among the Southern soldiers, but his constant personal superintendence combined with his pleasing authoritative manner to push things forward, so that he soon had his defensive works well under way.2 In one respect at least the substitution of Lee for Johnston was a gain for the Southern cause. Johnston and Davis could not work together, and while the fault lay more with the Confederate President, the general was not wholly blameless. Johnston's letters at this time are marked by an acerbity which is not absent even when he is writing to Lee, for whom he had undoubtedly a profound respect. But no one could quarrel with Lee, who in his magnanimity and his deference to his fellow-workers resembles Lincoln. Between the courtly Virginia gentleman, proud of his lineage, and the Illinois backwoodsman who came out of the depths, the likeness, in this respect, is as true as it is striking.

The harmony between Davis and Lee was complete. Something had already been done in the way of bringing reinforcements from the South, and under the new command this movement went on with vigor. In reading the orders, the despatches, the history of the army at this time, one seems to feel that a new energy has been infused into the management of affairs. Lee had a talent for organization equal to that of McClellan. In a few days he had matters well in hand and had gained the respect of the officers of his army. Unremitting in industry, he rode over his lines nearly every day. June 6 he noted the enemy working like: beavers," and wrote Longstreet: "Our people seem to think he will advance to-morrow-morning. If so,-I-directed that he should be resisted." Longstreet,, who commanded the Confederate right, had expected an attack at any moment since the battle of Fair Oaks.5. In six days subsequent to that battle the

1 Letter of Davis to his wife, June 11, Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 310. 2 Long, p. 165 et seq.

$ See vol. iii. p. 459.

4 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 577.

5 Letter of June 7 to Johnston, ibid., p. 580.

Confederate defences were so far advanced that Lee had good ground for his hope that he could repel an assault.1

an arm

Although McClellan was in sight of the spires of Richmond, he had no intention of attempting to break through by storm the Confederate line of intrenchments. The weather was unfavorable. The heavy rains continued, and the Chickahominy became a flood interfering with the desired crossing of troops from the north to the south side of the river. The roads were so bad that the movement of artillery in which the Federals excelled was extremely difficult if not impossible. The freshet in the James River was the greatest that had been known since 1847. In one street of Richmond the water came nearly up to the hubs of wagon-wheels, and owing to the condition of the roads the task of supplying the Confederate army was laborious and irksome. When Burnside visited, June 10, McClellan's headquarters, it took him four and a half hours to cover nine miles. He reported to Stanton that it was impossible to move artillery, and "but for the railroad the army could not be subsisted and foraged." 2

McClellan was begging for reinforcements, and the War Department did its best to comply with his demands. McCall's division of McDowell's corps was ordered to join him, and regiments were sent him from Baltimore, Washington, and Fort Monroe. These troops went forward by water as McClellan desired. It had been intended to send him the residue of McDowell's army, and this general wrote: "I go with the greatest satisfaction, and hope to arrive with my main body in time to be of service."3 The President strained every nerve to help McClellan, but was unable to do all that he wished. June 15 he wrote: I now fear that McDowell cannot get to you either by water or by land in time. "Shields's division has got so terribly out of shape, out at

1 Long, p. 167.

J

2 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 224; see also p. 223 and part i. pp. 45, 46; Richmond Dispatch, June 5, 6, 7, 11; Richmond Whig, June 7; letter of Davis to his wife, Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 310.

3 June 8 or 10, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 220.

elbows and out at toes, that it will require a long time to get it in again."1 At the time the order was given McCall to join the Army of the Potomac, Stanton telegraphed McClellan: Please state whether you will feel sufficiently strong for your final movement when McCall reaches you." The reply came promptly: "I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery."2 June 12 and 13 McCall's division joined him: this with the troops from Baltimore, Washington, and Fort Monroe gave him a total reinforcement, since the battle of Fair Oaks, of 21,000.3 The weather had now become fine. The roads were dry. It actually looked as if McClellan were going to give battle. June 13 his adjutant telegraphed Burnside: "General McClellan desires me to say that there is a prospect of an engagement here shortly;" and five days later he himself telegraphed the President: "After to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit.” 5 preposterous overestimate of the enemy's force and a shrinking from an order that would result in the profuse shedding of blood led him again to hesitate: he did not give the word that would have brought on a desperate battle. Perhaps at

1 Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 181.

2 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 46; part iii. p. 219.

3 Ibid., part i. p. 47; part iii. p. 230.

But a

4 Ibid., part i. p. 47; part iii. pp. 223, 225, 226; Richmond Dispatch, June 13, 14; McClellan's letters to his wife, June 11, 14, 15, Own Story, pp. 403, 404.

