fully, and when in his speech to his constituents, December 18, he made a powerful plea for their sympathy for the free States, he made no allusion to it whatever. Nevertheless, there was a slight undercurrent of feeling and hope that the policy might turn out better than for the moment it promised. John Stuart Mill did not join in the general disapproval; he wrote Motley that no American could have exulted more than he over the anti-slavery Proclamation.2

Affairs across the English Channel now claim our attention. On account of a money dispute France, Spain, and Great Britain had sent, in 1861, an expedition to Mexico; but Great Britain and Spain withdrew their forces in April, 1862, and the movement became, on the part of France, an attempt to conquer Mexico, to restore the prestige of the Latin race on this side of the ocean, and to place on the throne a European monarch. The people of the United States looked upon her operations with suspicion, which, Seward diplomatically wrote, was allayed in the mind of the administration by her assurance that she did not propose to establish an anti-republican government in Mexico. Still later, after large reinforcements had been ordered to the invading army, he believed, or affected to believe, that the Emperor of the French, Louis Napoleon, concealed no "hidden design against the United States," while at the same time

tion to him, not only for affording me the use of this valuable manuscript material and for his very excellent biography of Sumner, but for the ideas and impressions I have received from him in familiar intercourse during a friendship of four years. Living through the period of history that I am endeavoring to picture, he had the faculty of throwing himself back to those times in which he had been an actor, and while revivifying them to me he maintained the position of an impartial observer, remarkable in a man who had espoused so zealously one side of the contest.

1 Letter of Oct. 10 to Sumner..

- Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS. 2 Letter of Oct. 31, Motley's Letters, vol. ii. p. 95.

3 For an interesting account of this movement, see Frederic Bancroft, Political Science Quart., March, 1896; also, H. H. Bancroft, Hist. of Mexico, vol. vi.; Lothrop's Seward, p. 387; Letters on England, Louis Blanc, vol. ii. p. 70 ct seq.

Seward to Dayton, June 21, 1862, Dip. Corr., 1862, p. 355.

5 Seward to Dayton, Nov. 10, ibid., p. 404, also p. 400.

Adams "suspected his object to be to grasp at a new dependency in that region, with its borders on the Mississippi River."1

Slidell, the Confederate commissioner to France, had an interview with the Emperor at Vichy, July 17, and intimated that as the Lincoln government sympathized with Mexico, the Confederate States would make common cause with him against the common enemy;2 at the same time he offered Louis Napoleon a hundred thousand bales of cotton, worth, in Europe, $12,500,000, if he would send his war-ships to break the blockade. The proposition, he reports, did not seem disagreeable to the Emperor. He also asked for the recognition of his government, and later saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and made a formal demand for it. During the summer the Emperor took no action, but continuing to observe closely events in America, he made up his mind in the autumn that it was time to interfere in the struggle. October 22 he accorded to Slidell an interview at St. Cloud, in which he intimated that he should endeavor to bring about the joint mediation of France, England, and Russia. "My own preference is for a proposition of an armistice of six months," he said; "this would put a stop to the effusion of blood, and hostilities would probably never be resumed. We can urge it on the high grounds of humanity and the interest of the whole civilized world; if it be refused by the North, it will afford good reason for recognition, and perhaps for more active intervention." In eight days from this time the Emperor, through his Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed a despatch

1 Adams's statement to Russell in interview of Nov. 15, Adams's Diary. 2 It is quite probable that in this assurance Slidell went beyond his instructions. See Benjamin to Slidell, Oct. 17, an intercepted despatch, Dip. Corr., 1863, part i. p. 64.

3 Confed. Dip. Corr., MS., cited by John Bigelow, France and the Confed. Navy, p. 128. For an account of Slidell's first interview, ibid., p. 116, also pp. 114, 177. I have verified the part of these despatches used in the text by having a comparison made with the originals in the archives.

to his ambassadors at St. Petersburg and London, proposing that the three governments "exert their influence at Washington, as well as with the Confederates, to obtain an armistice for six months." The reply of Russia, declining to be a party to such a mediation, was, in its terms, most friendly to the North. "In our opinion," it said, "what ought specially to be avoided [is] the appearance of any pressure whatsoever of a nature to wound public opinion in the United States, and to excite susceptibilities very easily aroused at the bare idea of foreign intervention." Earl Russell also declined to join in any such mediation, for the reason "that there is no ground at the present moment to hope that the federal government would accept the proposal suggested, and a refusal from Washington at the present time would prevent any speedy renewal of the offer."1 The decision of the government was entirely satisfactory to the British public.2

Two months later a combination of circumstances induced the Emperor to propose, for his government alone, a mediation between the two belligerents. The apparently crushing

1 Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1862, p. 738 et seq. The French proposal is printed in the Times, of Nov. 14, and Earl Russell's answer, Nov. 15. "His Lordship seemed a little elated by his paper, and was more cordial than usual."— Adams's Diary, Nov. 15.

