destroy the enemy's force in this vicinity. I think there is really a fair chance to do this if

1 July 6, O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 80.

2 Of 10.30 P. M. "Sigel and Couch say that scouts, prisoners, and country people confirm previous reports of the enemy's force—that is, some 20,000 or 30,000. Until more forces arrive, we have nothing to meet that number in the field, and the militia is not reliable even to hold the fortifications of Washington and Baltimore. . . . If you propose to cut off this raid and not merely to secure our depots, we must have more forces here. Indeed, if the enemy's strength is as great as represented, it is doubtful if the militia can hold all of our defences. I do not think that we can expect much from Hunter. He is too far off and moves too slowly. I think, therefore, that very considerable reinforcements should be sent directly to this place." Ibid., pp. 119, 120.

3 Ibid., pp 133, 134.

July 9, 6 P. M., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 134.

the movement is prompt. This is what I think upon your suggestion, and is not an order." The President was wiser than the general. Grant, as the sequel proved, made a mistake in not proceeding immediately to Washington, and he failed to furnish satisfying reasons for not acting upon this suggestion of his own, which was so promptly accepted by the President. "Before more troops can be sent from here, he telegraphed, "Hunter will be able to join Wright [commander 6th Corps] in rear of the enemy, with at least 10,000 men, besides a force sufficient to hold Maryland Heights. I think, on reflection, it would have a bad effect for me to leave here, and with General Ord at Baltimore, and Hunter and Wright with the forces following the enemy up, could do no good. I have great faith that the enemy will never be able to get back with much of his force." 2

Yet Grant had acted with sufficient promptness to save the capital, as Early, by delay, had missed a great opportunity. The Confederate commander suspected, probably, that the veterans had already arrived, for he did not seize Fort Stevens, which guarded the entrance to Washington by the Seventh Street road, and which he might have had by simply saying the word. At noon of this day (July 11), two divis

1 July 10, 2.30 P. M., O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 155.

2 Ibid., p. 156; H. Porter, Century Magazine, May, 1897, p. 99. It may be urged that it was not safe for Grant to leave City Point on even a temporary errand, for the reason that Butler, being the senior officer in rank, would then be in supreme command of the operations against Petersburg. That was indeed an additional reason for the displacement of Butler, but the Army of the Potomac being engaged in siege operations was safe certainly under the command of Meade, assisted by his accomplished chief-of-staff Humphreys and the corps commanders Hancock and Warren.

John N. Frazee, Lieut.-Col. 150th Reg. Ohio N. G. (100-days men) Com'd'g Fort Stevens, reported, July 16: “The troops garrisoning the fort were composed of Company K, One Hundred and Fiftieth Regiment Ohio National Guard, 78 men, Capt. Safford; Thirteenth Michigan Battery, 79 men, Capt. Charles Dupont; 52 convalescents, commanded by Lieutenant Turner, of Company K, One Hundred and Fiftieth Regiment Ohio National Guard." O. R., vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 247. To support the statement in the text, see the rest of his report; also Hayward's, p. 245, and A. D.

ions of the Sixth Corps, from City Point, with General Wright in command, arrived at the wharf in Washington, and soon after four o'clock in the afternoon were in the neighborhood of Fort Stevens. The capital was saved. The next day a severe skirmish took place, which was watched from the fort by the President, who was apparently oblivious of the flying bullets of the sharpshooters, until the fall of a wounded officer near him caused General Wright to ask him peremptorily to retire to a safer spot. The night of July 12 the Confederates withdrew, burning, as they departed, the house of Postmaster-General Blair at Silver Spring. A pursuit was attempted which accomplished nothing. Dana,3 who had gone to Washington, saw accurately the situation, and with prophetic insight foretold the result. "Nothing can possibly be done here toward pursuing or cutting off the enemy, for want of a commander," he telegraphed Grant. "There is no head to the whole, and it seems indispensable that you should at once appoint one. Hunter will be the ranking officer if he ever gets up, but he will not do. Indeed, the Secretary of War directs me to tell you, in his judgment Hunter ought instantly to be relieved, having proven himself far more incompetent than even Sigel. He also directs me to say that advice or suggestions from you will not be sufficient. General Halleck will not give orders except as he receives them; the President will give none, and until you direct positively and explicitly what is to be done, everything will go on in the deplorable and fatal way in which it has gone on for the past week."4 There was a mass of contra

McCook's, p. 230. I have been helped in this account by the recollections of my brother, Robert R. Rhodes, then a corporal in Company B, 150th Ohio N. G., stationed at this time at Fort Bunker Hill.

1 Despatch of Wright, July 11, 4.10 P. M., O. R., vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 265; see also the reports which follow, p. 265. The advance of the Nineteenth Corps arrived the same day.

2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 173; Chittenden, p. 415.

3 Charles A.

✦ O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. p. 223. Grant's flippant words were a poor answer to this weighty communication: "If the enemy has left Maryland," he said, " as I suppose he has, he should have upon his heels veterans,

dictory orders, a playing at cross purposes, the outgeneralling of the Federal commanders by Early, and a demoralization of the Union forces. Despatches were a long while in transmission between Washington and Grant's headquarters, and everything operated badly, for the reason that there was no efficient head. As long as he had no competent coadjutor in the Shenandoah valley, the commander of the armies should have been in Washington, or for a time even with the troops in pursuit of the Confederates. Toward the end of July Early turned upon his pursuers, drove them across the Potomac, and sent McCausland, with his cavalry, on a raid into Pennsylvania. McCausland occupied Chambersburg (July 30), and "in retaliation of the depredations committed by Major-General Hunter. . . during his recent raid," demanded from the citizens of the town "$100,000 in gold, or, in lieu thereof, $500,000 in greenbacks or national currency."1 Compliance therewith being impossible, the Confederate general carried out his threat, and laid the best part of the town in ashes.2

militiamen, men on horseback, and everything that can be got to follow to eat out Virginia clear and clean as far as they go, so that crows flying over it for the balance of this season will have to carry their provender with them."-O. R., vol. xxxvii. part ii. pp. 300, 301. Grant's support of Hunter is incomprehensible unless it was due to his kindness of heart. See ibid., pp. 332, 365.

1 McCausland's order, ibid., part i. p. 334.

2 Couch's report, ibid., p. 331; see, also, p. 334, and part ii. pp. 515, 525, 542; Pond, The Shenandoah Valley, p. 102; McClure, Lincoln and Men of War Times, pp. 239, 387.

Lincoln telegraphed Grant, Aug. 14: "The Secretary of War and I concur that you had better confer with General Lee, and stipulate for a mutual discontinuance of house-burning and other destruction of private property."― Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 561. In this connection I add a citation from Grant's celebrated despatch to Sheridan of Aug. 26: "Give the enemy no rest. . . . Do all the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock of all descriptions, and negroes, so as to prevent further planting. If the war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah valley to remain a barren waste." — O. R., vol. xliii. part i. p. 917.

Pursuit of McCausland was ordered, and resulted in the crippling of his force. “This affair [the final skirmish of the pursuit]," writes Early, “had a very damaging effect upon my cavalry for the rest of the campaign.". Pond, The Shenandoah Valley, p. 107.