5 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. pp. 227, 223. I append most of McClellan's despatch of June 18. "Our army is well over the Chickahominy, except the very considerable forces necessary to protect our flanks and communications. Our whole line of pickets in front runs within six miles of Richmond. The rebel line runs within musket-range of ours. Each has heavy support at hand. A general engagement may take place any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less decisive. The enemy exhibit at every point a readiness to meet us. They certainly have great numbers and extensive works. . . . After to-morrow, we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky and the completion of some necessary preliminaries." See also letter to his wife, June 15, Own Story, p. 405.

this time his irresolution and timidity stood his army in good stead. McClellan had 105,000 to Lee's 64,000,1 and when we take into account that a portion of his force was necessary to guard his communications on the north side of the Chickahominy, he had not preponderance enough to justify a direct attack on an army strongly intrenched. It is evident from Lee's and Davis's letters that nothing would have gratified them more.2 Whatever discouragement had prevailed immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks had vanished. "We are better prepared now than we were on the first of the month," wrote Jefferson Davis, June 23, "and with God's blessing will beat the enemy as soon as we can get at him." 3

As McClellan gave expression in writing to his many vacillating moods, it is difficult to know exactly what was his real plan, but we may accept the one which he outlined to his wife. "I shall probably," he gave her to understand, "make my first advance June 17 or 18. The next battle will be fought at Old Tavern,' on the road from New Bridge to Richmond. I think the rebels will make a desperate fight, but I feel sure that we will gain our point. I shall make the first battle mainly an artillery combat. As soon as I gain possession of the Old Tavern' I will push them in upon Richmond and behind their works; then I will bring up my heavy guns, shell the city, and carry it by assault." It was substantially this same plan that Lee, who seemed to know McClellan as well as did McClellan himself, divined and undertook to thwart. "Unless McClellan can be driven out of his intrenchments," he wrote Jackson, "he will move by positions ["gradual approaches" is the expression Lee employs in a previous letter] under cover of his heavy guns within shelling distance of Richmond." 5 It was apparently the

1 June 20, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 238; Allan, Army of Northern Vir ginia, p. 69.

2 Correspondence, O. R., vol. xi. part iii.; Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. 3 To his wife, Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 314.

4 Letter of June 15, Own Story, p. 405.

5 June 16, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 602.

conventional design of an engineer officer, and was foreseen independently by Davis, Longstreet, and D. H. Hill.1 Knowing the Federal superiority in artillery, it is little wonder that they regarded the movements of the Union army with apprehension. Perhaps they did not guess what Lee seemingly took for granted, that McClellan's procrastination would bring to naught his strategy. Nothing indeed could have been more dangerous to the Union forces. Encamped in the swamps of the Chickahominy, unaccustomed to an atmosphere so damp and malarious, drinking the water of the marshes, his soldiers suffered from diarrhoea and fevers, many of them also from scurvy, with the natural result that the morale of his army had lowered distinctly from the 1st to the 20th of June.2 But more than this, his delay was even fatal in that it afforded Lee time to mature and execute a project which needed a greater genius than McClellan to frustrate. Davis visited the lines of the army frequently, and from his own observations and friendly intercourse with the commanding general, comprehended the situation and saw clearly the problem to be solved. "The enemy," he wrote June 13, "keeps close under cover, is probably waiting for reinforcements, or resolved to fight only behind his own intrenchment. We must find if possible the means to get at him without putting the breasts of our men in antagonism to his heaps of earth."3 As a measure towards this end, Lee decided to reinforce with two brigades Jackson, who was still in the Shenandoah valley, directing

1 D. H. Hill, the general of a division, wrote, June 10: "The enemy has now ditched himself up to the very gates of Richmond. In a week or two weeks at furthest he will open his siege batteries and the capital must fall.”— O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 587. Davis wrote his wife, June 11: "The enemy's policy is to advance by regular approaches covered by successive lines of earthworks, that reviled policy of West Pointism and Spades which is sure to succeed against those who do not use like means to counteract it."- Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 310. Longstreet wrote D. H. Hill, June 16: "I don't think we have as much to apprehend in the way of an attack as the long guns." O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 603.

2 C. W., part i. pp. 285, 286, 293; O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 228; Palfrey, Papers of the Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass., vol. i. p. 203.

3 To his wife, Mrs. Davis's Memoir, vol. ii. p. 312.