2 See the Times, Daily News, and Spectator, Nov. 15, and the Sat. Rev., Nov. 22. John Bright wrote Sumner, Dec. 6: "I can assure you that the refusal of Lord Russell to unite with France in that matter has been cordially approved throughout the country, and even by those who, like Mr. Gladstone, believe your undertaking hopeless, and many of whom doubtless wish that you may ultimately fail in your efforts to restore the Union. Judging from the tone of our press and from all I can hear, I think England is not more, but is really less hostile than she was some time ago and the more you seem likely to succeed, the more will your friends and moderate men show themselves, and your enemies be driven into obscurity. To me it seems that mediation or intervention is less likely and less possible than ever, and that recognition will be a thing not even talked about by any sane man if you once obtain possession of your Atlantic and Gulf ports.” — PierceSumner Papers, MS.

For an example of the tortuous diplomacy of the Emperor, cf. the Emperor's conversation with Slidell already quoted, with the assurances given by Drouyn de l'Huys, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Dayton, Dip. Corr., 1862, p. 404.

disaster of Fredericksburg 1 satisfied him, as, indeed, it confirmed the public opinion of Europe, that the cause of the North was hopeless. At the same time the distress in the cotton-manufacturing districts of France, which had become acute, was brought home as the winter wore on. More than a hundred thousand operatives in one department alone were out of work, and in a condition of utter misery, subsisting, according to report, "by roaming at night from house to house, and demanding, rather than asking, alms."2 Seizing the fit opportunity, Slidell, on January 8, sent, through the private secretary of the Emperor, a memorandum to him, praying for the separate recognition by France of the Confederacy. If Louis Napoleon had not already determined to move alone, this communication furnished the final arguments guiding him to a decision. The next day he dictated a despatch, in which he offered, in courteous and diplomatic words, the friendly mediation of his government between the two sections without the suggestion of an armistice which had been contained in his former proposition. This message went through the usual diplomatic channels, and was presented, February 3, by the French Minister at Washington to Seward, who, three days later, by the President's instructions, declined the offer in a polite, gently argumentative, and considerate letter. The Emperor lacked the courage to proceed further in his policy of intervention without the co-operation of Great Britain, which was persistently withheld.5

1 "Another tremendous disaster has fallen on the Federal arms. So great has been the carnage, so complete and undeniable the defeat, that the North appears stunned by the blow."- Times, Dec. 29, 1862.

2 The Spectator, Jan. 3, 1863; the Times, Jan. 10; the Index, Jan. 8.

3 Slidell to Benjamin, Jan. 11, 21, 1863, Confed. Dip. Corr., MS., Treas. Dep't, Wash.

This correspondence is printed in Sen. Ex. Doc., No. 38, 37 Cong.,
Seward's reply is printed in his works, vol. v. p. 376; vide ante,

3 Sess. p. 222.

5 Sir Roundell Palmer, the Solicitor-General, wrote in a private letter, Jan. 8: "The bearing of the upper classes (Conservatives and Liberals alike) to the side of the South is so strong that, but for the apparently opposite bearing of the intelligent industrial population, there would be some danger of

In the record of our relations with England during the Civil War, we now come to a splendid page, which, unrolling, as it does, the response of anti-slavery opinion in England to the President's Proclamation of Emancipation, delights those who have faith in the common people. In contrast with the sneers from the governing classes, the friends of the North suspended their judgment to await a better understanding of the matter; and knowing that the September proclamation was preliminary, and believing that it was tentative, they were anxious to see whether it would be confirmed and perfected on the first of January. In November, 1862, however, an Emancipation Society had been established, to encourage the Federal government and people; but a meeting which they held in London to give expression to their sentiments was boisterous, for it was somewhat disturbed by Southern sympathizers. The December 1st message of the

the Government being driven, or drifting of its own accord, into the enormous mistake (as I think it would be) of a premature recognition of the South, flagrante bello. For such a step there could not, I believe, be found anything like a precedent in the whole range of modern history, except the recognition of the United States themselves by France, which was treated by us, very justly, as equivalent to a Declaration of War; and, if we were to do the same thing now, the United States would certainly view the act in the same light, and would resent it accordingly, whether at once, or afterwards, would (of course) depend upon circumstances." - Memorials, Earl of Selborne, vol. ii. p. 438. March 3 Congress, by a large majority, adopted a concurrent resolution which declared that any proposition from a foreign power for mediation or for any other form of interference would be regarded as an unfriendly act. Pierce's Sumner, vol. iv. p. 122; Sumner's Works, vol. vii. p. 308.

1 The Daily News, Nov. 14, 15, 1862. John Bright wrote Sumner, Dec. 6: "The anti-slavery sentiment here has been more called forth of late, especially since the Proclamation was issued, and I am confident that every day the supporters of the South among us find themselves in greater difficulty, owing to the course taken by your government in reference to the negro question. .. The Proclamation, like everything else you have done, has been misrepresented, but it has had a large effect here, and men are looking with great interest to the first of January, and hoping that the President may be firm." Pierce-Sumner Papers, MS.

Adams wrote Seward, Nov. 15, 1862: "Efforts are now making here, with a good prospect of success, for a more effective organization of the anti